

Mısır ve Türkiye'deki Üç İslami Siyasi Hareketin Siyasî Stratejilerinin Karşılaştırmalı Bir Analizi

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Öz

İslamcılıktan ilham alan üç siyasî hareket, Mısır'daki Müslüman Kardeşler (MK), Türkiye'deki Milli Görüş (MG), ve Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Ak Parti) siyasî arenada ortaya çıkışlarından itibaren farklı siyasî stratejiler uygulamışlardır. İki hareketin, MK ve MG'nin, stratejileri kendilerini nihayet iktidara taşımış, ancak çarpıcı bir şekilde, her ikisi de iktidarda sadece bir yıl civarında, sırasıyla 2012-2013 ve 1996-1997 yılları arasında, tutunabilmişler ve sonra askerî darbeler tarafından devrilmişlerdir. 1997'deki darbenin ardından MG üyeleri tarafından 2001'de kurulan Ak Parti, önceki iki partiden oldukça farklı stratejiler izleyerek, Ocak 2017 itibarıyla, Kasım 2002'den beri halen iktidardadır. Bu makale siyasî stratejiler üzerine mukayeseli bir çalışmadır ve kökleri İslamcılıkta bulunan üç farklı siyasî partinin siyasî başarılarının nasıl bu derece birbirinden farklılaşabildiği sorusuna cevap aramaktadır. Makalede öncelikle bu duruma ilişkin iki araştırma sorusu oluşturulmuş ve ardından bu sorulara yanıt verilmiştir. Makale, nihai olarak, İslamcılıktan doğan veya ondan ilham alan siyasî hareketlerin, kullandıkları siyasî stratejilere göre siyasî başarı oranlarının değişeceğini iddia etmekte ve İslamcılığı ilgilendirdiği kadarıyla siyasî başarı getiren siyasî stratejileri tespit etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: siyasî strateji; İslamcılık; Türkiye; Mısır

A Comparative Analysis Of Political Strategies Of Three Islamic Political Movements In Egypt And Turkey

Abstract

Three political movements inspired by Islamism, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt, the National Outlook [Milli Görüş, NO], and the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in Turkey have employed miscellaneous political strategies since their emergence on the political arena. The strategies of two movements, the MB and the NO, eventually carried them to power, yet strikingly, they both could remain in power for approximately one year, between 2012 and 2013, and between 1996 and 1997 respectively. Then, they were ousted by military coups. Being founded in 2001 by the former NO members after the 1997 military coup, the JDP has been in power since 2002 to date, 2017, by employing different strategies than the former two movements. This

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article aims at investigating why three political parties have differed so much in terms of their political success although their roots are almost in the same ideology, namely Islamism. Two research questions are formed and answered in the article that ultimately argues that political parties inspired by Islamism may differ in their levels of political success if they employ different political strategies. The article also determines the strategies that bring about political success to the extent that they relate to Islamism.

Key Words: *political strategy; Islamism; Turkey; Egypt*

A. Introduction

Political ideologies have their own peculiar understandings of political power. As political strategy is closely interlinked with one's perception of political power, ideologies develop their own types of strategies although they still overlap to some extent. From this perspective, Islamic and Islamist movements have historically developed their own political strategies. However, their strategies differed in a significant way—their varied understandings of Islam shaped their political strategies.

In this article, political strategies of two 'Islamist' movements; namely National Outlook (NO, *Milli Görüş*) of Turkey and Muslim Brotherhood (MB) of Egypt, and plus one political party partially inspired by Islamism, Justice and Development Party (JDP) will be examined comparatively. The reason for choosing these three specific cases is that two of them are the mainstream Islamist political movements of their respective countries; NO in Turkey and MB in Egypt. Their popularity and political power have increased gradually in the 20th century except some vicissitudes.

These two examples pose some similarities and differences to compare, but what is more interesting is the birth of the JDP and its rise to power in November 2002. After parting from the tradition of the NO in 2001, a number of relatively young politicians founded the JDP with the objective of renewing their policies in a way that they would not clash with the secular establishment in Turkey. Their pragmatism, among others, proved savvy, thereby securing their place in power since 2002.

B. Research Questions

The trajectories of two different political movements in two different countries suggest that they had succeeded in rising to power many years following their foundation (1928 for MB, 1970 for NO

respectively). Now the first purpose of this article is to determine the contours of the strategies of these two political movements, MB and NO, starting from their establishment. Therefore,

Question 1: What political strategies did two Islamist movements (MB in Egypt and NO in Turkey) and one political party partly inspired by Islamism (JDP) employ on their way to power?

Having put that, one more issue begs the question. It is bizarre that both political movements (MB and NO) could remain only about one year in power after moving into office. Then they both were toppled by the military. The JDP proved resilient and won approximately 34%, 46% and 49% in the parliamentary elections of 2002, 2007 and 2011 respectively, thereby being able to form the government three times on its own until the end of 2011 (www.secimsonucu.com). Here a phenomenon is conspicuous: The JDP could remain in power much more than the other two movements. (In this article, the JDP is also regarded as a political movement since it is an offspring of the NO movement.) Now emerges the second question of this article:

Question 2: What political strategies did the JDP employ to remain in power between 2002 and 2012 when it ascended to power whereas other two movements (the NO and the MB) could remain in power for nearly one year?

In this study, I firstly examine the political strategies of the MB in Egypt since its foundation in 1928 up to the July 3rd military coup in 2013 when Mohamed Morsi, a former member of the MB, who had been the president for nearly one year, was ousted by the Egyptian military. Then I examine the strategies of the NO movement in Turkey since the foundation of its first political party, the National Order Party, in 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan till the so-called 1997 *post-modern coup* when Erbakan, who had been prime minister for approximately one year, was forced to resign by the intimidation of the Turkish military. After comparing the strategies of these two political movements, I will continue with the case of the JDP whose striking political strategy has been keeping it in power for more than one decade whereas other two political movements could remain in power for around one year although all three movements are inspired by Islamism.

It should also be noted here that the JDP has been still in power to date, January 2017, although its trajectory after the end of 2011 (i.e., the beginning of 2012) is not included in this research. The reason for this exclusion is the fact that the trajectory of Turkish

politics since 2002, and hence JDP's political strategies, have changed dramatically since 2011 due to a social upheaval (Gezi protests in mid-2013), a politically-motivated corruption probe (on December 17 & 25, 2013), and a bloody coup attempt (July 15, 2017), the later two of which have since their inception generally regarded among the Turkish society to be masterminded by the Gulenists within the Turkish bureaucracy, especially the army, the judiciary, and the police, and for which there is strong and varied evidence that they are so (Filkins, 17.10.2016).

The JDP's strategy will be compared by other two movements' strategies *en masse*, and a lesson is drawn from this comparison related to the nature of political power in the conclusion. Subsequently, some policy advices are provided, and lastly some tips are given for further research.

C. Some Preliminary Remarks On Islamism And Islamists

Before starting to analyze the MB's political strategy, firstly, it is vital for understanding the political strategies traditionally employed by the Islamists to note that those who trust in God in a transcending way have tendency to develop less political strategy by expecting political blessings from God. That tendency is also interlinked with the fact that there is a romantic sentiment in Islamism, which emphasizes 'exerting effort' without considering much if it will work or not, in an anticipation of either martyrdom or victory from God. In other words, Islamists, especially long-suffered hardline Islamists, care much about exerting more effort in God's path (*fi sebilillah*) and care little about what will happen in the end. This fact helps explain the self-confidence of Islamism vis-à-vis the concrete global political power centers, and suggests a difference in their stances towards political power.

Secondly, there is a widespread consensus in the academic literature and on the international media that the MB and the NO are Islamist movements, but it needs to be clarified whether the JDP can be regarded as Islamist, on which there is no consensus either in the academic literature or on the international media.

Brumberg distinguishes between three kinds of Islamism. The first is radical or militant fundamentalism which rejects gradualism in its entirety and subscribes to the ideal of establishing an "Islamic state" which will forcefully impose a certain interpretation of Islamic law. The second is reformist or moderate fundamentalism which aims at founding an Islamic state but rejects

the use of force and violence, builds on popular support, adopts the policy of gradualism, and takes moderate stances. This type of Islamism seeks to transform society with the goal of replacing the existing secular constitutional norms with a religious order. The third is Islamic liberalism or strategic modernism which intends not to establish a religious state but to broaden the frame of religious freedoms and co-exist with the other political groups within a pluralistic order. In light of this distinction, Brumberg argues that the JDP belongs to the third category (Hale and Özbudun, 2010: 9).

Similarly, Çınar and Duran suggest (2008: 33) that the JDP, with its Islamic sensitivities, “may be regarded a soft version of ‘Islamism without Islamists’.” By the same token, Yıldız writes (2008: 41) that the JDP “[is] considered conservative or moderately Islamist,” adding (2008: 46) that it “is an incarnation of the new Islamism, more or less in line with ‘the moderate Islam’ promoted by the United States after 9/11.” Likewise, Dağı uses the term “New Islamism” for the conservative democracy of the JDP (Yıldız, 2008: 47). Other scholars who regard the JDP as an Islamist party are, among many others, Bassam Tibi who uses the term “Islamist conservatism” for it (Hasche, 2015: 280), Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007: 10) who calls it a “pro-Islamist party,” Taşpınar (25.04.2012) who describes it with terms “moderate Islamist” or “pro-Islamist,” Yörük (2014: 240) who defines it by “neo-liberal Islamist,” and Hasche (2015: 274) who argues that the JDP is an Islamist-conservative party.

There are also scholars who disagree with the definition of the JDP by the term “Islamist,” such as Çayır (2008: 62) who regards its cadre as “Muslim democrats,” Cizre (2008: 1-3) who defines it by the terms “pragmatic-conservative and Islam-sensitive party” and “Islam-sympathetic,” Atasoy who argues that it is “pro-Islamic,” and Yavuz who asserts (2003: 240) it under the rubric of “pro-Islamic,” arguing (2003: 261) that its ascent to power in 2002 represents the “nationalization (Turkification) and Westernization of Islamism in Turkey.” Similarly, Hale and Özbudun argues (2010: 20-22) that the JDP broke off with the previous Islamist tradition and thus can be defined by the term “conservative democrat,” adding, however, that conservatism has no blueprint like socialism or liberalism, which makes it (i.e., conservatism) difficult to delineate.

The confusion about the definition of the JDP stems from the fact that these political terms given above are used comparatively in vastly different circumstances. Then arises the problem of

“conceptual stretching,” which leads to “concept misinformation,” to borrow two terms from Giovanni Sartori (1970). Differently, a political concept sometimes gains negative connotations over time to the extent that people coin a euphemism for it. For instance, Kedourie, Vatikiotis, and Pipes uses Islamism almost as the opposite of a pluralism (Hale and Özbudun, 2010: xii-xiii). In this respect, Islamism has been subjected to a high dose of conceptual stretching in the last several decades, and it has gained distinct negative connotations in the English language. This paper regards the JDP as a political party partly inspired by Islamism and uses the term “Islamism” with neither any negative nor any positive connotation.

D. Political Strategies Of The Muslim Brotherhood (Mb) In Egypt

Founded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928, the MB’s aim was to transform the Egyptians to build a new society and a new state based on Islam (Black, 2010: 440-443). Al-Banna told that the MB was a Sunni path, a Sufi movement, a political organization, a sport union, a scientific and cultural society, an economic company and a social system of ideas (el-Verdani, 2011: 52-53). He outlined a threefold strategy for the Society of MB to achieve this long-term goal (Bradley, 2008: 229). This strategy included: (1) propaganda (inviting people into the Society for recruiting); (2) organization (educating its members in an organized way); (3) action (the phase in which political power would be claimed). This strategy aims at a gradual rise to power and has been applied by the subsequent leaders of the Society as well as al-Banna.

a. Between 1928 and 1949

In the first years of the organization, the MB did not seem to have a political agenda as it was established as a charity organization. Although it kept away from politics during its first years between 1928 and the early 1930s, this could easily be regarded as a tactic since any kind of visible political organization would make the King Fuad frown. Having realized that, al-Banna emphasized the need to increase the number of the members through *dawah* (propaganda, invitation), by which the organization would recruit thousands of members, especially from amongst the poor and youth. Al-Banna took good advantage of the socio-economic and political atmosphere of Egypt in 1930s when the impact of the British occupation was severely felt amongst the public. Egyptians were strictly divided economically as the poor and the elite. The fact that the MB was founded as a charity organization is a tactical choice *per se* for that

very reason. Al-Banna founded neither a religious society that many would think it would have received more appeal from the Egyptian people, nor a political party which would not be viable under the circumstances in the late 1920s. The more the MB provided economic assistance to the poor Egyptians, the more it became rooted in society. Accordingly, as Lia points out (1998: 39), the first members of the MB were from among carpenters, workers, shoemakers and so on who were recruited from coffee houses, Qur’anic schools and mosques? As the number of members increased dramatically, and more *zakat* (Islamic alms tax) was collected, charity institutions like small hospitals and pharmacies were opened for common people. Meanwhile, al-Banna acted prudently by distancing himself from explicit political rhetoric so as not to arouse suspicion in political circles (Wickham, 2013: 20-23).

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distancing himself from explicit political rhetoric so as not to arouse suspicion in political circles.

However, after the organization started to gain ground with an increasing momentum among the Egyptians, and the number of its members skyrocketed during the 1930s, al-Banna's rhetoric began being politicized. In that decade, al-Banna gradually grew more critical of Egypt's wealthy class as well as putting more emphasis on the media and on the training of the MB youth. He also began criticizing colonialism louder as well as a number of "social problems" like prostitution and alcohol consumption. His tone continued to raise the number of MB members, and the Society took the shape of a social movement—a sign indicating that it was a modern phenomenon utilizing modern instruments to enhance its power (Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 40). Dealing with abovementioned social problems instead of common religious concerns, al-Banna made a strategic choice between becoming a traditional religious scholar (*a'lim*) who had loyal yet politically passive followers (*murids*) and becoming the charismatic spiritual leader of a modern social movement which used modern instruments.

Al-Banna, for the first time, openly engaged in politics between 1936 and 1939 when an Arab revolt in Palestine against Jews broke out (Mitchell, 1969: 15-16). Boycotting the Jews, raising money for the Palestinians, and propagating against the Zionists were the landmarks of the Islamism of this period. It is strongly possible that al-Banna thought in 1936 that the Society gained enough social appeal to engage in politics. This stance of the Society against Jews earned it more popularity among the lay Egyptians.

As the Society grew bigger in numbers, some of its members started to militarize in the late 1930s. Although al-Banna rejected the militarization of the Society until then, with the effect of the onset of the Second World War in 1939, it seems that he could not stand the vehement demands of the younger members to engage in military action against the ruling elites. Some MB members were already in the streets clashing with the Egyptian police without being under al-Banna's control. Intending to end the clashes, al-Banna took a radical decision and accepted the demands of the young members to form battalions to hold the Society together, but he principally rejected violent activities against civilians. As Kenney argues (2012: 444), the Brotherhood rejected violence as a political instrument at the times

of al-Banna. This decision proved successful in favor of al-Banna’s leadership, but it was also at the expense of being imprisoned for al-Banna for a few weeks and of a ban on the Society’s activities during the World War II. The Society also advocated for the nationalization of the Suez Canal, a blatantly obtrusive step in the eyes of the British. Nonetheless, al-Banna was still careful in his acts to curb a possible suppression of the Society *en masse*.

The Egyptian economy witnessed an economic stagnation in 1940s. Harsh shortages triggered public demonstrations culminating in the resignation of the government. The British-supported new government of the Wafd Party moved into office. After it was announced that a general election would be held in 1942, al-Banna declared his candidacy for the parliament. However, upon the prime minister’s pressure, he withdrew it with the concession that the Society would be free in its activities, and some Islamic laws would be enacted. Afterwards, the Society made itself recognized as a “political, social and religious institution” under the law but it grew more critical of the government—a stance that would result in its being suppressed and harassed by the police throughout 1940s. The Society also sent volunteers to the Arab-Israeli War in 1948 and began being deemed an autonomous entity in Egypt, which finally led to its dissolution by the government in late 1948. Meanwhile, al-Banna lost control of the Society due to being under constant custodies and to the “Secret Apparatus (*al-Jihaz es-Sirri*)” which was founded earlier as the military branch of the Society and which engaged in violent activities, including the alleged attempt of assassination against then’s Egyptian prime minister (Ranko, 2015: 56-61). The police fiercely cracked down on the MB members on the charges of embarking upon a violent revolution against the regime, and on 12 February 1949, al-Banna was assassinated by unknown gunmen (Carre and Michaud, 1983: 33).

Compared with the radical Islamist movements, al-Banna’s political strategy may be called as *partly* prudent. After his death, this partly prudent strategy was carried on by the subsequent Brotherhood leaders. The Society was sometimes dragged into somewhat different political paths depending on the political atmosphere of the time and on the struggles for the leadership, but the mainstream Brotherhood would keep the relatively moderate, violence-rejecting strategy of its founder, al-Banna.

b. Between 1949 and 1973

After a struggle for leadership of the Society, Hassan al-Hudaybi, an intransigent opponent of violence, was elected as the second supreme leader of the Brotherhood in 1951. He firstly tried to reach a compromise with the government to remove the ban on the Society but failed. Meanwhile, anti-government demonstrations broke out again across the country, and the Brotherhood cooperated in these demonstrations with another anti-government group, the Wafd Party, against then's Egyptian government. Although they normally differed in many of their views, they united in this same action, which shows the pragmatism of the Society, but this pragmatism was only limited to the extent that the Brotherhood did not make the same cooperation with the more anti-government-oriented communists as they regarded communism as blasphemous (Kramer, 2013: eBook Ch. 3).

Before the "Free Officers Revolution" in 1952, the charismatic leader of the junta, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and other military officers had taken part in the activities of the Brotherhood, and hence were supported by the Society during the 1952 Coup (Alexander, 2011: 537), which shows the Society, at that time, was willing to use undemocratic means to earn power. The supreme leader of the Society, al-Hudaybi, justified the coup. Although this attitude of al-Hudaybi seemed to favor the Brotherhood in the first phase of the 1952 Revolution, it later came out that the junta was against the Society. At first, the activities of the Society are undermined in various ways, and then, subsequent to the controversial suicide attack against Nasser, the Society was outlawed *in toto*. The ideology Nasser developed, called as "Arab socialism" or "Nasserism," was also at odds with the Islamism of the Society. Besides, the spell of Nasserism challenged the social charisma of the Brotherhood. After dissolving the organization on the charges of attempting suicide, Nasser filled the prisons of Egypt with Brotherhood members (Zollner, 2007: 413). The tortures made to the members of the Society and their disillusionment caused unrest in the Brotherhood, which would culminate in the birth of Sayyid Qutb's radical Islamist ideology (Zahid, 2010: 78-81).

Being influenced by Abu'l Ala Maududi, Sayyid Qutb wrote an influential book in 1964, *The Milestones*, in which he suggested (2011) that a vanguard group should be formed to lead an Islamic revolution that would crash the ignorant (*jahili*) regime and restore God's sovereignty. This was an important challenge to the moderate

path of Banna-Hudaybi and motivated some members to take on arms for an Islamic revolution.

At those heated times, despite seeming to be a weak leader, al-Hudaybi emerged as a tactful authority after writing an effective tract like a road map, *Preachers not Judges (Du’at la Qudat)*. Zollner (2007: 423-424) argues that it was written by another person who was also a Brotherhood member upon the order of al-Hudaybi. Being a decisive rejection of Qutb’s jihadist ideology, it not only restored al-Hudaybi’s leadership but also moderated some of those who were marginalized by Qutb and obviated more marginalization. In addition, Zollner argues (2007: 427) the regime, and al-Azhar, which is the most prestigious educational institution in Egypt, supported al-Hudaybi and other moderate voices in the Society against Qutbic fractions. This cooperation of al-Hudaybi with the regime against the Qutbists is, again, an indicator of the extent of his pragmatism that played a considerable role in the Society’s outstripping the Qutbic extremism. Qutb was executed in 1966 by Nasser. Afterwards, the extremist voices lingered for a while among the members of the Brotherhood, and then mostly faded away or, in few cases, led some members into leaving the Brotherhood to form separate organizations like that of the “Qutbists.” In 1973, Omar al-Telmesani, another moderate, succeeded al-Hudaybi carrying the Society in safe harbor after the storm. Nasser was succeeded after his death by Anwar al-Sadat in 1980 heralding a period of limited liberalization in political arena (Halverson, 2010: 83-88).

c. Between 1973 and 2011

Islamism began rethriving in Egypt after the ebbing of Nasserism. Ayubi explains (1980: 485-486) this with the fact that Islam was seen as the last resort after the fading of the amalgam of socialism and Arab nationalism after 1960s. The turning point in Nasser’s charisma was his defeat in the Arab-Israeli War in 1967. The Brotherhood took good advantage of this defeat and propagated in favor of the Society, seeking to restore its popularity.

After 1970, under Sadat’s rule, the Society felt, to some extent, relieved and, contrary to al-Banna’s negative attitude towards the concept of political party, it took a strategic step and asked the government for permission to be a political party. Pahwa points (2013: 190) to this fact by writing that the Brotherhood leadership underwent a political reconciliation with the Egyptian state with the objective of founding an Islamic polity whereby it aimed to apply “God’s rule.”

Al-Telmesani stated that “if the righteous didn’t participate in politics, the political sphere would be dominated by unbelievers and the morally corrupt” (quoted by Pahwa, 2013: 192). This decision of the Brotherhood, which it has hitherto applied, was significant in terms of the fact that the Society was getting more incorporated into the Egyptian political system after Qutb, who feverishly rejected it by arguing that it was totally corrupt and that who entered into that system would become corrupt too. However, the Brotherhood’s attempt to found a political party was rejected on the grounds that its being a political party was against the law. Nonetheless, the Brotherhood carried on its activities to gain more appeal among the society although it was officially outlawed. It continued rejecting terrorism and violence during and after 1970s and condemned jihadist militants who murdered al-Sadat in 1981 (Halverson, 2010: 86-93).

After al-Sadat, under Mubarak’s rule, the Brotherhood’s interest in politics went on. The concepts of pluralism and multi-party politics were endorsed by the Society inasmuch as they all worked in favor of Islamism. Pahwa argues that Brotherhood’s understanding of political authority became gradually more ambiguous during 1980s and afterwards. Besides, the Brotherhood’s political discourse at the time transformed visibly into a more applicable agenda such as forming a government based on Shari’a-inspired constitutionalism, realizing separation of powers, implementing free-market economy, indicating that they began capturing the postmodern *zeitgeist* (Pahwa, 2013: 200). Similarly, Kenney argues (2012: 447) that a new more pragmatist generation emerged who grew more critical of the elderly’s old Islamist idealism. This pragmatic transformation of the Society and its endorsement of modern political tools in favour of the applicability of its ideology helped it increase its socio-political influence in Egypt. Had it not ever taken this strategic step, being caught unprepared, it might have been divided into fractions when Mubarak resigned, and elections were declared to be held in 2011.

In the pseudo-elections of 1984 and 1987, the Brotherhood made alliances with different political parties, with Wafd and Labour parties respectively, to get its members elected into parliament. These elections helped the Society become co-opted into the Egyptian political system more and gain political experience. However, in the early 1990s, the Mubarak regime started a campaign

of repression against the Society, imprisoning many of its members and harassing its activities (Pahwa, 2013: 200). This tactic of the regime could be seen as a counter-strike against the soaring popularity of the Society. Along with all this turmoil, the more time passed, the more the younger generation grew critical of the elderly in the Society.

In the early 2000s, the Brotherhood grew more liberal as an organization with the effect of the younger generation’s increasing administrative influence. It started to stress democracy and pluralism as well as accepting that Copts, Egyptian Christians, may join into the Brotherhood. This change into a relatively liberal rhetoric proved rewarding to improve its image both nationally and internationally. Although being oppressed by the regime after the 2005 pseudo-election, the Society remained moderate and away from violence (Caromba and Solomon: 2008: 120-122). It made cooperation with *Kefaya* movement, which founded in the early 2000s, to call for more democracy and free elections (ikhwanweb.com/tagBView.php?id=Kefaya).

d. The Fall of Mubarak in 2011 and Morsi’s Rise to Power

Upon the fall of Mubarak following the mass demonstrations in January 2011 during what later came to be termed the “Arab Spring,” the Brotherhood founded a political party titled Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). Saad el-Katatny, a senior member of the Society, told that the party’s reference would be Islam that is the religion of the state and the source of legislation (Tavana, 2011: 560). This could be seen as a strategic mistake that raised eyebrows in the Western political circles, feeding their deep-seated suspicions about Islamist parties, in particular when it comes to a pivotal country like Egypt. While many other political parties and groups emphasized protecting minority rights and avoided direct reference to Islam, the FJP’s rhetoric was outspoken as it was before the 2011 Revolution although many anti-Islamist policy advices were being written in the Western countries during those tumultuous days (Ehrenfeld, 2011). However, the Brotherhood, by endorsing and fostering democracy, still somewhat benefited from the existing political atmosphere. The FJP underlined free-market capitalism and indicated to tourism as Egypt’s major source of income (Tavana, 2011: 565). Particularly, the fact that it was very interested in economic problems contributed to its popularity among the poor, which constituted more than half of the Egyptian society.

Shortly put, there are basically three factors that carried the MB to power: (1) its widespread social base and rootedness in the Egyptian society; (2) its adoption of democracy as a legitimate political system and founding a political party; (3) the FJP's emphasis on economic development and social justice.

This outspokenly Islamist rhetoric of the FJP would probably somewhat help it increase its constituency in the general election inside but would alienate it from the Western governments and cost it to be seen by them as a potential threat. Mohamed Morsi was elected as the president of Egypt in the May-June 2012 Presidential Election. Despite this success, it may be argued that the FJP seems to have simply overlooked the international balance of power while shaping its political rhetoric after the fall of Mubarak. The strategic mistakes that contributed to Morsi's fall from presidency would be handled while answering the second question of this paper, in comparison with Turkey's Justice and Development Party's relatively long term in power. Upon analyzing the rise of the MB to power, now it is time to turn to the trajectory of the National Outlook in Turkey.

E. The Political Strategies Of The "National Outlook" (*Milli Görüş*, No)

The first Turkish Islamist party, the National Order Party (NOP), which started the tradition of the National Outlook (*Milli Görüş*), was founded by Necmettin Erbakan who became prime minister in 1996, that is, after 26 years following its foundation. This is relatively a quite shorter period compared to the Brotherhood's ascension to power in 83 years (1928: foundation – 2011: presidency). The primary reason for this arresting dissimilarity is the lack of free and fair elections in Egypt until 2011.

The NOP was closed down soon after its foundation on the charges of acting against the Turkish republican tenet of secularism, and the National Salvation Party (NSP) succeeded it in 1972 by the same ideology, Islamism. The NSP gained 11% of the votes in 1973 general election and secured 48 seats in the Turkish Parliament, which indicates to a remarkable success in a short period. In 1974 two party, the People's Republican Party (PRP) and the NSP, formed a coalition government, making Necmettin Erbakan the vice prime minister. NSP proved to be quite pragmatic by accepting to form a coalition with a center-left party (PRP). It was also astute considering the mobilization of the residents of the newly forming squatter towns in big cities and the *Sufi* orders into political arena by well-organized

grass-roots propaganda groups. Later, the NSP formed two more coalition governments with different parties with different ideologies although it gained fewer votes in subsequent elections. Plagued by short-term unstable coalition governments, the period between 1970 and 1980 was beneficial for the NSP in terms of gaining political experience. The military coup in 1980 harbingered a new term in Turkish politics (www.secimsonucu.com).

After the military left the political arena to the politicians in 1983, Erbakan founded the Welfare Party (WP) as the successor of the NSP which was dissolved after the coup. Throughout the general elections in 1980s, the WP sought to find resonance in the Turkish society. Aiming to decrease the popularity of communism after the 1980 Coup, military generals and prominent intellectuals fostered the idea of a Turkish-Islamic synthesis that would create a political environment contributing to the social appeal of the WP (Yavuz, 1997: 67). Erbakan took advantage of this atmosphere and made his party organize on a large scale in the country.

At the same time, Turgut Özal, Turkish prime minister and later president for a decade between 1983 and 1993 introduced a new era of economic and somewhat socio-political liberalization. Small entrepreneurs began to sprout in miscellaneous Turkish provinces such as Kayseri, Gaziantep and Konya. These diligent local businesspersons were already emerging after the widespread Turkish industrialization and urbanization, to which Adnan Menderes gave a fillip after 1950s. These newly-forming petite bourgeoisie would later unite under a business organization named as the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (“MÜSİAD” in Turkish) which would contribute to the socio-economic base of the WP in 1990s (Türküne, 2012).

The WP’s carefully fashioned rhetoric would find nice resonance among the people who immigrated into big cities. As pointed out by Çolak (2010: 148), Erbakan’s populist policies such as the “just order (*adil düzen*)” were quite successful in earning the votes of these squatter town dwellers (Yilmaz, 2012: 368). Kamrava points (1998: 228) to this fact by arguing that it was social democracy of the WP which attracted the people, not its Islamic rhetoric. Gülalp likewise puts forth (2011: 441) that the decline of social democracy and the rise of political Islam in Turkey are strictly interrelated. This argument sheds light onto the fact that the more leftist parties lost votes after the heyday of socialism in the late 1960s, the more Islamist parties gained ground in Turkey – a point

that poses striking similarity with the fact that Brotherhood's Islamism in the early 1970s, that is, just after the apex of Nasserism in 1960s, got the upper hand again among the Egyptian people vis-à-vis the Nasserism. Kamrava also argues (1998: 289) that the third-worldly rhetoric of the WP also furthered its popularity – Erbakan's rhetoric was anti-Western and anti-colonialist at the time, which helped him tune in the feelings of the deprived masses.

Erbakan changed his political rhetoric into a more democratic one before each general election not to provoke the military and the secular establishment. Although his ideal society was not individualistic, he emphasized pluralist democracy before the 1994 election as a manoeuvre (Yavuz, 1997: 76). This is an important difference from the Muslim Brotherhood who showed almost no flexibility in its Islamist rhetoric no matter when. Such political manoeuvre would help Erbakan lead a relatively prolonged political career and be tolerated by the Turkish military until the 1997 Coup.

The WP also attracted the masses with its organizational professionalism, socio-cultural activities and grassroots organizations, similar with the organizational sophistication of the MB in Egypt. As Yavuz argues (1997: 78), the WP's rosary (*tesbih*) organizational strategy proved to be savvy in absorbing local cultural characteristics; the WP members participated in funerals, weddings, and so forth. This flexibility helped the WP be relatively more inclusive than other parties across Turkey. Whereas the MB, as a socio-political and religious organization, was rivalled by other religious groups such as *Salafis* who had little organizational capabilities yet unnegligible rootedness in the Arab societies (Wiktorowicz, 2000), the WP was welcomed and supported by the bulk of the Islamic organizations, *Sufi* orders, local Islamic societies and religiously-inspired masses (Gülalp, 2001: 433). For instance, as Özdalga indicates (2007: 106), Erbakan was a member of the biggest *Sufi* order in Turkey, namely *Naqshbandi*. The WP's relative inclusiveness might have been engendered by the National Outlook movement's advantage to set up a political party that could unite almost all alienated and disenfranchised religiously-oriented groups under a single roof while the MB in Egypt was not allowed to found a political party until 2011, thereby being necessarily seen as a membership-compulsory organization by the majority of the Egyptians.

An important discrepancy between the Turkish and Egyptian Islamists is that the former see the state as a semi-holy supreme authority that should be respected and obeyed, yet hijacked by the secular Kemalist establishment whereas the bulk of the latter, except the young generation of the Brotherhood, deem the state a *jahili*, corrupt, irreligious authority that should be destroyed and replaced with an Islamic and Shari’a-based one. In other words, in the Turkish political culture, religion and state are seen as two cooperating fathers of the society, in part as a consequence of the historical unity between the sultans and the *ulama* in the Ottoman Empire. This significant difference between the two perceptions of state would change the Islamists’ attitudes toward the state – in Turkey, the Islamists would mostly seek to capture it from the hands of the secular hijackers to Islamize it whereas in Egypt, some Islamists would engage in violent activities to destroy the state with the objective of founding a brand new Islamic one. This fact seems to be the main reason for the marginality of religious extremism in Turkish society whereas it may gain high ground in Arabic societies, and that difference indirectly affected the WP’s being relatively more moderate than the MB, which helped the WP be politically more successful in a relatively shorter period than the MB.

The WP made sure that its political priority during 1980s was the attainment of feasible goals such as improving the Turkish economy, increasing the GDP and solving religious-identity-related problems rather than stressing the notorious Islamist aims. This realism proved to be a significant factor in the WP’s rise to power in 1990s. In a similar manner, Erbakan was somewhat more careful than the leaders of the Brotherhood in his relations with the army, the dominant political power of the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) societies. He was said to tell once his juniors to avoid polemics with the generals. The WP nominated some of the retired generals in general elections to keep its relations with the army mild (Kamrava, 1998, s. 292-293).

The WP was more pragmatic than the MB but less so than the JDP as the WP had utopian foreign policy goals such as the establishment of the United Nations of Islamic Countries and the introduction of *dinar* as the currency of it. In its foreign policy, the WP’s Islamism was clearly more conspicuous (Robins, 1997: 85-95; Hale & Özbudun, 2010: 6).

In 1990s, the WP’s votes skyrocketed unexpectedly. High inflation rates of the late 1980s created a widespread discontent

among the public who contributed to the rise of the WP in early 1990s. Its traditional Islamist and populist rhetoric, in addition to its organizational capabilities and working discipline, furthered this rise in 1991 general elections when the WP (in alliance with another party) gathered 16,2% of the votes, securing 62 seats in the parliament. Its rise continued in 1994 local elections when WP surprisingly gathered 19,7 % of the votes, gaining the mayoralties of the two biggest Turkish cities, Istanbul and Ankara (www.secimsonucu.com). The mayors of these cities gradually became famous with the increasing quality of municipal services, the incorruptness and the absence of nepotism (Yavuz, 1997: 72), which fostered the WP's image further in 1995 general elections when the WP, again surprisingly, gathered %21,4 of the votes, thereby winning 158 seats in the parliament (Idiz, 1996: 376). Among concerns about who will form the government, Erbakan ultimately became the first Islamist Turkish prime minister as the head of the coalition of the True Path Party and the Welfare Party (Yilmaz, 2012: 366-367).

Until now, the WP's political strategy is analyzed until its ascension to power in 1996. Its populist rhetoric that could tune in the feelings of the discontented, its political maneuvers, its hard-working grassroots organizations, its relative comprehensiveness that helped gain the votes of the Islamists, Sufi orders and local Islamic organizations at the same time, its success in the mayoralties of two biggest Turkish cities, its ability to keep away from nepotism and corruption in these cities, Erbakan's stress on identity problems in the south-eastern region where Kurds lived, its relatively flexible attitude and Erbakan's image as an incorrupt, politically-untried and "someone from among the society" drove the WP to power (Duran, 1998: 111). So its success relied on a set of political strategies. In addition, although it is not within the scope of this paper, the political atmosphere and socio-cultural transformations in Turkey after 1960s were also effective. Economic liberalization initiated by Özal after 1980s, the formation of the petite bourgeoisie who is famously dubbed now as the "Anatolian tigers" and identity problems of the southeastern region provided the WP with the opportunity to increase its votes (Onis, 1997: 749-752). Güalp further argues (2001: 435) that the rise of the WP was parallel with the globalization which fostered supra-national revivalist movements like Islamism and with post-modernism which undermine what Hanioglu called the "Kemalist logocracy" (Hanioglu, 15.03.2015). In

sum, the WP strategically took advantage of this socio-political environment since its emergence.

Similar to Morsi who served as the president of Egypt between 2012 and 2013, Erdogan remained in prime ministry for approximately one year between 1996 and 1997 and was intimidated into resignation by the military-led secular establishment in what later came to be called “Soft Coup” in February 1997. Politically well-experienced though, Erdogan made grave strategic mistakes while in office for one year, in part as a natural result of being in power, which is again very similar to Morsi. These mistakes of Erdogan and Morsi account for their relatively short term in power compared to the Justice and Development Party and its most prominent figure, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

However, it is crucial to clarify at this point that the similar political strategies of the MB and the WP are not the only reason for the fact that they remained in power approximately one year. The second reason for their relatively shorter terms in power is the fact that they are outright traditional Islamists whereas the JDP is not outright traditional Islamist. As indicated in the beginning of the article, the JDP is a political party “partly” inspired by Islamism and has Islamist roots; hence, it can be regarded as soft Islamist, but not traditionally Islamist. That is, ideologies of these three political movements played their roles in their political trajectories, thereby contributing to the differentiation of the periods in which they remained in power, but I argue that the main factor in this differentiation is their political strategies which fall in the scope of this article—the nuances between their ideologies do not fall in this scope.

Coming back to the JDP, it has been in power since November 2002 to date, January 2017. What political strategies had the JDP employed to remain in power since then in Turkey’s highly tempestuous political setting? Why could Morsi and Erdogan remain in power for about one year whereas Erdoğan still enjoy substantial power even though they all come from a similar Islamist background? Next section will examine the JDP’s political strategy in comparison with the other two movements and aims at answering these questions.

F. The Political Strategies Of The Justice And Development Party (Jdp)

The disagreement within the WP in the late 1990s between the new moderate generation and the elderly hardline Islamists was

deepened. Erbakan was forced to resign from prime ministry in the February 1997 Coup, and the WP was outlawed, which was followed by the foundation of a new political party named the Virtue Party (VP) by the old WP members. The disagreement within the Turkish Islamists turned into a sharp competition to take control of the newly founded VP. The rivalry was between who came to be called as the Renewalists (*Yenilikçiler*) and the Traditionalists (*Gelenekçiler*) (Taniyici, 2003: 474-475). The leading figures of the Renewalists, Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, quitted Islamist rhetoric and advocated for an improved democracy whereas the leader of the Traditionalists, Recai Kutan, championed the same classical Islamism of the National Outlook tradition. Nevertheless, the division was not so clear-cut and simple; the Traditionalists were cognizant that it was impossible to achieve their Islamist objectives in the existing Turkish political system, thereby starting to put emphasis on individual rights and freedoms and other similar liberal principles. Notwithstanding this democratic rhetoric, the Turkish Constitutional Court dissolved the newly founded VP, triggering the decisive partition of two groups; the Traditionalists founded the Felicity Party (FP) whose orientation would remain political Islam while the Renewalists set up the Justice and Development Party (JDP) whose ideology was declared as conservative democracy (Özbudun, 2006: 543).

The Renewalists' political orientation points to a *new thinking* amongst the Islamists and, as Çavdar concisely put (2006: 480), it "is the result of a process of political learning." Young and partly liberal actors of the VP learned much from their political experiences while working for the parties of the NO. They have come to notice that the Turkish society do not want a confrontation with the secular establishment, which brings about political turbulence and thus economic instability. Erdoğan, in particular, realized during his mayoral office in Istanbul that ideological governing is not feasible. Therefore, the more they took on political responsibilities, the more they adopted the method of making piecemeal, incremental, step-by-step changes. They learned well that repeating the same mistakes of the NO parties would be a political suicide. Their *new thinking* was also supplemented with the lessons they drew from the deep-seated concerns of the European Union about Islamism. For them, what is out there to be advocated politically was more freedom of religion in a more democratic society in a less confrontational but more accommodationist manner. It should also be noted that, as Çavdar

points out (2006: 480-482), the rising *Anatolian bourgeoisie* was looking for a more open and pro-globalization political orientation, which encouraged the Renewalists' transformation (Gumuscu and Sert, 2009: 957-960).

Demiralp similarly argues (2009: 320, 326) that the emerging entrepreneurs of central Anatolia were the real driving force behind the transformation of young Islamists in the VP. When Turkey entered the European Customs Union in 1996, the Islamist entrepreneurs came to figure out the advantages of becoming an EU member, yet National Outlook movement would not change its anti-EU direction until it was ousted in 1997 by the Turkish military (Taniyici, 2003: 463-464).

However, this analysis only explains why the split between the Renewalists and the Traditionalists occurred. The purpose of this section is rather to answer the second question of the article; namely, to describe the contours of the political strategies of the Justice and Development Party. To find its peculiar strategy, how the Renewalists have transformed themselves and what political steps they have taken at critical moments will be analyzed. Then, the differences between the NO and the JDP will be demonstrated.

After founding the JDP, these relatively new and young political actors avoided from making direct references to Islam in their political rhetoric; instead, they have declared the JDP's political ideology as conservative democracy. Realizing the drawbacks of Islamist policies, they changed both their rhetoric and their actions pragmatically and employed a practical political agenda (Heper, 2003: 133). What they firstly concentrate on was democratization and economic development that were both welcomed by all segments of the Turkish society.

Çavdar argues (2006: 486) that each Islamist party adopted more moderate policies, the climax of which was reached with the emergence of the JDP that proved the most moderate of all. The EU also played a significant role in Islamists' moderation and democratization. Finally, the JDP took advantage of this democratization process, which was supported by the EU (Onis, 2009: 21), to strengthen its position in political arena and, within a decade with a carefully crafted strategy, it has become the most powerful political actor in the Turkish politics. By downplaying their religious identity, the JDP cadre have both played the game within the allowed political frame and also gained gradually augmenting support from the Turkish society as they did not confront the secular

establishment, thereby avoiding any political and economic instability. Çolak similarly argues (2010: 161) that the JDP adopted a loyal-to-Kemalism rhetoric and has handled the identity problems of the Islamic masses on democratic grounds.

Until the end of 2011, the JDP has taken many steps to strengthen its position in Turkish political arena. Put differently, it governed the state in a way that it has also strengthened its position successfully and smoothly. Besides giving priority to the previously mentioned practical policies such as the democratization and economic development, it also shelved sensitive issues like that of headscarf to handle later. It put emphasis on economic development that was supported by both TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD who were generally regarded as rivals. During the JDP's term in power, inflation has remarkably decreased, and the GDP has sharply increased (Ak Parti Tanıtım ve Medya Başkanlığı Broşürü, 2012). The most strategic stance of the JDP was possibly its good relations with the US and Israel which have historically been demonized by the Islamists. The US was so contented with the JDP that Turkey was told to become the "strategic partner" of the US. The JDP was also backed in its liberal policies of economic privatization of the state-owned properties. The set of policies the JDP employed were shown by many in the Western countries as an example of the coexistence of Islam and democracy, which was a clear message to the other Islamists of Middle East. The term "moderate Islam" has increasingly been used to define *sui generis* example of the JDP. All that was, *nota bene*, until the end of 2011.

Shankland argues that Erdoğan was quite astute in his political decisions. When he has taken a step that was seen as going too far against the Kemalist establishment, he simply retreated. He was shrewd in, unlike former Islamists, taking incremental measures rather than radical ones. Shankland gives two examples in this respect, the first of which was when Erdoğan announced the possibility of making adultery a criminal offence and, upon the outcry of the Kemalists against this step, he retreated. Similarly, when he appointed Adnan Büyükdeniz, the general manager of an Islamic finance group, as the head of the Turkish Central Bank, and the appointment was vetoed by the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, he simply withdrew his candidate (Shankland, 2007: 362). These tactics can be seen as efforts to avoid any possible confrontation. This stance of Erdoğan poses conspicuous dissimilarity with that of the Muslim

Brotherhood that acted quickly to transform the political system in which it did not have enough political power to do so.

In comparison with Erdoğan’s preference of gradual transformation that he has achieved by taking small *political* steps, Morsi preferred taking *legal* steps that shook the existing system and engendered turmoil in Egypt. Erdoğan tamed the military with his smooth piecemeal political actions whereas Morsi infuriated the military with his radical and legal steps that he did by simply using his authority. As Telci rightly argues (2013: 85), it is very difficult to punish the actors of Mubarak era simply by legal means. It should also be discussed whether it was a correct choice, strategically speaking, for the Brotherhood to declare a candidate for 2012 Presidential Election. Although the Supreme Election Committee nullified the Brotherhood’s nomination of Khairat el-Shater for presidency, the Brotherhood did not retreated and nominated a new member, namely Mohammad Morsi. That might be seen as an impatient challenge against the secular hegemonic powers of Egypt such as the military, the judiciary, the media and the business world.

During his presidency, Morsi took contentious steps like his third constitutional decree which put him temporarily above judicial surveillance (Pinfari, 2013: 463). That was widely criticized both by the Mubarak-era actors and by the EU. When there were widespread demonstrations calling for Morsi’s resignation from presidency, the military announced a 48-hour ultimatum. However, Morsi failed to cognize the fragility of his position and failed to prevent the coup. In a decade, Erdoğan survived several acts of intimidation by the Turkish army such as the notorious E-Memorandum on April 27, 2007, which means political success is also dependent on political atmosphere but political atmosphere is at the same time affected by the strategies of political actors. Between 2002 and 2007, the political environment in Turkey was like that of Egypt during Morsi’s presidency between 2012 and 2013. After Abdullah Gül, JDP’s candidate for presidency, became the president of Turkey in 2007 presidential election, the JDP entered into a new phase in which it felt partially relieved. After 2009 when the JDP won the referendum on changing a number of articles in the Turkish Constitution that was written under the auspices of the military generals in 1982, the JDP felt that it is on the verge of becoming the *de facto* political power in the country, having defeated the old Kemalist establishment in the political arena. Only after 2009 did it handle the controversial matters such as the educational reform and the headscarf issue.

The JDP also acted strategically in the field of foreign policy. Davutoğlu's policy of *zero-problem with neighbors* was realized (until the Arab Spring), and similar to the lack of confrontation in domestic politics, the JDP refrained from confrontation in its foreign policy (again until the Arab Spring). By aiming at solving the disputes over Cyprus (Gözen, 2009: 487) and Aegean Sea (Gözen, 2006: 14) as well as struggling to achieve a *rapprochement* between Armenia and Turkey, the JDP created a peaceful image of itself in the international arena, thereby gathering much political credit in the eyes of the international community. Its attempts to be a moderator in the crisis between Israel and Palestinians has provided him further trust on a global scale.

Up to now, the reasons for the relatively long (nay, quite long) term of the JDP in power was examined in terms of political strategy. As seen, the JDP cadre proved to be surprisingly astute in strategy—something that cannot be easily expected from conventional Islamists. A quick overview of this comparison will throw these differences into relief and render them more instructive. That the analyses comprises only the period before the end of 2011 should be recalled.

Firstly, the JDP, from the very first days of its foundation espoused the mentality of making *incremental changes*, taking *piecemeal measures*, thereby achieving an astonishingly *smooth revolution*. The *ancién regime* of Turkey is simply gone at the end of 2011. There emerged a very different country in thirteen years, between 2002 and 2015. These changes *en masse* are tantamount to a real social revolution in Gramscian sense—the Kemalist hegemony is no longer at work. However, the tradition of the National Outlook lacked this mentality of smooth transformation. During his prime ministry between 1996 and 1997, Erbakan introduced a number of relatively *radical changes*, some of which were mentioned above (such as the projects of the *Islamic dinar* and the *United Nations of Islamic Countries*), and against which the seculars fiercely reacted. Without these radical steps, the Welfare Party's short term in power might have prolonged. As for the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, Mohamed Morsi, during his presidency between 2012 and 2013, similarly introduced *radical changes* like Erbakan. These sloppy steps put Morsi in a bitter power struggle with the seculars and military—a fight whose winner would absolutely be the latter who enjoy an overawing control over the political arena in Egypt.

Secondly, the JDP cadre proved to be knowledgeable about the nature of political power. They shrewdly realized the centres of political power in Turkey such as the military, the judiciary, the media, the business world, the police and the bureaucracy and have taken control of them smoothly. In countries like Turkey where democratic culture is weak, it seems to be more important, compared to Western countries, to possess hard power like the military, the police and the judiciary to feel confident than merely being in power. The fact that JDP has noticed this has been a significant factor in its prolonged term in power. Compared to the JDP, the NO and MB failed to understand the nature of power in their respective countries. The NO cadre was relatively more knowledgeable than the MB about the nature of power, yet they were less so than the JDP.

Thirdly, and in relation to the second difference between the JDP, the NO, and the MB, Erdoğan and his cadre were much more politically experienced than the MB, which played a significant role in their becoming realistic political leaders while in power rather than ideologically oriented politicians like the leaders of the MB. However, what is interesting is that NO cadre were older, thus more politically experienced, than those of the JDP, yet they could not retreat from their ideological stances in their late ages. This unchanging, uncompromising, and unconcessioning characteristics of the NO prevented it from being viable on the long term in the Turkish political arena, the best indicator of which are the statistics of election polls: JDP gathered 34,4%, 46,6% and 49,9% of the votes in the general elections of 2002, 2007, and 2011 respectively whereas the Felicity Party gathered 2,5%, 2,3%, 1,3% of the votes in the same respective elections (www.secimsonucu.com). Plus, at present (January 2017), no imminent change is within sight in the Turkish political outlook.

Fourthly, the JDP employed a carefully fashioned *pragmatist political rhetoric* whereas the other two, the NO and the MB, have employed *ideological rhetoric*, which affected their constituencies as well as engendering suspicion amongst the secular establishments in their respective countries. Likewise, the JDP’s rhetoric is more inclusive than the other two. People from all segments of the Turkish society and from all regions vote for the JDP whereas the NO’s constituency is relatively more homogenous, both socially and geographically. However, the provinces where they gather most of the votes remain the same. Of all the three movements, the Brotherhood’s rhetoric was the least inclusive. That is because the

JDP's rhetoric was based on *pragmatist democratic conservatism* inspired by Islamism whereas the NO's rhetoric was shaped by *moderate Islamism*. Being different from both, the Brotherhood's rhetoric was based on a relatively more *hardline Islamism*. Furthermore, it is odd to observe that in a seemingly more pious society like Egypt compared to Turkey, the votes of the pious people are more partitioned between various parties like the Freedom and Justice Party, and al-Nour Party than they are so in Turkey. In other words, the seemingly more religious Egyptian politicians cannot unite under one political party whereas seemingly less pious Turkish politicians can unite under one. This is significant to note when a Koranic verse, al-'Anfal: 46, recommending that the Muslims should be in unity is recalled (www.quran.com/8).

Lastly, the JDP has had a strategic foreign policy that was based on the doctrine of *zero-problem with neighbors* articulated by Ahmet Davutoğlu in his book, *Strategic Depth* (2001). The JDP earned much credit with its foreign policy abroad, contributing to the international prestige of Turkey, in MENA and in the Balkans in particular, until the Arab Spring. The JDP's good relations with the US and Israel have provided him with the opportunity to deal *only* with the domestic rivals like the military, the judiciary and so on. As mentioned above, the Islamist *Weltanschauung* is plagued with the evilness of the US and Israel, which compel them into conflictual relations with these two countries. That *nonanalytic attitude* became a central strategic drawback for Islamists throughout the last century. The JDP, being friendly with these two countries (friendly with Israel until the notorious incident of "Mavi Marmara" in 2010 when Israeli soldiers stormed into a Turkish vessel named "Mavi Marmara" in high seas in Mediterranean, allegedly carrying humanitarian help for the blockaded territory of Palestinians, and shot dead nine Turkish citizens) felt itself safe at home. The National Outlook and the Brotherhood failed to secure a similar compromise with the US and Israel.

G. Conclusion

This article sought to demonstrate that the two Islamist movements and one political party partly inspired by Islamism in Turkey and Egypt have their own understandings of Islam, which subsequently means that they have their own peculiar political strategies to rise to power in their respective countries. Having put that, I compared the political strategies of the two relatively similar political movements,

the National Outlook and the Muslim Brotherhood. Then, after analyzing the Justice and Development Party’s prolonged term in power, I investigated the reasons for its political success from the angle of political strategy.

The policy advice of this paper would be that the social movements or political parties should learn more about one another’s trajectories so as not to repeat the same mistakes again. To learn from one another, they, for example, may found an international forum, by virtue of which they may systematically learn from one another’s political experience. By doing so, taking the optimum steps and applying the beforehand-tried successful strategies, they may suffer less.

This article does not claim to provide an exhaustive account of the political trajectories of each party and movement, nor it claims to answer all aspects of the question why and how they rose to power. It also does not touch upon the interesting political developments in Turkey after the end of 2011. All it did is to analyze the political strategies of these parties in a comparative way until the beginning of the year 2012. Thus, its contribution to the literature seems to be twofold: firstly, drawing a descriptive and comparative picture of the political strategies of these three social movements in one paper, which has hardly ever been done in the literature heretofore, and secondly, demonstrating contours of the JDP’s successful political strategies and identifying its specifically important strategic stances and steps which resulted in its extraordinarily long term in power. This paper does not dwell upon the ideas of Islamist parties about political strategies of other Islamist parties in other countries. This can be the topic of further studies.

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