

**REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE
NECMETTİN ERBAKAN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY**

**THE INFLUENCE OF THE UN AND NATO ON
TURKISH-LIBYAN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 1945-
2020**

MERVE GÖNLÜHOŞ ELMAS

PHD THESIS

**SUPERVISED BY:
PROF. DR. YAKUP KAYA-PROF.DR. CHRISTIAN KAUNERT**

KONYA-2025

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	Tezin Adı	The Influence of the UN and NATO on Turkish-Libyan Relationship Between 1945-2020		

Bu tezin hazırlanmasında bilimsel etiğe ve akademik kurallara özenle riayet edildiğini, tez içindeki bütün bilgilerin etik davranış ve akademik kurallar çerçevesinde elde edilerek sunulduğunu, ayrıca tez yazım kurallarına uygun olarak hazırlanan bu çalışmada başkalarının eserlerinden yararlanılması durumunda bilimsel kurallara uygun olarak atıf yapıldığını bildiririm.

Öğrencinin Adı Soyadı
İmzası



ÖZET

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	Tezin Adı	The Influence of the UN and NATO on Turkish-Libyan Relationship Between 1945-2020		

Bu tez, 1945'ten günümüze Libya ve Türkiye arasındaki siyasi, askeri ve ekonomik ilişkileri NATO ve BM'nin bölgesel politikaları bağlamında incelemektedir. Söz konusu etkileşimin uluslararası kuruluşlar tarafından nasıl şekillendirildiğini ve güç ile hegemonyanın bu süreçteki rollerini araştırır. NATO ve BM'nin Türk-Libya ilişkileri üzerindeki etkilerini değerlendirerek, bu kuruluşların bölgesel dinamikleri nasıl etkilediklerini ortaya koyar. Tarihsel bir bakış açısı kullanarak, bu tez, güç ve etkilene üzerindeki geleneksel görüşleri sorgular ve hegemonik uygulamaların sıklıkla olumsuz sonuçlarını vurgular. Etkilenmenin nasıl bir özgürleştirici güç haline dönüştürülebileceğini sorgulayarak, uluslararası ilişkilerde barış ve güvenlik söylemi ile gerçekte çıkar temelli politikaların arasındaki bağlantıyı inceler. Nitel vaka analizi yöntemi kullanarak, bu araştırma uluslararası kuruluşların karmaşık dinamiklerini ve bunların Türkiye-Libya ilişkileri üzerindeki etkilerini, genel anlamda MENA bölgesi, özelde ise Türkiye-Libya ikilisi bağlamında ortaya koyar. Teorik söylemler ile pratik gerçekliklerin yeniden incelenmesi gerektiğini savunarak, barış ve güvenlik ilkeleriyle daha uyumlu politikalar için çağrıda bulunur. Çalışma, NATO ve BM içindeki güç ve hegemonya uygulamalarının yeniden değerlendirilmesini ve daha özgürleştirici bir etki ile yeni bir uluslararası düzenin teşvik edilmesini önerir.



ABSTRACT

ABSTRACT

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This thesis explores the political, military, and economic ties between Libya and Türkiye from 1945 to the present, particularly within the framework of NATO and UN regional policies. It examines how these relationships have been shaped by the influence of international organisations, focusing on the roles of power and hegemony. The study looks closely at the impact of NATO and the UN on Turkish-Libyan relations, uncovering how these institutions affect regional dynamics. By taking a historical approach, this research challenges traditional perspectives on influence and power, shedding light on the often-negative outcomes of hegemonic actions. It also critically considers how influence can be reimagined as a force for emancipation, while drawing attention to the tension between the discourse of peace and security and the reality of interest-driven policies in international relations. Using a qualitative case study method, this work uncovers the complex nature of international influence and its effects on bilateral relations, particularly in the broader MENA region and between Türkiye and Libya. The thesis advocates for a fresh look at the gap between theoretical frameworks and practical realities, calling for policies that more closely align with the ideals of peace and security. It also argues for a reconsideration of how power and hegemony are exercised within NATO and the UN, urging these institutions to embrace a more emancipatory role and contribute to shaping a new global order.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CENTO	:	Central Treaty Organisation
CS	:	Critical Scientists
CSS	:	Critical Security Studies
EEZ	:	Exclusive Economic Zone
EMGF	:	Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum
EU	:	European Union
GCA	:	Greek Cypriot Administration
GNA	:	Government of National Accord
GNC	:	General National Congress
HOR	:	House of Representatives
IAEA	:	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC	:	International Criminal Court
ICJ	:	International Court of Justice
IFC	:	International Finance Corporation
IO	:	International Organisation
JCP	:	Justice and Construction Party
LCG	:	Libyan Contact Group
LNA	:	Libyan National Army
LPA	:	Libyan Political Agreement
MB	:	Muslim Brotherhood
MENA	:	Middle East and North Africa
MIT	:	Turkish National Intelligence Service
NATO	:	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPT	:	Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
NTC	:	National Transitional Council
R2P	:	Responsibility to Protect
SNA	:	Syrian National Army
TRC	:	Tripoli Rescue Committee

TRNC	:	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UAE	:	United Arab Emirates
UK	:	United Kingdom
UN	:	United Nations
UNCLOS	:	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNFICYP	:	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGA	:	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	:	United Nations Security Council
UNSMIL	:	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
US	:	United States
WMD	:	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Introduction

Adding to historical literary discussions, this study explores the concept of influence through the perspective of Critical Security Studies (CSS) scholars, with particular emphasis on the Welsh School's understanding of security as a means for emancipation, providing a historical narrative. To begin with, it is of benefit to mention that the concept of influence has significantly evolved, requiring an in-depth examination of its theoretical framework and use in practice. Taking this into consideration, this research revisits conventional theories of influence and introduces a new framework that links theoretical concepts to events in the real world. Within the context of this framework, two new concepts called theoretical reality and practical reality are debated throughout the dissertation. The study demonstrates the profound effect of influence when directed toward achieving emancipatory results. More importantly, it underscores the importance of historical turning points in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, which make up the basis of both the primary and secondary arguments presented regarding the rethinking of influence. The research investigation is intended to clarify the intricate relationship between power and hegemony by focusing critically on historical events that are key in shaping the influence of international organisations (IO).

Although arguing that the theoretical basis of the study could be applied to any two countries within the MENA or Eastern Mediterranean region, it primarily investigates the influence of institutions and alliances like NATO and the UN on the bilateral relationship between Türkiye and Libya. While doing so, the dominance of the five most powerful states within IOs, US taking the lead, comes to the forefront. Interestingly, the US exerts considerable influence within NATO, so that even decisions regarding withdrawal from the alliance be communicated to Washington beforehand. This shows the globally known reality of US domination within NATO's power structure. Not only within NATO, but also within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the US dominance is of significant visibility. Instead of keeping the analysis general, the dissertation goes beyond and delves deeper into the question regarding, what changes could be made to turn the negative and hegemonic influence of IOs and alliances into an emancipatory one. In this regard, by exploring the ways in

which these organisations exerted, and still continue to exert their hegemony, the study uncovers the destructive influence of dominant practices, often preventing the potential for genuine emancipation overlooking the regional norms (NATO, LOSTAN 2577, 1958; NATO, PO68/98 C-M(67)80, 1968). Thus, the thesis argues that, for IOs to reach an emancipatory influence in the MENA/Eastern Mediterranean region in general and, in Türkiye and Libya in particular, their policies must be compatible with the specific socio-cultural, economic, political, and ideological settings of the territories they affect. Indeed, by observing reports prepared by NATO, it is possible to see that the information necessary regarding these facts is available. However, the willingness is missing (NATO, C-M (58) 71, 1958; NATO, C-M (59)25, 1959; NATO, C-M (59) 95).

As a matter of fact, the relationship between Türkiye and Libya after WWII, demonstrating how geopolitical objectives persist in influencing today's global power structure, provides a comprehensive historical field of investigation. This also reflects the importance of a historical context in understanding the influence of IOs. Particularly, five critical turning points concerning the Turkish-Libyan relationship after the establishment of the UN provide instances that are deeply analysed within the dissertation. Important in this regard is the fact that these turning points also constitute significant developments from post-World War II interactions to contemporary military and political engagements.

The study draws special attention to the necessity of examining the power structures and undermining reasons within the framework of leading IOs that influence contemporary world politics as well as certain regions in one or another way. In order to objectively fulfil this task, a critical approach, the Welsh School's thought of emancipatory realism, rooted in critical social science, has been adopted. It aims at promoting a new comprehension and utilisation of power and hegemony as driving forces of the influence of the UN and NATO within the world's power structure. To be more precise, the study argues that power and hegemony are important and two interconnected concepts leading to a destructive influence when applied in an interest-oriented political attitude. Observing the power structure within such IOs, it becomes obvious that certain countries, more powerful, have the dominance, leading to the decrease in sovereignty rights of almost all other countries in the world. Within this

equation, the most powerful countries, under the umbrella of IOs, adopting a discourse of peace and security, have the ability to make decisions about other countries or regions. Reports prepared under the umbrella of NATO or the UN obviously support this argument (NATO, AC /119-WP/ 35).¹ Hence, this study does not take power and hegemony as mere singular causes but as two subcomponents leading to an influence as exemplified. In doing so, a new concept of influence leading to emancipation is aimed at. Thus, this dissertation provides practical insights on how IOs might redirect their influence towards more equitable and emancipatory outcomes by revising the power dynamics within their organisational structure, acting more aligned with their theoretical peace and security discourse. Briefly, this study aims to elucidate the Turkish-Libyan relationship and the influence of IOs on it, while identifying potential techniques for leveraging influence as a catalyst for emancipatory change.

Ultimately, this research elucidates the intricate dynamics of global power relations and emphasises the necessity for a critical re-evaluation of contemporary influence mechanisms. The fundamental assertion is that, as long as the theoretical realities of international peace and security organisations remain contradictory to practical realities on the field, achieving an emancipatory influence is unattainable. Technically, the study employs a comprehensive methodology to analyse historical instances of international influence, utilising the theoretical framework of CSS. Particular emphasis is placed on the fact that in examining influence of the UN and NATO, it is essential to acknowledge the involvement of dominant governments such as the US, whose “leading from behind” policy is vital. This method by the US decreases direct involvement hiding behind IOs. In this way, the discourse of keeping peace and security enables, through the “leading from behind” strategy, a direct military intervention whenever deemed necessary. Historical and qualitative research indicate that this method may obscure the genuine nature of international involvement. Particularly Obama has been known for adopting this strategy in order to make interventions applying to a peace and security discourse. Indeed, one of these interventions and wars includes NATO’s intervention in Libya. Theoretically, the intervention in Libya has been claimed to be a collaborative initiative to support

¹ See Appendix 21.

democratic movements. However, practically, the situation on the ground turned out to be the contrary. Interest-oriented actions, characterised by intricate power dynamics, clearly reflected a contradiction between the peace and security rhetoric of IOs and the chaos occurring around the whole country.

In a nutshell, the qualitative research design, combining a theoretical and practical analysis of historical turning points within Turkish-Libyan history, fills a serious gap in the literature. It provides a reconceptualised framework for the term influence, aiming at turning the outcome to be emancipatory, since in the contemporary world, where power and hegemony constitute the main two driving forces of the influence leading to destructive results, it is not possible to talk about peace and security as is theoretically argued by the UN and NATO. The study commences with a comprehensive examination of the literature, continues with reconceptualising influence after the explanation of the methodological framework, and provides a historical insight. Later, five turning points are analysed following an extra chapter about a socio-cultural reality of the Turkish-Libyan relationship, namely the *Kuloghli*s. Throughout the dissertation, qualitative methods, including document analysis and expert interviews, provide significant insights into the practical application of theoretical concepts and the tangible effects of IOs influence. The results of the analyses are further contextualised by comparing them with analogous worldwide situations. The study employs critical reflection to maintain its objective adherence to emancipatory ideas. It aims to provide suggestions for worldwide potential projects, steering them toward a more emancipatory, secure, and peaceful trajectory.

1. RESEARCH REVIEW

1.1. Introduction

The geopolitical importance of the MENA region has long played a role in its instability and frequent incidents of terror attacks, exploitation, and coups. Despite several endeavours to maintain peace and security in the region, history proves that no single IO or country has entirely achieved these goals. Currently, the UN and NATO are two principal institutions/alliance claiming to maintain international peace and security, applying different strategies in order to deal with the complexity of the MENA region. However, NATO is also the biggest organisation contributing to the defence industry, which increases the number of weapons produced and used around the world. This again leads to the increasing number of deaths. It also needs to be mentioned that despite the existence of the UN Charter which claims that any kind of use of force and interference is illegal, powerful states within these organisations do not care about these principles when it comes to their interests.

Within this context, this research review shows important studies about the influence of the UN and NATO on the relationship between Türkiye and Libya, two countries heavily affected by and affecting regional issues. The review seeks to shed light on the role of IOs in defining Türkiye-Libya relations by examining scholarly discussion on their historical, political, and military dimensions. While current literature comprehensively covers many elements of Turkish-Libyan relations, it frequently lacks in reflecting the role and influence of IOs such as the UN and NATO that are theoretically applying to a peace and security discourse. This gap requires further examination into how such organisations influence regional issues, happenings, and political strategies. The literature review is divided into four sections to give a thorough examination of the interactions between IOs and regional dynamics, with a particular emphasis on Türkiye's relationship with Libya from the past to the present. The headings are: (1) Assessing the Concept of Influence from Theory to Practice, including theoretical discussions about the concepts of security, power, and hegemony leading to an influence that up to this day is perceived as destructive but should, according to critical social scientists, be an emancipatory one. (2) The second heading

within the literature review is about the relationship between Türkiye and Libya from the past to the present. Under this heading, historical, political, and military exchanges and developments that have formed the Turkish-Libyan relationship from the Ottoman past to the contemporary governments are examined. (3) The third part explores literary discussions concerning the influence of the UN and NATO on Turkish-Libyan relationship. It examines how these IOs have affected important turning points, political agendas, regional policies, and bilateral relations. (4) Finally, a Historical Review of Cultural and Political Contributions of *Kuloghli*s in the Maghreb has been provided. The final section reflects important works about the *Kuloghli*s' (of Turkish-Libyan descent) cultural and political contributions to Maghreb culture and Turkish-Libyan relations. This section is important in that it reflects how international peace and security organisations overlook regional norms on the ground while trying to exert influence arguing to keep peace and security.

In order to objectively comprehend the influence and power dynamics within the international system, a CSS approach has been adopted. CSS offers a critical look at how power and hegemony influence global security and political tactics. The review uses concepts of hegemony, as addressed by scholars such as Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, to examine the complex interplay of power and knowledge in shaping and influencing state interactions. A key originality of this thesis lies in its combination of CSS with history. Only in this way will it be possible to support the main argument and sub arguments of the whole study. This approach emphasises the role of ideas in the maintenance of hegemonic organisations while also criticising conventional power views by underlining the possibility of emancipation and giving examples from history. Yet the literature still lacks an explicit understanding of power and hegemony as driving forces in IOs influence. This thesis aims to fill this gap by stating that international peace and security organisations, such as the UN and NATO, have theoretical objectives of peace and security that frequently do not correspond to practical realities on the ground, taking also into consideration the increasing so called “defence industry,” killing more and more people. The thesis claims that as long as peace and security are only theoretical constructions and not properly practiced, the

promise of these institutions will never be realised as it is reflected in the historical turning points of this work.

The literature review uses a detailed examination of both primary and secondary sources to develop a coherent narrative about the influence of the UN and NATO on Turkish-Libyan relations. Methodologically, the research process begins with a detailed literature examination benefitting from academic databases, library archives, and institutional publications. By doing so, sources that do not address the influence of the UN and NATO have not been given priority. The review offers a critical assessment of prior research' strengths and inefficiencies, with a focus on how they handle or miss the influence of IOs. Alongside scholarly discussions, the thesis employs a qualitative case study to examine critical historical periods in Turkish-Libyan relations. In order to reach as much useful information as possible, an analysis of primary documents and archival materials sourced from the UN, NATO, and Turkish archives has been applied. However, considering the difficulties in accessing Libyan archives and conducting interviews with Libyan locals, the assessment in this regard rather focusses on secondary sources and discrete information gathering to ensure a thorough and comprehensive examination.

1.2. Assessing the Concept of Influence from Theory to Practice

The concept of influence in security studies is critical in order to understand how power dynamics shape international interactions and policies from the past to the present. The first part of the literature review investigates certain components of influence, focussing on major contributions by researchers such as Ken Booth, Richard Wyn Jones, Robert W. Cox, Rita Floyd, and James G. March. By doing so, it reflects scholarly debates about the conceptual and methodological basis of the whole research.

Ken Booth's significant contribution to the field of literature is his advancement and clear explanation of the CSS methodology, specifically within the framework of the Welsh School of Security Studies. The author contends that conventional security studies, namely realist security theories, have inherent limitations in comprehending security and neglect to tackle the fundamental factors contributing to insecurity. Therefore, he argues for a new and fresh understanding of

security. According to him, genuine security cannot be achieved by adopting a traditional realist perspective. This only leads to a dilemma where the security of one state is achieved at the cost of another state's vulnerability. Exactly at this point, this thesis argues that the aforementioned situation reflects the interest-oriented policy of powerful states. In order to achieve their goals, these countries apply to IOs like the UN and NATO. Hence, the influence of international peace and security organisations, which is a gap in the literature, becomes inevitable. In addition, Booth prioritises emancipation in which true security is only attainable by not denying it to others. His work encourages scholars to question their beliefs and reconsider their thoughts about the concept of security. Moreover, Booth's critical approach reflects the importance and necessity of interdisciplinary examination of security dynamics with history as one of the most important disciplines (Booth, ed., 2005).

Another scholar contributing to the field is Rita Floyd, suggesting a more consequentialist assessment of security. While doing so, Floyd makes a combination of the Copenhagen and Welsh Schools of Security Studies. She adds to the literature by emphasising the prescriptive quality of security language and the necessity to contemplate the repercussions of security policies. Rita Floyd's contribution to the literature is focussed on critically analysing the Welsh School of Security Studies, namely its idea of security as emancipation. She contends that although this conceptualisation presents a promising progression in security theory, it encounters substantial obstacles, notably in relation to normativity. Floyd highlights the significance of achieving unanimity among academics in defining security as emancipation, in order to effectively apply it in practice. She proposes that the academy could function as an initial step in cultivating such agreement. However, her work lacks in defining the difference between practice and theory that, according to this thesis, is the main obstacle for real peace, security, and emancipation. Floyd prompts scholars to critically examine the faults in the theory, including its normative foundation. This invites a comprehensive review of security from a consequentialist perspective, incorporating perspectives from both the Copenhagen and Welsh Schools. Her work enhances comprehension of the intricacies associated with redefining

security and the pragmatic obstacles of implementing these conceptualisations in reality (Floyd, 2007).

Thirdly, James G. March's study on influence makes a substantial contribution to the field by carefully exploring the complexities of how it operates, particularly in the realms of interpersonal relationships and public opinion. March points out several important challenges, such as the difficulty of applying empirical studies more broadly, the complexities in determining a clear order of influence, the possibility of delayed or unforeseen outcomes, and the challenges of measuring influence accurately due to its multidimensional nature. His primary contribution to the discussions on influence, is his perspective viewing influence as a key driver of change (March, 1955).

Megan Shannon, Daniel Morey, and Frederick J. Boehmke's paper, "The Influence of IOs on Militarised Dispute Initiation and Duration," is one research that takes a positive perspective of IOs influence. Contrary to one of the thesis's sub arguments, these academics claim that the literature on IOs reveals their critical role in not only preventing but actively lowering conflict length. Accordingly, traditionally, research has concentrated on the function of IOs in conflict prevention; however, the authors challenge this narrative by claiming that IOs play an equally important role in shortening confrontations once they occur. This emphasis on IOs as active actors in conflict resolution challenges conventional assumptions and broadens our knowledge of their duties beyond prevention, underlining their critical role in maintaining global peace and security. Reading the paper till the end reveals that the authors base their case on theoretical facts rather than providing real-life instances. In this regard, from a critical standpoint, it is feasible to claim that the piece is more about what should be rather than what in practical fact actually is (Shannon, Morey and Boehmke, 2010).

Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Alexander H. Montgomery also talk about the influence of IOs. Many international relations researchers believe that IOs play an increasingly important role in promoting peace and cooperation among states. Over the last three decades, research has concentrated on the liberal premise that IOs give major pacific benefits by minimising military confrontation by fostering a culture of mutual self-interest and understanding. While influencing the position in a conflict,

membership within IOs also has an influence on the foreign policy behaviour of states. In this context, the Turkish-Libyan case provides a good example. As soon as the member state within an IO behaves unfavourably, it faces embargoes or other sanctions. Taking these discussions into consideration, Burton and Montgomery argue that IOs do not always reduce conflict (Burton and Montgomery, 2006).

Another work reflecting the influence of IOs is Jakobi Anja's "International Organizations and World Society: Studying Global Policy Development in Public Policy." Within the framework of this study, IOs are critical actors determining the national policy agenda of states. Anja calls this model "agenda setting." Accordingly, IOs have the ability to influence the timing, content, and prioritisation of policies within national contexts. This sophisticated understanding not only improves existing conceptual frameworks but also broadens the conversation about the power dynamics at work in global governance. The study's findings are especially useful in understanding how IOs can successfully navigate the complexities of state sovereignty and political resistance to promote coherent global policy initiatives. This paper is important in that it clearly reflects the influence of IOs (Jakobi, 2009).

Ole Wæver's analysis focuses on his investigation of the notion of securitisation in the realm of security studies. Wæver's influential study delves into the process of securitisation, which involves framing specific concerns as existential threats that demand exceptional actions. Wæver's main contribution is his criticism of the inclination to treat a variety of topics as matters of security without establishing specific criteria for determining when an issue should be considered a security concern. He poses significant inquiries on the ramifications of categorising anything as a security concern, specifically in relation to its influence on politics, policy formulation, and societal communication. Understanding the procedure of how to categorise anything as a security concern is important in order to be able to analyse the security situation in a country. Particularly within MENA countries, the securitisation process plays an important role due to the fact that the intervention of IOs is mostly dependent on this process (Wæver, 1993).

Another work by Ken Booth is his book "Theory of World Security," which provides a thorough analysis of the idea and application of security in the context of

global events, making a valuable contribution to existing work on the subject. Booth contends that the field of security studies should not alone prioritise comprehending the world but should also actively strive to effect positive transformations. In order to effect positive transformations, history is a perfect address to take lessons and improve peace and security policies. Booth's statement is strongly supported by this thesis aiming to picture instances in order to understand what main obstacles against positive transformations are. Booth's main contribution in this regard is in his emphasis on the CSS methodology, which questions traditional security paradigms and aims to reveal hidden power dynamics and inequities. Booth contends that CSS should not be limited to a theoretical framework but should also strive to achieve tangible liberation. According to him, understanding security challenges requires a careful examination of historical, cultural, social, and other significant variables as reflected during this work (Booth, 2012).

In addition, Richard Wyn Jones combines critical theory with security studies, namely in the field of CSS. In his scholarly publication titled "Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory," Jones examines the points where security, strategy, and critical theory intersect. He offers valuable perspectives on how critical approaches might enhance our comprehension of security dynamics. One of Jones' significant contributions is his emphasis on rejecting traditional dichotomies, such as the division between value and study and knowledge and action. Thus, Jones emphasises the significance of including normative factors into scholarly study, based on Max Horkheimer's assertion. This challenges the belief that research may be impartial and devoid of values. This method is consistent with critical theory's focus on revealing power dynamics and advocating for social transformation. Although, Jones' work is missing in describing how to reach social transformation in a positive and emancipatory way. Rather than understanding what the obstacles are, this thesis will build on CSS by describing how to act. Jones' work emphasises the political aspect of producing knowledge, reflecting Ken Booth's claim that knowledge is intrinsically political and shaped by society. Jones improves the perception of how knowledge influences security discourses and policies and how it may be harnessed to facilitate transformative change by exposing the political nature of knowledge. Richard Wyn

Jones' research challenges scholars to rigorously examine dominant assumptions and power dynamics in the realm of security studies, ultimately fostering a more sophisticated and politically active approach to comprehending security matters (Jones, 1999).

In addition to his previous work, "Message in a Bottle": Theory and Praxis in CSS," Jones argues for an emancipatory approach to both knowledge production and political engagement within security studies. The scholar delves deeper into the interaction between critical theory and security studies within the framework of CSS. He emphasises the transformative nature of critical theories. Drawing on the Frankfurt School's ideas, particularly those of Jürgen Habermas, Jones asserts that critical theory should aim to foster an understanding of the world that leads to profound socio-cultural, economic, and political transformations taking lessons from history. As a very important reference point for this dissertation, the concept of emancipatory political praxis is also a concept introduced by Jones. This concept emphasises the importance of using historical, social, and cultural insights to challenge the dominant power structure. Moreover, Jones highlights the need for emancipatory action in the realm of CSS, urging scholars to not only engage in critical reflection but also to advocate for alternative security frameworks that prioritise individual freedom and social justice (Jones, 2000).

Next to the debates above, Antonio Gramsci is a significant figure in talks about power. His particular contribution to the literature discussions resides in his conceptual advancement of the notion of hegemony, which has had a profound influence on the discourse around power dynamics, domination, and societal transformation. Gramsci's understanding of hegemony originated from his Marxist viewpoint and his involvement in politics and activism in Italy in the early 20th century. It is possible to read Gramsci's ideas in Robert W. Cox's works, particularly his article titled "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method," that contributes to the literature in a serious way. According to Cox, Gramsci's major observation is that hegemony functions not only via force but also through agreement, as dominant groups preserve their authority by influencing and regulating the cultural and intellectual environment of society. While arguing that dominant groups preserve

their authority by influencing a certain environment, this theory lacks adapting it to IOs such as the UN or NATO. In this regard, this thesis agrees with Gramsci's hegemony theory only with an additional necessary analysis of the hegemony of the UN and NATO. Additionally, Gramsci contends that intellectuals contribute significantly to the dissemination and reinforcement of hegemonic conceptions, hence facilitating control. The differentiation made by Gramsci between "traditional" intellectuals and "organic" intellectuals holds great importance. Gramsci argues that traditional intellectuals, while perceiving themselves as autonomous thinkers, frequently contribute to the preservation and consolidation of prevailing power dynamics. On the other hand, organic intellectuals originate from particular social classes and express the interests and viewpoints of those classes, which may possibly question established dominant narratives. This thesis will, hence, try to understand the concept of traditional intellectuals and organic intellectuals in a bigger picture by applying this concept to the UN and NATO. Gramsci's work elucidates the significance of intellectuals and the cultural domain in upholding or contesting hegemony, offering a conceptual framework that extends beyond conventional Marxist ideas of economic determinism to comprehend power dynamics (Cox, 1983).

Adding to the discussions on hegemony, Christopher Dunn offers an in-depth exploration of the concept and its implications in providing social change. In his research, the scholar, co-authored with other scholars delves into the historical importance of hegemony, exploring the actions of dominant powers. His examination of hegemony is notable for its focus on the fluidity of this process, where one state or a group of states exerts power over others. Dunn's analysis sheds light on the strategies that dominant powers use to assert control and influence over less powerful nations, influencing global political and economic systems in the process. According to Dunn, there is an interaction between hegemony and societal change. Dunn is convinced that dominant states often seek to maintain and expand their influence through military, economic, or even cultural hegemony. He is also convinced that subordinated states could challenge this power structure if they wanted to. This thesis builds on Dunn's insights by examining pivotal moments in the history of Libya and Türkiye, two

nations often considered subordinate within international peace and security organisations (Dunn, 1994).

Jasper Godwin Ridley's biography of Lord Palmerston, a key player in 19th-century British politics, is another valuable contribution to the existing literature. Ridley's book "Lord Palmerston" offers an intricate portrayal of Palmerston's biography, political trajectory, and impact on British foreign policy. Ridley's significant contribution is in his examination of Palmerston's pragmatic approach to foreign politics. Ridley illuminates the influence of human interests on foreign policy and historical outcomes by analysing Palmerston's actions and judgments as a statesman. Taking this interest as a driving force of acting within the international system, it could be told that the most influential countries are those with the greatest interests. While Ridley's work is missing in portraying the equation between interest and influence, the five turning points analysed in this thesis will do so. In addition, Ridley's biography provides valuable perspectives on the wider historical backdrop of the 19th century, encompassing the geopolitical forces that influenced Palmerston's viewpoint (Godwin, 1972).

Antonio Gramsci's "Prison Notebooks" (2011) and Hans Morgenthau's "Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace" (1965) are two further works that need to be mentioned in the literature review and that offer theoretical perspectives on power and the formation of narratives related to security. Indeed, a combination of the concept of hegemony that has been proposed by Gramsci, and Morgenthau's realist approach, will enhance the understanding of security dynamics, opening new paths (Gramsci, 2011).

Stephen Krasner contributes to the literary discussion by analysing the notion of sovereignty and the intricacies of international politics. Krasner in his book titled: "Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy," explores how powerful states within IOs take action to practice their power and hegemony. An important contribution to this thesis made by Krasner is his explanation of how governments, especially those with great power, ignore established norms by concentrating only to advance their own interests. Within this context, Krasner put forward a concept called "organised hypocrisy," referring to the reality that states choose to overlook and disregard norms and law

depending on their own geopolitical interests. This is a reflection of the existence and contradiction of theoretical reality and practical reality. Moreover, Krasner states that knowledge and authority can be used for societal improvement. Different actors, such as states or even civil society, may address these issues and create a positive change. In a nutshell, Krasner's work highlights the conflicts that arise between a country's authority, global standards, and its actions. It also encourages to think about how one may use knowledge and influence to improve the overall welfare and freedom of the world. At this point, Krasner adopts a Marxist perspective encouraging scholars not only to understand but to change (Krasner, 1999).

Moreover, Sean Homer provides in-depth analysis of the underlying power dynamics and ideologies that shape global events and the functioning of IOs. The scholar applies to Marxism, examining the structure and function of IOs. It also gives an insight into the interests that are prioritised and the countries possessing these interests. Homer thoroughly explores the conflicts between social classes while encouraging critical researchers to examine the discourse of powerful and dominant states. As a result, his work could inspire readers to carefully analyse the underlying assumptions of IOs and investigate alternative approaches to addressing global issues. Hence, this will foster discussions addressing the relationship between authority, information, and societal change on a worldwide level (Homer, 1999).

Next to these scholars, Max Weber, a leading name when it comes to the literary discussions about influence and power, argues that both concepts have the ability and strength to control or even direct the actions of other actors. According to Weber, power is the capacity of individuals, groups, or states to achieve their goals despite resistance (Weber, 2009; Weber, 1997).

Not only Weber, but also scholars like Robert A. Dahl, Steven Lukes, and David A. Baldwin have taken their time to think about power and influence. Their argument surrounds the idea that influence, and power are essentially interchangeable, both describing the ability of one actor to prompt action from another (Dahl, 1997; Lukes, 1986; Baldwin, 2016).

Undoubtedly, there are further scholars discussing the difference and interaction of influence, power, and hegemony, coming up with many results. By observing all these discussions, one thing becomes clear, namely that influence, and power are two parallelly proceeding concepts with the capacity to direct or control behaviour. While power stands for having the necessary resources, influence is more interpreted as the ability to make change happen. For instance, realists such as Hans Morgenthau or Kenneth N. Waltz draw particular attention to the resources necessary to influence other actors (Waltz, 2001; Morgenthau, 1948).

Scholars such as Ruth Zimmerling, Allen Baldwin, and Joseph Nye have contributed to the literary discussion on power, hegemony, and influence in the same direction. Zimmerling's work delves into various expressions of influence, while Baldwin and Nye explore the nuances of economic statecraft and the evolution of power in the international arena (Zimmerling, 2005; Baldwin, 1989; Nye, 2006). Building on these discussions, this dissertation aims at considering power and hegemony as sub-components of the influence rather than as single impact factors.

In order to understand the theoretical dimension of the influence in practice, important turning points between Türkiye and Libya need to be explored from the past to the present. One particular important scholar taking part in this mission is Geoff Simons. Simon's focus lies in the modern history of Libya. As a matter of fact, Simons' book "Libya: The Struggle for Survival" offers a detailed analysis of Libya's political, social, and economic dynamics beginning with the establishment of independent Libya. It provides insights into the country's internal affairs and its relationships with other regional actors, such as Türkiye, the UN, and NATO. Simons' notable contribution is in his investigation of the UN's influence on Libya, namely during the initial stages of the nation's independence era. The author illustrates the influential role of international actors in establishing Libya's political landscape by emphasising the UN's involvement in the imposition of King Idris in 1951. Simons' research helps to develop a comprehension of the intricate connection between Libya and other entities, demonstrating the extensive impact that interventions from organisations such as the UN can have on a nation's autonomy and domestic matters. His thorough and detailed study and analysis offer significant perspectives on the historical backdrop of

Libya's challenges and the wider dynamics of international influence in the area. Simons' work is a valuable contribution to the literature by providing a detailed and subtle depiction of Libya's history and its relationships with the global community (Simons, 1996).

1.2.1. Summary

Evidently, there have been many debates about the concept of influence within the critical school of thought. Scholars have offered a series of theoretical insights and practical methods. In this regard, traditional realists are convinced that influence is a result of state power through military means. This group of scholars argues that international politics is about one state's gain while another's loss. However, the critical school of thought, including scholars such as Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, criticise realist narrative, arguing that it overlooks deeper causes of insecurity, like social injustice and unequal power relations. On the one hand, Booth argues for an emancipatory approach, applying the concept of influence in order to promote social justice as an obligatory fact of security. On the other hand, Jones puts emphasis on the significance of normative factors playing the most important role in a region and political engagement, advocating for a broader and more inclusive understanding of influence. James G. March, in contrast to the material focus of traditional realism, offers a more complex view of influence by exploring the intricacies of causality. He examines the often delayed and indirect effects that characterise influence, especially in human relationships and public opinion, which stands in opposition to the straightforward, power-based views commonly associated with realism. This nuanced framework for understanding influence provides a more comprehensive way of viewing how it unfolds over time and across different contexts. Adding to this complexity, Rita Floyd critiques the Welsh School's idea of security as emancipation by pointing out both the moral and practical challenges involved in putting such an approach into practice. Floyd, adopting a rather consequentialist perspective, draws particular attention to real world reflection and impact of the theoretically discussed issues and concepts. She is convinced that only in this way will scholars be able to reach a consensus within specific contexts.

The literary discussion provided above also explores the role of IOs in directing and controlling influence which is very important within the context of this study. At this point, names such as Megan Shannon, Daniel Morey, and Frederick J. Boehmke come to the forefront. These scholars primarily investigate the question of whether IOs are influential in conflict prevention. They reach the result that IOs indeed influence the duration of a conflict or its resolution procedure. In addition, there are further names searching for the extent to which IOs influence international interactions and how they do this through social networks. This leads to the re-examination of the idea that IOs are successful in reducing or even preventing conflict. Indeed, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Alexander H. Montgomery could be listed among these scholars. Reading their work provides a new insight into the context-dependent nature of influence. Jakobi Anja's research into agenda-setting and policy dissemination further illustrates the subtle ways in which IOs exercise influence, showing the power dynamics at play and the challenges they present to state sovereignty when IOs shape national policy. Ole Waever's securitisation theory offers yet another perspective by focusing on how certain issues are framed as security concerns, with discourse playing a critical role in constructing influence. This approach is particularly relevant in regions like the MENA, where securitisation processes often drive international interventions and IO involvement. Waever's focus on discourse contrasts sharply with more materialist approaches, suggesting that influence can be exercised not just through direct actions but also through the way issues are framed and discussed within global discourse.

Further complicating the understanding of influence, Antonio Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony as interpreted by Robert W. Cox, and Stephen Krasner's critique of "organized hypocrisy" in international norms reveal the broader power dynamics at work in global governance. Gramsci's idea of cultural hegemony shows how dominant groups maintain power through consensus rather than coercion, while Krasner's analysis of state behaviour underscores the contradictions and inconsistencies that often accompany the exercise of influence in international relations. Historical perspectives, such as those offered by Geoff Simons and Jasper Godwin Ridley, add another dimension to the study of influence. Simons' examination of Libya's political

and economic landscape and Ridley's exploration of Lord Palmerston's foreign policy highlight the long-standing role of influence in shaping both national development and global interactions. To sum up, there is a considerably rich scholarly debate about influence within the context of security. Many perspectives and schools of thought have investigated the concept of influence. Although there are diverse ideas about the interaction between power, hegemony, and influence, scholars agree on the fact that influence is a multi-dimensional concept, as reflected by the different focus of perspectives. While some bring attention to military means, others are convinced of the importance of norms. Within the framework of this dissertation, power, hegemony, and influence are argued to be better understood through historical comparison and analysis.

1.3. Understanding Turkish-Libyan Relations from Ottoman Governance to Modern Alliances

Numerous studies have investigated Turkish-Libyan relations from both historical and contemporary viewpoints. However, as mentioned above, there is a considerable gap in the literature regarding the influence of IOs on the bilateral relationship. This thesis argues that the concept of influence, as used to Turkish-Libyan relations, can be extended to other countries in strategically significant positions. To fully comprehend this influence, it is necessary to investigate historical turning points in these countries. Soon, -and this is one of the sub-arguments of this study- it becomes apparent that the influence is driven by the interests of hegemonic nations within IOs such as the UN and NATO. Although there is limited study on the influence of the UN and NATO on the Turkish-Libyan relationship, conducting a historical case analysis provides significant and a much deeper insight into the concept. In order to contextualise this influence, a brief study of significant works on the relationship between Türkiye and Libya is required.

To begin with, in his work "Introduction À l'histoire de l'Orient Musulman", Jean Sauvaget offers a detailed examination of the power and impact of the Ottoman state during the 16th century, making a substantial contribution to the scholarly discourse. Sauvaget's work provides serious information about the Ottoman administration, the control of Sultans, financial information and further. In his work,

Sauvaget emphasises the military excellence of the Ottoman Empire, specifically highlighting its well-organised armed forces, superior artillery, and powerful navy in the Mediterranean, which captured the interest of Europe. Sauvaget's synthesis of these aspects provides a nuanced comprehension of the Ottoman Empire's power and impact during the 16th century. This enriches the existing literature on Ottoman history and offers useful insights for historians and researchers studying this period. Sauvaget's analysis further sheds light on the robustness of the Ottoman state, including significant information on its vast territorial boundaries, substantial financial assets, well-organised administrative system, military might, and dominant naval presence in the Mediterranean region. He emphasises the Ottoman Empire's role as a stabilising influence in the region and their importance in safeguarding and ensuring the safety of religious minority groups, in contrast to the mistreatment they experienced under the rule of other empires. As a whole, the researcher's work contributes to this thesis and increases the existing body of literature, reflecting the importance of contemporary Türkiye for the region as well as for Libya (Sauvaget, 1961).

Orhan Koloğlu, who is of Turkish heritage and the son of the first Libyan Prime Minister, Sadullah Koloğlu, has also made noteworthy contributions to the literature of the Ottoman era in Libya. Koloğlu's work "Libya/Osmanlı Dönemi" offers a comprehensive historical account of the Ottoman Empire's governance, administration, and social structure in Libya during that period. Furthermore, the author examines different administration phases within the Ottoman Rule. Examples include beylerbeys, Janissaries, the central Ottoman government, etc. Koloğlu also examines the relationship and interaction of the Ottoman Empire and Libyan society. Socio-cultural, political, and ideological facts were of particular importance for his study. Throughout his research, Koloğlu applied to Ottoman archives and historical records, providing a nuanced understanding of the Ottoman/Turkish existence in Libya. Therefore, his work is of immense importance for historical scholars. Additional research by Orhan Koloğlu titled "500 Years in Turkish-Libyan Relations," provides a comprehensive historical analysis of the mutual connection, elucidating the extensive centuries-long engagement between Türkiye and Libya. Koloğlu's studies

offer a valuable source for further research (Koloğlu, 2007). He presents a sophisticated explanation of the empire's strategic motives, which include a desire to control Mediterranean and Sahara commerce routes and oppose European colonial threats. Koloğlu documents the growth of administrative institutions, from direct control by Beghlerbegs to local Dayis and Kouloghlus, highlighting the changing dynamics between central and local forces. He also investigates the socio-political effects of Ottoman policy on local communities, such as the integration of Turkish settlers and the emergence of new political players. Examining Ottoman modernisation initiatives and their intersections with European colonial ambitions, particularly the Italian invasion of Libya, enriches our knowledge of the region's broader geopolitical struggles (Koloğlu, 2008).

Lisa Anderson's study provides an important overview of Ottoman authority in Libya, focussing on the reoccupation of Tripoli in 1835 and the subsequent administrative reforms that moulded the region's history. Anderson illuminates how the Ottoman government, urbanisation, and settlement patterns impacted local economies and social systems by delving into their complexity. Her investigation of the impact on tribal and religious dynamics, particularly the Sanusiyyah movement, illustrates the shifting power structures and problems that existed during this time. Anderson's work fills gaps in current literature by providing a more nuanced perspective of Ottoman Libya and its legacy, considerably contributing to historical discourse on the region (Anderson, 1984).

Nicola Ziadeh's scholarly work focuses on doing a more extensive examination of the Sanusiyyah movement, a revivalist Islamic movement, and its significance within the framework of Libyan history and the fight for independence in Libya as well as in Türkiye. Ziadeh's scholarly article, "Sanusiya: A Study of Revivalist Movement in Islam," offers a comprehensive analysis of the origins, philosophies, and activities of the Sanussiyah movement, with a specific focus on its presence in Libya. Ziadeh provides valuable insights into the motivations, techniques, and influence of the movement on Libyan culture and politics by thoroughly examining its historical foundation and evaluating original sources. His work specifically illuminates the change in approach undertaken by Seyyid Muhammed Idris, who eventually became

known as King Idris, in his pursuit of diplomatic means to achieve Libyan independence. Ziadeh's shift away from previous confrontational methods is situated within a larger examination of the Sanussiyah movement's development and its dealings with colonial powers. He contributes to the literature thoroughly with detailed research, discerning analysis, and placement of the Sanussiyah movement within the wider historical and political context of Libya. Taking his contribution to the literature, it will be possible to see the relationship between Türkiye and Libya within the framework of the Sanussiyah movement soon. Starting from its inception to the present day, the Sanussiyah group did not lose its ties to the Turkish society. This thesis therefore will also build on the comprehension of the relationship between the Sanussiyah and the Ottoman State, later becoming the Republic of Türkiye (Ziadeh, 1983).

The list of scholars studying the Ottoman Period in Libya could continue pages long. One significant issue within scholarly debate is that it has been proven that during the struggle for independence in Türkiye, Libyan people supported the Turkish party, in particular movements such as the Sanussiyah. Many articles have been written about Türkiye's independence and the support of Libyan people. For instance, a work by Lisa Anderson chronologically reflects the transitional phase of Ottoman Libya to the struggle for independence and the support of Libyan people during this period. Anderson's work, titled "The Origins of Arab Nationalism," sheds light on how the political and ideological landscape in Ottoman Libya changed during the Young Turk revolution and Italian invasion. It emphasises the distinct trajectory of Libyan political identity during this time period, highlighting the tenacity of pan-Islamic patriotism in the face of burgeoning Arab nationalism elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. By examining the relationship between Ottoman policy, local resistance, and Italian invasion, the study sheds light on the dynamics of resistance and identity creation in a milieu that is frequently overshadowed by larger regional narratives. Furthermore, it emphasises the significance of Ottoman military and political policies in developing Libyan resistance and identity, adding to our understanding of the region's complicated historical and political development in the early twentieth century (Anderson, 1991).

Timothy's work, *Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War for Libya: 1911-1912*, examines the transitional phase in Ottoman-Libyan ties, with a focus on the complex dynamics between Türkiye and Libya in the early twentieth century. In addition, the scholar talks about Turkish support for Libya's fight against Italians and the assistance of Libyan locals to the Turkish nation during the struggle for independence. His work focusses on the diplomatic aspects of the Italo-Turkish dispute, revealing a larger story of mutual support between Turkish and Libyan citizens at times of crisis. Timothy mainly based his study on historical archives that show a deep unity and common commitment between the two regions, emphasising how their cooperation went beyond conventional political alliances. This contribution is significant because it not only sheds light on the geopolitical manoeuvrings of the time but also emphasises Türkiye and Libya's enduring bonds of support and solidarity, enriching the historical understanding of their interconnections and the broader impact of mutual assistance on their respective national struggles (Timothy, 1990).

Another work reflecting the transition period is Nevzat Artuç's "Turkish-Senussi Relations from the Italo-Turkish War to the Turkish War of Independence." This article makes substantial contributions to the literature on Turkish-Senussi relations by re-evaluating Sultan II. Abdülhamid's diplomatic strategy, the strategic function of the Hamidiye Regiments, and the complicated dynamics of the Italian-Turkish War and World War I. It provides new insights into how early miscommunications and geopolitical concerns affected Ottoman foreign policy, discusses the Turkish-Senussi alliance's impact on regional defence efforts, and investigates the limitations of Senussi support during World War I. Furthermore, it emphasises Sheikh Ahmed es-Senussi's influence on caliphate debates and Turkish independence, contextualising his role in improving Turkish-Libyan relations. This book contributes to historical understanding by combining primary sources and offering a thorough account of these crucial relationships (Artuç, 2022).

Similarly, Bahri Oğuzhan Demirezen examined the interaction between Libya and Türkiye during the Ottoman Empire's transition into the Turkish Republic. He brought particular attention to the relationship between the Turkish national movement and the religious movement that is known for struggling against foreign intervention,

the Senussiyah. Demirezen argues that Sheikh Ahmet Senussi, who was the leader of the movement at that time, was a strategic partner for the Turkish War of Independence in general and Mustafa Kemal Paşa in particular. Both names were known for their fight and national awakening propaganda in their home countries against colonial interventions. Therefore, the scholar brings attention to the collaboration among regional movements. He further reflects the Senussiyah movements' influence in the MENA region. Furthermore, it gives light on how the Senussi's support not only aided the Turkish national cause but also helped to the resurrection of Islamic solidarity and the caliphate's survival, enriching the period's historical narrative (Demirezen, 2020).

During the Italian colonial period in Libya, there was notable support from Turkish individuals for Libya's struggle for independence. When Libya gained independence in 1951 under the auspices of the UN, King Idris chose a prime minister of Turkish descent, as highlighted in Orhan Koloğlu's work. This decision underscores the enduring relationship between Türkiye and Libya. The literature, however, is lacking in studies that focus on the Turkish-Libyan relationship during Libya's independence struggle. Despite this gap, archived documents and records from this period are available. One of the objectives of this thesis is to address this deficiency by exploring Turkish-Libyan connections during Libya's struggle for independence, a period that has received less scholarly attention compared to the Gaddafi era and beyond. Hence, recent studies about Turkish-Libyan relations show much more interest in the period after Gaddafi.

In this context, Yeliz Gündüz's thesis, "An Analysis of the Libyan Ceasefires as Part of a Peace Process," offers a significant contribution to the literature on conflict resolution by examining the complexities of ceasefires in Libya, particularly within the context of Turkish-Libyan relations. Her work builds on the broader discourse of war-to-peace transitions, highlighting how Türkiye's strategic involvement has shaped the outcomes of ceasefire agreements in Libya after 2011. Gündüz underscores the challenges of sustaining peace in the post-Cold War era, where international interventions often lead to temporary ceasefires rather than lasting peace. By focusing on Türkiye's role, she provides valuable insights into the effectiveness of international

mediation efforts, contributing to a deeper understanding of the dynamics that influence peace processes in conflict zones like Libya (Gündüz, 2021).

The literature on Türkiye's recent involvement in Libya has mainly concentrated on ideology or regional ambitions. Recent scholars like Cüneyt Özşahin and Cenap Çakmak focusing on the relationship between Türkiye and Libya argue that Türkiye's movements in the region are related to national security and maritime interest. According to both, Türkiye, rather than acting due to ideological alignment with Libya, its actions are driven by security and maritime considerations. The "Blue Homeland" (Mavi Vatan), anchored in past military viewpoints, is fundamental to Türkiye's national discourse, showing how it is used to generate public support. Hence, the study reflects different narratives applied by the Turkish government in order to legitimise its actions. Examples include national security concerns and international standards. This methodological approach uses theme discourse analysis of official statements and agreements to illustrate Türkiye's Libya policy's purposeful use of language to win national and international support. Thus, the article sheds light on Türkiye's involvement in Libya and its wider effects on regional and global affairs (Özşahin and Çakmak, 2022).

Muddassır Quamar's article titled "Turkey and the Regional Flashpoint in Libya" contributes considerably to the literature on Turkish-Libyan relations by providing a detailed analysis of Türkiye's engagement in Libya, focussing on its geopolitical, economic, and domestic objectives. Quamar argues that Türkiye's military involvement in Libya was motivated by geostrategic ambitions and regional factors rather than ideological goals. The scholar gives detailed information about Türkiye's political tactics in the regions by exemplifying it with the alignment of the Turkish government with the GNA. He mentions Türkiye's clever step sitting around the same table with the UN recognised government in Tripoli. In this way, Türkiye increases its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The UN position regarding Türkiye's involvement is another field of research the scholar digs into. By doing so, the researcher tries to observe the impact of Türkiye's military involvement in the whole Eastern Mediterranean region (Quamar, 2020).

Ergün Demirel's assessment of Türkiye's participation in Libya adds richness to the literature on Türkiye-Libya ties by shedding light on the diverse causes and consequences of Ankara's involvement. The paper presents a detailed background on Libya's post-2011 turmoil, emphasising serious economic deterioration and humanitarian concerns that contextualise Türkiye's strategic interests. It digs into Ankara's aims to establish itself as a regional force in MENA, illustrating how Türkiye's backing for the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) is consistent with its overall foreign policy objectives. The author also compares Türkiye's involvement to that of other foreign actors, including France, Egypt, and the UAE, providing a full understanding of the geopolitical factors at work. By incorporating economic, political, and military components, the research contributes to the debate on international relations and gives insight into the complex interaction of regional forces and strategic goals that shape the Libyan conflict (Demirel, 2021).

Şaban Kardaş, an additional name who explores Türkiye's shift in policy during the Libyan crisis in 2011. He examines the dynamics that potentially had driven this shift, putting forward a concept called "escalation dominance." This concept aimed at reflecting how Türkiye's initial effectiveness in modifying the conflict's dynamics was later limited by shifting on-the-ground reality. The paper contextualises the Libya crisis by linking it to broader regional rivalries involving Türkiye, the UAE, Egypt, and Russia, as well as highlighting Türkiye's economic and strategic motivations, such as recovering losses from the Gaddafi era and its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, the study investigates how Türkiye's military involvement and subsequent de-escalation affected regional diplomacy, as well as the broader transformation of Türkiye's foreign policy from a liberal to a more coercive stance, providing a comprehensive picture of Türkiye's strategic adjustments in response to regional crises (Kardaş, 2020).

Further names contributing to this area are Kekilli and Öztürk. Both scholars include a historical background and context in order to understand the improvement of the relationship between Libya and Türkiye into its contemporary status. The authors argue that 500 years of past is not simply a fact to overlook. By observing the conflict in 2011 within this context, it becomes, according to these scholars, easier to

understand Türkiye's actions. Moreover, adopting a historical approach will also provide different perspectives in comprehending Türkiye's political attitude throughout Turkish-Libyan relations and Türkiye's strategic support for the GNA later on. The scholars examine Türkiye's response to Haftar's military actions, as well as the ramifications for regional stability and diplomacy. This work adds to the literature by tracing Türkiye's transformation from diplomatic supporter to active military engagement, which reflects broader changes in its regional policies and strategic goals (Kekilli and Öztürk, 2020).

The thesis named "The Challenges Facing Stability of the Political System in Libya After Applying Gaddafi's Ideology" prepared by Almuammari adds to the literature on Turkish-Libyan relations by giving a thorough examination of Libya's historical and political history, with a special emphasis on the impact of Muammar Gaddafi's ideology and the subsequent collapse of his dictatorship. Almuammari argues that the demise of Gaddafi's Jamahiriya caused permanent instability in the country. The scholar further makes suggestions on possible solutions on how regional countries, including Türkiye might improve relations with Libya in order to change the situation in a positive direction and build stability. This backdrop is critical for understanding Türkiye's strategic goals and diplomatic methods in Libya, contributing to the literature on the dynamics of Turkish-Libyan relations in the midst of continued regional chaos (Almuammari, 2021).

The report titled "Strategic Step in the Eastern Mediterranean Equation: Memorandum of Understanding Between Türkiye and Libya," prepared by the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications, adds significantly to the literature on Turkish-Libyan relations and Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics. It analyses the 2019 Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between Türkiye and Libya in depth, with a focus on maritime jurisdiction delimitation and security cooperation. The paper contextualises these accords within the larger regional power struggles by outlining Türkiye's strategic aims and legal views on hydrocarbon resources and maritime boundaries. According to this report, Türkiye's actions in the Eastern Mediterranean are about asserting its rights. By observing this report, one understands Türkiye's political approach in shaping regional stability while at the

same time becoming an insight into maritime conflicts and the Eastern Mediterranean's developing dynamics (Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications, 2020).

An additional name mentioning the importance of historical and contemporary circumstances in influencing the Turkish-Libyan Maritime Border Agreement in 2019 is Elmaloul. The scholar argues that such an agreement signed in a critical political atmosphere was a strategic move by Türkiye to express its existence in the region while many regional countries such as Greece, Israel, and Egypt were trying to oversee Türkiye. Türkiye, in this way, gave a message to the international world that it was also a part of the competition in the Eastern Mediterranean. With the agreement in 2019, Türkiye and Libya aimed at strengthening their position in the region, an area defined by geopolitical conflict and substantial petroleum resources. The research explains how the arrangement represents Türkiye's geopolitical interests of counterbalancing Greece, Cyprus, and Israel's exclusionary energy initiatives, as well as Libya's reliance on Turkish backing in the face of internal upheaval and international interference. His paper contributes to a better understanding of the dynamic interplay between national interests and regional alliances, demonstrating how Türkiye's involvement in Libya is motivated by both geopolitical calculations and a larger plan to secure its position in the Mediterranean (Elmaloul, 2021).

1.3.1. Summary

Evidently, the literary debate about Turkish-Libyan relationship extends from the past to the present. It traces the beginning of the interaction of both nations during the Ottoman period to today's contemporary political situation. While observing the literature, the existence of not only political ties but rather socio-cultural, historical, political as well as ideological communalities come to the forefront. Although it is possible to argue about a geostrategic reality in the region regarding the Turkish-Libyan relationship, these communalities should not be overlooked. To begin with, Jean Sauvaget's exploration of the Ottoman Empire's governance highlights its extensive territorial reach, administrative competence, and military strength during the 16th century while portraying the stabilising role of the Ottoman Empire and its efforts to protect religious minorities, providing a foundational understanding of Ottoman

influence in Libya. Furthermore, Koloğlu's research delves into the intricate relationship between local dynamics and the Ottoman Empire's strategic objectives in North Africa, further examining the impact of modernisation efforts and European colonial pressures on Ottoman-Libyan relations. Lisa Anderson's work builds on this by focusing on the significant reforms initiated by the Ottomans in Libya after 1835, including urbanisation and administrative changes, alongside the influence of the Sanusiyyah movement. Generally, these scholars bring attention to Libya's transformation under Ottoman rule and regional consequences. Particularly, the Senussiyyah movement, known for its role during Libyan as well as Turkish independence, seems to be of great importance within the literary discussion. This focus on local movements is echoed in the works of Timothy and other scholars like Nevzat Artuç and Bahri Oğuzhan Demirezen, who explore the cooperation between Türkiye and Libya, especially in countering Italian imperial ambitions and fostering regional defence. These historical analyses shed light on the enduring partnership between Türkiye and Libya, rooted in shared resistance against external threats and mutual strategic interests. Coming to more recent times, the literature shifts its focus to Türkiye's ongoing involvement in Libya, particularly following the 2011 conflict.

In this regard, Yeliz Gündüz's analysis of Türkiye's role in Libya's ceasefire agreements highlights the challenges of transitioning from conflict to peace and Türkiye's significant contributions to these processes. This contemporary perspective is enriched by the work of scholars like Cüneyt Özşahin and Cenap Çakmak, who prioritise Türkiye's national security and maritime concerns in their evaluation of its objectives in Libya. The geopolitical dimension is further explored by Muddassir Quamar, who examines the motivations behind Türkiye's military involvement in Libya, including its broader implications in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ergün Demirel provides a comparative analysis by placing Türkiye's actions within the context of other foreign powers, offering insights into its regional and global strategies. Meanwhile, Şaban Kardaş's concept of "escalation dominance" provides a nuanced understanding of Türkiye's shift from non-interference to active military engagement in Libya, illustrating the constraints and opportunities presented by changing circumstances. Kekilli and Öztürk further discuss Türkiye's transition from a

supportive to an active military policy, emphasising its impact on regional stability and diplomacy. Almuammari's analysis of Muammar Gaddafi's influence on Libya's instability provides further examination of Turkish-Libyan relations within the context of ideological and strategic comparison.

Coming to the 2019 Agreement between Türkiye and Libya, there are many arguments regarding the underlying facts. An official report prepared by the Directorate of Communication of the Turkish Republic puts great importance on the agreement in terms of maritime delimitation and security cooperation. This document, alongside Elmaloul's assessment of the 2019 Maritime Border Agreement, highlights the geopolitical and economic stakes for both countries in the Eastern Mediterranean. As can be derived from the summary, the literature on Turkish-Libyan relations extends from historical narratives, strategic interest, geopolitical challenges, regional norms, and further, while demonstrating the influence of deep-rooted ties on present-day political engagements.

1.4. Influence of the UN and NATO on Turkish-Libyan Relations

When it comes to discussions about the influence of the UN, one of the most important names that needs to be mentioned in the literature is Adrian Pelt. He served as the UN mediator for Libyan matters during the process of independence. The author's significant scholarly contribution focuses on examining the intricate dynamics that occurred during the process of Libyan independence, particularly within the context of UN engagement reflecting its influence. Pelt's research illuminates the UN role as a dominant player in influencing the direction of post-conflict stabilisation efforts in Libya. His output is a valuable resource for individuals who are interested in comprehending the intricacies of state-building processes and power dynamics following the end of colonial rule. Furthermore, Pelts' study provides a comprehensive account of the independence process of Libya. An analysis of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) sessions offers a comprehensive record of the deliberations and suggestions pertaining to the autonomy of Libya. For example, the Bevin-Sforza plan, devised by British and Italian officials, had substantial consequences for the fate of the local population, leading to opposition from Libyan leaders. While providing the influence of the UN during the independence process of

Libya, Pelt's work, however, lacks in reflecting the influence of the UN on Türkiye-Libya relations. Hence, profiting from Pelt's work, this thesis will add the analysis of the influence of the UN on Turkish-Libyan relations during the independence process of Libya (Pelt, 1970).

Ann Dearden's article "Independence for Libya: The Political Problems" offers a valuable contribution to the literature on decolonisation and the complex processes of establishing new states in the post-World War II era. Her work provides an in-depth analysis of Libya's path to independence, focusing on the challenges and political dynamics involved in uniting Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan into a single Libyan state. Dearden's exploration of the UN's unprecedented role in state-building, led by Commissioner Adrian Pelt, highlights the intricate balance between international intervention and local governance. Her article sheds light on the tensions between the former colonial powers, Britain and France, and the emerging Libyan leadership, emphasising the impact of international advisory efforts on local political sentiments. Dearden brings attention to the influence of IOs in shaping the international political order and the establishment of independence procedures in many countries in the MENA (Dearden, 1950).

In his book *Creating a New Libya*, Richard Daniels also examines the process leading to Libya's independence in many dimensions. The scholar argues that the creation of a provisional government under the auspices of the UN led to Idris Al Senussi becoming the king. Daniels examines Libya's alignment with the Allies during World War II, noting how military efforts freed the region from Axis control. He also describes the challenges the British and French military administrations encountered in restoring governance, focusing on their achievements in reestablishing education, civil services, and healthcare. Furthermore, Daniels discusses Libya's economic difficulties, emphasising the need for agricultural development and the financial support provided by the United Kingdom. In this regard, Daniels' study enriches the literature by providing an insight into the transformation process of Libya from years of conflict to an independent state (Daniels, 1951).

The Editorial Book authored by Atay Akdevelioğlu, Oran Baskın, and Çağrı Erhan offers a thorough analysis of Turkish foreign policy spanning from the War of

Independence to the present. The book “Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar” (Turkish Foreign Policy: Facts, Documents, and Comments), edited by Oran Baskın, provides valuable analysis of the historical context, decision-making processes, and external influences that have influenced Türkiye’s foreign policy trajectory. An important aspect of the work done by these researchers is their examination of Türkiye’s interactions with IOs like NATO and the UN. Through an analysis of significant events like Türkiye’s entry into NATO, they provide insight into the intricate dynamics of global influence and decision-making in relation to Turkish foreign policy. However, the analysis of the influence of the UN and NATO specifically on Turkish-Libyan relations throughout the past up to the present day is lacking. Moreover, their research emphasises the intricate relationship between Türkiye’s foreign policy goals and its engagements with organisations such as NATO and the UN. The researchers offer a detailed analysis of how Türkiye’s perspective on global issues has been shaped by its interactions with these organisations, providing a nuanced comprehension of Türkiye’s role in the international community. Hence, the analysis of Türkiye’s engagements with entities such as NATO and the UN increases the understanding of the intricacies of international relations in the MENA and beyond (Oran, 2001).

John Anthony Allan contributes to the body of written works with his 1981 publication titled “Libya: The Experience of Oil.” Allan conducts an analysis of Libya’s oil sector and its influence on the nation’s economics, politics, and global interactions. Allan’s analysis explores the historical circumstances during the discovery of oil in Libya and the following growth of its petroleum industry. The author investigates the impact of oil as a wealth on Libya, which resulted in the country becoming one of the richest nations in the area. Additionally, the author analyses the difficulties and advantages that come with managing such a valuable resource. Furthermore, Allan’s research provides a valuable and detailed understanding of the political intricacies related to Libya’s oil industry, namely during the rule of King Idris and Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Allan’s analysis of oil resource management under various leaderships provides valuable insights into the influence of oil wealth on Libya’s domestic policies and its interactions with the international community. His

contribution to the literature is characterised by his meticulous research, discerning analysis, and nuanced investigation of the impact of oil on Libya's socio-economic and political progress. The value of his work persists for scholars, policymakers, and individuals with an interest in comprehending the intricacies of resource management in oil-abundant nations such as Libya. The most important aspect is that Allan's analysis serves to understand how a position of a country can change this country's importance for the international community, which is one of the main arguments within CSS adopted in this thesis (Allan, 1981).

Peter Odell's contribution in his work "Oil and World Power: Background to the Oil Crisis" is also anticipated to centre on the wider backdrop of the global oil sector and its impact on shaping international relations. His work also reflects the importance of a country's geostrategic, geopolitical, and geographical position to international hegemons. He explores the historical development of the oil market, the rise of oil-producing countries as influential actors in global politics, and the geopolitical tactics used by major powers to ensure access to oil resources. Odell's findings offer a structure for comprehending how Libya's oil riches align with the broader dynamics of global power struggles and economic interests. He emphasises the geographical advantage of Libya's proximity to important markets in Europe and North America. Additionally, he points out that the closure of the Suez Canal during the Middle East conflict in 1967 resulted in heightened interest and investment from oil companies that were searching for alternate ways for transporting oil. Moreover, Odell's research highlights the economic and geopolitical consequences of Libya's significant increase in oil output before the 1969 coup. He proposes that if the Suez Canal had not reopened, Libya could have become a significant participant in the worldwide oil market, potentially becoming the third largest oil producer, following the US and the Soviet Union. Odell's research offers excellent insights into the complex relationship between geopolitics, economics, and energy resources within the framework of power, hegemony, and influence lacking in UN and NATO dimension. It does so by only providing comprehensive knowledge of Libya's oil industry within the broader framework of global power dynamics and oil markets. His work continues to be pertinent for scholars, policymakers, and individuals with an interest in the

intricacies of the global oil industry and its influence on international relations (Odell, 2013).

Mohamed El Mehdawi contributes to the literature by providing insights into the industrialisation process of Libya, specifically focusing on the nationalisation of oil assets and its impact on the country's economy and development after 1970. The scholar argues that oil was one of the most important facts affecting Libya's development and crises within the international system. The analysis of the decrease in oil production after Gaddafi's nationalisation policy sheds light on the variables that have contributed to this trend, offering vital insights into the dynamics of the country's oil industry and its connection with government intervention. However, Mehdawi's work lacks in reflecting the influence of the UN and NATO during this process. According to Mehdawi, Libya's oil nationalisation is situated within the wider historical framework of the MENA area. His research places the nationalisation process in the broader framework of geopolitical and economic forces. This allows readers to grasp the importance of Libya's activities in relation to regional events and global energy markets (Mehdawi, 1981).

One important turning point within this thesis reflecting the relationship between Türkiye and Libya during significant turning points, and the influence of the UN and NATO, is the Cyprus crisis. However, it needs to be mentioned that there are only a few works written about the Libyan support to Türkiye during the Cyprus crisis in 1974. İsmail Şahin is one of the best-known figures in the context of the Cyprus issue. Şahin's scholarly work focuses on Türkiye's endeavours to preserve the existing state of affairs in Cyprus and the diplomatic obstacles presented by Archbishop Makarios' position on the island's political status. Şahin's paper explores the historical and political background of the founding of the Republic of Cyprus and the resulting difficulties caused by conflicting views for the island's future. He emphasises that Türkiye, together with Greece and the United Kingdom, serves as a guarantor state to protect the independence, territorial integrity, and security of Cyprus, as stated in the constitution. Furthermore, Şahin's research illuminates Türkiye's diplomatic endeavours to tackle concerns related to the actions of Enosis supporters, specifically Archbishop Makarios, who perceived certain accords as betrayals of the objective to

unite with Greece. Şahin records Türkiye's continuous correspondence with Makarios, asking him to use peaceful methods in accordance with international law to preserve the existing situation on the island. His work offers a different perspective on Türkiye's struggle for existence in the region as well as the obstacle it encounters during the struggle for recognition within the context of the Cyprus issue (Şahin, 2020).

In his 1985 book named "In the Eye of the Storm," Kurt Waldheim contributes to the broader discourse on international conflicts by offering detailed perspectives on the Cyprus crisis and the role of the UN. Instead of discussing whether the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was successful or not, Waldheim delves into the challenges faced by this group. He emphasises the established scepticism toward the UN peacekeeping force, referencing previous operations such as in the Congo. According to Waldheim, the difficulty in reaching an ultimate result in Cyprus stems from the primary reason that all groups on the island are reluctant to fully accept the Cypriot identity, preferring to fall back upon a regional state's nation (Waldheim, 1986).

Another researcher adding to the literature about the Cyprus crisis and the influence of IOs is David Rudnick. Rudnick explores the Cyprus crisis from its very beginning on, up to 1974. He puts particular importance on the influence and involvement of NATO during the Cyprus crisis in 1974. Rudnick argues that the Cyprus crisis in 1974 had a negative influence on member states within the alliance. In order to support his argument, he provides a historical narrative bringing attention to the Zürich and London Agreements of 1960. Rudnick states that the London and Zürich Agreements need to be understood better. The author emphasises the ineffectiveness of NATO's attempts to prevent a proxy conflict between Greece and Türkiye on the island, which at the end led to direct clashes between their military troops. In addition, Rudnick examines the diplomatic consequences of the Cyprus issue, with a specific emphasis on the tense relationship between Türkiye and the US after Senator Eagleton's attempts to impose an embargo on military sales to Türkiye. Within this context, Senator Eagleton communicates with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger about possible consequences for Türkiye's unexpected attitude in the

Eastern Mediterranean. The scholar, while providing insights into these discussions, demonstrates Türkiye's dependence in foreign policy on NATO (Rudnick, 1977).

Another name contributing to the literature is Brigadier Francis Henn, adding to the body of literature with his work titled "A Business of Some Heat: The UN Force in Cyprus Before and During the 1974 Turkish Invasion," published in 2004. He conducts a comprehensive analysis of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and its involvement in the events leading up to and during the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Henn's study provides important insights into the intricate dynamics surrounding the Cyprus issue, with a particular emphasis on the diplomatic endeavours of multiple stakeholders, such as Türkiye, Southern Cyprus, Greece, the EU, the UN, and NATO. The author further underlines the continuous influence of the Cyprus dispute on Türkiye's relations with these organisations and the difficulties encountered in dealing with the subject in international forums. In addition, Henn's analysis of UNFICYP reflects the function of international peacekeeping troops in resolving conflicts and promoting peace, offering significant perspectives on the challenges of upholding peace and stability in disputed areas (Brigardier, 2004).

James Alan's work centres around a meticulous examination of the UNFICYP and its efficacy in upholding peace and security on the island. Alan's appraisal of UNFICYP's effectiveness in Cyprus is comprehensive, as it examines both the triumphs and shortcomings of the organisation in preventing conflict escalation and supporting peace. He mentions that the UNFICYP was the most effective organ on the island, being successful in reducing the chaos even though there were many mistakes in tackling the Cyprus war. These mistakes demonstrate the importance of context-specific policies and strategies during conflict resolution in any case. He illuminates the intricate connection between peacekeeping missions and conflict resolution processes by analysing the lasting influence of UNFICYP's presence on the political dynamics of the island (Alan, 1989).

An additional important event that has the potential to reflect the influence of the UN and NATO on any two regional countries in the MENA is the Arab Spring. Nader Hashemi's article, "The Arab Spring Two Years on: Reflections on Dignity, Democracy, and Devotion," published in *Ethics & International Affairs* in 2013,

provides a critical analysis of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt during the Arab Spring. Hashemi challenges the oversimplified narratives presented by Western media. He emphasises that although the Western media portrayed the events in Tunisia and Egypt as revolutions against authoritarianism and dictatorship, the protests were driven by many underlying factors. The author contends that the uprisings were primarily motivated by poverty, a desire for dignity, and responses to worsening social conditions, pervasive corruption, and official misconduct. Hashemi rejects the thought that the Arab Spring was purely a civil demonstration, questioning provocative concerns in fuelling these events. The scholar invites researcher to dig deeper into the causes and driving mechanism of the uprising rather than agreeing on mass media output. His work offers profound insights into the intricacies of the Arab Spring upheavals, providing a sophisticated view that surpasses basic portrayals. Despite his detailed analysis of the Arab Spring, Hashemi's work lacks in exploring the international influence. Therefore, taking also into consideration his conclusions, this thesis will add an international dimension to the issue by exemplifying the influence of international peace and security organisations on the Turkish-Libyan relationship (Hashemi, 2013).

Frederic Wehrey's work on the Arab Spring makes a significant contribution to understanding how Libya's internal conflicts became internationalised after 2011. In his research, Wehrey focuses on the role of external actors, particularly NATO member nations, and their involvement in the Libyan conflict. He argues that different groups such as AFRICOM or the UN military, are influential in shaping the conflict based on their geopolitical and geostrategic interests. Furthermore, the researcher is convinced that the weaker the authority in a country, the more international attention is attracted. The US, France, the UK, Türkiye, as well as Russia's existence in Libya, support this argument. Wehrey is offering a critical examination of the underlying motivations and outcomes of the actions of these countries. He is also not convinced that NATO had a positive influence in resolving the problem. According to him, different interests within the alliance led to a more competitive atmosphere on the ground (Wehrey, 2013).

A similar contribution to the literary discussion has been made by Richard Brody. He wrote his article titled “Did Bernard-Henri Lévy Take NATO to War?” in 2011. Brody analyses the involvement of Bernard-Henri Lévy, a prominent French philosopher and public intellectual, in promoting NATO action in Libya during the rebellion against Muammar Gaddafi’s government. Brody’s study offers valuable perspectives on the intricacies of the Libyan revolt and NATO’s participation in the conflict. The author emphasises the early lack of action by the mass of Libyans during the revolt, which enabled Gaddafi’s soldiers to quickly regain power. Nevertheless, Brody highlights the significance of the rebels from Cyrenaica, who implored NATO for aircraft intervention when they were on the brink of imminent defeat. Brody states that in order to understand the level of influence by NATO in the Libyan crisis, theoretical as well as practical aspects need to be considered. Within this regard, the scholar brings attention to individuals, groups, and ideas involved in the Libyan uprising and tries to comprehend NATO’s reaction. Brody begins with the Arab Spring, discusses international influence, and explores activities turning people against authoritarian regimes (Brody, 2011).

Mary Fitzgerald’s literary work may be found in her chapter titled “Finding Their Place: Libya’s Islamists During and After Revolution,” which is included in the book “The Libyan Revolution and its Aftermath,” edited by Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn. This book was published in 2015 by Oxford University Press. Accordingly, one of the most significant facts affecting the Turkish-Libyan relationship is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Therefore, while analysing the relationship between these countries, the MB needs to be considered. By doing a literature review, it comes to the forefront that the consideration of this group is very low. Fitzgerald argues that the MB was one of the most influential fractions during the Libyan uprising in establishing revolutionary brigades. Furthermore, the scholar states that the MB was actively involved in providing humanitarian aid while gaining important positions within the National Transitional Council. Fitzgerald claims that the MB consciously works to expand its influence by stating a non-governmental institutional identity. She analyses the Brotherhood’s organisational structure and techniques used to traverse the transitional phase and establish itself as a political power in post-revolutionary Libya.

Fitzgerald enhances comprehension of the intricacies of Islamist groups following regime transition by placing the Brotherhood's operations in the wider political context of post-2011 Libya. Fitzgerald illuminates the difficulties and possibilities encountered by the Brotherhood in establishing its power and ideology within Libya's changing political landscape. Mary Fitzgerald's work significantly enhances scholarly discussion on the Libyan revolution and its consequences by offering valuable perspectives on the influence of Islamist movements, specifically the Libyan MB, in shaping the nation's political path during and after the revolution (Fitzgerald, 2015).

Ali Khadija is another name that provides a thorough analysis of the Libyan MB's return to political engagement following the Libyan Civil War in the article "MB to Contest Libyan Elections as Independent Party." Khadija documents the considerable influence exerted by the MB, a well-known Islamist organisation in the MENA region, on Libya's political situation following the Arab Spring. He argues that the MB was founded in 1949 and passively observed the situation in the country until 2011, when it for the first time reappeared as a conference on November 17, 2011. In addition, Khadija's article gives insight into the calculated choices made by the Libyan MB, including their declaration to establish a political organisation and engage in the next Public National Conference elections set for June 2012. The scholar delivers a clear and in-depth examination of the Brotherhood's goals to actively participate in politics and exert influence in Libya after the civil war. His work also emphasises the wider regional backdrop against which the Libyan MB functions, alluding to the participation of notable individuals such as Suleiman Abdelkader and Tunisian politician Rashid Ghannouchi. The scholar calls for particular attention to the influence of the MB in the MENA region as an Islamist movement while the literature drawing attention to the MB also fails in understanding the influence of the UN and NATO (Khadija, 2011).

Frederiksen and Tziarras offer a comprehensive examination of the Second Libyan Civil War and its wider consequences for the region, making a noteworthy addition to the existing body of scholarly discussions. Their research examines the underlying dynamics of the conflict, which include the rise of Islamist factions that are linked with the MB. Accordingly, this has led to a division and intensification of

opposing forces both within the country and on the international stage. The researchers provide insights into the conflict in Libya by exploring power structures represented by the General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli and the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk. These scholars explore the competing interests and alliances that influence the conflict. Moreover, Frederiksen and Tziarras emphasise the involvement of external actors, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Qatar, in supplying military assistance to conflicting factions, thereby intensifying the conflict and prolonging instability in the region. The researchers investigate the ideological division regarding the position on the MB, which plays a crucial role in determining foreign alliances (Frederiksen and Tziarras, 2020)

In addition, Paul Kubicek is working on the Justice and Development Party government in Türkiye. Of particular interest is the Turkish governments shift in its foreign policy. Kubicek argues that with the Justice and Development Party in administration, Türkiye underwent a transformation in its foreign policy, prioritising its neighbours in the MENA region as well as the Eastern Mediterranean. This realignment, according to Kubicek, became especially apparent in the wake of significant regional events, such as the Libyan civil war, which spurred Türkiye's more active involvement in regional politics. His study unpacks the various factors shaping Türkiye's foreign policy decisions, including regional conflicts, shifts in geopolitics, and evolving security concerns. Kubicek argues that by adopting a multi-theoretical approach including realist, liberal, and constructivist, it becomes much easier to understand the underlying facts of the issue at hand. His work also examines the broader impact of domestic politics, particularly the role of the Justice and Development Party, in shaping Türkiye's international engagements. This thorough theoretical and empirical analysis enriches the literature on contemporary Turkish foreign policy by offering insights into how internal political dynamics influence its regional strategy and decision-making processes (Kubicek, 2022).

Ali Balcı's literary contribution is evident in his 2017 publication "Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar" ("Türkiye's Foreign Policy: Principles, Actors, and Practices"). Balcı's book offers a thorough examination of Türkiye's foreign policy concepts, players, and methods, specifically highlighting its position

and activities during the Libyan uprising. Balcı provides an analysis of the discussions among different countries, such as the US, France, the UK, Germany, Italy, and Türkiye, over the possibility of intervening in Libya after the UNSC passed two resolutions during the Arab Spring. He emphasises the disparities in the level of desire to intervene among these nations, with France and the UK displaying greater enthusiasm in contrast to the more cautious stance of Germany, Italy, and Türkiye. In addition, Balcı analyses Türkiye's originally cautious approach in terms of providing support to opposition factions in Libya, influenced to some extent by the economic interdependence between the two nations. The author explores Türkiye's strategic realignment towards offering assistance to anti-Gaddafi opposition factions, which he perceives as an innovative foreign policy strategy rooted in Islamic beliefs. Balcı's comprehensive examination of Türkiye's foreign policy decisions and actions during the Libyan revolt enhances our comprehension of Türkiye's role in regional dynamics and its changing strategies in international relations. His research illuminates the intricacies and factors that influence Türkiye's strategy towards global politics, specifically in relation to the Arab Spring revolts (Balcı, 2017).

Peter Bartu's literary contribution is his publication titled "Libya's Political Transition: The Challenges of Mediation," which was released in 2014. Bartu conducts a comprehensive examination of the difficulties and intricacies involved in Libya's political transition, specifically highlighting the mediation endeavours of the UN and other global entities. Bartu further analyses the formation of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) after the capture of Tripoli, emphasising its goals of reinstating public security, advancing the principles of law and order, facilitating inclusive political discussions and national reconciliation, and initiating procedures for drafting a constitution and holding elections. In addition, Bartu explores the intricacies that arose from the participation of multiple intermediaries and the formation of distinct centres of power in various parts of Libya. The scholar examines the cooperative endeavours between the UN and the African Union, Arab League, and EU in promoting political peace. However, he acknowledges the difficulties and critiques encountered, particularly in relation to alleged favouritism towards the government of the National Accord. Peter Bartu's literary discussion provides vital insights into the

complexities of Libya's political transition and the difficulties encountered in attaining stability and reconciliation throughout the post-conflict phase (Bartu, 2014).

Emrullah İşler, in his chapter titled "Türkiye-Libya İlişkileri: Tarihsel Perspektif" ("Turkish-Libyan Relations: Historical Perspective"), which is included in the book "Libya Krizi Bölgesel ve Küresel Aktörlerin Politikaları" ("Libya Crisis Policies of Regional and Global Actors"), edited by Burhanettin Duran and Muhittin Ataman and published by SETA in 2020, conducts a thorough analysis of the relationship between Türkiye and Libya, specifically focusing on their interactions during the ongoing situation in Libya. The author tries to uncover the underlying facts that cause certain parties to support Fayeze al Sarraj in Tripoli while others support the Haftar group in Benghazi. The author pictures possible reasons for Türkiye's backing of the GNA, including a favourable attitude towards pro-Brotherhood groups and the need to safeguard economic stakes in the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, İşler states that Türkiye put great effort into getting in touch with all parties in order to provide a solution. While explaining Türkiye's attitude in the Libyan crisis, İşler trusts the Turkish government to foster peace and security by supporting only the UN-recognised government in Tripoli. His study improves scholarly comprehension of the geopolitical dynamics in the region and the tactics used by Türkiye to negotiate the difficulties of the conflict (İşler, 2020).

Haifa Mohamed Hosen's dissertation, titled "Bilateral Relations between Türkiye and Libya 1951-2018," offers an investigation into the diplomatic connections between Türkiye and Libya spanning almost seventy years. Haifa Mohamed Hosen provides a comprehensive and methodical examination of the diplomatic ties between Türkiye and Libya, covering the period from Libya's initial years of autonomy in 1951 to the present day in 2018. Hosen's research greatly enhances our comprehension of the historical, political, and economic aspects of the bilateral connection between these two nations. Hosen's detailed analysis of archival sources, official papers, and diplomatic letters offers significant insights into the several phases of interaction, collaboration, and occasional conflicts between Türkiye and Libya. According to Hosen's analysis, the intricate elements that have impacted the bilateral relationship should be categorised as geopolitical reasons, economic interests, and cultural

similarities. His work also provides a detailed examination of Türkiye's changing position on the Libyan issue, emphasising the variables that influenced Türkiye's decision-making and its eventual involvement in diplomatic efforts like the Libyan Contact Group. In addition, Hosen's dissertation provides insight into the influence of prominent figures in Turkish foreign policy circles, including former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, and their impact on moulding Türkiye's stance towards the Libyan conflict. This work situates Türkiye's actions within the wider context of international relations and regional dynamics, enhancing an understanding of Türkiye's foreign policy conduct in the MENA region (Hosen, 2019).

Andrea Beccaro's work on foreign involvement in Libya provides a detailed exploration of Russia's strategic ambitions and military interventions in the region. In his chapter, "Russia: Looking for a Warm Sea," from the book *Foreign Actors in Libya's Crisis*, Beccaro examines Russia's objectives in Libya, particularly its support for General Khalifa Haftar and the use of the Wagner Group. His analysis sheds light on Russia's broader "return strategy" in the Mediterranean, using its involvement in Libya as part of a larger effort to expand its influence and establish Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities. The scholar is convinced that there is a link between Russia's actions all around the MENA region. These kinds of parallel actions, according to Beccaro, reflect the geopolitical interests of a country (Beccaro, 2011).

Nicolò Sartori's chapter, *Il Mediterraneo e La Sicurezza Energetica* ("The Mediterranean and Energy Security"), found in the book *La Sicurezza Nel Mediterraneo e l'Italia* edited by Alessandro Marrone and Michele Nones, offers a thorough examination of the Mediterranean's pivotal role in ensuring global energy security as well as transportation. Sartori argues that the Suez Canal, the Dardanelles, and the Bosphorus Straits are the most important routes in facilitating the flow of energy resources across the Mediterranean to Europe or even to the US. According to Sartori, these routes are necessary for the continuation of the global supply chain, linking energy producers to markets. The scholar sees the Mediterranean region as a key to the circulation of energy trade. By emphasising the interdependence between global energy markets and these strategic waterways overlooking the influence of IOs, Sartori

provides a nuanced perspective on the crucial factors influencing energy security in this vital region (Sartori, 2015).

Ioannis Grigoriadis makes a significant contribution to the field of literature with his work titled “Energy Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean: Conflict or Cooperation?” published in *Middle East Policy* in 2014. Grigoriadis analyses the consequences of energy findings in the Eastern Mediterranean, specifically on the possibility of disputes or collaborations among the countries involved. According to Grigoriadis, the formation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) in 2019 is aimed at improving cooperation among regional countries in the Eastern Mediterranean. He claims that the reason for this forum was mainly to decrease dependency on Russian energy by Europe. In addition, he discusses the EastMed pipeline initiative, which seeks to establish a connection between Greece, Southern Cyprus, and Israel with the EU through the Eastern Mediterranean. He also lists the project’s potential impact on regional dynamics and the unity of Western nations. The author makes suggestions regarding possible collaboration among regional countries to positively influence security and power dynamics (Grigoriadis, 2014).

Since one of the most important turning points within this thesis is the Maritime Deal between Türkiye and Libya, a research review regarding this turning point has also been done, realising that the influence of the UN and NATO has not been examined so far. In this sense, Ayaz Avan Esengül’s scholarly contribution provides a detailed analysis of the intricate dynamics surrounding the Eastern Mediterranean maritime jurisdictional question. Esengül explores the legal structure that regulates marine jurisdiction, with a specific focus on the importance of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and its consequences for countries with coastlines. The author thoroughly examines Türkiye’s policy aims, including its goals of achieving energy self-sufficiency, becoming a regional energy hub, and maintaining its dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, Esengül assesses the EU’s stance on the issues, taking into account the Union’s dedication to international law and its endeavours to facilitate resolutions between the coastal states. The scholar argues for a deeper and more strategic diplomatic collaboration among regional countries in order to decrease tensions and increase stability (Avan, 2020).

Furthermore, Gamze Alper's research on the Eastern Mediterranean maritime jurisdictional question offers a comprehensive examination of the declarations and restrictions of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the region, as governed by international law. By examining the legal foundation of the EEZ crisis, Alper digs deeper into the geopolitical and geostrategic objectives of coastal states like Egypt, Syria, the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA), Greece, and Türkiye. Alper adds to the literature by providing an understanding for international agreements like the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and assessing how these declarations match with the national interests of coastal states. In addition, Alper's research considers the consequences of these acts on surrounding states, with a specific emphasis on Türkiye's accords with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and their effects on regional dynamics. In general, this work offers a detailed insight into the EEZ declarations and marine jurisdictional limits in the Eastern Mediterranean, contributing to the thesis in providing legal regulations regarding the Maritime Deal (Alper, 2020).

Interestingly in Turkish maritime history is the concept "Mavi Vatan" put forward by Admiral Ramazan Cem Gürdeniz. Mavi Vatan means Blue Homeland and refers to Türkiye's ideal actions within the Eastern Mediterranean. After the foundation of this concept, even the Turkish government applied to the notion. Furthermore, a great part within the Turkish population adopts an ideological attitude regarding the Eastern Mediterranean, as in the concept of Mavi Vatan. Therefore this concept, being a very important turning point in Turkish maritime history, demonstrates the right for Türkiye to protect its maritime rights. It brings attention to the territory right of Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean. Gürdeniz emphasises the importance of maritime security and safeguarding Türkiye's maritime interests by considering the Blue Homeland as an extension of the Turkish Homeland (vatan). Moreover, Gürdeniz's research illuminates Türkiye's strategic perspective and its endeavours to strengthen its naval dominance in accordance with its wider geopolitical goals. Admiral Ramazan Cem Gürdeniz's contribution enhances our comprehension of Türkiye's maritime strategy and its consequences for regional security and geopolitics (Gürdeniz, 2021).

Heinz Jürgen Axt's literary discussion focuses on analysing the increasing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, specifically regarding naval deployments and military drills among regional entities. The article titled "Troubled Water in the Eastern Mediterranean" discusses the challenges and issues surrounding the water resources in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Accordingly, Türkiye is posing challenges to Greece and Cyprus in relation to energy resources. The analysis by Axt offers valuable perspectives on the factors behind the increased militarisation of the area and the potential consequences for regional security. Axt states that there are many reasons influencing the increase in chaos within Libya. According to this scholar, territorial claims, competition for energy resources, and geopolitical and geostrategic objectives are listed among these reasons. The scholar also brings great importance to the military practices known as "Eunomia" conducted by Greece, Italy, France, and Southern Cyprus. In addition, Axt's article provides a thorough examination of the issues that Türkiye poses to Greece and Cyprus in relation to energy resources. It elucidates the underlying motivations behind Türkiye's assertive actions and the potential ramifications for regional stability (Axt, 2021).

Similar to Admiral Gürdeniz, Cihat Yaycı also argued for maritime jurisdiction regulations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Yaycı explores and tries to prove the legality of Türkiye's geopolitical claims in the Eastern Mediterranean against the GCA. He explores the objections made by the Turkish government against its exclusion in the regions. Providing legal regulations and information about the EEZ Yaycı discusses the rights of Türkiye, Greece, and Southern and Northern Cyprus related to international regulations. Through his examination, he underscores the intricate and contentious nature of the dispute, highlighting the conflicting claims over maritime areas. By doing so, Yaycı provided a historical and political context in order to foster a better understanding of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean (Yaycı, 2011).

Duncan Hollis contributes to the scholarly discourse on international law by providing a detailed analysis of the procedural steps involved in the registration of international agreements with the UN. Furthermore, he talks about the whole process regarding the submission, registration, and publication of treaties to the UN Secretariat's Treaty Section. Hollis emphasises legal regulations regarding the

implementation of these agreements. The scholar states that the registration of agreements is a sign of formal recording and making them accessible to the international community, demonstrating transparency. For the purposes of this thesis, Hollis's analysis is instrumental in examining the treaties signed between Türkiye and Libya in 2019 concerning maritime borders and military security (Hollis, 2020).

Stefano Marcuzzi offers a critical examination of NATO's challenges during the 2019 Libyan escalation, providing valuable insights into the Alliance's internal dynamics and decision-making processes. Marcuzzi argues that the difficulties that NATO faced during the crisis while trying to regulate the internal chaos in Libya caused member states within the alliance to start to dispute. The scholar brings attention to the different perspectives among NATO members. In this regard, the scholar states, the questioning of NATO's credibility should be started. This shows the importance of considering the complex driving forces within NATO. By doing so, he illustrates the complexity of achieving consensus and navigating the decision-making process within NATO. His discussion of the supporters and opponents of NATO's involvement provides a deeper understanding of the conflicting interests and priorities among member states, especially in balancing domestic concerns with external threats (Marcuzzi, 2022).

1.4.1. Summary

The literary discussion surrounding the UN and NATO influence within the MENA region in general but on Turkish-Libyan relations in particular, reflects many underlying facts, such as historical, geopolitical, geostrategic, economic, ideological, and sociocultural. The UN's early involvement in Libya, as discussed by Pelt, played a crucial role in shaping the country's political landscape during its independence, laying the groundwork for future international relations, including those with Türkiye. However, the involvement as explored by Pelt during the independence process of Libya visibly differs from the involvement during the post-Gaddafi period of the UN and NATO. Within this context, Bartu examines and demonstrates the difficulties in a circumstance where there is serious fragmentation in power structure. These challenges have directly impacted Türkiye's strategic decisions, as Ankara has had to navigate a volatile political environment shaped by the UN's evolving role. NATO's

involvement in Libya, particularly during the 2011 intervention, adds another layer of complexity. Marcuzzi's analysis of NATO's internal struggles and decision-making processes during the conflict shows how internal divisions within the alliance influenced its failure in resolving the issue. These divisions also affected Türkiye, which had to balance its role within NATO with its regional policies in Libya. Brody's critique of external advocacy for NATO intervention, particularly through figures like Bernard-Henri Lévy, introduces a moral dimension to the discussion, suggesting that ideological pressures also shaped Türkiye's policy decisions. Nevertheless, geopolitical and economic considerations complicate the relationship between Türkiye and Libya. In this regard, İşler links Türkiye's support for the GNA to broader objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean, where oil security and maritime disputes are central concerns. This perspective is reinforced by historical analyses, such as those by Hosen, which trace the evolution of Turkish policy in Libya and its implications for regional diplomacy.

The significance of energy resources and maritime routes, discussed by Sartori and Grigoriadis, underscores the strategic importance of Libya in ensuring global energy security, a priority for Türkiye as well. Libya's oil resources emerge as a critical factor in its international relations. Allan and Odell explore how Libya's oil wealth has influenced its global standing and, by extension, its relations with countries like Türkiye. El Mehdawi's examination of oil nationalisation further highlights the economic policies that have shaped these interactions. Wehrey's contemporary analysis of post-2011 conflicts provide insight into the ongoing strategic objectives driving foreign interventions, including Türkiye's involvement. The discussions in the literature, when combined, illustrate that the influence of the UN and NATO on Turkish-Libyan relations cannot be understood in isolation. Instead, these influences are intertwined with a broader set of historical, geopolitical, and economic factors. The UN's early role in Libya contrasts with its later challenges, while NATO's intervention and internal conflicts complicate Türkiye's strategic calculations and decreases the possibility of a peaceful solution. The importance of energy resources and maritime disputes further underscores the multifaceted nature of Turkish-Libyan relations. Thus,

it will not be wrong to state that the relationship between Türkiye and Libya is shaped by a complex network of influences, where IOs play significant roles.

1.5. A Historical Review of Cultural and Political Contributions of *Kuloghli*s in the Maghreb

Despite not being a part of the Turkish-Libyan case, there is one part in the thesis that aims to reflect the importance of understanding cultural, political, religious, and historical ties while trying to keep peace and security in a certain country, in particular within the MENA region. This part is about the *Kuloghli*s being Libyans of Turkish background and constituting an important part of Libya. Hence, Aziz Samih's literary contribution is around his examination of the "*Kuloghli*s" concept within the Maghreb region in general. Samih illuminates a specific social phenomenon in the Maghreb by identifying *Kuloghli*s as individuals who have sought refuge in the region for reasons such as engaging in criminal activities, experiencing parental abuse, or pursuing opportunities due to their assertive and daring nature. His research gives an insight into the underlying socio-economic and cultural facts of the change in Maghreb. It provides a comprehension of migration, social exclusion, and identity movements in North Africa. Samih's article improves the existing literature by providing a detailed description of a particular subgroup within Maghreb society. Indeed, this again contributes to the understanding of the wide array of elements that influenced social dynamics in the MENA during the early 20th century (İlter, 1936).

Magaly Morsy is another name analysing the *Kuloghli*s in the historical context of North Africa, specifically during the 19th century. Morsy offers a distinct historical and social viewpoint on the group known as *Kuloghli*s, whom he defines as individuals of mixed heritage. The scholar argues *Kuloghli*s to be former Janissaries quitting their jobs and marrying Libyan women, which caused a significant demographic change in the broader North African region. As can be derived, the change mainly was based on the Ottoman existence and caused a new social group with a unique identity in Libya to occur. By observing this process, it becomes clear that in the 19th century, the North African region witnessed a significant transformation regarding its social, cultural, and demographic aspects (Magaly, 1984).

A third name exploring the origins and history of the *Kuloghli*s in the Maghreb is Ahmet Kavas. Kavas places the *Kuloghli*s within the context of the Ottoman Empire and tries to picture their existence within all periods of the empire. Of particular significance is the 17th century, when the Ottoman Empire starts to lose power but still can keep its influence in North Africa due to the existence of the *Kuloghli*s. Kavas's work expands existing scholarly discussion by offering a comprehensive understanding of the historical development and ongoing relevance of the *Kuloghli*s, framed within the broader context of North African and Ottoman history. His research sheds light on the intricate interplay between Ottoman governance, local dynamics, and societal structures in shaping the Maghreb's history. In fact, Ahmet Kavas is a leading name when it comes to Turkish-Libyan history. He is convinced that Islam and the Arab identity throughout history have persisted in adopting a tribal culture (Kavas, 2001).

Halil İnalçık, a distinguished historian renowned for his expertise in Ottoman history, concentrates on the empire's development from 1300 to 1600. His work offers crucial insights into the political, economic, and cultural dimensions that shaped the Ottoman State's growth and governance. Of particular interest is his exploration of the empire's early engagements with North Africa, set against the broader context of Ottoman presence in the region. His discussions deepen an understanding of the initial phases of Ottoman expansion and the introduction of Turkish characteristics into local communities. Moreover, İnalçık examines the Ottoman Empire's efforts to enhance the naval strength of the Mamluks of Egypt, predominantly of Turkish origin, during the late 15th century. This aspect of his research underscores the military alliances and strategic cooperation among Muslim powers in the Mediterranean during that era. It also draws attention to the important naval and political links between the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, particularly regarding maritime activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. İnalçık's scholarly discussion thus provides a comprehensive view of the Ottoman Empire's classical period, including its external relations and expansion into neighbouring regions such as North Africa. His work adds valuable perspectives to the historiography by offering in-depth analysis of the complex factors that

influenced Ottoman expansion, administration, and diplomacy in the MENA region during this formative stage of the empire's history (İnalçık and Quataert, 1994).

Mohamed Hédi Chérif's literary contribution focuses on examining the impact of the Ottoman occupation and the influence of *Kuloghli*s in the regions of Tunis and Tripoli. Chérif's analysis of the power dynamics and administrative changes in these regions since the early 18th century offers useful insights into how the *Kuloghli*s class has evolved and exerted influence in the Ottoman realms. The author argues that in order to understand the influence of the *Kuloghli*s in the North African region, one needs to concentrate on the 18th century. According to Chérif, *Kuloghli*s gained particular authority during this century while the Ottoman Empires were losing power. A mutual dependency occurred at that time, while the Ottoman Empire trusted the *Kuloghli*s in keeping its influence. Chérif further digs deeper into the *Kuloghli*s involvement in the Algerian administration and states that this process was much more difficult than in the rest of the Maghreb (Chérif, 1999:).

1.5.1. Summary

The study of *Kuloghli*s, people of Turkish heritage who still have a large presence in Libya and the Maghreb region, offers a unique perspective on North Africa's historical and socio-cultural dynamics. This part of the literature reflects scholarly contributions that offer light on the *Kuloghli*s' influence on regional politics, society, and identity from the Ottoman period until the present day. The reason to include this group in the thesis is to show socio-cultural realities on the ground that affect Turkish-Libyan as well as other relationships in the MENA. Within this context, Aziz Samih's study of *Kuloghli*s in the Maghreb region provides an incisive portrait of these individuals as refugees from various backgrounds, including criminal activity, familial abuse, and adventurous desires. Samih brings special attention to the migration process, social exclusion, and the creation of identity in North Africa. Next to Samih, Magaly Morsy is also exploring the *Kuloghli*s. Morsy argues that in order to understand the identity of this particular group in the Maghreb, the Janissaries and their function for the Ottoman administration need to be considered seriously. The reason for that is the establishment of the *Kuloghli*s through marriages of Janissaries and local Libyan women. By exploring Morsy's work, one becomes an insight into the

*Kuloghli*s identity as an interaction of Ottoman military and Libyan nationality, changing the demographic feature of the Maghreb. Morsy's focus on the social and cultural transformations caused by the *Kuloghli*s adds to our understanding of identity formation and societal transformation impacted by Ottoman and Janissary contacts. Additionally, Ahmet Kavas presents a broader historical framework by investigating the decline of Ottoman influence in the 17th century and its consequences for the Maghreb region. His research on the *Kuloghli*s' survival despite the loss of Ottoman rule sheds light on their ongoing impact in North Africa and the Ottoman Empire. Kavas' work not only reveals the historical significance of the *Kuloghli*s but also places them within the greater context of Ottoman-North African interactions. Furthermore, Kavas' examination of Libya's historical trajectory from antiquity to Islamic conquest gives a complete framework for comprehending the region's growing geopolitical and cultural dynamics. Halil İnalçık examines the Ottoman Empire's early ties with North Africa, covering maritime and military operations. His research of Ottoman expansion and Turkish integration into local populations helps to comprehend the early stages of Ottoman dominance in North Africa. His examination of the Ottomans' strategic ties and military engagements, particularly with Egypt, highlights the complicated connections between the Ottomans and regional powers, resulting in a more sophisticated understanding of Ottoman diplomacy and expansion.

Furthermore, Muhammad Hédi Chérif's research on the Ottoman occupation and the function of *Kuloghli*s in Tunis and Tripoli provides a detailed analysis of power dynamics and administrative developments in these areas. Chérif emphasises the *Kuloghli*s' emergence in the 18th century and their growing power inside the Ottoman bureaucracy. His research sheds light on regional variances in the *Kuloghli*s' impact and governance issues, as well as socio-political transformations in Ottoman domains. To sum up, the literature on *Kuloghli*s and their position in North Africa indicates a complex web of historical, social, and cultural interactions. Scholars such as Samih, Morsy, Kavas, İnalçık, and Chérif, etc. provide varied viewpoints on the *Kuloghli*s' significance, including their origins, integration, and influence on regional politics and identities. This set of studies increases our understanding of the complicated processes at play in North Africa when it comes to international interactions.

1.6. Conclusion

Although the literature analysis might be extended, such expansion is considered superfluous as it does not directly focus on the influence of the UN and the NATO on the Turkish-Libyan relationship. By doing case analysis, this thesis will try to fill the gap in reflecting the influence of the UN and NATO on the Turkish-Libyan relationship from a critical perspective. Taking the existing literature into consideration, it becomes obvious that the influence of the UN and NATO could be applied to any two other countries in the region. This is how the regional situation, according to the literature, looks like. The most important task is to choose the right turning points within the Turkish-Libyan case in order to be able to analyse and picture the influence. Therefore, this research review mostly concentrates on analysing specific historical moments between Türkiye and Libya in order to observe the involvement of the UN and NATO during these crucial periods of change.

By embracing this methodology, it becomes apparent that the conceptual frameworks governing the activities of these institutions diverge from their actual implementations. This discrepancy highlights the necessity of harmonising theoretical realities with practical applications. Furthermore, the instances documented in the literature emphasise the capacity of knowledge to facilitate national liberation when theoretical concepts are properly applied in practical situations. More precisely, there are cases where the dominant power, demonstrated by the UN and NATO, had the potential to bring about beneficial results like emancipation but ultimately failed to do so due to misalignment of theory and practice. Hence, an examination of important bilateral examples recorded in the literature provides a helpful method for comprehending the distinctions between the theoretical realities of the UN and NATO, as well as their practical realities. This in-depth investigation will enhance academic discussion by going beyond superficial observation and providing practical insights on attaining lasting emancipation. By studying specific turning points, this thesis deepens the understanding of how IOs can influence bilateral relations and contribute to wider geopolitical dynamics. The whole process takes place from a critical perspective, in which the main goal is to reach an emancipatory result. Therefore, this thesis will not only theoretically understand every single turning point within the Turkish-Libyan

case and its influence on the UN and NATO, but it will also reflect possible ways to reach this goal in practice.



2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE INFLUENCE

2.1. Introduction

To begin with, it is important to mention that by reconceptualising influence, this thesis aims to draw attention to social science and humanities in political and security issues. As can be derived from the literature, scholarly discussion lacks in exploring the influence of international peace and security organisations such as the UN and NATO solely. In order to be able to explore the influence of the UN and NATO, this thesis is going to work on five turning points regarding the case on Turkish-Libyan relationship. Hence, the literature review in the previous chapter helps to explore scholarly work on the theoretical dimension of the influence as a single concept and the five turning points that have been chosen for this thesis. By observing the literature regarding the five turning points within the Turkish-Libyan case to be analysed in this thesis, it soon becomes clear that the exploration of the influence of the UN and NATO is missing, while theoretically the concept of influence is available from many perspectives. Although all former influence's conceptualisations have made an important contribution to the theoretical understanding of the influence, this thesis argues that a new conceptualisation has to be adopted in order to comprehend the influence together with its driving forces. Only in this way it will be possible to learn from history and change the negative influence into an emancipatory one.

During this thesis, it has been applied to the CSS approach in general and the Welsh School in particular. The reason for this is that CSS is not only based on theoretical explanations and conclusions but rather on reaching knowledge, finding reality, and changing. In other words, critical theorists demonstrate that various critical narratives of 'reality' and 'knowledge' exist and are feasible by starting with enlightenment concepts of rational knowledge of human interests. The potential for change toward a "reflective" society is thus always indicated by alternative narratives of reality held by critical theory. Welsh School researchers are also renowned for developing significant and useful frameworks for thinking about security concerns that emphasise emancipation. The Welsh School begins by criticising traditional security studies, in particular realist security theories. According to the Welsh School, "true"

security can never be achieved by viewing security in terms of “power” and “order.” Since one state’s security is another state’s insecurity, the security dilemma at the centre of realist theory by definition makes some (states) secure and others (states) insecure. The defence industry, now a distinct and significant sector, exemplifies the growing divide in global security. More powerful states bolster their security through advancements in defence technologies, often leaving less powerful nations increasingly vulnerable. Despite limited in-depth exploration on this issue, the industry’s impact on global security dynamics is evident, as it amplifies the security disparities between states of varying power and influence. This is unacceptable to the Welsh School. According to them, individuals and communities can only obtain true security if they do not deprive others of it (Booth, 1991a: 319). The Welsh School contends that if security is viewed as emancipation, then an alternative reality is feasible (Booth, 1991b: 539). True security is produced through emancipation, not by force or authority. Theoretically, emancipation provides security (Booth, 1991a: 319).

At this point, the Welsh school is subjected to harsh criticism. For instance, according to Rita Floyd, it is easier said than done to implement the Welsh School idea and its conceptualisation of security as emancipation. The definition of security as emancipation must be agreed upon by all academics in order for the idea to be applied in the actual world. The academy could act as a starting point for emancipation. Rita Floyd contends that despite the conceptualisation of security as emancipation being a promising advancement in security theory, the theory has flaws, the majority of which are due to its normative belief (Floyd, 2007: 332). Where security ends is thus the main issue with Booth and Wyn Jones’ strategy. Both theorists assume that the more security, the better, but neither provides recommendations for when a problem is not a security problem. What then is the benefit of framing anything as a security issue if all issues are, in fact, security-related? (Wæver, 2003: 1-36). Criticism has also focused on CSS’s unmistakably Western European ideational roots, arguing that CSS is destined to have a limited political impact. This idea has influenced discussions on two related topics, namely the applicability of CSS to comprehending insecurities in non-Western societies and what it means for CSS (together with other security academics)

to have political impact. Depending on these factors, the CSS effort falls short in giving a nuanced and persuading grasp of the ethics, borders, or politics of security.

Considering this information, it would be beneficial to see first whether the statement that 'security is emancipation', needs an analysis in its praxis. Secondly, it would be possible to see the borders of security if practical reality could be measured and theorised. The third point is the criticism about the political impact of CSS (read Welsh School) that seems to be made in order to express the passive stance of CSS. In fact, this thesis argues that drawing a distinction between theoretical reality and practical reality automatically reveals the lack of political impact of CSS. Since CSS is mainly theory-based, it is not right to conclude that the limited political impact is related to the theory's Western European ideational roots. In particular, CSS is about what should be and how to change, rather than making definitive assumptions. A lack in CSS (read: Welsh School) occurs therefore in the explanation of the existence of a theoretical and practical reality, whereas there should be a serious dichotomy between them.

The main contribution of this chapter is the reflection of the existence of a theoretical reality and the practical reality considering the influence, based on the Welsh School. This theory is based upon the question of the Welsh School about what reality is. It is necessary to understand the connection or disconnection between theoretical reality and practical reality that produces a certain kind of Influence. Since the Welsh school is not only based on producing theory but also on practicing and changing, the term influence needs to be reconceptualised within this process. This will be the main endeavour of this chapter. Within this regard, according to CSS in general and the Welsh School in particular, power and hegemony are normally perceived as two concepts independent of influence. However, this thesis argues that influence is the inevitable result of power and hegemony. Therefore, it considers both concepts as a subcomponent of the influence. Thus, the new conceptualisation of influence will propose a new point that assists scholars to identify the influence as an indispensable result of hegemony and power used in a bad way due to the lack of understanding the connection/disconnection between theoretical reality and practical reality. The influence cannot be considered independent of historical events and

turning points. Therefore, the influence of NATO and the UN on Turkish-Libyan relations will help to reflect the argument of our thesis in a historical perspective.

After a critical analysis of notable conceptual frameworks of influence that were developed, this thesis argues that all of them lack the ability to recognise what the influence of NATO and the UN on Turkish-Libyan relations is. In addition, all of them do not provide an explanation regarding why the influence should be applicable for any two other countries in the MENA region. Undoubtedly, the strongest basis for the influence is the discourse of keeping international peace and security. Peace and security discussions on the basis of IOs date back almost a hundred years, traditionally based on military force and the control of military force. CSS, as it developed through the 1990s, sought to investigate what security might mean in theory and practice from perspectives on global and local politics that start from very different political, methodological, and philosophical standpoints. CSS is a body of knowledge about security in world politics; it is not a theory of security as such, telling us (like realism) who are the key actors and what are the most rational strategies.

The Aberystwyth Theories, also known as the Welsh School of CSS, on which this thesis is based, mainly reach out to Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones' debates. Both names are known for drawing important and effective frameworks on security issues focusing on emancipation as the prism through which both theory and the practice of security should be viewed. The Welsh School argues that the twentieth century is a unique as well as brutal century. It captures a bloody time period where theoretical commitments were made to the idea of the development of poorer countries; racism and colonialism were delegitimised internationally; the goal of disarmament became a staple of international affairs; a human rights culture was sponsored globally; and the legal scope for war was narrowed more than ever before in history. In order to control all these developments, the need for universal and multipurpose IOs prioritising global peace and security became accepted. This thesis is going to observe the influence of two such organisations namely the UN and NATO, adding a historical perspective. Instead of talking about key actors and strategies, this thesis aims to explore the existence, strength, benefits, and harms of the influence.

Giving examples of turning points in the relationship between Libya and Türkiye, will help to understand the influence in theory and practice. It will also contribute to the literature of CSS in terms of methodology by including archival research on the issue. As Marks states, it is important to change the world rather than to understand it. The CSS is in this sense a theory of practice that is in itself directly related to ‘influence’, however, lacking in concept. In this context, this thesis tries to reveal reality, to question what we can know, and to answer how we might act (Booth, 2007: 99). In order to develop such a comprehensive conceptualisation of influence, three important questions need to be taken into consideration.

First, the existence of the influence of NATO and the UN on the internal matters of Türkiye and Libya should be questioned. It needs to be understood whether Türkiye and Libya are influenced by the UN and NATO during important decision-making processes regarding any issue concerning their national borders. For instance, to what extent is the Turkish government or the Libyan government influenced by the UN and the NATO regarding the presence of political or even military actors? To make it apparent, the UN had an influence in the imposition of King Idris in Libya in 1951, the year that symbolises the very beginning of modern Libya (Simons, 1996: 154). Furthermore, Türkiye was for a very long time dependent on Military support by NATO. This dependence automatically turned out to be an influence of the US, UK and France (NATO, IPT 119/28, 1956; NATO, IPT 98/ 273, 1969; NATO, IPT 197/242/INFO, 1964).² Another question is, how are these countries influenced while adopting a new law? This thesis argues that the existence of the influence of NATO and the UN on internal matters exists. Furthermore, it will be possible to identify a similar influence in every country in the MENA region. However, to make it simple, this thesis only aims to present the Turkish-Libyan relationship as an example.

The second aspect that needs to be considered is the influence of the UN and NATO on the external matters of Türkiye and Libya. Are Türkiye and Libya influenced by the UN and NATO in the international context? This aspect also contains the influence of the UN and NATO on the decision-making of Libya and Türkiye

² See Appendix 19.

toward each other. How is Libya influenced by the UN and NATO while implementing a policy towards Türkiye and vice versa? As a result of the literature review, it has been determined that the conceptualisation of the influence mainly concentrates on the decision-making processes within NATO and the UN. Frankly, countries in the MENA have a special importance to powerful actors in the international system who also are affective decision-makers within the UN and NATO. Therefore, the extent of influence by the UN and NATO is an important issue that needs to be investigated. For example, the process of Türkiye joining NATO took place as a result of an important decision in favour of NATO. Indeed, after Türkiye broke its neutrality in the Second World War and declared war on Germany and Japan, NATO membership started to be discussed. As a result of Türkiye's open stance against Soviet Russia and sending troops to Korea, NATO membership discussions accelerated and eventually took place on 18 February 1952 (Akdevelioğlu, Oran, Erhan, 2016: 36). After this process, Türkiye also became an important country taking regularly place in NATO reports (NATO, C-M(55)150 Part III, 1953). As can be seen, NATO's influence is present on Türkiye's important decision-making processes from the very beginning on in external matters.

Last but not least, it is essential to have a look at how the influence of the UN and NATO is justified. From the establishment of the UN in 1945 and NATO in 1949 to the present, the actions of these two alliances are internationally accepted. How do these two organisations, that have a serious say in the international arena, justify their activities? At this point, the capacity of the influence built on peace and security discourses and the supporting concepts behind it become more important. What are the other concepts that make the influence so unquestionable?

After considering these three aspects, the next step will be developing our conceptualisation of the influence accordingly. In fact, the influence, closely related to knowledge in theory and in practice, is one of the most pertaining concepts to critical Security theories, which is underemphasised. According to Ken Booth, all knowledge is a social process. Knowledge is not simply something. It is produced by one side socially and therefore politically. Knowledge carries its benefits within itself. It provides advantages to some and disadvantages to others (Booth, 2007: 36). To make

it more understandable, the production of knowledge regarding the rise of terrorism has contributed to the expansion of the defence industry. This growth, however, often benefits certain political and economic interests while disadvantaging those who are not actively involved in the production of such knowledge. As a result, one side reaps political and economic gains, while the other, lacking the means to produce or control this knowledge, faces negative consequences. As expressed in Robert Cox's words in the field of international relations, knowledge is always for someone and with a purpose. Since critical security theory reveals the political content of knowledge, it provides the basis for social change and thus progress. Ken Booth argues that change that involves progress is emancipatory. Indeed, emancipation seems to be the output in CSS theories. On the other hand, Richard Wyn Jones repeats Max Horkheimers' statement clearly that critical theory rejects the traditional "separation of value and research, knowledge and action, and other polarities" (Jones, 1999: 122). This means that there has to be an interaction between knowledge and action. Within the context of this thesis, if there is an action, influence becomes inevitable. The holder/producer of knowledge is able to direct the influence automatically, relying on its power and hegemony. In other words, the more knowledge, the more influence. In this setting, based on the Welsh School Theory, this thesis will theoretically demonstrate the influence reflecting power and hegemony as two components that actually revolve around the concept of knowledge.

2.2. Hegemony as a Subcomponent of Influence

As mentioned earlier, the influence exerted by the UN and NATO on Turkish-Libyan relations can be partially explained through the concept of hegemony. To fully grasp the scope of this influence, it is essential to recognise hegemony as a factor in both internal and external dimensions. In doing so, certain key facts need to be taken into consideration. Antonio Gramsci's Marxist understanding of hegemony forms a foundational part of this analysis. Despite the personal cost to him, Gramsci's conceptualisation of hegemony is shaped by his own political experience. Gramsci argues that "all men are intellectuals," though not all serve the role of intellectuals in society. He distinguishes between 'traditional' intellectuals, who see themselves as independent but in reality, reinforce existing power structures, and 'organic'

intellectuals, who theorise and articulate the ideas of a specific social class (Gramsci, 1988: 195). Contrary to the conventional belief that power is maintained solely through coercion, Gramsci proposes that ideas also play a vital role. As Marx had previously noted, the dominant ideas of any era are those of the ruling class. In this context, hegemony is a political leadership or dominance based on the consent of those governed. This consent is secured through the dissemination and normalisation of the ruling class's worldview (Bates, 1975: 351).

The literature on measuring or assessing the concept of hegemony in relation to the influence of IOs is relatively limited. The application of the concept of hegemony has not been a central focus in areas like critical international relations or CSS. Gramsci, for his part, introduces hegemony in an attempt to explain how advanced capitalist nations in the West maintain their dominance. He argues that leadership through moral, intellectual, and consensual means is essential for continuity (Gramsci, 2011: 34). According to Gramsci, hegemony and dictatorship are interconnected. A social class cannot convince others of the legitimacy of its worldview until it has fully internalised that worldview itself. Once this is accomplished, hegemony, rather than dictatorship, becomes the primary form of governance. However, in certain historical circumstances, Gramsci acknowledges that dictatorship may be necessary to establish hegemony, just as hegemony, once established, can ensure the continuation of dictatorship. This historical dynamic highlights how hegemony not only facilitates but also sustains political dominance. Social, cultural, and intellectual developments are crucial to Gramsci's analysis of hegemony, which he frames in terms of class dominance within the state. It is also important to recognise that while the core principles of hegemony remain constant, the concept evolves in response to historical developments.

International events, in particular, have a profound impact on how hegemony is maintained and legitimised. True hegemony, as Ken Booth argues, requires genuine acceptance and legitimacy, rather than mere domination (Booth, 2007: 299). This notion aligns with the epistemology of Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones of the Welsh School, who draw on the work of Jürgen Habermas from the Frankfurt School. Both emphasise the emancipatory potential of knowledge. Wyn Jones argues that

critical scientist must aim to foster an understanding of the world that promotes emancipatory socio-cultural, economic, and political change—a process referred to as emancipatory political praxis. This is especially relevant to proponents of CSS, where the need for emancipatory praxis is particularly pressing (Jones, 1995: 299-319). For such praxis to be successful, it is essential to consider the socio-cultural, socio-economic, socio-political, and historical contexts in which it operates.




Figure 1: Achieving an emancipatory influence requires taking into account socio-economic, socio-cultural, socio-political, and historical factors within the framework of maintaining peace and security. This approach is referred to as Emancipatory Political Praxis.

Jones aims to present the importance between theory and praxis, which is also known as the Marxist way of thinking—not to interpret but to change the world. Theory here refers to knowledge, whereas praxis refers to the emancipation praxis. In fact, there is a rebellion against hegemony in all of these discourses based on CSS. Nevertheless, it soon becomes obvious that all theories and discourses established to destroy hegemony are restricted to the state, a group within the state or a person. This shows that either the definition is insufficient or needs to be put on the agenda of CSS.

Ken Booth, on the other hand, seems to have put more emphasis on hegemony. He is convinced that history contains a series of conceptual distinctions that help differentiate between suzerainty, hegemony, empire, and a state system. Booth also asks the question whether hegemony presupposes a common culture and always ends up in empire (Booth, 2001: 1-15). Interestingly, during imperial times, subordinated states were considered the hegemonic sphere of influence while the situation today with the UN and NATO does not look very different. One of the most interesting and important facts that Ken Booth mentions is the 'hegemonic ambitions' of the major powers. He describes wars in history as expensive businesses (Dunn et al, 1994: 361-376). Thinking of the numbers that are spent to produce different kinds of weapons under the discourse of developing the defence industry today, this statement keeps its actuality. Although, today, it is no longer possible to talk about the classical form of war as known from history between two states or empires only. In history, war was a fact that might shift the international balance. Above all, hegemony was used in such a structure. As a result, hegemony was doomed to remain within the state or empire.

When seen from an epistemological standpoint, knowledge may also be primarily important within the state or empire. Theoretically, even though there are exceptions, historical reality reveals that knowledge feeds hegemony. This reality is still valid in theory, whereas in praxis, conditions and therefore the praxis itself have changed. In this context, this thesis will also put forth two concepts called theoretical reality and practical reality that became increasingly important in the second half of the twentieth century. It will prove that in order to find out and understand reality as it is aimed by Welsh School scholars, a clear distinction between theoretical reality and practical reality is necessary. Furthermore, understanding the influence of knowledge on reality and how to change it will become easier after recognising the existence of these two concepts. In particular, understanding that there is a relationship between theoretical reality and its owner so as between practical reality and its owner will make it possible, as Marx states, 'not to observe but to change'. One of the most threatening issues to security today is the distinction between theoretical reality and practical reality. This is why CSS theorists should take this issue to their agenda to ensure the necessary social and political change. The difference between the two concepts is one

of the main factors that facilitates the hegemony to spill over into the international arena. Frankly, as long as hegemony exists, emancipation is out of the question.

Hegemony in general presents a similar word to supremacy or dominance that for a majority means subordination. Interestingly, as soon as others succeed in following, hegemony ends. This is why critical thinkers like Ken Booth, Richard Wyn Jones, or Robert Cox describe hegemony as historically transitory, as mentioned above. In order to make a global conceptualisation, it is important to cover the international system. According to Robert Cox, the overlapping and interconnected systems of society, economy, culture, gender, ethnicity, class, and ideology that can constitute and perpetuate political powers are at the heart of the hegemonic dilemma. Therefore, hegemony is used here to refer to the quality of the whole, not just a relationship between the parts. Dominance and subordination are part-to-whole relationships, with dominance implying inherent hegemony. But hegemony entails more than just dominance. Hegemony is a sort of dominance in which dominance is hidden by the impression of submission, as if it were the natural order of things. So, dominance exists, but it is less obvious when we talk about hegemony. To elaborate, hegemony is an internalised coherence that most likely arose from externally imposed order but has been turned into an intersubjectively created reality (Dunn et al., 1994: 366). Reading this definition, the distinction between theoretical reality and practical reality becomes obvious soon. The external impositions are legalised and justified by discourses and theories based on peace and security that constitute the theoretical reality. However, in praxis, dominance and hegemony become exactly what we call practical reality.

Accepting the transitory nature of hegemony will lead us to the inference of its different form in history when globalisation arises. From that point on, it is possible to broaden the concept of hegemony to include international hegemony. In addition, knowledge parallelly evolves into a more international form. The distinction between theoretical reality and practical reality becomes again obvious. Interestingly, the idea of establishing IOs also coincides with the globalisation process. While traditional security studies' theorists explain this process by power and dominance, in the neo-Gramscian way of thinking, as adopted by CSS, the whole process should be regarded

as the influence with the element of power by generating consent and creating voluntariness. Hegemony with globalisation starts to be interpreted as a result of consent and voluntariness. On the other hand, knowledge appears to be one of the most influential factors, either strengthening the hegemony based on consent or creating the idea of counter-hegemony. Indeed, this is the case with IOs' memberships as a result of the knowledge produced and accepted internationally. Countries voluntarily become members of IOs despite knowing that this will have an influence on their policies. Undoubtedly, an equation between this process and knowledge is necessary. As taken by Richard Wyn Jones and Ken Booth, knowledge cannot be thought independent of the owner and its political message. Every action causing an influence is based on social, cultural, and political facts. While emancipating some, knowledge makes others dependent. This again means that knowledge has the power to create internalised hegemony. The key determinant here is who owns the knowledge.

Hegemonic power is described in international terms as an actor having the authority to establish international law and control the growth of dominant ideologies on a global scale (Keohane, 1989: 201). In general, the hegemon implements interest-oriented policies and is in charge of developing international rules. In the international system, hegemony refers to a state's or group of states' economic, political, and military dominance over others. The imperial sphere of influence continues in different form today. To repeat, although the form of hegemons changes, the function remains the same. In the past, single states were considered hegemons, while with the globalisation process, the type of hegemony has evolved more and more into groupings and organisations. There is one visible change related to the argument of this thesis. In the past, theoretical reality and practical reality were proceeding parallel to one another. The enemy or the cooperation partner was obvious. On the contrary today, finding the connection between theoretical reality and practical reality requires political acumen and is one of the most affecting facts of international security.

Keeping this argument aside, hegemons are still able to actively shape the aspirations and wants of their subordinates. The system is simple: those who control the physical means of production and the knowledge also control the mental ones and the consent. The globalisation process that developed its current meaning in the

beginning of the 20th century, changed the form of hegemony in a radical way. From that point on, the most potent actors in the globe became united around certain discourses. It is commonly known that IOs develop their cooperation in order to accomplish their shared goals and keep their knowledge dominant in difficult situations. This is where hegemony and influence intersect. In addition to being important actors in international affairs, IOs also significantly influence national governments. These significant international role models have even swayed over individuals near them in the world's most critical regions. Indeed, the First and Second World Wars of the twentieth century were significant historical events that brought such strong powers to the fore. These conflicts are important touchstones for the modern world because they laid the way for the development of the aforementioned globally influential organisations, particularly alliances like the UN and NATO.

As is well known, the UN and NATO are two alliances made up of states that maintain peace and security. The structure of the alliance influences the power hierarchy in the system. Furthermore, realists agree with Lord Palmerston that human interests determine what persists (Ridley, 1971: 44). Palmerstone believes that powerful states owe it to these interests to advance them. It is feasible to argue that IOs such as the UN and NATO, as two global alliances, enable the fulfilment of the afore mentioned aims. In terms of their impact on the Turkish-Libyan relationship, the two major IOs, the UN and NATO, whose influence we want to conceptualise within the scope of this thesis, behave very similarly. Furthermore, their influence is comparable in the MENA. Influence internationally justified and spreading thanks to hegemony and power is the frame under which these groups interact with one another, towards subordinated states.

It should be seriously debated to what extent hegemony over the subordinate is built on consent. This thesis will examine some examples of the influence of NATO and the UN on the Turkish-Libyan relationship by also reflecting whether there is consent. By doing so, the distinction between theoretical reality and practical reality will be represented by exploring historical and current instances. If hegemony is founded on consent, the conceptual framework of influence needs to be examined from the bottom up, referring to only a social development rather than a top-down socio-

political development. This thesis will go with the latter option. The influence will be evaluated from top down, starting with NATO and the UN and how they affect Turkish-Libyan relations. To make it more understandable, the influence of the hegemon down to the relationship between two countries will be analysed. Not to mention that the permanent members of NATO and the members of the UNSC have even as single states an influence on the entire global social order. For this reason, there should be nothing that these countries cannot achieve by putting into operation the UNSC and NATO as tools to justify their hegemony and influence the subordinates. In the meantime, a distinction between theoretical reality and practical reality will help to find out the truth and what needs to be done for change.

2.3. Power as a Subcomponent of Influence

While traditional studies represent power as a major factor, this thesis with a critical perspective will position power as a component or even subcomponent of the influence. Instead of regarding it as a main factor in itself, this thesis considers the concept of power as a component that definitely leads to an influence. The two most important and powerful IOs namely the UN and NATO, prove that one of the components of the influence is power. Historically observed, the meaning of power as well evolves into different forms. During the imperial and colonial times, power was meant to be completely in the hands of the military. Possessing a big and qualitative army was a sign of power. These states or empires were able to extend their power and exploit. With the time, the military and the army replaced themselves with knowledge. Those possessing the knowledge have come to dominate the geographical structure, natural resources, and therefore the world economy. Knowledge appears to have transformed the prevailing reality over thousands of years.

With the globalisation process, a nation's power is made up of more than only its material resources or its defence spending. For instance, one significant source of power is how well-equipped a nation is to exert influence over others through trade in goods and services, military donations, and participation in regional and IOs. Nobody contests the significance of material resources in a nation's power today or in the future, especially given the revival of geopolitics. However, another important

consideration is how well-positioned a nation is to influence another. This fact is also the most important fact for countries influenced by international actors. The example of Libya and Türkiye is one of the most visible evidence of this importance. A country's position comes at the beginning of the factors affecting its natural wealth and therefore its importance in the international system. To be more precise, a country's standing affects the desire of international actors to increase or decrease influence over such countries.

The idea of power is when one actor has the ability to make another do something that they otherwise would not. Traditional security experts believe that sovereign states are the only political organisations capable of providing security and that the expansion or maintenance of state power is the only sure means to achieve it (Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 16). Power, in all its manifestations, but particularly military power, breeds mistrust, and the result is a state system marked by threats, crises, and war; by victors and losers; and by danger and terror (Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 16). There has arisen what may be called the 'security dilemma' of men, groups, or their leaders. Individuals or groups living in such a constellation must be concerned about their safety from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other organisations or individuals. In order to be safe from such attacks, people are motivated to acquire more and more power to escape the impact of others' power (Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 22). From this vantage point, it is straightforward to see that power is merely a component. It has the ability to influence something and so modify it.

Ken Booth discusses power as a source of mistrust between governments. He refers to migrants, squandering of natural resources, and sophisticated weapons as examples of disasters produced by those in authority. Booth is also convinced that it is they who shape global politics (Booth, 1991a: 315). His critical thoughts are very instructive indeed. Taking power as a cause to disseminate mistrust among states reflects the direction in which authority influences international relations. States no longer have trust in each other. Therefore, IOs become platforms where the state confirms adherence and loyalty. However, the adherence and loyalty in question are not willing. Making a mistake despite other members in an organisation will lead to

the threatening or sanction of other members. In this sense, the state is not confronted with another single state but with a bunch of states. One of the most affective determinants leading to this international system was the knowledge of real facts. The knowledge about historical reality, the knowledge about geographical reality, the knowledge about the reality of natural resources, knowledge about sociological reality, etc., each influencing the formation of the international system into a global form. It was the knowledge of reality that led to the power to influence international policy.

According to scholars of the Welsh School, emancipation should logically be given precedence in security issues over the mainstream themes of power and order (Booth, 1991a: 319). It will be useful in this context to develop an equation between the emancipation process that comes with knowledge and the power that also comes with knowledge. Perhaps the greatest deduction that fits within critical security theory here is to use the power that comes with knowledge in the path of emancipation. In CSS, power is mostly employed as a destructive force that threatens security. Despite the fact that power is now utilised to affect the international system in a detrimental manner, its usage in a friendly sense and manner would influence the globe correspondingly. In this scenario, the equation would look as follows:

Influence = Knowledge  Power and Hegemony 
Emancipation

Ken Booth is convinced that some governments can exercise enormous power, but they are not the only agents, and they are not immune to influence. To a greater or lesser extent, the implementation of an emancipatory approach through process idealistic phases is in the hands of all individuals who wish it to be (Booth, 1991a: 326). This means that the argument of this thesis is already supported by CSS scholars only with one must, that is the willingness of governments. Considered internationally, this turns out to be the willingness of states. According to Ken Booth, it is too early in history to infer that the international system is inherently a “war system.” As states become less significant under the ‘new medievalism,’ he calls for further decentralisation of power towards a global civil society and a global community of

communities. He quotes Oscar Wilde: 'A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not even worth glancing at (Booth, 1991b: 527).'

Power in the past and present has been understood very much in the Morgenthauian way: 'International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power' (Booth, 1991b: 527). This thesis confirms Booth's argument about the part where it is too soon to conclude necessarily with the international system as a war system. On the contrary, by reminding the above equation, it is useful to say that there is more opportunity to access knowledge today. Would it be possible to use the power coming with knowledge for goodness and emancipation? Maybe this is the question that needs to be asked today. The answer to the question is possible with Booth's detection above, 'the willingness'.

Although the existence of IOs might make it difficult, civil society could change a lot. There are many examples of what a society can achieve in reality. However, with the globalisation, a lot of facts changed so that societies are now no longer able to dare. In Krasner's words, states, particularly great powers, can violate even the most established rules of international society, such as the non-use of force and non-intervention in the affairs of another state. The possibilities for hypocrisy in the international sphere are multiplied by the fact that there are many rules, and these are often contradictory. State leaders are therefore able to 'pick and choose among different rules (Krasner, 1999: 6). Simpler expressed: there are different **theoretical realities**, while states choose one and transform it into the **practical reality** accordingly. Obviously, the concept of power is different in theory and in practice. The fact that power is still perceived as destructive in the global system, which is theoretically built on the discourses of peace and security, is due to the fact that **theoretical and practical reality** are independent of each other in praxis.

Regardless of their differences in focus and practice, all CSS proponents appear to see the ultimate goal of their work as assisting in the transformation of dominant patterns of power and dominance in favour of people who are currently disempowered and disenfranchised. This is how Richard Wyn Jones communicates his feelings about power and dominance. According to Jones, traditional Security Studies exaggerate the

struggle for power among sovereign states in an anarchical system. He is convinced that CSS has sought to explore regional security questions, including military, or practical policies to advance the security of people as individuals and groups (Jones and Stamnes, 2000: 41). Indeed, it envisions the use of power for good. Jones arrives at the theoretical fact that power should be employed in a peaceful and secure manner. There must be practice for this theory to be consistent. If the goal is to engage the powerless rather than the strong, theoretical reality must become practical reality.

Critical intellectuals, according to Said, “are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless” (Said, 1994: 44). Thus, the proponents of CSS try to place the poor, the disadvantaged, the insecure, and the powerless at the Centre of its agenda. In this approach, they recognise that for the vast majority of the world’s population, problems such as environmental security, food security, and economic security are far more serious and urgent dangers to security than interstate fighting. To some extent, this is correct in terms of the international system. The greatest significant threat to security is the international system itself. It is also one of the main reasons why food, the economy, and the environment are in such danger.

What is meant by the international system? IOs differ in theory and practice that influence single member states and force them to act in one direction. These organisations generally have interest-oriented policies and do not care about the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless, etc. The dilemma lies in the fact that member states of these organisations are forced to act in accordance. If not, soon an international crisis will emerge. Thus, in order to transform the theoretical reality of CSS into practical reality, exposing the influence of these IOs is a good starting point. As stated by Adorno, the need to lend suffering a voice is the precondition of all truth/reality (Homer, 1998: 66).




Figure 2: *An emancipatory influence based on peace and security is only possible if practical reality aligns with theoretical reality.*

CSS considers the interaction between theory and its historical, social, and political environment to be critical. Theories, according to CSS, are performative rather than explanatory. Certain practices are enabled by the way we think and write about security, while others are disabled, thereby contributing to 'shape' reality. The form the future takes will be determined by who gets to shape it. According to CSS scholars, the invention of an emancipatory future is more urgent than any other. Their perspective of academics' roles is not (and cannot be) that of a distant spectator, but rather that of Antonio Gramsci's 'organic intellectual'; therefore, they need to engage in social and political criticism, replication, and practice. A critical approach is one that anticipates change.

The next step of the thesis is to understand the concept of the influence within the framework of CSS by actively exploring historical facts and archives. The influence of IOs, as is the case in this thesis with the UN and NATO, will be examined on the relationship between Türkiye and Libya. In order to do so, historical turning points and, of course, present happenings will be analysed. The argument is that it is possible to learn from the past and prevent recurrence. However, the future has to be shaped by organic intellectuals aiming to invent an emancipatory future. Not to mention that security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation,

not power or order, produces true security (Booth, 1991: 319). One thing is certain: critical scientists must broaden their conceptualisation of security because the term has already been broadened in practice (Jones, 1995: 85). With globalisation, the governmental structures of sovereign states are losing much of their power. This is occurring both domestically and internationally, where transnational actors of various kinds are undermining the sovereignty of the state (Beck, 1992: 232).

2.4. Understanding the Inevitable Influence in Consequence of Power and Hegemony

After exploring power and hegemony as sub-components of the influence, this thesis will represent the influence of IOs as inevitable for security issues in the MENA in general and the Turkish-Libyan relations in particular. Since CSS aims to change rather than observe, a historical perspective with the context of learning from the past and preventing and changing in the present is adopted. Formal networks of influence may now be more indicative of a government's ability to persuade other states to behave in the international system than more traditional techniques of material coercion. However, the concept of coercive power, rather than influence, continues to dominate intellectual and political debates about the structure of the international system and the capacity of nation states to advance and defend critical national interests. This is why there is a severe gap in the understanding of IO' worldwide power.

In the modern history of international relations, the end of World War II saw the establishment of a dichotomy in the paradigm of IOs between weak and powerful governments. Acting through IOs like the UN or NATO, the victorious powers or the allied forces imposed their policy agenda on the international community, with specific reference to the axis powers. Though maintaining international peace and security has been the cornerstone of the UN or even NATO, they have failed to deliver on this front over the years. In the meantime, the distinction between **theoretical reality** and **practical reality** became increasingly clearer. Indeed, these flaws can be attributed to the fact that some powerful governments are attempting to monopolise and manipulate the system in order to align its objectives with their vested interests and thereby advance their agenda. As a result, it is commonly stated that powerful states create

such organisations to further their own interests. However, concluding that IOs are essentially vehicles of hegemonic predation through which states exercise their authority to control the international scene would be a reasonable assessment. The goal of this thesis is not to conduct due diligence. Its goal is to observe the problem (in this example, the effect of IOs) as a whole, with its historical, political, and social foundations.

IOs such as the UN and NATO have a mixed track record when it comes to serving the cause for which they were formed, indicating the IOs' non-transformative nature. IOs are frequently co-opted by the interests of their member countries, causing them to diverge from their intended mission. This causes a conflict between their original aim and the results of their actions. States provide IOs power to fulfil their purposes, turning IOs to a bridge rather than drivers of geopolitics. The formation and growth of IOs frequently indicate conscious actions made by states to alter their jointly formed environment and, thus, themselves. The autonomy of IOs is nonetheless constrained by state interests and authority, as reflected in their institutional structure. However, in order to promote their interests, powerful governments must build these organisations in such a way that smaller states are enticed to participate. Pursuing their interests unilaterally has consequences such as undermining international soft power objectives, opening themselves up to diplomatic condemnatory attacks from international adversaries, jeopardising long-term policy interests with other international allies who may distance themselves from the concerned state's illegitimate action, and so on. As a result, powerful states have an incentive to provide IOs with significant autonomy and favour them over other arrangements such as decentralised collaboration or informal dialogues. Powerful states will not enter an organisation over which they have no control but compromising the independence of an organisation performing specific activities will diminish its efficacy and, as a result, their own capacity to achieve cherished goals.

IOs such as the UN and NATO are trusted with facilitating agreement negotiation and implementation, resolving disputes, managing conflicts, carrying out operational tasks such as technical aid, formulating standards, and defining international discourse. All of this is because they are created in a structure capable of safeguarding the interests of powerful. Powerful states use IOs to achieve their goals

because it gives them legitimacy and demonstrates that they are responsible members of the international community who follow international conventions. They acquire more clout when they raise issues through IOs rather than acting unilaterally, which typically comes with a reputational penalty. Furthermore, they might use IOs to entice smaller states to support them by offering incentives. Sharing resources such as military, logistical, intelligence, humanitarian help, and expertise lessens the load on powerful states. On the other hand, there are states with geopolitical, military, and ideological advantages that make them significant to big powers, particularly in the MENA. These advantages allow them to maintain their significant place in the international system. Such countries are involved in operations of big power influence zones. Any changes in these countries will impact each of the world's superpowers. Following the trails of these countries allows one to find competition spheres. These countries are known as 'pivot states' (Sweijts, Knowles and Oosterveld, 2014). Although the report of the Atlantic Council does not include Türkiye as a pivot state, especially after 9/11, Türkiye's geo-strategic location became increasingly important. So, IOs have more influence on these countries because they deal more with them.

As can be derived from the paragraph above, IOs are platforms where powerful states legitimise their international interests. Therefore, CSS components mainly talk about power as a destructive determinant. This thesis agrees with this argument only by adding to it the idea of taking power as a component of influence and turning it into a determinant with a good influence on the powerless, voiceless, and insecure. In order to do so, one needs to change the distinction between theory and praxis. According to the theoretical reality, the UN and NATO are security-based peaceful organisations, whereas the practical reality is as told above.

According to scholars, power, hegemony, and influence are exercised through networks of economic, political, ideological, or security interactions. Influential global actors are even more successful in modifying the beliefs and attitudes of other states without physical intervention. This is the area where hegemony, founded on consent, successfully operates through discourses instead of direct power, yet maintains the same level of influence. The literature is, as told before, lacking in describing international influence. Scholars have worked on certain measurements of international influence, whereas the main concentration was either on the influence of

single national states on other nations or the influence of single states in the decision-making process within the most powerful global organisations such as the UN or NATO. This thesis will therefore focus on the influence of NATO and the UN, the two most powerful organisations on the relationship between two important states in the MENA region. In this sense, our thesis will move its point on the influence of IOs rather than the influence of single states and the impact on decision-making within such organisations.

While it is possible to state that there are certain concepts of influence and power, scholars fail to coherently distinguish them from one another (Zimmerling, 2005: 104; Pörn, 1970: 68; Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950: 71; Moscovici, 1979: 77). In terms of international affairs, influence is a much broader concept than power. This section describes how the idea of influence is debated in the global system. Three key discussions come to the fore when explaining our concept of influence. The first asserts that power and influence are interchangeable and that there is no distinction between the two (Baldwin, 1985: 489; Nye, 2011: 12). Max Weber was the first to advocate for influence and power as exercises over “other persons”—these are “the ability of an individual or group to realise their own objectives, goals, or aims in the face of opposition from others (Weber, 1930: 152). Famous power theorists such as Robert A. Dahl, Steven Lukes, and David A. Baldwin have endorsed this viewpoint, arguing that the terms “influence” and “power” only refer to actor A’s ability to persuade actor B to “do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957: 202; Lukes, 2005: 36) and that the terms influence and power can be used “interchangeably” (Baldwin, 1995: 117-141).

A second school of thought, similar to the first, views influence as a shift that actor A creates in actor B. However, it differs in that it argues that power, not influence, is a concept that refers to actor A’s ability to sway actor B (Cartwright, 1965: 165; French, 1956: 728; Raven and French, 1960: 609). According to this viewpoint, influence may be used, whereas power can be obtained. Realist authors such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth N. Waltz hold this position, arguing that a country’s material resources are critical to its ability to affect the behaviour of its neighbours (Waltz, 1991: 102-111; Morgenthau, 1973: 15).

Finally, according to a third school of thinking, influence is a force that becomes power when actor A utilises it knowingly (and effectively) to affect actor B's behaviour. According to it, the most efficient way to depict the link between power and influence is through a hierarchy in which influence is the overarching concept and power is the deliberate application of influence (Wrong, 1988: 21). It acknowledges that an actor can wield influence by governing over sources (whether natural, military, or interpersonal), but contends that an actor lacks power unless they can successfully employ their sources of influence to achieve the desired effects. Dennis H. Wrong expresses this concept clearly when he says that if actor A succeeds in changing actor B's behaviour "in the desired direction," then he certainly has control over B" (Wrong, 1988: 13).

2.5. Conclusion

Influence and power, as defined by Max Weber and other thinkers, are an individual's or group's ability to achieve their own objectives, goals, or ambitions in the face of opposition from others. Persuasion is the action that leads to hegemony. Instead of viewing them as interchangeable, this thesis contends that viewing power and hegemony as components of influence would make it easier to transform their destructive role into an emancipatory one. Power and hegemony are overstated, despite the reality that they are influenced by a variety of economic, military, and social variables. Power, as one of our components, will have a positive or negative influence based on our perspective of reality regarding these factors. Because hegemony, a sort of domination based on permission, is the second component, it appears that consent can be produced. Thus, it seems quite possible to turn the influence in favour of those who are insecure and voiceless, by producing consent with the power obtained through knowledge.

Today, IOs such as NATO and the UN have this capacity whereas the only depending on factor is the willingness of powerful states within the organisation. This attempt would change the whole world, which is why we take the case from top-down to reflect the ease of change normally. If theoretical reality and practical reality of powerful states would advance parallel, peace and security organisations would

become successful. At this point, CSS theorists need to focus more on IOs and the distinction between theory and praxis in reality. Not to mention again, it is no secret that NATO and the UN have a significant influence on the world, and they are indispensable to the international security system. From the very tangible aspect of military power to the illusive and ethereal consequences of functional professionalisation, they have the ability to influence. It only needs a good theoretical approach that may help to diagnose, predict and finally prescribe. To make it simple, the theoretical reality and practical reality need to progress in a parallel manner.

When theoretical reality and practical reality align with each other:




Figure 3: Theoretical reality should consider socio-cultural, socio-economic, socio-political, and historical facts. Practical reality should align with this theoretical foundation. When these steps are followed, the resulting influence will be emancipatory.

When theoretical reality and practical reality contradict each other:




Figure 4: *When theoretical reality contradicts practical reality, theory becomes mere peace and security discourse, overshadowed by prevailing interests. Power and hegemony drive actions based on interests, resulting in ineffective peace and security initiatives rather than true emancipation.*

3. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Introduction

The former chapter of this thesis indicated that the Welsh School theory lacks a mechanism that has the ability to recognise that power and hegemony are two driving forces of the influence. Despite criticising realism due to its importance, it puts on power and hegemony, CSS (read: the Welsh School) by also taking both concepts as two single influential aspects. However, this thesis argues that the influence is an inevitable consequence driven by power and hegemony. Furthermore, the lack of recognising the existence of a theoretical reality and practical reality decreases the understanding of power and hegemony as two sub-components of the influence. In order to overcome this theoretical gap, this thesis introduces a new conceptualisation of the influence that can assist scholars to describe comprehensively the relationship between hegemony, power, and influence. More important, this thesis reveals the presence of theoretical reality and practical reality in security-related events from history to the present. While the new conceptualisation of the influence will be empirically illustrated in the following chapters, it is important to both explain and justify the methodological framework adopted in this thesis, a task that will be the main goal of this chapter.

This chapter will be organised as follows: The chapter's first section defines the ontological and epistemological approaches used in this thesis, which together make up the two fundamental categories in social science research and influence how social scientists approach theories and conduct their research (Marsh and Furlog, 2002: 17). The case study examined in chapter 5, which makes up the empirical portion of this thesis, is introduced in the chapter's second part. This chapter's third section describes how primary sources and secondary sources constitute the data for this thesis. The axiological and ethical issues for this thesis are addressed in the chapter's fourth part. Before continuing with the ontological and epistemological approach, it is of essence to start by stating that one aim of this study is to prove that peace and security issues cannot be thought independent of social sciences particularly history.

3.2. Ontological and Epistemological Approach

This chapter aims to reflect both the ontological and epistemological approaches applied in this thesis. Since it is of essence for social and political science researchers to recognise and be able to stand for their own ontological and epistemological stance against critiques from other positions, this part of the thesis is compulsory. Ontologically, the thesis adheres to the critical social science approach, which, contrary to traditional theories, argues that reality consists of multiple layers, namely empirical reality, pure reality, and the factual plane. Although it is possible to observe empirical reality by using our senses, it is mainly produced by deeper structures and causal mechanisms operating on unobservable levels. Therefore, theories and research help us understand these mechanisms. Structures on the plane of pure reality are directly observable. In fact, such structures are not fixed and can be evolved and changed. Causal mechanisms operating on the factual plane may have inconsistencies and act paradoxically, producing structural contradictions. They may involve forces or processes that appear to be contradictory but are actually part of a larger single process.

The critical approach tells us that our observations and empirical experiences of reality are not pure, unbiased, and immediate. In contrast, our ideas, beliefs, and interpretations form and influence what and how we observe it. Our knowledge of empirical reality can indeed grasp how things really are, but not in a complete way. This whole process depends on our experiences, ideas, and beliefs. Due to limited human sense, our first observations are misleading or only partially true. This situation allows some groups in society to hold power and exploit others. As Karl Marx states:

The ruling ideas of each age are the ideas of the ruling class of that age. The class that owns the material means of production also has control over the mental means of production. Therefore, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it (Marx and Engels, 1947: 39).

The critical approach recognises humans as rational decision-makers shaped by social structures and creative beings constructing meaning. It is never straightforward to see the structures that critical researchers talk about. A researcher

must use theory to dig deeper into superficial relationships, observe periods of crisis and intense conflict, examine connections, look to the past, and evaluate future possibilities.

Revealing the deeper plane of reality is difficult but important. The surface reality is full of ideology, myth, distortion, and false appearances. At this point, this thesis argues that by digging deeper into superficial relationships applying to history, the existence of theoretical reality and practical reality will soon occur. This is also one of the most visible proofs that the surface reality is different than the concrete reality. To better understand, a critical social scientist informs about own experiences, helps to understand a historical situation, and empowers to improve conditions. Knowledge is gained above all through the actions we take, both as we strive to change our environment and when interacting with other people. As critical social science researchers learn how the world works, they link the analysis of objective conditions with subjective insights to uncover invisible power and unnoticed injustices. While doing so, they take knowledge as a tool to take an active part in the world. Critical social science adopts a transformative perspective in the application of knowledge. It transforms, fundamentally changes, reorganises essential structures, and transcends existing boundaries. According to this approach, being objective does not mean being a value-free creature.

Epistemologically, this thesis adheres to an emancipatory realist approach that is known for being adopted by the Welsh School today. However, the emancipatory realist approach as a part of critical social science, dates back to Jürgen Habermas, who is associated with the Frankfurt School and known for focusing on the foundations of epistemology and social theory. This method views emancipation as the lens that illuminates both the theory and the practice of security. Emancipation in this sense seems to be the output of this method. Within this context, Welsh School scholars prioritise to change the world rather than to understand it. Accordingly, the emancipatory realist approach reveals the political and historical content of knowledge; it provides the basis for social change by learning from history and thus progress. Critical theory rejects a traditional separation of value and research, knowledge and action, and other polarities. Instead, it argues about an interaction

between knowledge and action, reality and emancipation, and value and research. The most important part of such an epistemological position is that it needs to be understood that it is not about what 'is', but rather about what 'should be'. It aims to change and improve. Indeed, the emancipatory realist approach argues for real security to be emancipatory, knowledge to be emancipatory, and most importantly, reality to be emancipatory. Agreeing with this process, this thesis aims to reflect that in order to reach a change and an improvement, two new concepts named theoretical reality and practical reality need to be understood. Furthermore, it needs to be recognised that power and hegemony are two potent concepts that automatically cause an influence that could be turned into an emancipatory one in all fields. For this reason, the direction in which power and hegemony are channelled is very important.

As can be derived from the previous paragraphs, while the way we learn or know the world has its roots in ontological assumptions, epistemology includes what we need to do in order to produce knowledge and what the scientific knowledge we produce looks like. The ontological position of a researcher influences his epistemological position; however, the former is far from determining the latter.

Considering the adoption of the ontological and epistemological approaches, a certain research design needs to be decided in order to provide a framework for the collection and analysis of data. To reveal the new concept of the influence, with its contradictions based on theoretical reality and practical reality, the influence of NATO and the UN on Turkish-Libyan relations has been chosen as the main network of relationships. Important historical turning points have been selected chronologically and analysed within a case study research design. The historical events that have been analysed in this thesis provide a clear view of the influence that is an inevitable consequence of power and hegemony. Moreover, examining these turning points of a political relationship, digging deeper into its superficial stance, observing periods of crisis and conflict, and examining connections will reveal the existence of theoretical reality on one side and practical reality on the other.

The improvement of the influence in an emancipatory way is related to the understanding of theoretical reality and practical reality. In order to receive as much

information as possible, a case study research design within the context of a qualitative method is mainly adopted. A qualitative method is necessary because it first prioritises for researchers to be aware of themselves and the context of their research. As a second step, it proposes for researchers to adopt a viewpoint. Last but not least, this method is a strategic way of designing research, collecting, analysing and interpreting data for social and political sciences. On the other hand, a case study provides a concrete evaluation, comparison, and determination of the areas that can, or should, according to the critical social science, be improved. At this point, history serves as the most important lesson. Historical turning points analysed in a critical perspective are the best address to learn about mistakes and areas to be improved. This is also the reason why this study has been conducted in the history department, namely in order to reflect the importance of history to learn and improve.

3.3. Implementing the Case Study Research Design

In order to explore the influence as an inevitable result of power and hegemony and to uncover the distinction and parallels between theoretical reality and practical reality, this thesis adopts the case study research design. Case studies are among the most widely used research methods in social science, political science, international relations, and security studies, according to Bennet and Elman (Elman and Bennet, 2007: 170-195). A case study research design has three features that make it an effective instrument in the methodological arsenal of the researcher (Burnham et al., 2004: 54–55). First, the inclusion of a solid theoretical component has a greater impact on case study research design. Second, despite selecting a descriptive case study for the study, there needs to be a clear research focus to prevent the collection of data on the chosen case study at random. Third, a cautious selection of several turning points will allow for a more thorough analysis of a theory and will highlight the conditions under which hypotheses and theories may or may not be true. However, despite the fact that case studies have the potential to be a potent research design, there are significant risks associated with this research structure, particularly given the fact that it is frequently difficult and occasionally even dangerous to generalise from a specific case study (Gray, 2004: 248).

A case study research focuses on the numerous nuances and situations of each case as it examines one case or a small group of cases in depth. In other words, it looks at the specifics of both the internal traits of each instance and its surroundings. Within the context of this thesis, case analysis is recommended for a variety of reasons. There are various advantages to this analysis management. It clarifies ideas and conveys abstract concepts while also enabling certain connections between them and the precise details of the turning points within the Turkish-Libyan case being studied. Additionally, it enables concepts and hypotheses to be assessed and used as evidence by being observed in actual lived experience. A case study may be the most effective way, as a historian, to present or apply a theory in this context. One of the most important characteristics of a case study is the identification of causal mechanisms. This means that by doing a case study, it is possible to reveal the influence of one factor on the other in its details. Hence, different kinds of influence of NATO and the UN on the Turkish-Libyan relationship will be reflected as theoretical reality and practical reality.

In acknowledging the limitations of the case study research design, this thesis uses some turning points within the Turkish-Libyan case, each representing a different category of the influence of NATO and the UN. In this way, this thesis will be able to comprehensively illustrate the new conceptual framework of the influence developed with its subcomponents power and hegemony, in contradiction to traditional realists. The relationship between Türkiye and Libya has been chosen as the case since there is a serious gap in the literature in examining the influence of IOs on the relationship of two MENA countries. By examining the influence of the UN and NATO, particular attention will be drawn to the five big, powerful states within the UNSC that have the veto right and are therefore untouchable. It will be soon recognised that the influence of the UN and NATO differs dependent on geopolitics. While to some countries a certain act might be a war crime, it does not influence others in the same way and manner. This again reflects how biased security is conceptualised.

As critical social scientists argue to change and improve the world related to security, this thesis aims at persisting that the MENA region would be the best place to start. In order to do so, the influence of the most powerful organisations in the region

needs to be reconceptualised, so that it is possible to see that hegemony and power could be channelled in a positive way by shrinking the difference between theoretical reality and practical reality. The relationship between Libya and Türkiye covers the best case because, after the establishment of the UN (1945) and NATO (1949), this relationship is based on the comfort zone of these organisations. Although, according to Lawrence, NATO countries typically use the UN as a forum to resolve their disputes, this thesis will not focus on the connection between both organisations, but only on their influence on Turkish-Libyan relations (Kaplan, 2010: 33).

Indeed, this thesis indicates two main reasons why focusing on the Turkish-Libyan relationship is adequate for exploring the influence of IOs. First, the relationship between Türkiye and Libya comprises many kinds of influence experience during important turning points, such as wars, military operations, peace processes, terrorism, political decisions, issues concerning the Eastern Mediterranean, etc. Thus, the case of the Turkish-Libyan relationship provides critical scholars with fertile ground to investigate different instances of the influence in its reconceptualised form. Second, there is a widespread literature about how the relationship between Türkiye and Libya first decreased with the WWI process and increased again after WWII as two regional neighbours but missing a global perspective. Many researchers also analysed interest and conflict areas of the UN and NATO in Libya and Türkiye as single states. However, the influence of these organisations on the relationships of two very important regional actors, such as Türkiye and Libya, still needs to be observed under the lens of case study research. Hence, using these relevant sources can also enhance the scholars' ability to learn about the influence that could be emancipatory rather than binding, by taking lessons from the history.

3.4. Important Turning Points to be Covered Chronologically within the Turkish-Libyan Case

Energy, trade, defence, immigration, historical and cultural ties are six primary areas of overlap in Türkiye and Libya's relationship. It is first important to note that both nations are substantial producers and exporters of oil and natural gas. Türkiye imports a significant amount of its oil from Libya and has made significant investments

in the nation's energy industry. Second, with bilateral commerce between the two countries exceeding a billion dollars in 2019, Türkiye is one of Libya's principal economic partners. Construction of roads, hospitals, and schools are just a few of the infrastructure projects Turkish businesses are involved in Libya. The Turkish government has given the internationally acclaimed GNA in Libya military support within the context of defence, notably by sending troops and offering military instruction. Other regional powers, including Egypt, which backs the Libyan National Army (LNA) in the ongoing conflict, have disagreed on this, and it has been a source of tension. The fourth reason is that Türkiye has played a part in controlling the flow of migrants through the nation. Libya has been a significant transit country for people trying to reach Europe. Finally, it is important to keep in mind that both nations have a shared history and culture, with Libya showing various Turkish cultural influences when we analyse the situations. As a result, the instances that need to be examined rely mostly on the mentioned shared interests. In this section of the thesis, five turning points will be included for analysis within the Turkish-Libyan case so that the new conceptualisation of the influence may be seen.

The first turning point that will be examined also marks the restart of Turkish-Libyan relations in the post-WWII era, namely the discussions of Libyan independence during the General Assembly. Libya retained under Allied administration from 1942 to 1950 following Italy's actual defeat by the Allies in 1942; Tripoli retained under American authority, Benghazi (Cyrenaica) under British, and the Fezzan under French control. Future plans for Libya were debatable. At the UNGA between 1949-1951, Türkiye and Libya had the opportunity to officially encounter under the auspices of the UN. On October 3, 1949, the Turkish delegate Adnan Kural requested that the UNGA has to make a decision about the future of the Italian colonies. According to the Turkish envoy, it was hypocritical to assert that the military occupation of these regions in the shape of a protective state results in the people's freedom (Koloğlu, 2007: 255). The envoy mentioned that Türkiye, as a Mediterranean country, is interested in the future of Libya and does not approve of a weak self-government supported by Britain. In addition, he emphasised that there are citizens of Libyan origin who held senior positions in both Türkiye and the Ottoman regime (Koloğlu, 2007:

256). Adnan Kural's final statements that Türkiye has always supported an independent and united Libya aroused great interest in the Libyan people. Even a party named the Hizbul Ittihadî Tripoli Turki (unification with Türkiye party) was founded by a group of people with rather utopian visions to unify with Türkiye. Thus, it became much easier to establish close relations with Türkiye after 1951, when Idris es-Senusî became the head of the independent state as the king of Libya. As mentioned in the UNGA at that time, Türkiye sent its experienced bureaucrats from Libyan origin to the newly established Libyan state. For instance, Sadullah Kuloğlu (Koloğlu), one of these people, is a bureaucrat who served as a district governor of the Republic of Türkiye, where he was called the "Arab District Governor." When he went to Libya as the first Prime Minister of Libya, he was suddenly called the "Turkish Prime Minister." In fact, this is a fine reflection of the irony of history. Hence, the first instance and a very important turning point in history for Turkish-Libyan relations are the UNGA debates. These debates represent the influence of the UN on Türkiye and Libya's relationship with its future outcomes and earlier happenings very clearly. It is a reflection of how an IO influences the creation of a country, which means that it has an influence on its internal matters, as well as how it influences its relations with Türkiye which means that it has an influence on external matters. Türkiye's position and attitude during this assembly became also the reason why Libya and Türkiye created a good relationship after 1951. However, this relationship was built under the observation of the UN. Therefore, it needs to be analysed deeper and in detail how the UN influenced the Turkish-Libyan relationship with this assembly beginning in 1949.

The second turning point that will be analysed takes place during the period of Muammar Gadhafi's reign and is about the Cyprus crisis. Hence, in 1974, a significant development took place in Turkish-Libyan relations. Gaddafi strongly supported Türkiye's Cyprus operations materially (such as refuelling military planes) and morally. This process caused the relations between Libya and Türkiye to gain momentum, and suddenly commercial relations with Libya were developed. During this period, Turkish companies signed trade and cooperation agreements and received large tenders. In particular, Türkiye's exports reached almost its peak. Turkish workers started to be employed in the region. Statesmen such as M. Ahmed Manguş, the

Minister of Reconstruction and Settlement in Libya in the 1970s, who did some of his education in Türkiye, also contributed significantly to the acceleration of relations between the two countries (Kavas, 2011). However, for some reason, IOs such as the UN and NATO started to express their concerns about this relationship and Gaddafi's aggressive attitude later (NATO, PO 85 /123, 1985). The US as the most powerful and the hegemon state within these organisations started to impose different embargos on Libya. Of course, this changed the course of the Turkish-Libyan relationship, which will be reflected in detail later. Hence, in the second instance, Türkiye's Cyprus crisis, one of Türkiye's most important foreign affairs issues, and the UN and NATO's position on Libya's support will be analysed. Furthermore, a picture of how this process influenced the future relationship between Libya and Türkiye will be provided. At this point, one can emphasise that the influence of IOs on external as well as internal matters is also available in the second turning point within the Turkish-Libyan case. Not to mention that, as soon as NATO and UN concerns and discussions about Libya decreased and went positive, Turkish-Libyan relations increased and went to normal again, which is one of the main reflections of an existing influence.

The third turning point begins with the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The process of Arab revolutions that started in Tunisia also affected Libya, leading to the popular revolution on February 17, 2011. Türkiye followed a cautious policy in the beginning of this process. Despite its opposition to outside intervention, the Turkish government later reluctantly agreed to join the illegal intervention of NATO, which clearly shows NATO's influence on Turkish foreign policies. The word illegal has been consciously used in order to express that there was no UN mandate. This again clearly reflects how the influence of such organisations turns out to be negative due to the fact that theory and practice contradict each other. In fact, the Turkish government had mainly to focus on the safety of its citizens and their investments in the country during the period when the conflicts and events started to intensify. Since evacuation of Turkish workers had been among Türkiye's priorities, 25,000 of its citizens were successfully transferred from the country. The first attitude of Türkiye during the revolution process in Libya was seen as "partial passivity fed by concerns" (Çakmak, 2011: 355). Türkiye prioritised the safety of the people of the region and its own

citizens. Both Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu and President Erdoğan wanted to bring a political solution to the fore at that time. Turkish officials warned that any NATO intervention could reduce the sense of public ownership of the revolution (Çakmak, 2011: 356). There have been suggestions that Türkiye did not want the issue to be a *fait accompli* and that the problems should be resolved through political initiatives. In the following process, Türkiye tried to take steps towards the humanitarian crisis caused by the increase in conflicts in the region. At that time, Erdoğan had basically announced a 3-point roadmap for the crisis in Libya, including (1) ensuring a real ceasefire, (2) establishing safe zones for humanitarian aid, and (3) Gaddafi's "opening the way for a constitutional order in which the people will vote for their rulers with their free will (Çakmak, 2011: 358). With these suggestions, Türkiye started to take an active stance in the process of change in Libya. The Turkish government participated in Libya group meetings and had close contacts with the National Transitional Congress. These moves of Türkiye were negatively received by Gaddafi, and an attitude was taken against Türkiye. The Turkish government, on the other hand, had clearly expressed its conviction that the solution would be in line with the wishes of the Libyan people. However, the intervention of the NATO with all its powerful members and the US with its "leading from behind" strategy caused the wishes of the Libyan people to become unheard. The fact that Türkiye was included in the Libyan intervention in 2011 also shows that the UN and NATO (rather than collaborating) had an important influence on Türkiye's foreign policy towards Libya. Thus, the third section will analyse the process in 2011 and discuss its future implications based on the influence of the UN and NATO in the Turkish-Libyan relationship.

In November 2019, Türkiye announced that it had reached a pact on maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea as well as one on security and military cooperation with the globally acclaimed government of Libya, the GNA.³ The marine accord attempted to create a Mediterranean Sea EEZ. This implied that both nations may assert ownership of resources found on the seafloor. Nevertheless, the accord was swiftly denounced by neighbouring nations like Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,

³ See Appendix 25.

other European nations, and the US. The legitimacy of the accords and their adherence to the UN's law of the sea came up for debate. Soon after, the UN got involved, and on October 1, 2020, Antonio Guterres, the UN Secretary-General, officially registered the Turkish-GNA agreement in conformity with Article 102 of the UN Charter. Also in this turning point, it is possible to talk about a certain influence, whereas the instance lacks a thorough analysis in scholarly discussion. The fourth turning point within the Turkish-Libyan case of this thesis will therefore try to understand the dynamics of the Maritime Boundary Agreement between Libya and Türkiye while portraying the secret or/and public influence of the UN and NATO during this process.

Soon after the Maritime Boundary Agreement, a presidential memorandum on sending troops to Libya was submitted to the Turkish Parliament to be discussed on January 2, 2020. The parliament approved this memorandum to deploy troops into Libya to back the UN-recognised government in the capital after forces loyal to Haftar, a rival administration, launched an offensive. The legislation passed with a 325–184 vote. The Turkish involvement, which was made upon the request of the Libyan Government after the ratification of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Limitation of Maritime Jurisdiction and the Memorandum of Understanding on Security and Military Cooperation signed between Türkiye and Libya, can be evaluated within the framework of continuity in Turkish-Libyan relations. In fact, Tripoli's exposure to violent attacks by Haftar's militias and the environment of conflict that Haftar initiated to establish a dictatorship in Libya forced Libya's actors aiming for a civil administration and democracy to seek military aid from Türkiye. By deploying in Tripoli, the Turkish military explained its aim as preventing a subcontractor assigned to put Libya at the disposal of the anti-Türkiye camp and the forces behind it from balancing against Libya and Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean. According to the Turkish government, this step was necessary since the UN is failing in solving the Libyan problem. Türkiye complains that the UN is even embracing the erosion of the legitimacy borders, as if it wanted Haftar to enter Tripoli. These are serious allegations that need detailed and careful exploration. In order to understand UN and NATO intentions and influence in this turning point, it is necessary to take a deep look at the issue after the intervention of NATO in the country,

both academically and politically. Within this context, the fifth turning point is also one of the main events that will clearly reveal the influence of NATO and the UN on Turkish-Libyan relations.

3.5. Methods of Data Collection

In order to explore the influence of IOs, this section addresses the methodological approach of this thesis, which is, as mentioned above, a qualitative one. Most social scientists who adopt the qualitative method follow steps that are relatively different from those followed in quantitative studies. Researchers adopting the qualitative method first decide about a problem or a topic. Afterwards, they place themselves within the topic/problem and the topic/problem itself into a socio-historical context. Qualitative researchers reflect on the philosophical paradigm to be adopted and find their place in related discussions. As in the quantitative method, a qualitative researcher also designs research, collects, analyses, and interprets data (Neuman, 2020: 59). It is possible to collect qualitative data in many forms: photographs, maps, open-ended interviews, observations, documents, etc. This data collection can be divided into two top categories, including the field research and the historical comparative research. The field research is an ethnographic case study, while historical-comparative research consists of a collection of related types of research. As a whole, where the purpose of the research is to explore people's subjective experiences and the interpretations they attach to those experiences, qualitative methods are most appropriately employed (Devine, 2002: 199).

In essence, the four main components of the methodologies chosen to gather data for this thesis are personal interviews, secondary sources analysis, and examination of primary sources as well as archival documents. These four elements provide adequate tools for comprehensively exploring the influence of the UN and NATO on the Turkish-Libyan relationship. As one might think, the most difficult of these, but the only way to listen to live witnesses, is through **personal interviews**. This element, which is a powerful data tool of social scientific survey research (Baral, 2017: 82-104), includes interviews with figures influenced by any of the five turning points within the Turkish-Libyan case in this thesis. Then, there is the **archival research**,

which particularly contributes to this thesis in being peculiar. Archival documents of the UN and NATO, as well as the Turkish Military Archive, the Presidential Archive, and archives available online from Benghazi and Tripoli, will provide a much more comprehensive conclusion. The third way is to dig into **primary sources**, including speeches, autobiographies, documented interviews, etc. These sources also help to understand and analyse the influence, reading it firsthand. At this point, generally in political issues, mutual correspondence offers important clues. The correspondence of the ambassadors of Türkiye and Libya and the meetings of NATO and the UN representatives come to mind first. **Secondary sources**, on the other hand, cover biographies, books, and research articles regarding each of the turning points within the Turkish-Libyan case of this thesis. As is visible in the literature review part, there are many secondary sources that serve as a step in the formation process of this thesis.

3.6. Axiology and Ethical Principles

This part of the chapter is about the ethical and axiological issues raised by this thesis. As is commonly understood, axiology pertains to the significance of values that a researcher in social studies must consider. The problems and issues axiology investigates have been with us from the moment man began to reflect upon the conditions of his life, the structure of reality, the order of nature, and man's place in it. Inquiry into the claims, truth, and validity of value judgments is a necessity of life itself. The concept of value permeates our lives at every step. We prefer one thing to another, we shift our attention from one event to another, we praise one behaviour and condemn another, we like and dislike, and whenever we do it, we value (Hart, 1971: 29-41). At this point, it needs to be mentioned that values are foundational for both the knowledge-producing researcher and the research itself.

Since this thesis deals with a fundamental issue in world politics and history, it is crucial to examine how a critical social scientist fits into such a process. The critical researcher has to observe research from different perspectives, beginning with his/her own role as a researcher and the extent to which he/she is able to know the truth about reality. A critical researcher investigating the influence of IOs on the relationship between two strategic states needs to understand Ken Booth's emancipatory realism.

In this theory, Booth places the researcher in the subject as the main actor, revealing the politics behind knowledge (Booth, 2007: 62). All knowledge is a social process that is socially and therefore politically produced. The critical perspective is convinced that knowledge, while being against some, is in favour of some others. A critical researcher is therefore mainly tasked with revealing the reality and politics hidden behind knowledge.

According to Booth, this process takes place in three steps. First, the critical researcher has to criticise the false naturalness of traditional theories. Hence, the critical researcher reaches reality by rejecting naturalism, which assumes that the social world can be treated objectively. In this way, the focus of critical theory on knowledge offers us a way to understand social ontology and thus the construction of social realities. Additionally, critical thinking also leads to questioning the epistemology of the social world. For instance, interests underlying the knowledge provide a comprehensive sample. The main path for a critical researcher to know the truth is to find out who the knowledge is for and what kind of function it has in supporting interests. Finally, to find out what can be done in order to change a bad situation is the last step for a critical researcher. In the case of a change that leads to emancipation, the critical researcher calls himself/herself successful in finding the truth about reality. The Influence of IOs in this thesis is conceptualised as a consequence of knowledge consisting of two main subcomponents, like hegemony and power, that could definitively change the negative influence into a positive one. In this case, most MENA countries that are partially dependent on powerful states will gain emancipation.

Secondly, dealing with international matters requires the researcher to adopt a global perspective rather than a value-depending one. By value is meant the researcher's personal culture, traditions, religion, etc. According to critical social scientists, it is impossible for the researcher to perform a value-free analysis. In fact, this is almost not possible in any process that involves social beings. Alexandra Gehciu proves this statement by exemplifying it with the attitude of IOs such as the EU, NATO, and European Organisation for Security and Cooperation after 9/11 against international terrorism. It is seen that the members of these organisations are seen as

civilised and reliable, whereas non-members are seen as barbaric and threatening. Although, the 9/11 event is still discussed by historians and there are many unveiled dimensions of the tragedy, Thus, one can say, even though there is no final examination and conclusion of 9/11, IOs as authorities include social beings with certain interests' categories the world in groups regarding their own values. No matter how critical the issue is, even the largest and most professional organisations cannot build a value-free reality. The advantage of a critical researcher is their awareness of this weakness of social beings. Accordingly, the researcher continues to search for knowledge and reality rather than claiming to have done the most objective observation or reached the most concrete reality. As described above, critical researchers divide this process into three distinct layers called empirical reality, pure reality, and the factual plane. Empirical reality can only be observed by using senses but is produced by deeper structures and causal mechanisms operating on unobservable planes. In this layer, theory and research can help us to understand the structures that operate on the plane of reality and the mechanisms that produce and change these structures over time. Secondly, structures in the plane of reality are directly observable and changeable. With theoretical insight and scrutiny, the critical researcher can expose deep structures slowly. Thirdly, causal mechanisms operating on the factual plane may appear to have internal inconsistencies and paradoxes. However, they may contain forces or processes that appear to be contradictory but are actually part of a larger singular process. Frankly, for the critical researcher, observations and empirical reality are not pure, unbiased, and independent from experience. Reality is not independent of thoughts, experiences, and actions that interact with each other during time. Hence, according to the critical perspective, research, even if unintended, reflects value in the background. It should not be expected from a researcher of Western background to fully criticise NATO or the UN's influence in the MENA region. On the other hand, a researcher of MENA background is not expected to praise these organisation's influence. Even if the researcher tries to be objective, sentences reveal values.

Last but not least, the researcher needs to act as a moralist in order to explore the issue within ethical borders. The question at this point is to what extent the

influence of IOs is an inherently normative process. The critical researcher is aware of the complex interrelationship between influence and hegemony, power, and dependence. However, critical social scientists concentrate themselves rather on the positive potential of this interrelationship. According to this theory, the researcher has to find out the equation of influence, hegemony, and power leading to emancipation. According to CS' scholars, emancipation, on the other hand, is automatically a sign of security (Collins, 2018: 69). Whereas in the previous equation, dependency indicates the absence of security. Taking this on the basis of NATO and the UN's influence in the MENA region, it could be argued that these IOs fail to fulfil their founding purpose. Since critical theories do not deal much with the influence of IOs, there is a serious gap in the literature. For this reason, it is not possible to find the opinions of critical researchers on the subject. However, considering that critical theory is a school established to improve and emancipate, concentration on the emancipatory structure of the influence of IOs should be intensified. As a matter of fact, the positive aspects of the influence are quite high. The critical thinking in this sense, by taking the concept of influence with hegemony and power as subcomponents, is the best way to turn negative into positive. Hence, instead of mentioning positive and negative functions of the influence, the improving and emancipatory nature of critical approaches helps to understand how the influence could be turned into an emancipatory and security-keeping concept.

One of the most well-known instances is the UN and NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011. In accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC enacted resolution 1973 (2011) on March 17, 2011, authorising the use of force, including the imposition of a no-fly zone, to defend civilians and civilian areas attacked by the Qaddafi dictatorship and its supporters. This resolution called for a halt to violence against civilians, the creation of an airspace no-fly zone over Libya that would not apply to flights carrying humanitarian aid, and the backing of all member nations. By a vote of 10-0, with the abstentions of Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia, the resolution was approved (Taylor, 2011: 3-5). However, the case in reality was not as described above. Already in February 2011, NATO was far from being a neutral observer; rather, it actively fuelled the outbreak of civil war by covertly

supporting the rebels. As seen in other illegal NATO interventions, such as in Serbia in 1999, secret NATO operatives were already deployed in Libya long before the UNSC passed Resolution 1973. This operation in Libya was not a peaceful one but rather an illegal intervention (Ganser, 2020: 242). This is an instance of how power, hegemony, and influence are seen in one.

The structure of the equation alters the meaning of influence, making it either positive or negative. When evaluated from this point of view, it is seen that the influence of the UN and NATO should be positive and only aim to stop the war and protect the civilians. But, considering all death, a country to become almost unrecognisable, and the ongoing chaos in the country today, the negative position of the influence of the UN and NATO comes to the fore. Pentagon authorities eventually claimed that Gadhafi had almost little air defence left to him and was losing the capacity to control and maintain his ground forces. His command bunkers were made useless, his air force unable to fly, his warships were in port, his ammo depots were destroyed, and communication towers were falling (“Briefing by Vice Adm. Gortney on *Operation Odyssey Dawn*”, 2011). Finally, not to mention Gadhafi’s exemplary death on 20 October 2011. This example shows how the influence of IOs that should be positive, as in its discourse, turns out to be negative. Hence, the critical researcher prefers, instead of issuing firm judgments, to observe the subject and to understand what could be done to change and improve the situation.

Regarding the aforementioned argument, this thesis takes the stance that while some influence cases—such as war, civil war, military operations, and chaos—may be negatively viewed, it is possible to turn them into a positive one. It tries to bring attention to the significance of a critical social scientist in developing plans that can turn a negative influence into a positive one.

Ethical principles, on the other hand, are specifically relevant to performing research that involves other people. Essentially, the ethical guidelines focus on four basic issues: (1) whether participants are harmed; (2) whether informed agreement was obtained; (3) whether there was a privacy violation; and (4) whether deceit was used (Bryman, 2012: 135). Hence, this section mainly discussed the role of a critical social

scientist and addressed the ethical debate whether the influence of NATO and the UN can be improved in the MENA region.

3.7. Conclusion

This chapter's goal is to make the technique for this thesis more understandable. It begins by addressing the crucial issues of ontology and epistemology. The thesis follows the critical social science ontology, which holds that social systems are "created" and "only partially objective," but that their objectivity depends on common knowledge and the values of the critical researcher. The argument corresponds to emancipatory realism, which contends that reality can only be reached by rejecting naturalism (which holds that the social world may be treated objectively). In this approach, critical theory's emphasis on knowledge gives us a method to comprehend social ontology and, by extension, the creation of social realities. Second, the key features of the case study research design that is used in this thesis are introduced in this chapter. Thus, it underlines how the five turning points of the thesis, which reflect distinct facets of the influence of IOs, will be fitted to the new concept of influence with its subcomponent's hegemony and power. Third, this chapter describes the use of qualitative approaches in obtaining the data for the thesis, which is dependent on interviews, primary sources, secondary sources, and archival resources. Finally, this chapter analyses the ethical and axiological issues, highlighting the significance of these issues for the study presented in this thesis.

In the chapters that follow, this thesis will examine in detail five turning points within the Turkish-Libyan case, each of which demonstrates the influence of both the UN and NATO. These instances aim to illustrate the new conceptual framework of IOs' influence introduced in Chapter 2. However, before engaging with these turning points, it is essential to first establish the historical context of the Türkiye-Libya relationship. Additionally, an understanding of the origins of the UN and NATO, the purposes behind their formation, and an evaluation of their success in achieving their foundational goals will enhance the critical analysis of the turning points presented in the case study. Therefore, the next chapter will provide a chronological overview of the Türkiye-Libya relationship, alongside relevant historical and political background

on the UN and NATO. While this account may not be entirely free from subjectivity, it will offer valuable insights into the operations and influence of two of the most significant peace and security organisations globally, enriching the study's critical perspective.



4. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

4.1. Introduction

Before delving into the discussions of the UN Assemblies spanning from 1948 to 1951 about Libyan independence, it is imperative to provide a succinct historical background on the diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and Libya, which became later Türkiye and Libya. In fact, the geographical area known as Libya was initially formed by the Phoenicians as important marine hubs and economic centres before the Common Era. However, it later came under Roman administration during the post-Common Era period. After the partition of the Roman Empire into two distinct entities, the province that remained under Byzantine governance underwent a transfer of authority to the Prophet Muhammad in the year 643. Hence, following the conquest by Khalifa Omar, the land was given to the Muslim people. Over the course of an extended period, the residents of the geographical area progressively adopted the Islamic religion.

Based on this short informative picture, it is possible to state that, due to its strategic importance, the territorial region of Libya garnered the attention of various prominent nations throughout historical periods. As a result, a sequence of intense conflicts and political volatility has ensued in the region (Kavas, 2003: 176–179). Undoubtedly, a prolonged struggle for control and authority has endured in the region across countless millennia. An ongoing conflict has emerged between the Islamic Empires and the entities of Rome/Byzantium, as well as among the indigenous Arab dynasties located inside the region. Over the course of various historical developments, the Berber communities and tribes, progressively adopting the Arab culture, endeavoured to establish their influence over the lands of Libya. Meanwhile, the administration of regional dynasties and the subsequent inter-dynastic disputes held significant importance (Kavas, 2012: 288–289). Indeed, several notable figures and events are of particular importance in this context. This chapter aims to highlight key events in Turkish-Libyan history that played a crucial role in shaping the relationship to its form today. It provides an insight into the essence of the region as a whole and

of Türkiye and Libya as two strategic actors. Furthermore, the chapter is important since it reflects the enduring relationship between both countries.

After providing a short picture of Libya up to its transition to Ottoman rule, one recognises that Libya saw a lot of transitions while mainly resting under Arab influence. When it comes to Turkish-Libyan relations, the transition to the Ottoman Empire as the precursor of the Turkish Republic is of particular significance. Therefore, the following part will briefly provide a chronological narrative of the transition of Tripoli (Libya) to the Ottoman Empire.

4.2. Transition of Tripoli (Libya) to Ottoman Rule

In the early 16th century, the province of Tripoli in Libya underwent an invasion by Spain, a notable power of the time. The Spanish, who successfully ended the era of Andalusian dominance in Europe, also pushed their territorial aspirations in North Africa. However, the local population in Libya was not happy to be under Spanish colonisation. Hence, during the era of Spanish colonisation, the Libyan population sent a mission to Istanbul in 1519 with the aim of seeking aid from the Ottoman Empire. In response to this demand, the Ottoman Empire initially sent a limited amount of military assistance.

Despite so, it should be noted that only in the year 1551, after 32 years, the province of Libya could be seized by Admiral Sinan Pasha and Turgut Reis, who were sent by Suleiman the Magnificent. This action was taken in response to the call for help and, of course, to the Spanish, who were seen as a threat to the Ottoman Empire's control over the Mediterranean, aiming to use the area as a strategic stronghold. Under the dominion of the Ottoman Empire on the other side, Libya (Tripoli) experienced a transformation into a *beghlerbeghlik* guided by Turgut Reis. Indeed, the aforementioned growth played a vital role in solidifying the territorial integrity of the contemporary Libyan State, as it was finally incorporated as an Ottoman province at that era. As mentioned above, Tripoli possessed considerable strategic importance in terms of the Ottoman Empire's dominion over the Mediterranean, which is known for its important location. This location had a significant influence as a strategic military

outpost for the Ottoman Navy and its effectively supported marine commerce (Kavas, 2012: 175).

A particular development that serves as a testament to the strategic importance of Tripoli is the decree promulgated on 6 Rebiu'l-Evvel 967/6 December 1559 by Suleiman the Magnificent to Turgut Reis, the Governor of Tripoli. By reading the text, it can be derived that the primary objective of Sultan Suleiman in issuing this proclamation was to ensure the security and well-being of Tripoli and its populace. In order to accomplish this goal, the sultan utilised the following statements within the given context:

Muslims residing in Tripoli (Libya) hold equal value to me as any other individuals within my nation. I place significant priority on providing assistance, facilitating their livelihood, and ensuring their protection from potential harm. Hence, I have forwarded all the requisite materials to you. Attempt to protect those regions from the non-believers (namely the Spanish and the Crusader Fleet). It is imperative to establish collaboration and foster harmonious relationships with all indigenous tribes, esteemed scholars, and venerable elders within the region. Efficiently safeguard the entirety of Tripoli's coastal regions in Libya. It is advisable to reinforce the defensive structures of your castles. Ensure the protection of both villages and individuals from any potential threat. Share the presents that were sent by me to the esteemed individuals in the region. It is imperative to consistently exhibit respectful and considerate behaviour towards others (BDA, 28-29; BOA.A. DVNS. MHM., d. 3/579).

The Ottoman Empire was decisive in being the role player and not the playground in the Mediterranean in the 16th century. In order to keep its reign as long as possible, the Empire considered and respected local people, the tribal structure, and religious realities in its conquered territories as long as the necessary and required payments/taxes were made. Due to this kind of policy, the existence of the Ottoman Empire could last for centuries. In fact, up to early 19th century, it was possible to talk about a parallel proceeding between theoretical reality and practical reality within the Ottoman administration. This meant that the discourse of the Ottoman Administration was not different from its ruling in practice on the field. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire was able to keep peace and security within its borders for that time period. So

to say, the Ottoman Administration 'meant what it said'. According to Sauvaget, the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century possessed significant power. He describes this as follows:

The Sultans ruled over vast territories spanning millions of square kilometres. Furthermore, their budget sources were more extensive and dependable compared to European states, including Spain with its gold mines. The Ottoman Empire boasted a well-structured administration that provided beneficial services to the loyal population, and their disciplined military force, superior artillery, and dominant navy in the Mediterranean commanded the attention of Europe as a whole (Sauvaget, 1961: 165).

In the early stages of Ottoman rule, the Tripoli region in Libya was initially governed by beglerbeghs, reflecting the administrative structure commonly employed by the Ottoman Empire to manage its provinces. Over time, a shift in the balance of power occurred as the Janissaries, an elite military corp within the Ottoman Empire, gained prominence and exercised considerable influence over the region for a certain period. This dominance by the Janissaries marked a significant phase in the governance of Tripoli. Subsequently, the emergence of the Karamanli families led to a further transformation in the region's administration, underscoring the dynamic nature of political authority within Ottoman Tripolitania. The appointment of janissaries as well as all subsequent military personnel and administrators was under the purview of the Ottoman ruler (Koloğlu, 2003: 179-183; Kavas, 2012). Nevertheless, starting in the latter portion of the 19th century, the officials assigned to certain areas in the region known as the MENA today began to be appointed by the central controlling entity, further strengthening the central government's power.

Moreover, in 1871, the Benghazi Sanjak underwent a significant transition, evolving into a province with the appointment of a selected governor to assume charge. The decision was influenced by factors such as the extensive territorial size of the region, its significant distance from the administrative centre of Tripoli, and the perceived insufficiency of security measures undertaken at a necessary level (BDA, 252-254). Following a series of developments, the region of Benghazi underwent a significant change, evolving into a mutasarriflik, which referred to the civil governor

of a sanjak or livâ in the Ottoman provincial administration. This transformation established a direct administrative connection between Benghazi and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ottoman Empire. For a long time, the Ottoman Empire guaranteed its administration in Tripoli and Benghazi as an additional part of it (Erinç, 1992: 181-183). Nevertheless, during a prolonged period spanning several centuries subsequent to the establishment of Ottoman dominion with all kinds of its administrative systems, the Ottoman Empire undertook the construction of a significant number of buildings such as soup kitchens, mosques, schools, hospitals, and barracks in various regions of Libya.

During the reign of Sultan II. Abdulhamid, significant infrastructure advancements occurred in Tripoli, encompassing the establishment of educational institutions, healthcare facilities, governmental edifices, and other associated constructions (Kavas, 2012: 191–193). Several of these works persist in their original form up until the present time. Tripoli still boasts a number of prominent sites, such as the Turgut Reis Mosque and Tomb, Müşir Bazaar, Turkish Bazaar, Karamanlı Ahmet Pasha Mosque, Gürcü Mustafa Pasha Mosque, and the Tripoli Clock Tower. Furthermore, the Ottoman Industrial School and Naval Schools are also notable architectural edifices inside the city still existing (Kavas, 2003: 184-188).

The current perception of the Turkish government among the Libyan population might be interpreted as a reflection of the positive measures implemented in the past, when the Libyan people were ruled in a peaceful and secure manner. The Ottoman administration prioritised development efforts and allocated financial resources towards Libya, with a particular focus on the urban centres of Tripoli and Benghazi throughout its reign (BDA, 231-240). The initiative to develop and improve the infrastructure of Tripoli and Benghazi ports was implemented, hence supporting the advancement and expansion of commercial operations within the respective territories (BDA, 241-249). In general, the region experienced the adoption of administrative and financial changes with the objective of improving the welfare of the Libyan population by deterring unscrupulous activities (BDA, 263-264). This is why the involvement at the invitation of the Ottoman Empire in Libya ended up in a peaceful territory for so many years. On the other side, if a peaceful and secure

atmosphere were not the case, history would have faced another call by the Libyan people to another powerful Imperium at that period.

Even almost at the end of the Ottoman Empire, during the tenure of Sultan II. Abdulhamid, deliberate endeavours were undertaken to promote the advancement of Libya (Tripolitania), while concurrently securing the allegiance of its populace to the empire. A thorough report was assembled, in accordance with the viewpoints of the sultan, delineating the requisite reforms across multiple sectors, including military service, security, administration, education, trade, agriculture, animal husbandry, transportation, and communication. The suggested alterations on this matter were thoroughly discussed within the legislative body and subsequently initiated for implementation (BDA, 367-368). Knowing this, one can say that Libya, or better expressed, Tripoli and Benghazi, were important from the beginning on for the Ottoman Empire and later for Türkiye.

4.3. Italy's Occupation of Tripoli (Libya)

During the period marked by the waning influence of the Ottoman Empire, the outlying territories located in North Africa underwent colonisation by European powers, namely Italy, England, and France. In the context of the historical period under consideration, it is worth mentioning that France established its occupation of Algeria in 1830 and Tunisia in 1882, whereas England assumed control over Egypt in 1881 and Sudan in 1889. Within the framework of the competitive endeavour to acquire colonial territories in Europe, Italy, a nation that underwent political unity comparatively later, turned its focus towards Tripoli, situated on the opposing shoreline. By taking advantage of the volatile conditions experienced by the Ottoman Empire, namely the political turmoil, Italy initiated a military campaign against Tripoli in September 1911 (Güzel, 2017: 80-83).

Despite the absence of a contiguous land border with Libya, as a result of British dominion over Egypt, the Ottoman Empire undertook specific defensive measures in reaction to the Italian incursion. Not to mention that, at the beginning of the Italian intervention, the British seemed to support the Ottoman existence in Libya. The Ottoman administration, on the other hand, applied measures such as improving

its military presence and collaborating with local people against the colonisation danger. Nevertheless, the implementation of these measures was delayed, leading to a lack of military readiness on the part of the Ottoman Empire to effectively respond to the Italian invasion. Within this particular context, England later retracted its political support for the Ottoman Empire and supported the Italian occupation (BDA, 327–331).

As a result, following the commencement of Italian military landings in the coastal areas of Tripoli, some commanders, most notably Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal Pasha, conveyed their readiness and were covertly deployed to Libya via Egypt or Tunisia under the authority of the Ottoman Government. Indeed, the successful mobilisation and command of indigenous communities by Ottoman officers, to resist against Italians in Derne, Tobruk, and Benghazi, posed substantial obstacles for the Italian forces for a long time. Another name to be known serving for the Ottoman army during the specified time frame was Colonel Neşet Bey, who undertook the task of organising military operations in Tripoli. Simultaneously, Major Enver Bey, who is also recognised as Enver Pasha, undertook leadership of the Benghazi-Derne Front situated in Benghazi. Upon his arrival in Benghazi, Enver Pasha led a contingent comprising 400 soldiers and actively participated in consequential military confrontations against the Italian forces.

Furthermore, Major Mustafa Kemal Bey, later recognised as Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, assumed command of military forces in Derne and Tobruk, actively engaging in combat against the Italian forces. Many guns were allocated to the local population residing in the region, who were thereafter militarily organised and led by individuals of esteemed religious authority, namely sayyids and sheikhs. The primary objective of this mobilisation was to actively participate in armed opposition against the Italian military presence (BDA, 481-483). The historical, cultural, and religious ties between the Turkish party and the locals during this period was one of the most influential facts shaping the defence formation in Libya. By considering this reality, it is possible to state that political stability in countries within the MENA, such as Libya, cannot be achieved without understanding them in a historical, religious, cultural, and political framework.

Back to the Italian occupation, according to a communication from the General Staff Department to the Ministry of Internal Affairs regarding military operations, it was documented that the Italian forces, initiating their first movement towards the south from Derne along three separate routes, were forced to retreat following the counterattack carried out by Ottoman troops and local resistance. The aforementioned withdrawal ultimately evolved into a condition of abandonment, leading to notable losses among the Italian forces, however, the Italian forces continued their attacks (BDA, 510-512).

The Ottoman Empire did not only support Libyan locals militarily, but it also extended a financial aid of 50,000 Ottoman Liras to the residents of Tripoli, who were experiencing considerable difficulties due to the prolonged struggle with Italy and the enforcement of an Italian trade embargo. The supply of assistance was considered essential, as the basic needs of the population had reached a critical level of urgency (BDA, 538-539). Despite many efforts from the local side, as a result of continuous Italian bombardment and the subsequent atrocities committed during the occupation, a considerable number of individuals from the region were compelled to engage in migration to various locations within the Ottoman Empire, with Istanbul being particularly preferred as a destination (CDA, BOA., DH. ŞFR, 506/551, 60/10). On January 21, 1912, the preliminary draft law was adopted by the Ottoman Government. The aforementioned legislation concerned the provision of essential assistance to Libyan immigrants hailing from the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi, who were adversely impacted by Italy's military aggression. The provision of aid was intended to be facilitated with the objective of assisting their settlement (CDA BOA., MV., 226-62).

The inhabitants of the depicted region demonstrated steadfast loyalty to the Ottoman government, even during the period of Italian rule. For instance, a petition, dated March 1, 1912, was directed to the Ottoman Government by the sayyids, sheikhs, and scholars residing in the Tripoli and Benghazi territories, reflecting strong opposition to Italians and trust in Ottoman administration. In the petition, religious and patriotic reasons were exhibited and emphasised. The petition claimed steadfast

loyalty to the Ottoman sultan/Caliph and a preference for death rather than being taken captive by Italians or other Western powers (CDA BOA., İ.MBH., 9-21).

In order to better understand the resistance, it is important to acknowledge that in the regions under Italian control, the acts of aggression also directed towards children and women, along with the extreme cruelty inflicted upon the Libyan population, generated substantial public outcry and consequently strengthened the resistance against the Italian military. It is possible to observe this aggressive attitude in official documents (“Osmanlı Belgelerinde Trablusgarb”, 439-497).

On the other side, in light of the prevailing circumstances, Italy executed a sequence of measures that encompassed the dispatch of military personnel to twelve islands falling under the authority of the Ottoman Empire, the bombardment of specific ports situated within Ottoman territories, an offensive operation targeting Beirut, and the enforcement of a blockade on the Dardanelles. As a result, the events, in conjunction with the eruption of the Balkan Wars, caused the Ottoman Empire to comply with the peace conditions that were imposed by Italy (Çelebi, 2011: 104-105). On the 16th of October 1912, Sultan Mehmed Reşad signed an edict granting autonomy to Tripoli, a decision that occurred just two days prior to the signing of the Treaty of Ushi/Lausanne. The decision to provide autonomy to the region can be traced to the strategic manoeuvring of the Ottoman Empire. It can be understood that, in pursuing this course of action, the empire sought to mitigate the risk of eliciting an adverse reaction from the Libyan population and to avert the perception of abandonment of a Muslim area. In fact, this step was implemented with the aim of indicating that the province was not neglected but rather subjected to a strong military presence by Italy. The decision to provide full autonomy to the area of Tripoli was based on the understanding that the Balkan states’ involvement in military operations against the Ottoman Empire hindered the Ottoman authority from offering support in the fight with Italy.

The legal articles that have been issued within this specific situation comprise multiple provisions. First and foremost, it mandates the provision of crucial assistance in the development of legislation and regulations within the specified geographical

area. Furthermore, it delineates the designation of Şemseddin Bey as Naibüssultan by the sultan for a period of five years. Finally, it is required that a judge from the central authority be appointed to verify the selection of local judges (“Osmanlı Belgelerinde Trablusgarb”, 541–543). As a result, subsequent to the ratification of the Treaty of Ushi, which comprised eleven articles, between the Ottoman Empire and Italy on October 18, 1912, the official recognition of the Italian occupation of Tripoli and Benghazi took place. Consequently, Italy pledged to disengage from the twelve islands it had previously occupied (Erim, 1953: 354–451; “Osmanlı Belgelerinde Trablusgarb”: 544). Based on the stipulations stated in the treaty, it becomes evident that Libyan Muslims were permitted to adhere to the religious and judicial jurisdiction wielded by the Ottoman monarch. Moreover, it is also noteworthy to mention that the Ottoman Empire had a continued presence in the region. Italy expressed its intention to meet its financial responsibilities towards the Ottoman Empire by allocating a specific piece of Tripoli as a kind of compensation for the Ottoman Public Debt. Meanwhile, the pre-war bilateral and commercial agreements between the two sides shall be maintained (CDA BOA., HSD.CB., 4/78).

The Ottoman Empire, upon agreeing to the surrender of Tripoli (Libya) as specified in the treaty, sought to include certain clauses inside the treaty articles in order to maintain its influence in the region. In this way, the Ottoman Empire successfully managed and orchestrated the military leaders and tribes that were present in the area, particularly through the utilisation of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa organisation. As a result, the Libyan population repeatedly demonstrated their refusal to accept the Italian occupation and remained steadfast in their ongoing resistance endeavours.

The letter written by Minister of War Nazım Pasha to Enver Bey, the Commander of Benghazi and the surrounding area, contained a number of relevant information regarding this issue. He wrote:

Commencing a conflict with four Balkan states entails the imperative of establishing peaceful relations with the Italians. The commendable endeavours of the indigenous people in safeguarding their homeland during the Tripoli War are noteworthy. Within this framework, Sheikh Ahmed Şerîf Sanûsî proclaimed that even in the event of the Ottoman Empire's withdrawal from Tripoli and Benghazi,

they would persist in their struggle to protect their native land, even if it meant sacrificing their lives. Additionally, the Sheikh emphasised the necessity of delivering the weaponry and ammunition in Benghazi to the Sanûsîs.(“Osmanlı Belgelerinde Trablusgarb”: 557-559).

As a consequence of this particular situation, the scope of Italian dominion throughout the First World War was limited only to the coastal regions of Libya with no effective penetration into the inland territories. As mentioned in the letter by Minister of War Nazım Pasha to Enver Bey, another name to be known is Sheikh Ahmed Sanusi, a fervent advocate of the Ottoman Empire, who engaged in continuous correspondence with the Ottoman Government subsequent to the Italian occupation of the area. At the commencement of the First World War, he openly declared his loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and actively pursued support in the form of weaponry and munitions to counter Italian forces (Mutlu, 2019: 55-56).

4.4. Tripoli (Libya) in the First World War and the Armistice of Mudros

Based on available archival evidence, it can be deduced that the Ottoman Empire, before the onset of the First World War, regarded Tripoli (Libya) as a region warranting autonomous independence (“Osmanlı Belgelerinde Trablusgarb”: 570-577). However, during the initial stages of the struggle, the portion of Libya that was under Italian occupation, including its capital Tripoli, maintained its religious affiliation with the Caliphate, which was under the authority of the Ottoman sultan. Italy exhibited considerable concern on the prospective engagement of the Ottoman Empire in the fight against its own alliance. Furthermore, Italy expressed its alarm regarding the extensive revolt of Libyan Muslims within its controlled areas and conveyed this concern to the Ottoman authorities (“*Osmanlı Belgelerinde Birinci Dünya Harbi I*”: 83; CDA BOA., DH.EUM., 5. Şb, 3/16).

On the other side, at the commencement of the First World War, the Libyan population’s military endeavours, facilitated by the Ottoman Empire, were reinforced through the allocation of military personnel, armaments, and ammunition delivered to the area by the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Ministry of War and other private organisations effectively employed their operatives in the region to rally the local

community against the Italians. The Ottoman officers who were deployed to the region assumed leadership of the troops and played a pivotal role in directing the military operations against the Italians. They actively endeavoured to establish measures to counter the influence of the Italians and the British in the region, particularly by fostering a collaborative relationship with Sheikh Ahmed Sanusi of the Sanusid tribe. As a result, the Ottoman Empire became involved during the First World War in Tripoli (Libya) as a direct consequence of the aforementioned endeavours (Ünalp, 2010: 147). During that time, Sheikh Seyyid Ahmed Şerîf Senûsî Pasha was granted the prestigious designation of Naibüssultan of Tripoli and Benghazi by the Council of Ministers as a token of acknowledgment for his commendable achievements and steadfast dedication exhibited throughout the conflict (“Osmanlı Belgelerinde Trablusgarb”: 575-577). The primary aim of the Ottoman Empire’s strategic decision to establish a front in the region was to redirect the focus and allocation of resources of the Allied Powers, who had declared war against them, away from the main struggle. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire, driven by its goal to regain control over Egypt, endeavoured to put an end to Italian governance in Tripoli.

During the First World War, the Ottoman Empire pursued a strategic objective of launching a dual-front assault against British-controlled Egypt. The Canal Expedition, launched by the Ottoman Empire in February 1915, was the attempt to contest British dominance in Egypt. However, this military action ultimately proved futile. Soon, the Ottoman Empire formulated a strategy to exert additional pressure on British soldiers. During the specific historical context, Enver Pasha, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman Empire, appointed his brother Nuri Bey (sometimes referred to as Nuri Killigil Pasha) to be deployed to the area and assume command of the military campaigns aimed at countering the Italian and British forces. Nuri Bey, in conjunction with the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, a group that established its central operations in Benghazi, formulated a strategic blueprint aimed at orchestrating a joint military campaign with the Sanusids to mount an offensive against Egypt (Ünalp, 2010: 148). In addition, Ramazan Shetevi, a notable tribal chief with considerable sway over a huge territorial expanse within Libya, assumed a crucial role

in providing support to the Ottoman Empire and actively participated in resistance endeavours against both Italian and British military troops.

The original military resistance by Ottoman forces took place in the Sellum region, which is situated in eastern Libya and is currently part of Egypt's territory. Following that, the military forces advanced east. Sellûm was effectively subdued as a result of the military campaign, during which Sheikh Ahmed Senûsî extended his assistance to the Ottoman troops by deploying his own armed forces (Azaman, 2009: 527). In anticipation of the 2nd Channel Offensive conducted by the Ottoman Army in August 1916, the Ottoman Empire deployed a diverse array of military resources, which encompassed a German submarine, three infantry companies, a heavy machine gun team, a battalion of troops, and a force of officers. These forces were sent to the western region of Egypt, where they actively participated in military engagements against the British forces.

The establishment of the African Groups Command in Benghazi was initiated with the aim of bolstering the military framework through the promotion of increased organisation. The command consisted of a total of nine battalions. During the early stages of the war, effective control of the Tobruk and Derne lines was maintained. Following a collaborative military operation conducted by British and Italian forces, the tribes and Ottoman troops made the decision to withdraw towards the eastern area. Furthermore, Nuri Pasha decided to transfer his central command to the eastern region of Misrata (Ünalp, 2010: 147-148). Soon, the Sellûb region was also taken back by the British (Azaman, 2009: 527-528). In the latter part of 1917, subsequent to the transfer of Nuri Pasha, the Commander of the African Groups, to the Caucasus Front, the responsibility of leading the Ottoman forces stationed in Libya was assumed by Osman Fuat Efendi, a prince of the Ottoman Empire. The erosion of Seyyid Ahmed's authority was partially attributed to his series of defeats in the latter stages of the struggle. Meanwhile, in collaboration with Sayyid Idris, the nephew of Ahmed Sanusî, who was appointed by the British as the leader of the Sanusiyah faction, the British forces, alongside Ottoman troops and Libyan resistance fighters, encountered significant difficulties in responding to the aerial attacks carried out by Italians. Despite so, the Ottoman military effectively controlled Tripoli, Misrata, Sirte, and certain parts of

Benghazi, while Italian garrisons faced restrictions in their authority, limited to specific coastal areas (Ünalp, 2010: 124).

During the aforementioned historical era, the Italian authorities subjected multiple tribes and prominent individuals from Tripoli and Benghazi, who were under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman forces, to acts of torture and forced displacement (CDA BOA., HR.SYS., 2230/86). As a result, Sheikh Ahmed Sanusi was carried to Istanbul in August 1918 through the use of a German submarine. Following his arrival, he was allowed a meeting with Sultan Vahdeddin in order to discuss further solution possibilities. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire exhibited its apprehension regarding Sheikh Sanusi's spiritual support among the general population as a strategy to safeguard its regional influence in relation to Sheikh Idris.

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War led to the complete elimination of Ottoman control in Tripoli, as well as in various other regions. As a result, as per the Armistice of Mudros, a treaty finalised on October 30, 1918, signifying the culmination of the First World War for the Ottoman Empire, it was specified that Ottoman military forces involved in hostilities against the Allied Powers in Libya were required to surrender to the closest garrisons under the jurisdiction of the Allied Powers. Following the implementation of a truce, it was noted that some areas, especially Tripoli, Misrata, and Benghazi, continued to be under the control of Ottoman forces. Ottoman military officers were continuously involved in the coordination and formation of indigenous opposition movements within certain geographical regions. In accordance with the stipulations defined in Article 17 of the Armistice of Mudros, it was mandated that Turkish military forces deployed in Tripoli and Benghazi were obligated to submit themselves to the nearest Italian garrison. In a similar vein, Article 18 outlined the provision that mandated the handover of the Ottoman-controlled ports of Misrata and Benghazi to the closest Italian unit (ATASE, 142, 7/1-2-3).

Despite the preceding paragraphs and the surrender requests presented by the Allied Powers, the formal surrender of the Ottoman troops involved in military operations across various regions of Tripoli did not occur until the year 1919. It is

noteworthy to mention that their capitulation was finally instigated by several commands emanating from Istanbul. As a result, during the early months of 1919, the Ottoman Empire's remaining military presence in Libya was officially withdrawn from the region. Nevertheless, Libya maintained considerable importance owing to its role as the last territorial possession ceded by the Ottoman Empire along the North African and Mediterranean coastlines. Furthermore, it served as the exclusive North African territory where Ottoman military forces were deployed during the signing of the Armistice of Mudros.

4.5. Important Affairs in Libya from the Post-Ottoman Period to the Present

After Italy's successful annexation of the province in 1912 and subsequent loss in the First World War, the region's ties with the Ottoman Empire were effectively broken. However, despite Italy's aggressive and expansionist policies in the 1930s, which aimed to establish colonies in the Mediterranean region, opposition continued. Ömer Muhtar, also known as the "Desert Lion" in Libya, courageously opposed the Italian forces alongside the local population, achieving significant victories, until his efforts were finally thwarted when he was captured and consequently committed to capital punishment (Kavas, 2007: 76-78).

After the years of colonisation, the year 1951 marked the attainment of independence by Libya, subsequently leading to the establishment of a royal administration within its territorial boundaries. The arrival of the head of the Sanussiyah Movement, who had forged a durable alliance with the British, took place in the Kingdom. In the course of attaining independence in Libya, the Libyan population sought support from the Turkish government. Again, the Libyan population engaged in written correspondence with the Turkish government, articulating their aspirations for annexation and unity. Based on media sources as well as individual claims, there existed a prevailing aspiration among the inhabitants of Tripoli to pursue a process of unification with Türkiye and an embarrassment due to Türkiye's passive attitude (CDA BCA, 1945-04-04, 541, 44205-209993-11; CDA BCA, 1949-05-19,

541, 44304-210808-21).⁴ For instance, the “Annexation Party to Türkiye” was established in the year 1947.⁵ The primary aim of this group was to integrate themselves into the nation of Türkiye. In the given context, the Turkish Presidency was the recipient of communication in 1949 from both the Libyan National Liberation Board and prominent figures in Libya.

The aforementioned correspondence specifically urged Türkiye to assume an active role inside the UN, arguing for the achievement of Libya’s independence (CDA, BCA, Muamelat Genel Müdürlüğü, 30-10-0-0/267-800-19). However, official records, as can be observed later in Chapter 5, reflect how the UN put efforts into hindering such an active role by Türkiye. Without Türkiye having one single word to say, international powers under the umbrella of the UN decided about Libya’s form of independence, its administration, and its political structure. In the year 1952, the Republic of Türkiye officially recognised the authority and independence of the United Kingdom of Libya and thereafter opted to establish diplomatic relations (CDA BCA., Kararlar Daire Başkanlığı (1928-), 30-18-1-2/127-100-8).

Türkiye and Libya continuously established robust bilateral relations characterised by substantial cooperation in multiple domains, encompassing economy, trade, marine affairs, energy, social affairs, and security, among others. (CDA BCA., 30-18-1-2/337-52-8; 30-18-1-2/378-214-15; 30-18-1-2/335-45-7). In the year 1969, Muammar Gaddafi, a military officer in Libya, effectively overthrew King Idris Sanûsî, also known as the leader of the Sanûsî religious movement, subsequently assuming the position of President of Libya. The duration of Gaddafi’s administration spanned a total of 42 years. Although Gaddafi was not in love with Turkish people and tried to keep Turkish Libyans (*Kuloghli*s) away from official administrative posts, he is known for supporting Türkiye in difficult times. Indeed, during the Cyprus Peace Operation carried out by Türkiye in 1974, the Libyan State under the leadership of Gaddafi provided political, economic, and spiritual support to Türkiye, despite the imposition of an international embargo on Türkiye by the international community (Koloğlu, 2003: 181-184). This support can definitively not be explained by socio-

⁴ See Appendix 11 and 18.

⁵ See Appendix 1.

cultural facts such as historical, cultural, or religious ties. However, it can be explained by the geopolitical and geographical position of both countries in the region. Furthermore, Gaddafi's discourse as a Muslim leader supporting a Muslim country was driven by his political agenda of regionalism. Gaddafi's three main ruling policies during his administration period—pan-Islamism, pan-Arabism, and nationalism—did not end up in favour of the international consensus.

Hence, despite not being expected, the Arab Spring as well affected Libya. While the main reason for this turmoil in 2011 was poverty, unemployment, and injustice, the events in Libya turned soon to protests aiming to take down Gaddafi. The Libyan civil war was characterised by the swift decline of Gaddafi's power subsequent to the military intervention led by NATO, ultimately resulting in his downfall at the hands of rebel forces in October 2011 (Tandoğan, 2018). Following that, the establishment of the Interim National Council Government took place in Libya, with a designated timeframe of 18 months. Subsequently, the National General Congress Assembly commenced its proceedings. However, despite the implementation of a revised management framework following the overthrow of Gaddafi's administration, the condition of turmoil in Libya continued. During this specific time frame, a notable evolution took place within the House of Representatives in Tobruk, resulting in its autonomous operational capacity.

As a result of the subsequent battle among the parties engaged, two unique leadership figures emerged inside the nation. General Haftar, currently stationed in Tobruk, embarked on an endeavour to engineer a coup against the government in Tripoli with the aid of the Zenta militia, known for their prior involvement in actions opposing the regime of Gaddafi. The coup endeavour was assisted by the support General Haftar received from various IOs. On the other side, the formation of the National Accord Government (GNA) in Tripoli, under the supervision of the UN, has taken place in a very volatile environment. This administration in Libya has garnered widespread recognition as the legitimate government by Türkiye, along with numerous other states. Although the House of Representatives located in Tobruk, which provides its backing to General Haftar, continues to maintain its claim and assertion to be the legitimate governing entity of the country. This faction continues to receive support

from several nations, such as the UAE, Egypt, Greece, France, and Russia (Kekilli, 2016: 8-29).

The support does not stem from emotional or socio-cultural factors. On the contrary, it is interest-oriented and purely geopolitical. Furthermore, the independent endeavours of Greece and the Greek Cypriot side to investigate and exploit energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, along with their efforts to encroach upon Türkiye's rights in the Maritime Jurisdiction Area, also presented a substantial challenge to Türkiye's rights and interests in the Mediterranean region ("Türkiye-Libya İlişkilerinde Yeni Dönem," 2020). Türkiye, in response, engaged in the "Memorandum of Understanding on the Limitation of Maritime Jurisdiction Areas and the Security and Military Cooperation Agreement" with the GNA, which is the internationally recognised government of Libya, on November 27, 2019. The primary aim of this agreement was to protect Türkiye's rights, interests, and security within the Eastern Mediterranean area while also serving as a deterrent against any endeavours to isolate Türkiye in the Mediterranean. The relevant agreement was ratified on December 6, 2019, subsequent to obtaining the approval of the President (Official Gazette, 2019) and still keeps its actuality.

Later on, in light of a sequence of occurrences in the region influenced by international powers, the GNA in Libya issued an official request to Turkish military forces to offer military assistance, in accordance with the previously ratified Security and Military Cooperation Agreement between Türkiye and Libya. The deployment of Turkish troops to Libya, available in detail in Chapter 5 in the case study, which was approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) on January 2, 2020, was driven by the goal of fostering peace and stability in Libya while concurrently protecting Türkiye's interests in the North African and Eastern Mediterranean areas. The measures implemented to protect national and international interests held considerable significance. The decision should be regarded as crucial for the purpose of maintaining Türkiye's regional legitimacy, both in practical terms and in diplomatic discussions. For Türkiye as a regional actor, regional stability and peace are important since every negative event will directly or indirectly influence Türkiye. This is not difficult to understand, as chaos in one region can have the effect of Domino, starting

in one country and spreading to neighbour countries like in the instance of the Arab Spring. On the other side, there are other countries active in the region that will not be affected by regional turmoil, speaking of some certain Western countries.

Indeed, since the commencement of the civil conflict in Libya, the US, Britain, France, and Italy have been actively involved in endeavours with the objective of asserting dominance over the oil reserves and strategically important areas within the region (TNA, WO, FO 1015/962, 1952; NATO, AC/119-WP (59)94/2, 1959; NATO, AC 119-WP(59)94/2, 1959). Although one should know that the theoretical discourse of such powerful Western countries in international peace and security organisations is based on peace and security. On the field, however, it is soon recognised that there is no concern about the human being as a socio-cultural existence and single countries as political, regional, and sovereign formations. There is a difference between what is said (theory) and what is done (practice). In contemporary times, a discernible phenomenon has emerged whereby Russia and select Arab nations, harbouring negative attitudes towards Türkiye, have been providing significant political and military support with the aim of furthering their respective domains of influence in Libya. As a result, Türkiye dispatched a group of its military personnel to Libya in January 2020 with the objective of delivering military training and advice assistance. The decision was motivated by Türkiye's dedication to protecting its own rights, interests, and the welfare of the Libyan population, with whom it maintains a historically deep and intimate connection.

It is important to acknowledge that the Libyan GNA has made significant advancements in retaking territory that was previously lost and gaining a strategic advantage over the forces led by Haftar. The progress in question has been expedited with the allocation of military troops and material assistance, encompassing armament and equipment, from Türkiye. Therefore, in addition to providing military support to Libya, the Republic of Türkiye actively participates in diplomatic initiatives with the goal of addressing the issues in Libya in favour of its interests and cultivating an atmosphere of peace, tranquillity, and mutual trust, which will as well influence the region, hence Türkiye in the long term. These endeavours cover a variety of bilateral and international interactions, including formal gatherings and scholarly conferences.

4.6. A Historical Dimension of the UN and NATO in Turkish-Libyan Relations

“Every war in the world begins with a Deception”

It is important to emphasise that there is no such thing as a humanitarian war, just as there is no such thing as a lovely form of sexual abuse. This important fact should be kept in mind while going through the turning points in order to explore the influence of the UN and NATO.

The UN is the only IO in which practically all countries of the world are members; currently, there are 193 member states. The World Peace Organisation (UN) was founded on June 26, 1945, in San Francisco, USA. The headquarters of the UN are located in New York, and the second seat is at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland. Indeed, many of the founders of the UN were shaken by the suffering and atrocities that people inflicted upon each other during World War II. The Republic of Türkiye, as one of the 51 founding members of the UN in 1945, has demonstrated a long-standing commitment to the principles of international peace and security. Serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) during the periods of 1951-52, 1954-55, 1961, and 2009-10, Türkiye has actively contributed to “peacekeeping” operations, crisis resolution, and global security discussions.

The fundamental idea of the UN is simple and clear: wars are illegal. This principle remains valid today, even though it is far too rarely explained in the various media outlets. In Article 2 of the UN Charter, the prohibition of violence is formulated wisely and clearly: “All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security, and justice are not endangered. All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.” There are only two exceptions to this prohibition. First, the right to self-defence, and second, war may be waged against a country if there is an explicit mandate from the UN Security Council.

Talking about the UNSC, it must be mentioned that the General Assembly, the Security Council, and even the Secretary-General do not have an independent

existence. They merely reflect the behaviour of their most powerful members. Or, as UN Secretary-General Sithu U Thant put it, *“The UN can only do what its member states with veto rights allow”* (U Thant, 1970:1). Only the UN Security Council is authorised to decide on the use of force. Worryingly, NATO is disproportionately represented in the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council consists of five permanent members with veto power and ten non-permanent members who are elected for two years and do not have veto power. The resolutions of the Security Council are binding for all 193 UN members if at least 9 of the 15 members approve the resolution and no permanent member casts a veto. The UNSC also makes final decisions for General Assembly discussions.

The dominant five permanent members of the UNSC are the NATO countries USA, UK, and France, as well as Russia and China. This again shows how the interests of NATO countries are disproportionately represented in the UN. The former Libyan president Gaddafi once protested that the influence of the UN General Assembly is far too small and the dominance of the UN Security Council is repulsive.

Currently, the Security Council is a security feudalism—a political feudalism for those enjoying a permanent seat. They protect each other and exploit everyone else. It should be called the Terror Council, not the Security Council (Gaddafi, 2009).

Muammar Gaddafi’s sharp criticism, which was well-founded by the facts, was expressed two years before he was attacked and killed by NATO countries France, the UK, and the USA during the war. Referring to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which governs the use of military force by the Security Council, he aptly explained how the two-class society works:

In political everyday life, the privileged use the Security Council against us when it benefits them. Otherwise, it is ignored. When they want to advance a project or have a personal concern, then the UN is respected and glorified, and Chapter VII is applied against poorer countries. But when they want to break the rules of the UN, the entire institution is simply ignored... Since its founding in 1945, the Security Council has failed to ensure security. We will ignore all security resolutions because these resolutions are exclusively directed against us and not

against the superpowers that have permanent seats and veto rights (Gaddafi, 2009; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2010).

Unfortunately, historical facts confirm Libya's criticism of the UN. Due to many wars and violent happenings even after the establishment of the UN, the success of the UN turns out to be questioned. Is it ethical to say that the UN is successful only because there is no war in the West?

On the other hand, NATO is the largest and most heavily armed military alliance the world has ever seen. Its member countries are located in North America and Europe. The defence spending of NATO member countries exceeds that of all other countries many times over. It is possible to talk about a military industrial complex since the defence industry profits from war. In fact, calling the whole system a defence industry itself constitutes significant propaganda to legitimise the production of every kind of weapon. The following question comes to mind: How to reach peace when the defence industry is spending so much money to produce, sell and earn via weapons. Initially, NATO was said to focus on the defence of its member countries. According to the NATO Alliance System, if one NATO member is attacked, all members need to help their ally.

Although the logic of NATO was to protect against socialism and communism, the alliance was not triggered by the Warsaw Pact of the Soviet Union, but as soon as the Soviet Union broke down, 9/11 happened, and three weeks later NATO, under US leadership, attacked Afghanistan, which was an illegal war without UN mandate. Not to mention that in the official commission report by NATO, detailed information about the third tower, which is also known as the World Trade Centre 7 or the Salomon Brothers Building, is missing. NATO under US leadership continued with the attack on Iraq in 2003, the attack on Libya, and the bombing of Syria. NATO was founded on April 4, 1949, in Washington. The 12 founding members were the USA, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Great Britain. Greece and Türkiye only joined the NATO military alliance in 1952. Within the UN, NATO countries often vote according to Washington's directives, as the Europeans benefit from the protection of the USA.

Today, NATO has 28 members. The USA is without question the most powerful member country within NATO. They have controlled NATO since its founding in 1949. “The only IO that has ever worked is NATO, and that’s because it’s a military alliance, and we are in charge,” (Nixon, 1998) former American President Richard Nixon once remarked tellingly. At this point it will not be wrong to state that the Europeans do not want to admit the dominance of the USA within NATO because this fact diminishes them to the status of vassals. The Europeans are allowed to always appoint the highest civilian NATO official, the Secretary General, which is often highlighted in the media. Currently, Mark Rutte, who is Dutch, serves as the NATO Secretary General. Before him, the Norwegian Jens Stoltenberg held the position. However, to secure American dominance in NATO, it is not the position of the Secretary General that is crucial, as that role is primarily important for public relations, but rather the position of the highest military commander for the European territory (SACEUR). The rank of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is always held by an American general, who is based at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in the Belgian city of Casteau. The SACEUR is responsible for the planning, preparation, and lead of all NATO wars.

NATO is also active in secret warfare, although this is rarely reported in the mainstream media. In 1990, it became known that NATO had established stay-behind secret armies in Europe. During the Cold War, these were tasked with fighting behind enemy lines in the event of a Soviet invasion of NATO territory and also acting against communists and socialists within NATO countries during peacetime if they became too strong and threatened NATO from within, so to speak. For instance, in Italy, where these NATO secret army called the GLADIO (Ganser, 2020: 26). Some of the NATO secret armies were involved in crimes such as coups, terrorist attacks, and torture, which is why the EU Parliament in 1990 demanded a thorough investigation of the stay-behind secret armies in all NATO countries. However, this investigation was blocked by NATO since NATO does not allow any insight into these dark aspects of its history. The NATO has divided the world into commands according to regions named USPACOM, USAFRICOM, USSOUTHCOM, USNORTHCOM, USCENTCOM, and USEUCOM led by PENTAGON, which is at the same time the

headquarters of the US Department of Defence. The chain of the command is as follows: 1. Pentagon/Virginia, the US 2. NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) 3. CIA, MI6 4. ACC Allied Clandestine Committee 5. CPC (Clandestine Planning Committee). This structure reflects that there is a systematic organisation of the NATO on how to lead military activities all around the world. Already in 1957, NATO decided to establish a military station in Libya (NATO, SGM 192-57).⁶ At this point, it should be questioned to what extent NATO is a Defence/Security organisation. It is important and of essence to repeatedly state that without a UN mandate, the intervention of NATO is illegal.

In fact, it should be noted that there are certain facts that need to be considered when talking about the power structure of NATO. Particularly important is the ability to see the picture from top to bottom. It is no longer a secret that the UN as well as NATO, the two most influential IOs, are to a great extent dominated by the US. This leads to the question of whether the US is an imperium, while there is indeed research calling the US an imperium. In order to give a clearer perspective, empires have often sought to leverage their position of strength to gain even more influence and power by controlling raw materials and trade routes and improving their military technology. In their historiography, empires have consistently ensured that their actions, including their wars, are portrayed by their court historians as wise, necessary, and just. The British historian Paul Kennedy has rightly pointed out that such historiography obscures the decadence of empires. Empires rise and fall; no empire lasts forever. The imperial overreach that Kennedy describes inevitably leads powerful states to lose their moral authority through abuse of power, deploy material and human resources across multiple fronts simultaneously, and ultimately overstretch their capabilities, resulting in the collapse of the empire (Kennedy, 1987: 99).

Recognising an empire is not difficult. An empire is typically the greatest economic and military power within a given historical period. If you measure the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the US economy, it becomes immediately clear that the US, even ahead of China, is currently the world's largest economic power.

⁶ See Appendix 22.

Additionally, the US has the dollar as the global reserve currency and can print it themselves. The military superiority of the US is also significant. They possess ten nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, while the other permanent members of the UN Security Council—namely the UK, France, Russia, and China—each operate only one aircraft carrier. The dominant position of the US empire is especially evident in military spending. In 2015, the US spent 600 billion dollars on the military. The US empire, with a market share of more than 30 percent, is also the largest arms exporter, ahead of Russia, China, France, and the UK (SIPRI, 2015). It is alarming that, according to research by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—who claim to be responsible for maintaining global peace—are also the five largest arms exporters. The permanent members of the UN Security Council benefit when a war breaks out, as arms exports to conflict regions then increase. In addition to the highest military spending, the US empire has more than 700 military bases spread around the world, including bases in Germany such as Ramstein (SIPRI, 2016).

The American Chalmers Johnson, a professor of political science in California, has closely studied the imperial development of the USA.

There was a time when imperialism could be measured by counting the number of colonies. The American version of the colony is the military base,” as Johnson astutely observed. “By tracking the global distribution of our military bases, one can learn a lot about our ever-growing imperial footprint, as well as the militarisation of politics that accompanies it (Johnson, 2007: 138).

The military bases serve the navy for stationing their ships, the air force as landing sites for their planes and helicopters, and the army as bases for troops and equipment. Of course, it should be noted that in the US, as well as in Europe, the word “empire” is not welcomed. Despite so, this information will help to analyse the influence of the UN and NATO from a different perspective, keeping in mind the role of the US. In this context, one soon recognises that even though its form changes, hegemony and power are applied for a negative influence

In order to provide a brief picture of the UN and NATO influence on Turkish-Libyan relations: Officially, UN involvement and influence on Turkish-Libyan relations begin with the establishment of a theoretically independent Libyan state. Libya gained independence from Italy in 1951 with the help of a UN resolution. The UN played a crucial role in establishing Libya as a sovereign state, overseeing its transition from an Italian colony to an independent kingdom. Although, at the end, the US, the UK and France established and enforced their military bases in the newly independent country.⁷ This was the beginning of the involvement of international peace and security organisations applying to theoretical discourses. In practice, Libya never became really independent and sovereign. Already in 1953, the Italian Government made a new request to the UN to return the state of Libya to Italian rule (UNGA, NO 719, 1953). The government of Italy took this courage from the agreement it had with the UK regarding the restitution of property.⁸ However, this is also related to the fact that there were locals wanting the influence of the UN.⁹

On the other hand, the next chapter will explore how the involvement of the UN during the establishment of an independent Libya affected Turkish-Libyan relations. Furthermore, Türkiye's stance during the independence discussions will

⁷ For instance, the UK obtained 20 year right to maintain military establishments in Libya in return for financial support to the new Kingdom of Libya (UNGA, Item 39A, NO 104, 1953). See Appendix 14.

⁸ U.N. TRIBUNAL IN LIBYA: Information has been received that on 25 February 1953 the Government of Italy requested the United Nations Tribunal in LiQ1a to determine whether the Agreement concluded in London on 28 June 1951, between the Government of Italy and the Government of the United Kingdom, relating to the restitution of property to certain Italian institutions in Libya was consistent with the provisions of Resolution 388 (V) of the General Assembly (UNGA, NO 746, 1953). See Appendix 15.

⁹ The discussion on this item started with a statement by the Libyan Government representative (Dr. A.N. Aneizi, Minister of Finance) who expressed cordial thanks to the United Nations for the help given so far. He spoke of the economic and social difficulties of his country, due especially to the lack of natural resources and to war devastation. He then quoted the previous resolutions of the Assembly and the Council, urging that assistance be given to Libya at least in the initial stage of its independence. He mentioned that a Five-Year Development Plan was prepared which was implemented in close harmony with the United Nations Technical Assistance and the Point Four programmes. However, this plan had to be curtailed to a bare minimum in view of the financial difficulties of his country and the utter lack of funds, as a result of which up to 45% of the annual budget requirements even for purely administrative expenditure depended on outside help. Out of this minimum, a considerable part will go to war damage reparation and not to real construction and development. He added that even UNICEF had so far not given help to Libya. With regard to technical assistance, he said that only about half of the experts recommended for 1953 were in fact sent to the country (UNGA NO 56, Part 2, 1953).

reflect how Turkish-Libyan relations despite the long Italian occupation continued to exist. One will soon recognise that it will not be correct and comprehensive to explore the relationship between Türkiye and Libya without taking into consideration the socio-cultural realities on the field. Furthermore, the Cyprus crisis of Türkiye as well fostered Libya to actively get into relations with Türkiye and support this country, although this was not in favour of the international system. Under the umbrella of international peace and security organisations both countries, Türkiye as well as Libya, faced serious sanctions during Türkiye's involvement in Cyprus. Details about this instance will be reflected in the second turning point of this thesis, while at this point it is sufficient to state that the UN and NATO involvement on this matter did not have peaceful and secure consequences. In 1973, when Muammar Gaddafi decided to nationalise Libyan oil and raw materials, the international community, which is today known as the countries mostly intervening and exploiting resource-rich countries, started to attack Gaddafi publicly in the mainstream media as a terror-supporting leader.

Later on, during the 1980s and 1990s, Libya faced international sanctions due to its alleged involvement in violent activities, including the Lockerbie bombing (UNSC, S/24961/Add.1, 1992).¹⁰ Again, the UN imposed sanctions, which affected Libya's economy and international relations. During this period of time, Türkiye as well had to navigate its relations seriously with Libya within the context of international pressure and sanctions. With the conclusion of the Cold War, NATO's priorities changed. The Alliance turned its counter policies from the socialist and communist direction to international terrorism. Also, Türkiye changed its foreign policies, particularly as a growing regional power. Türkiye began to pursue a more independent regional policy.

Meanwhile, Türkiye and Libya developed deeper commercial connections, particularly in the construction sector, with Turkish businesses completing large projects in Libya. However, NATO's influence over these bilateral relations remained indirect at first sight, focusing on bigger regional issues such as clashing interests in

¹⁰ See Appendix 23.

the Eastern Mediterranean. This focus is obvious in historical records (NATO, PO 69/531, 1969; NATO, PO 70/460, 1970; NATO, PO 71/38, 1971). The Arab Spring and the subsequent civil war in Libya saw also significant UN and NATO involvement. In 2011, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973, authorising NATO intervention in Libya to protect civilians. Not to mention that the authorisation came later than the intervention of NATO in Libya, which is according to international law a war crime. Türkiye, as a NATO member, also played a role in the intervention. This period marked another significant moment in Turkish-Libyan relations, with Türkiye initially supporting Gaddafi's regime before shifting its stance to support the opposition due to some debatable facts, which will be discussed in the third turning point of this study. After the uprising in Libya, during the second Libyan civil war, Türkiye supported the UN-recognised GNA against the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar. The UN's role in legitimising the GNA has been a crucial factor in Türkiye's involvement, providing a legal framework for its military and political support. Türkiye's role as a key supporter of the GNA aligns it with the UN's objectives, although it also pursues its strategic interests, including energy exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. On the other side, since NATO's member states were divided in their support, with some supporting the GNA and others, such as France, having competing interests, it became easier for Türkiye to reach a Maritime Delimitation Agreement as well as a Military Agreement in 2019, revising boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean and deploying military forces to Libya. These deals were critical for Türkiye as a regional country and did neither please the UN nor NATO.

However, neither of the listed facts up to this point alone are decisive when considering the historical and present continuity of the relationship between Türkiye and Libya. Hence, it needs to be understood that it is almost impossible in a region like the MENA to think that a geopolitical event will not affect the neighbour. Thinking of Europe, one can easily predict that chaos in France is in one or another way going to influence Italy. Therefore, thinking of the most powerful states within the UN and NATO, active in Libya but with a clear geographical distance and irrelevance, the question arises whether their existence makes more sense than that of Türkiye.

Within this framework, the influence of the UN and NATO needs to be analysed by observing the potential interests of all countries actively involved in decision-making. By doing so, it becomes easier to recognise how powerful countries apply to IOs in order to achieve their goals under the discourse of maintaining peace and security. Not to mention that powerful states only join such associations if it benefits their interests. Bringing certain powerful governments together around specific strategic goals will allow us to discuss hegemony under the aegis of both NATO and the UNSC. Only in this way will one be able to see why the influence is not emancipatory. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the theoretical reality of these IOs and their practices on the field throughout the relationship between Türkiye and Libya will help to explore possible changes for a more emancipatory influence.

As outlined in this chapter, the Turkish-Libyan relationship has persisted continuously from past to present over 600 years, shaped primarily but not decisively by geopolitical factors. The next five sections of this thesis will delve into key turning points in Turkish-Libyan history after the establishment of the UN in 1945. These sections will further substantiate the core argument, along with its supporting claims, which were thoroughly discussed in the theoretical framework earlier. As a matter of fact, the main goal is to reflect the importance of history to take lessons from and make necessary changes for future policies.

5. THE TURKISH-LIBYAN CASE: A HISTORICAL AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF UN AND NATO INFLUENCE

5.1. Introduction

This case study examines the evolving relationship between Türkiye and Libya by analysing critical historical turning points that reveal the influence of international peace and security organisations-in this case the UN and NATO. The selected turning points including the UN discussions on Libya's independence (1948–1951), Libyan support to the Turkish Government during the Cyprus crisis (1974), NATO's intervention in Libya during the Arab Spring (2011), the 2019 Maritime Agreement, and the 2019 Security and Military Agreement between Libya and Türkiye clearly reflect the role and influence of the UN and NATO in shaping issues like regional policies, security and power structures.

Furthermore, these turning points have been chosen for their significance in demonstrating the contradiction between the theoretical discourse of IOs on peace and security and their practical actions on the ground, which often align with the hegemonic interests of dominant states. Each turning point represents a moment when Türkiye and Libya engaged in critical geopolitical contact and negotiations, either challenging or conforming to the existing international order. As a matter of fact, the case study explores whether IOs facilitated an emancipatory influence in these moments or if they functioned as instruments of interest control and hegemony. More importantly, being not only a descriptive but also a prescriptive study, this study seeks to explore the conditions under which IOs might contribute to true emancipatory influence rather than reinforcing the existing power hierarchy.

5.2. Türkiye's Stance in the UN Discussions on Libyan Independence (1948-1951)

5.2.1. Introduction

The theoretical idea of this thesis underscores the importance of conducting a detailed analysis to see the degree and kind of influence exerted by international peace and security organisations such as NATO and the UN on the Turkish-Libyan relationship. The aim of doing so is to understand the same influence on any two other

countries in the MENA region. By recognising the influence, it is meant to explore to what extent the influence is emancipatory or not. Furthermore, if the influence is not emancipatory, what could be done to change this situation? Hence, the goal is not only to understand but to change, or rather to take the necessary steps for a positive change. In order to succeed as a critical social science researcher, it is vital to determine the degree to which Türkiye and Libya are influenced by the UN and NATO in significant political decision-making processes concerning their (1) national borders and their (2) regional position. This will help to see how the influence is driven by power and hegemony as two obvious features of the UN and NATO. Furthermore, it will lead the researcher to the questioning of the underlying reasoning behind the justification for the power wielded by these organisations.

In the previous chapter, a brief picture of the structure of the UN and NATO has been provided. It has clearly been reflected that the main role player, with the most military bases, is the US. Therefore, it is crucial to keep this in mind as the influence of the UN and NATO is explored throughout this study. Indeed, to comprehensively recognise the influence, it is beneficial to ascertain the presence of hegemony as a subcomponent in all its dimensions, while the concept of hegemony cannot be thought of independently of power, as is the initial idea of this study. On the other hand, hegemony and power are two concepts that are related and dependent on certain ambitions. Ken Booth is one of the most known names when it comes to the combination of ambitions and hegemony. He emphasises the noteworthy and consequential aspect of ‘hegemonic ambitions’ demonstrated by the primary powers during important international turning points throughout history up to the present day.

Within this theoretical framework, one might posit that, notwithstanding occasional exceptions, historical evidence indicates that the acquisition and transmission of knowledge plays a role in the development and perpetuation of hegemonic power systems. Critically explained, controlling knowledge and the physical means automatically leads to the control of the mental one. In fact, the underlying principles of theoretical reality continue to hold true, yet, in practical terms, the circumstances and subsequent actions have undergone alterations. In the current context, this thesis will introduce two new concepts, namely **theoretical reality** and

practical reality, that should garner considerable importance from the second part of the twentieth century to the present. A deeper understanding of how knowledge influences the fundamental nature of reality can be established after the recognition of these two concepts. By applying these two concepts to certain turning points within the history, not only an understanding can be achieved, but also the possibility of change occurs, since the main question for a critical researcher is to see what should be changed in order to reach a positive influence.

The turning points within the Turkish-Libyan case observed within this thesis, beginning with “Türkiye’s Stance in the UN Discussions on Libyan Independence (1948-1951),” provide the existence, strength, benefits, and harms of the influence. Only in this way will this research promote emancipatory socio-cultural, economic, and political change, which is known as the Emancipatory Political Praxis according to the critical security theory. This thesis diverges from traditional research by adopting a critical standpoint that reconceptualises power and hegemony as fundamental or potentially subordinate components of influence. Although, according to the scholarly perspectives of the Welsh School, there is an argument that prioritising the concept of emancipation is more important in the context of security than the current emphasis on power and hegemony (Booth, 1991a: 315). However, at this point, this study argues that only if enough attention is paid to power and hegemony applied by states or IOs to reach certain interests will it become possible to analyse the influence and turn security into an emancipatory nature.

One plausible deduction that is consistent with critical security theory is the application of knowledge as a mechanism for attaining emancipation. Power and hegemony, on the other hand, are primarily harnessed as a formidable force that is able to present a notable security concern. This study argues that in spite of the prevailing negative employment of power and hegemony to influence the worldwide system, the utilisation of power and hegemony in a cooperative and positive manner will likewise have a global influence. In the present context, the equation can be expressed as follows:

Influence = Knowledge *-turning to-* Power and Hegemony *-turning to-* Emancipation

The negative view of power and hegemony in the global system, which is based on ideas of peace and security, can be explained by the fundamental gap between theoretical concepts and real-world implementation. The objective of the case analyses is therefore to analyse the influence exerted by IOs in a critical perspective on peace and security dynamics within the MENA region, with a particular exemplification of the relationship between Türkiye and Libya. By doing so, a historical perspective that prioritises the acquisition of knowledge from past experiences, the prevention of unfavourable consequences, and the facilitation of transformative processes rather than simply passively monitoring occurrences will be applied.

The accompanying turning point serves as a useful historical lesson in order to reach the purpose of this thesis. A noteworthy analysis has been conducted on the proceedings of discussions in the UN assemblies over the foundation of Libya's independence, as it provides significant insights into the influence of the UN on Libya's formation from the very beginning on. It may be useful to repeat that the General Assembly is obliged to practice the decisions of the countries with veto rights in the UNSC, even though democratically it should be the contrary. Practically, this means that whatever the discussion in the General Assembly was regarding the Libyan issue, the US, the UK, France, China, and Russia had the final word. Having this in mind, the current instance provides a chance to examine Türkiye's position within the UN concerning Libyan issues. This again enables the reflection of the influence of the UN on the relationship between Türkiye and Libya. Additionally, by digging into the instance, the existence of the concepts of theoretical reality and practical reality becomes soon obvious. Ultimately, the contradiction between both concepts causes the influence to be negative. For this reason, the essential importance of this turning point rests in the researcher's observation of how the influence can be transformed into a force that promotes emancipation by providing a common field of action for theory and practice. Upon careful examination of the present condition of the MENA region, it becomes apparent that engaging in a discourse regarding the prospective emancipating influence of international peace and security organisations is not a viable

endeavour. Unless theoretical reality and practical reality reach a common field of action.

Thus, discussions on the UN level about Libya's independence and Türkiye's role during this process clearly show that in theory the discourse is based on peace and security, while in reality leading powers try to protect their interests. To remember, knowledge turning to power and hegemony in the UN case did not turn to an emancipatory influence, neither in the country nor in the region. In this context, the UN is caught between its own theoretical reality of peace and security and the practical reality of powerful and hegemonic states. When the first turning point within the Turkish-Libyan case analysis of the thesis is examined, it is possible to say that if peace and security organisations such as the UN and NATO do not put theory and practice on the same ground, the influence will not be emancipatory. This theory is not only based on understanding the case itself historically and chronologically, but rather on how to solve international political crises, particularly within the MENA region taking lessons from history.

5.2.2. Reflection of Debates on Libyan Independence

It could be clearly expressed that if the influence of the UN and NATO would have led to emancipation and if the theoretical realities discussed within the UN on Libyan independence would comply with the practical reality, Libyan people would not have missed their pre-colonial times. Indeed, the UN principles as well as the main reason for the establishment of NATO are based on peace and security. However, considering the situation in Libya, it can clearly be expressed that there is no peace and security achieved. This does not mean that the principles are all problematic; on the contrary, if the practical realisation would comply with these principles, the UN as well as NATO would be successful in their mission.

During the era of Italian colonisation and British control, there were numerous documented endeavours from the Libyan perspective to establish a unification with Türkiye, despite the presence of the British in Cyrenaica, the French in Fezzan, and the Italians in Tripolitania. This phenomenon signifies a persistent desire for the restoration of pre-colonial conditions that have endured over an extended period of

time among a significant majority of the populace. In this context, it would be accurate to assert that the relationship between Türkiye and Libya, albeit terminated at the governmental level, has not been entirely eradicated. This is a socio-cultural reality in the practical field that needs to be considered while exploring the influence of international peace and security organisations.

For instance, on June 21, 1947, an officer named Mohamed Hassan Lamir, serving in the Police Department in Tripoli, formally initiated a request to the Turkish Foreign Office, urging the commencement of discussions regarding the potential reunification of Tripoli with Türkiye (CBA 1949-06-21, 541, 44090-209-108-2).¹¹ Conversely, insights gleaned from archival records reveal the presence of a Tripoli Rescue Committee (TRC) of individuals of Turkish origin. The Tripoli Rescue Committee compiled reports regarding the state of affairs in Libya and facilitated their dissemination to Türkiye. In a comprehensive report commissioned by the TRC and transmitted from the Turkish Embassy in Cairo to the Foreign Office of the Turkish Republic on July 5, 1947, it is articulated that the populace of Libya expresses a desire for the unification of the three regions, namely Cyrenaica, Tripoli, and Fezzan, as a cohesive entity and integration into the Turkish Republic, reminiscent of historical periods. The comprehensive analysis also delineates the living conditions of the Libyan populace throughout the period of Ottoman Caliphate rule, when they experienced autonomy and the absence of colonial intervention (CBA 1947-07-05, 541, 44205-209991-10).¹²

Upon examination of the archival records, one can discern the existence of a political organisation known as the Turkish Tripoli Union Party. Mehmet Hasan El Emir, a member of the Turkish Tripoli Union Party, corresponded with the Foreign Office of the Turkish Republic on July 7, 1947. The author of the correspondence asserts the presence of European powers within the region and appeals for assistance from the Turkish authorities. El Emir provides a report on the establishment of the TTU party and its stated goals. Accordingly, the TTU party is driven by three primary objectives: complete autonomy or the establishment of Türkiye's authority, the

¹¹ See Appendix 2.

¹² See Appendix 17.

restoration of the territorial unity of Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and Tripoli as observed during the Ottoman era, and the acknowledgment of the Arab community. The content of this letter indicates that the Turkish Republic has been asked for political measures in order to reinstate its previous form of government (CBA 1947-08-05, 541, 44090-209108-1).

Archival records also show that there were complaints regarding Türkiye's lack of action in response to the several appeals made by the Libyan faction. A correspondence addressed to the Turkish delegates of the UN effectively conveys the prevailing sense of disillusionment experienced by the Libyan party. Elhadi Ibrahim el Meşrigi articulates his discontentment about the passive position adopted by Türkiye in his written correspondence. The author highlights the influence of the US on Türkiye's foreign policy and asserts that Türkiye has demonstrated a lack of independence in this regard. In his correspondence, Meşrigi underscores the extent of Türkiye's reliance on the US in matters of foreign policy, specifically highlighting their inability to exert influence in the context of Libyan independence (CBA 1949-05-14, 541, 44304-210808-26).¹³ Nevertheless, it appears that the Libyan population has maintained a persistent sense of optimism towards Türkiye.

On May 20, 1949, Abulasaad, a prominent religious leader widely acknowledged by the populace, corresponded with İsmet İnönü, the President of Türkiye during that period, via a letter. In his correspondence, Abulasaad requested the participation of Türkiye in the UN deliberations concerning the matter of Libyan autonomy, urging their support for the cause of Libyan independence (CBA 1949-26-05, 439, 267-800-19).¹⁴ A similar letter was sent to the Turkish Presidency by Mansour Kaddara (CBA 1949-13-05, 441, 81877).¹⁵ On the other side, the Turkish government claimed to actively being engaged in discussions with Italian counterparts to foster the promotion of Libyan independence on the Turkish side. In one of his correspondences, Turkish President İsmet İnönü highlighted the considerable endeavours undertaken by Türkiye on the global stage to provide assistance to the

¹³ See Appendix 9.

¹⁴ See Appendix 3

¹⁵ See Appendix 4.

cause of Libyan independence. This particular letter was sent to Emir es-Senusi, who would subsequently be recognised as King Idris (CBA 1949-07-09, 541, 44304-210-807).

The examination of archival records in Türkiye allows for the compilation of an ongoing list detailing the nature of Turkish-Libyan relations and the shared aspiration of their respective populations to foster unity with Türkiye. When discussing the impact of the UN, it is important to acknowledge that influential nations such as the US, UK, and France express discontent with the level of interdependence between these two countries. The letter outlining the instructions sent by the UN to the Turkish delegation explicitly indicates that Türkiye is expected to acknowledge and endorse the desired form of independence for Libya as determined by the UN member states. Additionally, it emphasises that the matter of addressing the population will be discussed subsequently (CBA 1949-10-10, 541, 44304-210810-31).¹⁶ At this point it needs to be reminded that while the form of hegemon changes, the function remains the same, namely, to dominate and influence as a global power. On the other side, by providing the above-mentioned examples, one soon recognises that subordinated states radically constitute the hegemonic sphere of influence. Within this context, the UN domination and decision-making as a global power about Libya and its relations to Türkiye, is one of the most obvious examples.

A record found in the National Archives of Türkiye reflects the appointment of Adrian Pelt as a nominee for the position of UN Commissioner for Libya. On December 8, 1949, the Press and Publications Bureau of the UN Department of Public Information issued a press release (GA/646) to formally announce the unanimous nomination of Adrian Pelt, Assistant Secretary General of the UN, by an Assembly Committee as a candidate for the position of UN Commissioner for Libya (CBA 1949-12-08, 4403-210804-13). The aforementioned announcement also stated that, in alignment with the resolution passed by the General Assembly on November 22 regarding the disposition of the former Italian colonies, Adrian Pelt and his committee were appointed to aid the General Assembly regarding the Libyan issue. The Assembly

¹⁶ See Appendix 8.

determined that Libya would be established as an independent and sovereign nation by no later than January 1, 1952.

This decision is a good example for a new form but the same functioning of the hegemon and powerful. Furthermore, it reflects how a country's position affects the desire of international actors to increase or decrease influence. In this instance, the hegemon not only increases its influence but is the decision-making actor itself. This means that there is no other option for Türkiye and Libya than obeying the decision taken by the UN that influences the national and international issues of these countries parallelly. Hence, thinking of the idea that IOs are platforms where powerful states legitimise their international interests, not the principles of such organisations, but the interests of powerful states need to be questioned. Indeed, powerful states will not enter an organisation over which they have no control. However, according to CSS researchers, the influence of powerful states with interest-oriented policies within international peace and security organisations based on their power ends up being a destructive one.

During the process of independence, Adrian Pelt received counsel from a council including one single representative from each of the regions, Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and the Fezzan (UNSC, NO 287, 1950). Furthermore, there were representatives present of the minority groups living in the regions. External countries included in the discussion were Egypt, France, Italy, Pakistan, the UK, and the US (CBA, 1949-12-08, 4403-210804-13; UNSC, NO. 299). Despite the expressed desire of the local population for annexation to Türkiye, the formation of political groups aimed at unification with Türkiye, and the presence of individuals of Turkish descent (Kouloughlis), the UN made a definitive decision to refrain from involving Türkiye in the Libyan issue, as seen by archival documents (CBA, 1949-12-08, 4403-210804-13). At this juncture, the interplay of power and hegemony in shaping the relationship between two MENA countries is increasingly evident as the main idea of this study claims. As mentioned above, dominant states wield significant influence over their less powerful counterparts, often dictating the course of events and decisions within the region. Up to this point, it will not be wrong to state that in the context of Libyan

independence, the UN emerges as a hegemonic force, exerting authority over post-conflict stabilisation efforts and shaping the nation's trajectory.

By mentioning the UN, one should remember that the final decision-making position is the UNSC. This reality also underscores the asymmetrical power dynamics prevalent in the MENA region, where powerful actors leverage their diplomatic, economic, and military capabilities to assert dominance and further their strategic interests applying to IOs. As events unfold, the ramifications of this interplay between power and hegemony will continue to shape the geopolitical landscape of the region, highlighting the enduring significance of these factors in international relations. Therefore, during the formation of the sovereign Libyan state, the UN expressed a lack of desire for the enhancement of relations between Türkiye and Libya. However, Adrian Pelt perceived the issue as a significant concern involving crucial strategic and several other interests (Pelt, 1970: 33).

In Pelt's memories, it is noted that the administering powers had a tendency to impede the union and full autonomy of Libya. Pelt further asserts that had it not been for their alliance with the US, there would have been a prolonged period of foreign domination over Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and the Fezzan, as the Soviet Union sought to establish a sphere of influence in the southern Mediterranean region in the immediate aftermath of the war (NATO, AC/146-D6, 1959). Interestingly, the existence of the US has not been seen as a foreign dominance by Pelt, whereas other countries are categorised as such. These two detections made by Pelt hold enormous importance and significance as they provide insights into the underlying nature and objectives of the UN in relation to Libya, right from its inception. Hence, it is imperative to analyse and comprehend future events based on this reality that the US has been placed at the top within the UN and all other countries have been categorised as foreign powers. Surprisingly, reading Pelt's memories about his time as UN Commissioner, he seems to agree with this situation. According to him, the attainment of Libya's independence would have been impossible without the support and intervention of the UN. Another intriguing revelation made by Adrian Pelt pertains to the necessity of accessing Turkish and Arab archives, which are predominantly untranslated, in order to obtain a comprehensive grasp of the historical context.

The very first commencement of the discussion on the Libyan issue took place during the third regular session of the UNGA, which began on the 21st of September 1948. During the latter portion of the session held between April 5th and May 18th, 1949, at Lake Success, the UK and the US reached a mutual understanding. It was agreed that, with regards to Libya, the UK would assume administrative responsibilities for Cyrenaica under the trusteeship of the UN. Additionally, a decision regarding Tripolitania was postponed until the subsequent part of the session (UNGA, 1949, 31). The Fezzan region was neither referenced nor alluded to throughout the proceedings of this Assembly in 1949. By examining the process only to this point, it becomes recognisable how powerful states only enter an IO over which they have certain control. This means that, even though the US is the leading power within the UNSC as well as the General Assembly, certain interests drive the entrance of other countries with power into IOs. It seems that the independence of Libya is not really welcomed in practice.

During the third UNGA, multiple suggestions were put up about Libya's independence. These ideas highlighted the significant divisions within the General Assembly, with different factions advocating for diverse interests and promoting distinct ideologies and philosophies (Pelt, 1970: 77-78). The Bevin-Sforza plan, formulated by British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin and Italian foreign minister Count Sforza, is contained within their respective proposals. This proposed plan entails the following provisions: firstly, the establishment of British trusteeship over Cyrenaica; secondly, the implementation of French trusteeship over the Fezzan; thirdly, the assignment of Italian trusteeship over Tripolitania starting in 1951; and finally, the allocation of Italian trusteeship over Italian Somaliland (TNA, FO 1015/77, 1951; TNA, PO, FO 371/90351, 1951). The idea was disseminated in the morning editions of newspapers on May 10th, coinciding with the scheduled commencement of Sub-Committee 15's deliberations on the multiple suggestions presented to its overseeing entity. The implementation of the plan had significant implications for the Arab governments, as it included grave consequences and involved the determination of the local population's destiny (UNGA, GAOR, 1949: 356). On May 10th, 1949, Mansur Qadara, who was present at the General Assembly as the leader of the delegation of

NCLL (National Council for Liberating Libya), transmitted a cable to the Secretary General of the UN, which contained the subsequent statement: “The people of Tripolitania shall steadfastly safeguard their inherent entitlement to liberty and shall resolutely resist any attempts to reinstate Italy’s governance, even at the cost of their own lives” (Pelt, 1970: 80). According to the report presented by the Secretary General, the General Assembly’s discussion on the Italian colonies indicated that a significant number of members anticipated the future inclusion of Libya as an independent member, potentially within a few years. Additionally, it was suggested that Somaliland may also be considered for membership, but possibly at a later time (UNGA, GAOR, 1949: 12).

Nevertheless, the UK and France, as well as the US and Italy, were not prepared to withdraw from this region and hence sought admission into the trusteeship system. None of them was ready to leave a country with such geostrategic and geopolitical significance, not to mention its natural resources (NATO, LOM, 202/64, 1964). From the beginning of the Libyan independence, these actors were decisive in not losing and controlling knowledge and the physical means within the country, which would ease the control of mental means in a later step (TNA, FO 371/97280). The discourse about colonies was reignited on the 30th of September 1949. It became evident in a short period of time that nearly all delegations had developed a lack of confidence in the efficacy of trusteeship as a viable resolution for the situation in Libya. The Soviet Union, in a departure from its previous stance on collective trusteeship for Libya, pre-empted alternative suggestions by presenting a draft resolution stipulating the prompt granting of independence to Libya. Accordingly, it is imperative that all foreign forces and military personnel evacuate Libyan soil within a span of three months, accompanied by the complete dismantlement of all military outposts within the same timeframe (UNGA, GAOR, A/C.1/487/REV.1, 1949: 21).

Hector McNeil, representing the UK, proposed the expeditious attainment of Libya’s independence. However, he suggested that the General Assembly should establish a defined timeframe within which the UK and France would retain administrative control over the currently occupied territories (RIIA/8/1809, 1950). At the conclusion of this period, the respective powers would be transferred to the Libyan

people. The General Assembly was left with the idea that the UK, faced with limited time, was compelled to establish regulations on its stance in Cyrenaica. The UK appeared to demonstrate a willingness to acknowledge and accommodate France's distinct interests pertaining to the Fezzan region (TNA, FO 1015/ 878, 1951; TNA, FO 371/97344, 1952). This attitude reflects a hierarchical structure within the UN itself that could be explained by a means to create hegemony even within international peace and security organisations disregarding theoretical facts and the reason of establishment.

In contrast, France held a negative stance toward the notion of a unified and autonomous Libyan state. Nevertheless, the French government acknowledged the growing support for Libyan independence. Maurice Couve de Murville, the spokesperson for France, presented a meticulously crafted statement. This comment appears to allude to a prospective analysis of the policy endeavours undertaken by UK and France in Libya between the years 1950 and 1951. It is as well possible to find the US, UK and France endeavours regarding Libya in the NATO archives (NATO, D-R, (51)90, 1952). Accordingly, it has been emphasised by numerous representatives that the unity of Libya holds significant importance. While it is evident that the three territories comprising Libya share certain similarities, it is crucial to avoid overemphasising these resemblances and to acknowledge the distinctive characteristics that set Libya apart and, at times, create divisions. The resolution of the entire issue, predicated on the principle of Libyan autonomy, would thus necessitate the establishment of distinct governing bodies in the respective regions, which should be accorded independence expeditiously, albeit with potential challenges in determining the precise timeframe for the realisation of said independence. Once the governments have resumed their normal operations, it becomes incumbent upon them to establish the desired system of association under which they intend to reside. During the transitional phase, the occupation authorities would undertake the task of governance, but the UN would retain the authority to oversee the political progress necessary for the realisation of its proposed measures, guaranteeing its influence (UNGA, GAOR, 1949: 25-26).

Knowing the role of the hegemon, it will no longer be difficult to see the political strategy implemented in putting the UN as the responsible IO. The culmination of the general arguments in the Fourth Session, First Committee, occurred on October 6th, 1949. Also, during this session, given the geopolitical interests of foreign powers in the region, it is noteworthy that the desired independence of Libya was expected to align with their interests. In fact, the Libyan populace voiced their perspectives on the matter. The statements made by the Libyan factions are summarised and available in the US Department of State Bulletin. Accordingly, Bashir Bey Saadawi, representing the National Congress of Tripolitania, advocated for the establishment of an autonomous and cohesive Libya, positing that such a development may potentially contribute to fostering peace and stability within the Middle Eastern region. The organisation he represented, advocated for the prompt granting of independence to Libya. Omar Sheneib, a member of the National Congress of Cyrenaica, expressed his support for the cause of Libyan independence. He highlighted the eagerness of the Cyrenaica population, led by Emir al Senussi, to attain complete autonomy. The individual presented a case opposing an excessively prolonged transition period and advocated for the unification of Libya under the Emir, contingent upon the willingness of the Tripolitarians. The absence of any hindrance to the unification of Libya was perceived by him in the British decision to bestow internal self-governance upon Cyrenaica, so prompting his advocacy for the prompt attainment of independence for Tripolitania and the Fezzan regions (TNA, PREM (/1478, 1951).

Subsequently, a representative affiliated with the aforementioned collective conveyed to the committee a cable originating from the Emir, wherein he expressed a need for the absolute autonomy of his nation, devoid of any transitional phase. Abdulla Sherif Bey, a member of the Independent Party of Tripolitania, expressed a firm and urgent stance calling for the prompt attainment of Libya's full, undivided, and unrestricted sovereignty. In the context of a transitional phase preceding the establishment of a democratic and constitutional regime, the individual expressed the opinion that oversight of the Assembly's resolution should be entrusted to a UN committee.

The statement made by Mr. Perlzweig, representing the Jewish Community of Tripolitania, was particularly intriguing. He expressed the need for specific measures to protect the Jewish community, as their economic and social status was declining, and their safety was being threatened by acts of terrorism instigated by external forces. The Jewish community expressed a desire for the UN to oversee the changeover period. Accordingly, it was recommended that the General Assembly prescribe the establishment of a Libyan government that adheres to democratic principles, including proportional representation, and explicitly safeguards human and religious rights, along with the right to emigrate (US Department of State Bulletin, 1950: 837; TNA, FO 371/90410/ 1823, 1950). Given this information, it is important to recognise how, among so many locals, the UN is ready to give privilege to a minority. Every human being could confess that no migrant group in any European country or the US has the right to decide about their own conditions within the country's political system. Hence, the indispensable question at this point is, what makes this group more important than millions of local Libyans? No matter what the reason is, it is possible to talk about a power and hegemony dimension, might it be economically, politically or geostrategic, with visible influence. On the other side, taking it from a positive perspective, this incident exemplifies that it is indeed possible to listen to minorities during important decision-making processes. Undoubtedly, this method could be applied to local people as well. Although very interesting, this topic goes beyond the borders of this study and is therefore to be explored by the reader himself/herself. The aim of drawing particular attention to this detail is to open new paths for further research supporting the new concept of influence based on its subcomponents, power and hegemony, argued by this thesis.

The absence of any discussion of Türkiye and its involvement in Libya by the UN is a significant reality that also merits attention. As previously alluded to, it has been noted that Libyan residents corresponded often with Türkiye, expressing their desire for annexation. Indeed, as will be subsequently discussed, despite the UN's attempts to disregard Türkiye's inevitable socio-cultural and geographical significance for the region, the residents of Libya did not hesitate to cooperate with individuals of Turkish descent. This fact becomes readily apparent, particularly in the context of the

constitution's formation. Throughout the entirety of the UN deliberations, the primary topics that emerged in relation to Libya encompassed independence, unity, the duration of the transitional phase, the role of administering powers, the configuration of UN representation, and the representation of local populations on the council. (For a critical social scientist, the case analysis will not be complete and convincing, disregarding some small details such as the fact that a significant proportion of the individuals selected to serve as representatives for Libya possess ancestral ties to Türkiye in varying degrees). Also, the UN Commissioner to Libya, Adrian Pelt, confesses the enduring bond between the Turks and the Libyan people, arguing for the growing criticism of Turkish rule fuelled by Arab nationalism following World War I. Pelt highlights the attraction of the Young Turk movement to the intelligentsia of Libya's coastal belt, with representatives from Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and even Fezzan traveling to Istanbul to participate in the parliament from 1908 to 1911. According to Adrian Pelt, tensions arose when it was revealed that the Young Turks intended to abolish the Caliphate and establish a pan-Ottoman empire under Turkish hegemony, prompting widespread opposition across the Arab world, including Libya. This historical context prompts reflection on the potential divergence of events had nationalism not emerged.

Despite all these challenges, the enduring bond between Türkiye and Libya persists, evident in the selection of representatives between 1950 and 1951 and the subsequent relationship between the two nations. Back to the report reflecting the findings of Sub Committee 17, that was responsible of Adrian Pelts appointment as commissioner along with a council composing of ten members: seven states (UK, US, France, Italy, Pakistan, and Egypt) and three local representatives (from Tripoli, Cyrenaica and Fezzan). This report highlights the inclusion of the subsequent paragraphs as a means to encapsulate the fundamental suggestions pertaining to Libya:

1. The formation of a unified, autonomous, and sovereign state in Libya, encompassing the regions of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and the Fezzan, is proposed.
2. The attainment of independence shall be promptly realised at the latest, by January 1, 1952.

3. The formulation of a constitution for Libya, encompassing the structure of the government, should be undertaken by delegates representing the residents of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and the Fezzan. These representatives should convene and engage in collaborative discussions inside a National Assembly (UNGA, R289(IV): 31).

In this context, the UN commissioner was required to seek input and follow the recommendations provided by the members of his council in the execution of his duties (UNGA, GAOR A/1235, 1949: 58).

Theoretically, the inquiry pertained to the desires of the Libyan populace. The UN mission utilised interviews with local individuals. However, the protracted duration of the independence process may be attributed to the conflict of local involvement and the predominant presence of colonial powers across a span exceeding two years. During that process Pelt issued a statement in Tripoli, Cyrenaica, and the Fezzan regions, expressing his intention to actively engage with the local populace and solicit their perspectives and recommendations. He underscored his receptiveness to the Libyan people, highlighting his willingness to receive visits and consider proposals, so fostering an inclusive and participatory approach (UNGA, 1949: 39). The primary objective of his mission has been clearly expressed by himself: *“It is not my function to govern your territory; that remains within the competence of the Administering Powers until you assume it for yourselves”* (UNGA, 1949: 39-40). This statement serves as a crucial reminder of the responsibility of the administering powers in governing the territory until the local population assumes control.

However, observing the situation in Libya today, it is not correct to state that Libya is independent, which reflects the non-emancipatory influence of the UN. It is noteworthy that, according to Article 100, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter, the Secretary-General and the staff are mandated to refrain from soliciting or accepting directions from any country or external authority while carrying out their responsibilities within the organisation. International officials are expected to abstain from engaging in any activities that could potentially compromise their standing as representatives, so ensuring their accountability solely to the organisation. However,

practical reality in the Libyan case, reflects that the issue was far more intricate, and efforts were made to address the crisis in a manner that favoured a select few countries.

At this point, it is necessary to recount a poignant narrative that encapsulates the response and contemplations of the indigenous populace, so shedding light on the perpetual dominance and influence exerted by prominent nations, juxtaposed against the despondent disposition of the local inhabitants. It has been recorded that during interactions, inhabitants posed the question: “*Mr. Commissioner, what type of constitution do you aim to provide for us?*” (Pelt, 1970: 176). This exemplifies the lack of agency experienced by local inhabitants throughout the course of their nation’s quest for independence. Furthermore, it represents a third-class society that has to abide by the decision given. During the interviews conducted by the mission in Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan, it has been documented that individuals have voiced their inclination to associate themselves with a Muslim nation due to their Islamic identity (Pelt, 1970: 191). Despite so, there are exceptions such as Brak, which is a town in the Fezzan. During independence talks with the commissioner to Libya, Adrian Pelt, the commissioner asked the people of Brak why they were content to remain under Christian rule when they could join a Moslem community? One notable replied that it had been a Moslem country, Türkiye, which had abandoned them within living memory, an act they had not forgotten.¹⁷ Brak, in this sense was an example reflecting how Fezzan’s people had trusted the common religion path they had with Türkiye and how their expectations failed. The Brak population later also expressed that they considered the UN Resolution as a gift from the Lord.

In September 1950, the Commissioner, in his inaugural annual report, made note of the absence of proposals aimed at fostering the unity and independence of Libya as a whole, despite the Administering Powers presenting several suggestions for the establishment of constitutional mechanisms in each of the three territories during the initial phase of the transitional period (UNGA, NO 339; NO 336; NO, 311; NO

¹⁷ This conversation is a translated transcript from French. It solely exists in typescript within the UN Archives due to the lack of necessity for formal UN documentation. However, there is nothing confidential about its contents, as all hearings were conducted in a semi-public manner.

308, 1950).¹⁸ Consequently, the UK representative on the council for Libya requested the addition of a footnote, which the French representative endorsed to the extent that it reflected the viewpoint of his own Government, with necessary modifications: Accordingly,

The government of His Majesty has consistently demonstrated awareness of their responsibilities outlined in the General Assembly resolution. These responsibilities encompass collaborating with the Commissioner to fulfil the requirements specified in paragraph 10. The individuals held the perspective that in order to successfully attain the goal of a unified and autonomous Libya, it was imperative to first establish local governing bodies in each of the territories under their jurisdiction. The government of His Majesty asserted that due to the lack of experience and preparedness among the inhabitants of the territories in managing their own affairs, any hasty actions taken by the administering power could potentially impose a form of governance or a sense of unity that the inhabitants were unable to make an informed decision about. During the early phases, the government intentionally limited their efforts to proposing the establishment and advancement of local self-governing bodies, allowing the residents to gain practical experience. Simultaneously, they conveyed to the commissioner, during their initial discussions in February 1950, their intention to undertake additional targeted measures to foster unity at a subsequent and more suitable juncture (UNGA, Para.234, 1949).

This assertion has been added since it indicates that the UK and France, as members of the UNSC, were reluctant to grant Libya the autonomy to make independent decisions.

Ultimately, a decision was reached to establish the council for Libya. It is noteworthy that the Administering Powers had concerns regarding the potential diminishment of their authority among the local populace if the Council convened in Libya. The hesitation of the UK and France as visible in the note above, is an indication reflecting these concerns. Finally, a decision was made with a degree of uncertainty to hold the constituent assembly in Geneva on the 4th of April 1950.

¹⁸ See Appendix 12 and 16.

In the meantime, during the whole process, the Libyan populace continued to demonstrate their desire to maintain diplomatic ties with Türkiye. Eventually, upon scrutinising the identities of the elected members in Libya, it becomes evident that a significant number of these individuals had Turkish ancestry or previously fought in the Ottoman Army during conflicts with the Allied forces. In order to corroborate the preceding assertion, Pelts memories come again to the forefront. Although his work lacks comprehensive background information, a thorough examination of all individuals involved will provide a scientifically rigorous result. The first representative from Cyrenaica was Ali Assad al Jerbi (Ketbi, 2012), who was born in Derna in 1901. He was the son of a local official under the Turkish administration. Jerbi had his education in Istanbul from 1911 to 1923, during which he pursued studies in the field of medicine. From September 1949 to July 1950, he had the position of Minister of Transport in the Cyrenaica emirate. Subsequently, the individual assumed a position inside the provisional administration led by Mahmud al-Muntasir, undertaking the role of foreign minister from March to December 1951, health minister from March to April 1951, and minister of justice from April to December 1951. During his tenure, his objective was to form the Libyan Army by utilising the remaining individuals from the Senussi army, a group that actively engaged in combat against the western allies in both world wars together with Turks. The individual in question provided military scholarships to aspiring recruits, enabling them to receive military training in Iraq and Türkiye. Additionally, he played a crucial role in the establishment of a military institution located in Benghazi (بناء أحد... الجري إبراهيم علي) ("ليبي باقات", "الليبية الدولة"). From 1954 to 1961, he assumed the role of the Libyan ambassador to Türkiye and concurrently served as the non-resident ambassador in Iraq. He assumed the role of ambassador to France from 1961 to 1967. The background of Ali Assad al Jerbi indicates a connection to Türkiye. Specifically, given his affiliation with the Senussi factions, which were recognised for their involvement with the Ottoman Army in Anatolia as well as in North Africa. During the period from 1954 to 1961, Jerbi effectively maintained positive diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Libya. He exerted significant efforts in providing support to Libyan soldiers for their deployment to Türkiye and their participation in military education programs. To construct the Military Academy in Benghazi, the individual used caution in selecting

soldiers who had received education in Türkiye. Although Türkiye's influence over Libya had diminished, the UN was compelled to acknowledge that remnants and consequences of the past continued to manifest in various ways.

Originating from the region of Cyrenaica, Hajj Ahmed al Senussi Sofu served as the representative of the Fezzan region. The individual in question was born to a prominent family within the Turkish Administration (Pelt, 1970: 206). In this context, it is once again evident that there exists an inherent connection to the Turkish heritage. Specifically, being associated with the Senussi Movement entails a shared fate with the presence of the Ottoman Empire in the region. Hajj Ahmed al Senussi Sofu asserted the state of affairs in Fezzan and underscored that despite Islam's mandate for both genders to pursue education, the Fezzanes were deprived of this opportunity during the colonial era.

Mustafa Mizran, a native of Tripoli born in 1897, served as the representative of Tripolitania. Mustafa Mizran acquired a formal education that encompassed both Turkish and Arabic languages, and subsequently served in the Turkish military throughout the course of World War I (Pelt, 1970: 206). Mizran exhibited a strong commitment to promoting Libyan unity, as well as a deep appreciation for his Ottoman heritage. The individual consistently harboured suspicions over the policies of the British and French governments, ultimately leading to the establishment of an anti-Western faction inside the Council.

All three representatives have a significant influence from their Ottoman-Turkish heritage, such that it is impossible to see them as separate entities from this historical context. Hence, the acquisition of this knowledge becomes crucial for comprehending the interconnection between Türkiye and Libya and, ultimately, the impact of IOs like the UN.

An additional factor that warrants consideration during the UN deliberations on Libya's independence is to the format of the Council's meetings. While local and regional delegates expressed a preference for public meetings, the Administering Powers advocated for private meetings. The rationale behind this decision was that discord among members about significant matters had the potential to perplex and

demoralise public sentiment in Libya. The Administering Powers harboured concerns regarding the potential exploitation of the council by specific individuals to incite public sentiment against their governance of public matters.

On the contrary, there existed a prevalent sentiment that the act of openly addressing the numerous challenges associated with Libya's transition would be advantageous in enabling the Libyan populace to develop a more informed perspective on the existing obstacles and potential remedies. Ultimately, the council decided to endorse the proposition that necessitates conducting meetings in a confidential manner until the establishment of the norms of process, which meant to decide about the destiny of a whole nation behind closed doors. A total of five meetings were allocated to the deliberation of the aforementioned guidelines, which had been formulated by the UN Secretariat in New York (UNGA, A/AC.32/Council/W.1/Rev.1; A/AC.32/Council/R.12., 1950). After the procedural regulations were addressed, the Council commenced its primary function as an advisory entity to the Commissioner. Adrian Pelt was presented with three papers for his consideration. The first of them was a memorandum detailing the activity of the Commissioners for the period spanning from 10th December 1949 to 19th April 1950. The Commissioner filed two requests for assistance to the Council. The first request pertained to the extent of the Commissioner's responsibilities, while the second request sought guidance on formulating a plan for the constitutional development of Libya.

Consequently, the Commission articulated in its explanatory statement the conviction that, apart from providing guidance and counsel to the populace of Libya regarding the constitutional advancement of their nation, it is incumbent upon the Commission to utilise all feasible methods to aid them in establishing the requisite governmental infrastructure, encompassing administrative capabilities, as well as fostering the growth of their economic assets and social establishments.¹⁹ The necessity for such a program became increasingly apparent due to the country's dearth

¹⁹ The following message has been received from the UN Commissioner in Libya from Benghazi: Sunday morning, 7 October, local time, under scenes great and enthusiasm and in presence of His Majesty King Designate, National Assembly unanimously voted Libyan Constitution (UNGA, NO 565, 1951). See Appendix 13.

of skilled individuals, economic underdevelopment, and persistent and substantial budgetary deficits. Thorough examinations and strategic considerations would be important not just for the interim period leading up to the proclamation of independence, but also for the subsequent years to follow (UNGA, A/1726; A/1730, Res.285; A/1513; A/1457; A/1509).

5.2.3. Türkiye's Stance towards Libyan Independence

Since this thesis aims to present diverse perspectives of the international influence on Turkish-Libyan relations, the implementation of personal interviews with relevant individuals connected to the issue seems to be very important. For instance, in one such interviews within the framework of this thesis, with a Libyan local, the informant shared his insights:

There was often talk about wanting to be annexed to Türkiye. This idea has historical roots, particularly with the Senussi group and King Idris. It's fascinating to note that when he came to power, he worked closely with Sadullah Kuloğlu, a president with Turkish ancestry whose family came to Libya in the 1520s ("Bir Valimiz Bingazide Başbakanlığa Tayin Edildi", 1949). This really reflects how deep those ties go. But while those cultural connections are significant, the reality is that state interests tend to drive international relations more than anything else. Lord Palmerston had it right when he said that the interests of states determine what lasts. During Idris's time, the relationship with Türkiye was somewhat functional and interdependent, largely due to the Kuloghlis community—a group with Turkish surnames like Karağlı (or Koroğlu) that has been based in Misrata. This community kept its unique identity, despite the obligatory changes brought by Gaddafi's regime.²⁰

Another informant responded:

If it were not for the influence of the UN and NATO, Turkish-Libyan relations could have looked very different between 1951 and 1969. It seemed like the international community, while trying to appear neutral, had a subtle influence on King Idris because of his perceived ties to Britain. The discovery of oil in Libya in 1963 was a game-changer. It sparked a lot of internal conflict and shifted the dynamics in

²⁰ Interview with Mohammad Sadek, Tripoli, 2022.

*the region. It is no secret that powerful states often prefer to work with monarchies or dictatorships because they find it easier to manage them. This might have affected how the international community interacted with Idris's regime—at first, positively, but then negatively as the situation evolved.*²¹

These were two interesting views received within the framework of this thesis regarding the question of their thoughts about the influence of the UN and NATO on Turkish-Libyan Relations. From this point of view, one understands that Libyan people did not really want to be influenced by the UN and NATO. Even King Idris, who was known as a British friendly leader in Libya, tended to collaborate with Turkish descendants as soon as he came to power. However, another reality is that Türkiye's passive stance has angered Libyan people as can be derived from the case of Fezzanese people in Brak above. Another example here is El-Hadi İbrahim El Misergi's letter to the Turkish Foreign Office on June 2, 1949. El Hadi wrote to the Turkish Foreign Office:

In light of recent events and our nation's historical relationship, it is with deep concern that we address the hostile stance taken towards Libya during its application to the UNGA. Throughout the course of the Libya issue, there has been a consistent display of unfavourable attitudes towards our nation. It is important to recall that Libya stood by Türkiye's side during moments of adversity, notably during the First World War when the Turkish flag was lowered even on Turkish soil yet continued to fly proudly in Libya. We earnestly hope for a revision of this policy in the future for the betterment of our bilateral relations (CBA, 44304-210804- 541 /3).

From this reproach, it can be understood easily that there was an expectation by Libyan people from the Turkish side. It can also be derived that this expectation was not met by the Turkish side. Türkiye seemed to be passive regarding the Libyan issue for a very long time. Archival documents even reveal an intriguing aspect of Turkish Republic's historical stance towards Libya, favouring its independence rather than reunification with Türkiye. It was clear that the newly established Turkish Republic, despite fighting together with Libyan locals in Anatolia as well as in Libya

²¹ Interview with Fatima Salem, Tripoli, 2023.

against the Western world was decisive keeping a passive stance while the Western world now decided about Libya's future. Notably, İsmet İnönü's letter to King Idris serves as a conspicuous example of this disposition. This passive attitude can be attributed to various factors such as economic, military, and political vulnerabilities experienced during that time. Whereas the fact that Türkiye was dependent on the power dynamics in every dimension can be expressed loudly (NATO, SGM-662-1). İnönü wrote to King Idris:

It is our earnest hope that the recent establishment of a government under your leadership in Benghazi will soon receive international recognition. The Republic of Türkiye has consistently advocated for Libya's swift attainment of independence and has actively engaged in negotiations on the international stage to facilitate this process. Today, we are gratified to witness significant progress towards realising this aspiration. Please accept my heartfelt best wishes for your continued success, İsmet İnönü (CBA, 044619, 41385-51, 1949).

İsmet İnönü's telegraph to King Idris presents an example of the strange twist of fate regarding the international involvement and Turkish-Libyan relationship.

As can be understood from both examples above, Türkiye's stance towards Libya's independence was passive although the Libyan side had more expected. There is another telegraph example from the Libyan side sent by Makluf Muttardi Buessir to the Turkish Presidency reflecting the Turkish stance towards Libyan independence:

It was Türkiye who constantly expressed interest in reclaiming the Ottoman administration lost in 1911. However, Ankara could not justify seeking territorial compensation for its late involvement and gave up. Consequently, the idea did not gain traction. Subsequently, Moscow intervened and claimed guardianship over Tripoli for itself. This move positioned the USSR favourably in the Central Mediterranean, aligning with the British imperial communication route. London likely opposed this plan, citing a promise of independence made to Sheikh Mohammed İdris of the Senussi movement. This promise, discussed during the Paris conference, was reminiscent of the Balfour Declaration's complexities. During discussions, Britain had to navigate other claims, such as those concerning Azerbaijan and Indonesia, where self-determination was invoked. Eventually, France proposed a solution at the Paris conference. France, too, had

interests in the former Italian colony, proposing border adjustments for security reasons and possibly reclaiming desert territory ceded to Italy in 1935. Amidst these discussions, France suggested entrusting Italy, under UN supervision, with administering Libya until it could govern itself. However, this proposal met resistance in the Arab world, seen as a violation of the British commitment to liberate Libya from Italian rule. The Arab League, comprising UN member states and founded in 1945, seemed a suitable option for tutelage over Libya. However, the Senussis, a significant force in the region, were seen as crucial for independence. Founded in 1835 by Algerian sage Muhammed ben Ali el Senoussi, the Senussis were a powerful MB (not the Muslim Brotherhood with its meaning today) with influence across North Africa. Despite agreements with Italy, they resisted colonisation and even formed a provisional government in Tripoli in 1916 with Turkish assistance. Despite doubts about their political maturity, granting them autonomy could address legitimate demands and revive a theocratic Muslim state with intriguing institutions (CBA, 44304-210808-21. 541-1, 1949).

The telegraph to President İnönü reveals Türkiye's recognition of its limited capacity to actively engage in the international struggle for Libya, which involved powers such as the US, UK, France, Italy, and potentially Russia.

Despite this acknowledgment, Türkiye strategically supported the Senoussi's quest for independence, understanding its inability to directly influence the outcome. This support manifested in the form of sending groups to aid the Senoussi's cause. Despite the Senoussi's eventual loss of hope in Turkish support, representatives of Turkish descent remained prevalent in key Libyan cities such as Tripoli, Benghazi, and Fezzan up until 1923 (Simon, 1980: 173). Furthermore, following Libya's achievement of independence, King Idris made the significant decision to collaborate with a recently appointed Turkish prime minister, highlighting the enduring historical ties between the two nations. This collaboration serves as a testament to the resilience of boundaries established during Italian colonisation and British rule. Additionally, Türkiye's active involvement in supporting Libyan independence aligns with the principles of the Islamic Union policy introduced by Abdulhamit II, which underscored the importance of solidarity among Islamic territories in the face of

imperialism. Thus, Türkiye's actions in Libya exemplify strategic manoeuvring informed by a careful consideration of historical, geopolitical, and ideological factors (Artuç, 2022: 283-298). It is well-documented that Abdulhamit's military forces, known as the Hamidiyya Regiments, were deployed in Libya for more than three decades, stationed in Benghazi and Tripoli alongside the Senussi movement. Even after the signing of the Italo-Ottoman peace agreement at Lausanne-Ouchy in 1912, Ahmad Şarif es Senussi persisted in his resistance against the Italians, aided directly by the Ottoman government.

This prolonged collaboration between the Senussi movement, and the Ottoman forces underscores the enduring commitment to Libyan independence and resistance against foreign occupation, despite the formal conclusion of hostilities between Italy and the Ottoman Empire (Stoddard, 1963). Despite the ongoing financial and logistic support from Istanbul starting from 1915, the guerrilla attack against British forces in Egypt in 1916 ultimately ended in failure. Throughout this period, Ahmed Şerif maintained his connections with the Ottomans; however, the influence of his cousin, Seyyid Muhammed Idris, who later became known as King Idris, began to rise. With Ahmed Şerif's consent, Idris initiated negotiations with both the British and the Italians in 1917. This marked a significant shift in strategy, as Idris sought to pursue diplomatic avenues in pursuit of Libyan independence, diverging from the more confrontational approach taken previously (Ziadeh, 1983: 65-72). Nevertheless, Ahmed Şerif did not lose his hopes for a resistance against colonialism (Artuç, 2021: 96). Hence, Ahmad Sharif, the third grand master of the Senussiyah, the cousin of King Idris (the first leader of independent Libya), escaped to Istanbul in 1918, and left Istanbul for inner Anatolia to join the Independence war of Türkiye. He supported the Ankara government until 1924 when he left for abroad (Koloğlu, 1981: 54; Özköse, 2001: 317-328).

Today, it is striking to note the conspicuous absence of these pivotal historical events in Libyan narratives (Artuç, 2021: 97). Ahmad Sharif's support for Türkiye has been notably overlooked in contemporary Libyan historiography, while modern Turkish historical accounts have similarly neglected the collaboration with Libyan locals. It is particularly noteworthy that despite numerous Arab-speaking nations

undergoing independence struggles, Libya stood out as the sole Ottoman territory that expressed a prolonged desire to remain part of the Ottoman State. It was only when the Senussi leadership despaired of receiving support from the newly established Turkish Republic that Libyan independence began to emerge as a pressing concern for them.

Considering this information, it would be incorrect to view Libya and Türkiye as entirely separate nations, as there exists a strong bond and a common past between the two. Delving into archival recordings from the UNGA reveals the marginalised position Türkiye found itself in. Disregarding the fraternal relationship between Turks and Libyan locals forged through shared struggles for independence, it is intriguing to note how the international community, against whom the Libyan people fought for independence, was granted the authority to determine Libya's future under the auspices of the UN.

On the other side, examining Türkiye's passive stance during the General Assembly talks in the UN can be understood from three distinct perspectives. Firstly, it can be viewed through a realist lens, suggesting that the Turkish Republic refrained from active engagement due to its national policy. The newly established Turkish Republic, wary of projecting an Ottoman-era image to the international community, which associated Islam with the state, opted for a secular stance. Hence, under İsmet İnönü's leadership, Türkiye sought to avoid being perceived as a government interested in Islamic territories. This perspective gains credence when considering Abdulhamit II's Islamic Union policy and the significance he placed on Libya, juxtaposed with Western perceptions of Islam as a dividing line between Libya and Türkiye. Secondly, a simpler explanation posits that Türkiye was not economically, politically, or socially prepared to take an active stance in the General Assembly. Thirdly, it is essential to consider the possibility that international powers of the time deliberately sidelined Türkiye to maintain the status quo in the MENA. This perspective suggests that neither the UN nor NATO desired Turkish involvement in discussions regarding Libyan independence, fearing it could influence the existing balance of power. Providing that, as reflected in archival recordings above, France and the UK were reluctant in giving independence to Libya at all, one can see how

powerful states prioritise their interests above all. Therefore, the UN General Assembly can be interpreted as a mechanism for controlling events in the MENA, under the guise of promoting security and peace. However, the underlying question remains whether the influence exerted through such forums truly leads to lasting positive and emancipatory outcomes.

5.2.4. Conclusion

In conclusion, this section has undertaken an extensive evaluation of the information presented, aiming to discern the impact of General Assembly discussions, theoretically aimed at fostering peace, stability, and emancipation in Libya. Throughout our analysis, it becomes abundantly clear that the Libyan and Turkish people share profound commonalities, transcending mere geographical boundaries. These commonalities constituting the ties between Libyans and Turks could be categorised as cultural, historical, and social etc. Such facts need to be considered when talking about Turkish-Libyan relations and the influence of IOs. Beyond religious affiliations, a significant feature uniting both communities is the presence of Turkish descendant Libyans, colloquially known as the *Kuloghilis*. Indeed, this shared heritage continues to serve as a testament to the enduring bonds forged over centuries, despite historical divisions and geopolitical upheavals. From the inception of independent Libya to the contemporary era, the influence of Turkish heritage remains palpable, manifesting in the presence of notable figures such as Sadullah Kologlu, Libya's inaugural Prime Minister to Fayiz Mustafa es-Serrac, a prominent politician of Turkish origin who was the prime minister of the National Accord Government.²²

Our analysis reveals a glaring incongruity between the theoretical discourse espoused within international forums like the General Assembly and the gritty realities of geopolitical manoeuvring on the ground. The turning point analysed in this section within the Turkish-Libyan case is the beginning of the reflection on how, despite rhetoric aimed at fostering peace and stability, practical outcomes often fall short,

²² In the 6th chapter, this thesis endeavours to provide a comprehensive exploration of Turkish Libyans and Libyan Turks, shedding light on their nuanced experiences and contributions to the socio-political fabric of both nations. By delving into these intricacies, we aim to elucidate the complex interplay between theoretical aspirations and practical realities, emphasizing that true emancipation remains elusive unless these two realms progress harmoniously.

mired in a quagmire of competing interests and power dynamics. As we navigate through the complexities of Turkish-Libyan relations, it becomes increasingly evident that genuine emancipation hinges upon the alignment of theoretical aspiration with practical actions. Only by bridging this gap can we hope to realise the ideals articulated within IOs and pave the way towards a future characterised by genuine peace, security, stability, and prosperity. However, as it is readable in this instance, even the discussion to make the sessions regarding Libyan independence secret and not public shows that there is no transparency while making decisions about Libyan locals. To provide a clearer picture: imagine that some MENA countries are deciding about France's situation with Corsica behind closed doors. Ridiculous as it sounds, this is the practical reality of the MENA region.

Returning to the General Assembly, the instance reflects that despite the robust historical ties between Türkiye and Libya, Türkiye has maintained a passive stance regarding Libyan independence. There are several reasons listed above that could have influenced Türkiye's stance. However, it does not matter which of the reasons is correct. Rather, it matters that Türkiye received independence in 1923 and was a newly established national state dealing with its own internal issues. Although Libyan people asked for unification, Türkiye was decisive in acting neutral and not influencing another country's future. In fact, one should think of how the situation would look like in 1951 if the Italians would not have colonised and the British would not have intervened, would a desire to get unified with Türkiye still exist? Indeed, a critical question arises: why should a country's independence and sovereignty be subject to the debates of other countries? As elucidated by Adrian Pelt in his book, and explored in this section, extensive discussions surrounding Libyan independence have taken place, with numerous plans drafted by major powers such as the US, Italy, Britain, France, and Russia. However, these plans often overlooked the aspirations of the local populace, who have long struggled against external interference in shaping their own destiny. Türkiye has refrained from presenting its own vision for Libya's independence, even though it is creating a missed opportunity for constructive engagement. Not to mention that the UN, as readable in this instance, clearly expressed its desire for Türkiye to not get involved in the issue. The turning point reflects how

historically there have been factions directly within the Libyan Parliament advocating for reunification with Türkiye, a sentiment rooted in the deep cultural and historical ties between the two nations. While these aspirations may not represent the entirety of Libyan society, they underscore the enduring connection between Türkiye and Libya, that cannot be dismissed lightly and was consciously disregarded by the UN.

The UN's purported role in establishing peaceful Libyan independence, as exemplified by Adrian Pelt's mission, was theoretically decisive. But as repeated many times, the practical reality paints a different picture, with international powers vying for influence and control over Libya's future. This competition among global actors, including Britain, France, Italy, and the US, has turned Libya into a battleground for competing interests rather than a beacon of emancipation. Again, the glaring contradiction between theoretical reality and practical reality regarding Libyan independence underscores the inadequacy of international efforts.

In a nutshell, the theoretical ideals espoused by IOs such as the UN and NATO envision a world characterised by freedom, democracy, and peace. However, the practical outcomes of their interventions, particularly in the MENA region, paint a starkly different picture. Rather than fostering emancipation and stability, their actions often result in the fragmentation of societies and the exacerbation of conflicts. One glaring consequence of international intervention in the MENA region is the erosion of social cohesion and the breakdown of interpersonal connections. States established through external influence or direct intervention often fail to account for the intricate religious, historical, cultural, and social ties that bind communities together. Consequently, people find themselves increasingly disconnected from one another, contributing to a sense of alienation and disunity. Despite the enduring bonds between nations like Türkiye and Libya, as well as among the broader MENA countries, these ties are frequently disregarded in the pursuit of geopolitical interests. Ignoring these deep-seated connections not only undermines prospects for peace but also hampers efforts toward genuine emancipation. Türkiye's passive stance on Libya, whether motivated by economic constraints, secularist policies, or international pressure, underscores the influence of external factors on domestic as well as external policies. The UN's reluctance to grant Türkiye a voice in discussions regarding Libyan

independence further highlights the influence of the international context on Türkiye's position. Observing the broader picture today, the MENA region remains plagued by conflict, instability, and insecurity, underscoring the failure of IOs to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Hence, the thesis posits that this contradiction between theoretical realities and practical realities is symptomatic of a broader systemic issue within IOs. The inability to align theoretical aspirations with on-the-ground realities hampers progress toward a free, peaceful, and safer MENA region. Only through a concerted effort to acknowledge and respect the region's complex socio-cultural, geostrategic, and geopolitical dynamics can lasting peace and emancipation be achieved.

5.3. The Influence of the UN and NATO on Türkiye's Relations with Libya during the 1974 Cyprus Conflict

5.3.1. Introduction

There is a dearth of information regarding the extent of Libyan assistance provided to Türkiye during the Cyprus dispute. Nevertheless, it is of utmost significance to delve into this form of assistance, as it represents a pivotal juncture in the chronicles of the MENA region, showcasing the influence of global organisations like the UN and NATO. It is important to acknowledge that throughout the period leading up to the demise of the Soviet Union, the UN and NATO were predominantly influenced by the US and the UK, the two most influential powers within these institutions, with the US as the leading one. Critical Security theorists explain this phenomenon with the fact that powerful states only enter IOs when they have a word to say. Therefore, the UNSC, which at the same time includes the most powerful NATO countries, constitutes a guaranteed organ for these countries, where they have the right to veto and decide about critical issues of many other countries without veto rights. It is not inaccurate to assert that the aforementioned two countries played a significant role in making crucial choices inside these organisations throughout the Cold War. Another aspect that should be addressed in this instance is the awareness of the indicated countries regarding the natural resources present in the MENA region. This explains their efforts and working hours in a different region much clearer, since it is impossible to become a world power by growing broccoli and other vegetables.

By examining historical facts and conducting a comparative analysis, it becomes evident that the influence of these organisations has been predominantly detrimental rather than emancipatory. The rationale behind this phenomenon can mostly be attributed to the policy priorities that, at the same time, constitute the practical reality of the dominant nations within these organisations. The recognition of the geostrategic significance, abundant resources, and strategic positioning of MENA countries, including Türkiye and Libya, has prompted influential states to take action. Indeed, a country's position affects the desire of international actors to increase or decrease their influence. It is observable that in countries within the MENA, the desire of international actors to be actively involved is high. Interestingly, after WWI, it is possible to see that the allies endeavoured to maintain the existing state of affairs, a task that is much facilitated inside the framework of IOs. Within this context, this thesis suggests that social and political scientists, while analysing matters related to IOs, should have this fact in mind. In doing so, it is no more a surprise that the determination of the idea of peace and security by the UN is predominantly influenced by governments that wield power and hegemonic authority.

Moreover, as argued by critical social scientists, powerful states owe it to their interests to advance. This instance therefore is essential in that it reflects how the theoretical reality of the UN and NATO of building peace and security differs from the practical reality based on hegemonic and powerful state interests. In this regard, the question of whether the UN has effectively achieved successful and equitable peace and security in the MENA region is no longer in doubt, given the evident situation. However, as CSS aims to do, it needs to be questioned about how to change this based on the given inferences. It could be said that either practical reality will keep up with theories built on peace and security discourses within the scope of the UN and NATO, or the theoretical realities of these institutions need to be recreated.

As known, the establishment of NATO was motivated by the objective of countering the perceived threats posed by communism and socialism. Throughout history, the dominant powers within NATO have positioned themselves in the MENA region with the objective of safeguarding societies against the perceived menace of communism and socialism. However, the extent of success in this regard is also

questionable. On the other side, this policy reflects subordinate states being the hegemonic sphere of influence. The decisive actor in this instance, the hegemon, obviously tried to protect its hegemonic sphere of influence against the idea of unknown ideologies. It can also be regarded as keeping the status quo. In both instances, the driving force remains the same, namely an interest-oriented policy.

Presently, communism and socialism have evolved into a socio-political framework predominantly characterised by Marxist principles and critical thinking. In this context, it is possible to examine a discourse rather than discussing a victorious or conscious effort against the socialist bloc. Within the current context, the main threat has evolved into international terrorism, primarily based on MENA origins. Not only in the UN but also in the NATO scenario, it is conceivable to discuss the exertion of influence through the lens of power and hegemony components claiming terrorism as a threat. As distinct from the first turning point within the case study that to a bigger extent reflects the influence of the UN, it is possible to see the influence of NATO clearer on Turkish-Libyan relations and the broader MENA region in the second turning point. Nevertheless, it appears that this influence also does not have positive and emancipatory implications when examining the outcomes of NATO deployments. As one of the supporting arguments of this study asserts, knowledge can be seen as a catalyst either leading to emancipation or to dependency. Dominant states within the UN and NATO possess substantial knowledge of the abundant subterranean resources present in the MENA region. It is evident that the utilisation of this knowledge is not directed towards the emancipation of the region but rather serves the pursuit of their own vested interests.

In a more extreme case, one soon recognises that power is employed as a destructive force, as argued by critical social scientists. In fact, the Libyan situation, as a prime example of a very oil-rich nation, illustrated the way knowledge can lead to dependency rather than emancipation. Numerous oil firms were compelled to engage in competition for land parcels in proximity to the Mediterranean region. By 1958, a significant portion of Libya's land area, amounting to fifty-five percent, had been allocated to fourteen international firms due to the swift dissemination of concessions during the preceding three years (Simons, 1996: 191). As can be understood, none of

the countries within the UN taking part in the discussions about Libyan independence left the country after completing the mission. On the contrary, it is possible to see them in every critical debate regarding Libya's national and international issues repeatedly.²³

On the other side, the geographical positioning of Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as its past connections with Libya and other neighbouring nations, has been and continues to be a significant concern for hegemons due to its geostrategic location, too. Undoubtedly, the possible strengthening of bilateral relations between Türkiye and Libya has the potential to significantly alter global power dynamics and disrupt the existing hegemonic equilibrium, which may be perceived as unfavourable by the established order since this will affect the status quo and the hegemonic sphere of influence. If this were the case, the hegemon would lose control over physical means, which would then lead to the loss of mental means. Therefore, a critical analysis of international peace and security organisations will help to understand the influence of the hegemon. Furthermore, it will provide insights into the underlying social, cultural, historical, economic, and political facts of the Turkish-Libyan relationship. The Cyprus conflict is one of the most reflective turning points in history, where these underlying factors are overlooked by IOs even though they serve to realise inevitable interaction within the region.

In order to enhance comprehension, this turning point within the Turkish-Libyan case provides a detailed analysis of the era encompassing Gaddafi's support to Türkiye during the Cyprus crisis. Analysing this period, it is possible to loudly pronounce dominant nations within IOs saw Gaddafi as a significant threat against the status quo due to some of his actions, such as nationalising Libya's oil reserves. The hegemonic power does not like it when a country located in a geo-strategic position acts against the international political system in a way affecting hegemonic interests. Regarding the issue from this point of view, it will not be wrong to talk about an international dictatorship/imperialism within the political system since dictatorship/imperialism in certain historical circumstances may be the only means to

²³ See Appendix 6.

create hegemony. On the other side, historical evidence reflects that while the form of hegemon changes, its function remains the same. In previous times, individual countries established their hegemony over less powerful regions, whereas today it will not be wrong to state that these countries increase their power and hegemony under the umbrella of certain IOs.

Although critical theory must aim for emancipatory political praxis, which means to promote emancipatory socio-cultural, economic, and political change (taking place at the bottom), this thesis will not explore the issue from the bottom to the top but contrary. This means it will examine the hegemon, its influence, and how to change it into an emancipatory one. The reason for this approach is that although there is no emancipatory change possible by disregarding socio-cultural, economic, and political facts, the influence comes from top down. This method provides the critical social scientist with a different perspective, challenging IOs to question their negative influence. Another fact to know is that IOs are platforms where powerful states legitimise their international interests. Therefore, it is always of benefit to know the interests of powerful states within hegemonic IOs. By doing so, one soon recognises that as soon as a single hegemonic sphere of influence becomes less negatively influenced, the hegemonic power within the international system seems to be in danger. This again means that there is a parallel between the negative influence and the power of the hegemon.

The international Cyprus conflict in 1974 and Gaddafi's support to Türkiye constitute a clear example of Gaddafi, paying particular importance to his relationship with Türkiye during his reign. As previously indicated, Gaddafi, upon executing his coup and assuming leadership, first made a commitment to preserve the existing worldwide political system. However, over a span of one year, a multitude of political transformations began to be encountered in Libya. Gaddafi suddenly started to turn his back to the Western world and to concentrate more on regional and national issues. In accordance with Gaddafi switching to a national and regional political attitude, changes in the UN and NATO policies towards Libya came to the fore. As will be in detail explained later, Gaddafi started to be pictured as a terrorist supporter and the Libyan state as a terror-supporting state, a strange and dangerous dictatorship for the

international community. Even if this were partially correct, it would be a biased attitude drawing a conclusion without examining the underlying facts.

This, as conceptualised by the Copenhagen School, would be the securitisation process. In this case, it depends on the securitising actor how the political attitude of Gaddafi is internationally perceived. Not to mention that there are certain facts driving the securitisation action. This again leads to the key question: whether peace and security are the main goals in practice. As a whole, the international Cyprus conflict is a historical moment that visibly helps to understand power and hegemony dynamics as sub-components of the influence. On the other hand, it serves as an important lesson teaching that, to turn this influence into an emancipatory one, social, cultural, economic, historical, and political aspects have to be considered in the context of the relationship between any two countries in the MENA. It reflects how knowledge, while emancipating some, makes some others dependent. Precisely, Turkish-Libyan relations during the Cyprus conflict constitute another turning point in history where the two- concepts introduced within this thesis, namely theoretical reality and practical reality, are conflicting with each other.

5.3.2. Libyan-Turkish Relations in 1974

The literature regarding Turkish-Libyan relationship during the Cyprus crisis in 1974 is lacking. As far as it is possible to read from memories, newspapers and archival documents, this thesis argues that since the only country during the Cyprus crisis supporting Türkiye, was Libya, it should be separately delved into the situation for each party and tried to understand to what extent the influence of IOs such as the UN and NATO are available during this specific period of time. Only in this way, one can set together the pieces of the puzzle and draw a comprehensive conclusion. Hence, the existence of the influence, its strength, harm, benefit etc. will be revealed by observing the historical, political, economic and socio-cultural dimension of Turkish-Libyan relations during the Cyprus crisis as a critical security researcher would do to promote an emancipatory change.

To begin with, it is beneficial to have a look at the situation in Libya between 1969-1974. On September 1, 1969, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi assumed control of

Libya by a nonviolent coup known as “Operation Jerusalem”. One of his initial actions was to publicly declare his takeover via radio broadcast. This inaugural address holds significant importance in comprehending the existence of the UN and NATO influence in the country at that time. Namely, in his speech Gaddafi implemented measures aimed at providing reassurance to Libya’s foreign allies and the international community. He explicitly stated:

I take this opportunity to assure all our foreign acquaintances that they can rest assured regarding the security of their assets and personal well-being. The individuals in question are currently afforded the safeguarding of our nation’s military forces. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that our enterprise is not aimed at any specific state or intended to contravene international accords or established international law. This matter is exclusively an internal affair (Simons, 1996: 176).

Despite being influenced by Abdunnasser’s Egypt and its Arab nationalist ideology, Gaddafi initially refrained from openly expressing his admiration during the early stages of his rule. Gaddafi possessed a clear understanding of the formidable challenges associated with confronting influential global powers, which concurrently held leading positions within international peace and security institutions like the UN and NATO.

Nevertheless, it is imperative to acknowledge that the aforementioned influential nations were not captivated by the Libyan desert itself, but rather by its abundant natural riches, notably oil. Libya is renowned for its abundant subterranean resources, which have contributed to its status as one of the wealthiest nations. Furthermore, throughout the reigns of King Idris and subsequently Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, Libya’s primary source of international contention predominantly stemmed from its oil reserves. King Idris did not demonstrate proficiency in resource management. Hence, scholars have posited that the post-coup rulers mainly disregarded his arduous resource management during the 1960s (Allan, 1981: 24). Gaddafi effectively implemented his governance strategy by leveraging a pre-coup oil policy to successfully attain a series of oil price escalations, benefiting not just Libya but also other oil-producing nations. During the 1970s, the growth of oil income

persisted at a rate comparable to that of the 1960s, notwithstanding the reduction in output that occurred in 1970, primarily due to escalating prices. The presence of a prudent approach to oil conservation in Libya was apparent, although a comparable level of knowledge was lacking in the equally significant domains of water management, agricultural land utilisation, and industrial development.

Towards the conclusion of the 1970s, Colonel Gaddafi and Major Jalloud advocated for the meticulous and cautious examination of development plans before to their execution, emphasising the necessity of adhering to the principles of Islamic socialism during implementation. Throughout the initial years following the coup, it became evident that the substantial influx of oil funds had a detrimental effect on a nation with little natural resources.

Indeed, the geographical location of Libya has played a significant role in facilitating the development of its oil industry. In a critical perspective, this is explained by the fact that a country's position affects the desire of international actors to increase or decrease their influence. Specifically, Libya's proximity to major European and North American markets has provided it with a strategic advantage over other prominent oil-producing regions, particularly those situated in the Middle East. Therefore, Libya became situated on the "market side" of the Suez Canal that was rendered inoperable due to the Middle East conflict in June 1967. Subsequently, the oil firms endeavoured to broaden their operations in Libya, opting for a more proactive approach instead of solely depending on the previous strategy of consolidation. The cost of transporting oil from the Mediterranean to Europe and North America was significantly lower compared to the expenses incurred while shipping it from the Persian Gulf, circumnavigating the Cape of Good Hope. In this particular scenario, there was a notable urgency to acquire Libyan oil, especially in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war. Therefore, during the period preceding the 1969 coup, the output of oil in Libya experienced a twofold increase. Had the Suez Canal remained closed, it is plausible that Libya may have emerged as the third largest global oil producer, trailing solely behind the US and the Soviet Union (Odell, 1970: 92). This phenomenon serves as a conspicuous manifestation of global influence inside the region, stemming from its abundant subterranean resources.

However, it is important to acknowledge that the influence of the UN, as the establishing organisation of Libya, has resulted in turmoil rather than liberation for the region. Power as well as hegemony in this case were employed as a destructive force that in the long term threatened and continues to threaten security rather than keeping it. This again can be explained by practically interest-oriented policies, whereas theoretically a discourse based on peace and security. Nevertheless, it can be argued that Libya had a vested interest in curtailing production, primarily due to concerns related to conservation and as a means of exerting control over prices. Libya embarked on a trajectory of output restriction when it undertook the nationalisation of various foreign assets in 1973, a move that was subsequently embraced by several other Arab oil-exporting states. Therefore, it can be shown that Libyan oil production in 1974 was merely 50% of the maximum production achieved in 1970, and this downward trend persisted throughout the entire decade. Also at this point, it can be seen that the influence of international actors exists and harms a country as long as the country's policies are not in favour of the international hegemon. Although rich of oil, countries categorised as subordinated countries constitute the hegemonic sphere of influence, it does not matter whether the powerful is dependent on the subordinated. Or critically, it may be right to question: if there were not a country rich of resources, would the hegemonic sphere of influence still exist? Nationally in Libya, one can see that during the 1970s, it became evident that the production and export of oil could be managed to fulfil several financial and political objectives. Libya played a significant role in spearheading a novel association between oil-producing nations and oil companies, commonly referred to as the 'majors' and the 'independents.' This ground-breaking development held immense global implications, particularly in terms of reshaping the dynamics between oil-rich Third World countries and the oil-dependent developed economies of Europe and North America. However, by doing so, the Libyan leader was soon categorised as an aggressive terror supporting dictator within the international community.

As can be concluded, Libya is among the hydrocarbon civilisations in the MENA. Its specific conditions have bestowed upon it a distinct and noteworthy significance. The significant status of Libya in modern history can be attributed to a

combination of factors, including its geographical location, colonial past, strategic significance, and the distinctive nature of the Gaddafi revolution.

In 1974, on the 14th of November, Henry Kissinger made the decision to designate oil as the “most strategically significant commodity” on a global scale (Anderson and Rashidian, 1991: 55).

The absence of oil in a nation renders it incapable of functioning within the contemporary global context. The US, specifically, exhibits significant and imbalanced energy consumption, heavily relying on oil to maintain its quality of living, military capabilities, and self-proclaimed worldwide position as the lone superpower. If any nation, irrespective of its motives, poses a threat to the international architecture that ensures US' access to oil, it should be mindful of its own security (Anderson and Rashidian, 1991: 55).

This shows again how power has a destructive nature rather than an emancipatory one. Furthermore, it is a reflection of the hegemonic sphere of influence. Thinking of the reality that IOs are platforms where powerful states legitimise their international interests, one soon realises the power of the US within the UN and NATO. Therefore, the longstanding animosity displayed by the US towards Libya cannot be attributed to terrorism, as the US has consistently supported its own designated actors, too. Nor is it fair to talk about the aim to keep peace and security as a practical reality since knowledge while emancipating some, makes some others dependent. Rather, this hostility can be traced back to the fundamental reason that Libya's ability to disrupt the international oil industry has caused embarrassment and inconvenience to global corporations. The utilisation of oil as a political instrument has been widely recognised by Libya for a considerable period of time. Gaddafi utilised his authority over Libyan oil output to bolster the progress of Third World nations on the international stage, enhance his military capabilities through weapon acquisitions, finance atomic bomb research, and provide backing to specific causes in Africa and other regions. From the time of the coup in 1969 until 1974, Muammar Gaddafi played a significant role in providing decisive support to neighbouring countries, employing the rhetoric of Islamic cooperation or Arab nationalism. One of the countries in question was Türkiye, characterised by its Islamic Ottoman heritage.

While Libya had the above-mentioned issues on its schedule, one of Türkiye's main topics in its foreign policy between 1955 and 1974 was the Cyprus issue. As known, the Republic of Cyprus as well continues to be a significant focal point in the Eastern Mediterranean area, mostly because of its strategic geographical positioning, geopolitical importance, and historical significance. Indeed, within the context of this thesis, it is more appropriate to refer to the subject matter as an international crisis, given the active participation of NATO and the UN. On the other hand, Libya became involved in the matter by providing Türkiye with essential weaponry and other forms of support. Undoubtedly, the acts undertaken by Libya and Türkiye during this crisis have resulted in significant repercussions since they were not in favour of the powerful and hegemon.

Tracing the historical path, in light of the compulsory transfer of Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire to British control, it is evident that Cyprus has maintained its importance for the Turkish Republic. Moreover, locals in Cyprus were not thrilled to be a colony of the UK. As a matter of fact, the Enosis campaign, which meant the unity of Cyprus with Greece, has a long history, first starting against the British and eventually evolving into a confrontation between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island.

As the ideology of Enosis started to increase after the year 1955, the Turkish party came up with the political suggestion to divide the island into Greek and Turkish administrations, commonly referred to as the Taksim plan. By early 1960s, Türkiye started to lend its support to the Taksim proposal. Meanwhile, the situation became such a chaos, that the UN as well as NATO became actively involved in the Cyprus issue. Moreover, under the umbrella of these organisations, the US and UK also get involved, imposing their policies (NATO, IMSWM- 219,1967). This is not a surprise thinking of the strategic position of Cyprus and the fact that related to this position, powerful states increase or decrease their influence. In addition to that, as the critical way of thinking argues, IOs are platforms where powerful states legitimise their international interests. Indeed, powerful states do not enter an organisation over which they have no influence.

The Cyprus issue is one of the most interesting historical happenings where it is possible to see how powerful states legitimise their policies by applying to international peace and security organisations. Furthermore, the destructive nature of power is clearly visible throughout this crisis. At present, it is evident that numerous Western nations have interpreted Türkiye's activities in Cyprus as being characterised as provocative by the Turkish Republic. Nevertheless, considering the proposition made by Taksim to divide the island into Greek and Turkish areas, Türkiye did not get any benefits from this arrangement, therefore lacking any motivation to act as if it did (Kaya and Yeter, 2018: 216). As the situation between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots on the island escalated, the involvement of international peace and security organisations such as the UN or NATO became inevitable. However, both the UN and NATO faced challenges in achieving an agreement. The main cause of the disagreement can be ascribed to fluctuations in political interests within the organisations, as reflected by subsequent documentation. On the other hand, Türkiye has also been actively engaged in addressing the Cyprus issue and has made significant endeavours to ensure its alignment with international legal norms. The Zurich and London Agreements, which were established on February 11, 1959, and February 19, 1959 respectively, were formulated and endorsed by the leaders of the groups existing on the island. The aforementioned accords were established based on the core principles of self-governance, political cooperation between the two factions, and societal self-determination. Türkiye, Greece, and the UK (acting on behalf of the UN) assumed the responsibility of being guarantor states, with the objective of protecting independence, territorial integrity, security, and fundamental principles enshrined in the constitution of the recently established Republic of Cyprus. A compromise was achieved by all parties involved through the establishment of official agreements that recognised the same political rights and status of both communities dwelling on the island (TNA, FCO 9/1927, 1974). However, supporters of Enosis, particularly the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, regarded these accords as a betrayal (NATO, LOM 374/64, 1964). This attitude led to aggressive attacks by Enosis supporters and other extreme individuals against Turkish Cypriots. Hence, Türkiye jumped in and expressed its apprehensions regarding the potential negative consequences for the recently established form of government. It consistently

delivered diplomatic notifications to Makarios, urging him to stop violent activities and maintain the current state of affairs on the island through peaceful means in compliance with international law (Şahin, 2016: 779-796).

Despite numerous attempts, Makarios instigated a series of systematic and comprehensive attacks targeting the Turkish Cypriot people. Meanwhile, based on historical records, it has been documented that Turkish Cypriots made explicit calls for support from Türkiye between the years 1950 and 1974. As the aggressive policies by Makarios and Enosis supporters did not stop, the Turkish government made the deliberate choice to engage in measures aimed at halting the ongoing assaults, despite several cautionary advisories issued by the UN and NATO (TNA, BW 61/59). Türkiye attempted to address the issue through regional collaboration without seeking assistance from the UN or NATO. Libya was one of these regional partners Türkiye applied to when the issue on the island escalated. Hence, during Muammar Gaddafi's rule, Libya emerged as a prominent regional ally of Türkiye. Due to Libya's provision of essential resources such as oil, gas, and weaponry, Türkiye remained almost unaffected by international embargoes during the Cyprus crisis. On the other side, the Libyan government as well faced the implementation of sanctions by powerful countries within the UN and NATO.

In the global context, numerous films, documentaries, and a multitude of books have been produced concerning Gaddafi, focusing on his substantial oil revenue of one billion dollars per week and his utilisation of torture and homicide as means to suppress dissenting voices. The dictatorship in question was commonly referred to as a regime characterised by a state of terror. Ronald Reagan, the former President of the US, recognised for his strategic and proactive approach inside NATO, notably referred to Muammar Gaddafi as "A Mad Dog," a characterisation that subsequently became the focus of an in-depth documentary ("Regime of Terror: A Horrifying Portrait of Libya's Leader from the Insiders Who Made Him"). Only in the late 1980s, when Libya implemented a series of economic changes aimed at liberalisation, despite being labelled a terror state for an extended period, the Gaddafi regime managed to successfully restore its diplomatic ties with powerful states and key members of the UN and NATO. First being labelled as a terror state and later, based on a change in

political attitude, being able to restore ties with powerful states, as can be seen from the Libyan example, is only possible if the political attitude is in the interest of the powerful states within peace and security organisations such as the UN and NATO. However, this does definitively not lead to an emancipatory socio-cultural, economic, and political change, as named by the critical researcher as the emancipatory political praxis.

On the contrary, this will harm one party while emancipating the powerful one. Within this context, it will not be wrong to derive that in the Libyan case, power based on knowledge, while emancipating some, makes some others dependent. It is no more secret that as long as Gaddafi's international actions aligned with the hegemonic system and the powerful, he has not been aggressed. In other words, he was forced to act dependent on the hegemonic system. In the year 1999, Libya initiated covert negotiations with the British administration with the aim of establishing normalised diplomatic relations. In September 2001, Muammar Gaddafi openly denounced the September 11 attacks on the US carried out by the extremist group al-Qaeda. Subsequently, he expressed his condolences to the victims and advocated for Libyan participation in the US-led war against terrorism (Zoubir, 2009: 401-415). This statement again reflects how in the international arena the utilisation of knowledge for policy objectives driven by interests, rather than focusing on the genuine emancipation and development of third-world countries, is prioritised. Repeatedly, it becomes evident that there exists a distinction between theoretical reality and practical reality. Moreover, it can be argued that peace and security organisations such as the UN and NATO exhibit a preference for implementing policies that align with the interests of dominant and hegemonic states. The inquiry that necessitates resolution pertains to the beneficiaries and scope of peace, as well as the recipients and nature of security. The connection between Libya and Türkiye during the Cyprus crisis also serves as an example of how IOs, despite espousing the goal of emancipation and theoretical discussions on peace and security, may exhibit contradictory actions in practice. As a matter of fact, to better understand the theoretical foundation of this thesis based on these ideas, it is necessary to thoroughly comprehend the aforementioned contradiction.

5.3.3. Libya's Support to Türkiye During the Cyprus Crisis

The exploration of the Libyan support for Türkiye during the Cyprus crisis is a significant turning point within the Turkish-Libyan case, albeit one that poses challenges in terms of locating relevant literature. On one side, this support exemplifies common efforts between Libya and Türkiye in response to a regional crisis that has drawn international attention. On the other hand, this collaborative effort serves as an example of resistance against the hegemon's regional assault. To begin with, one scholar that needs to be considered in discussions concerning Turkish-Libyan ties during the Cyprus crisis is Taner Baytok. His book titled "A Breath in Foreign Policy" provides a noteworthy illustration of Libya's significant aid to Türkiye during the Cyprus crisis, despite facing Western embargoes. Taner Baytok has previously held various positions within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including serving as the head of the NATO Department, the general director of the Strategic Research and Disarmament department, the general director of the Political Planning and Research department, the general director of the EU department, and as an ambassador to Abu Dhabi, Copenhagen, Dublin, and Bern. As an eyewitness, he provides an account of the Turkish-Libyan relations within the global Cyprus crisis.

The Peace Operation undertaken in Cyprus during the year 1974 stands as a key event in Turkish history. After the successful execution of a two-part military operation during the mid-summer timeframe, there was an observed increase in activity within our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The primary aim of this endeavour was to acquire the necessary armaments and resources to effectively equip our military forces, so strengthening their defences against the potential risk of intervention from Greece. Furthermore, a formal request was officially submitted to our esteemed colleagues within the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) throughout the aforementioned time frame, encompassing the nations of Iran and Iraq. The Shah's regime in Iran exhibited its inherent characteristics through its pursuit of territorial expansion. Iraq contended that it did not hold the aforementioned weapons and supplies, but rather stated that it had participated in conversations with Libya under Gaddafi's government. Iraq argued that the newly shuttered American air base in Benghazi contained the sought-after material and expressed willingness to furnish it upon our request. There was a deliberation over

the feasibility of submitting a formal petition, notwithstanding the ambiguity surrounding Gaddafi's prospective reaction and disposition towards the issue. Following the receipt of a positive response to our solicitation, we promptly sent out a roster. The Prime Minister, Jallud, made a personal visit to the airport and oversaw the shipment of two DC9 planes, which were carrying a significant quantity of equipment, to our designated destination.

As the one entrusted with the role of director within the NATO department, I have been tasked with the duty of overseeing and resolving this particular matter. In response to the pressing nature of the circumstances, I expeditiously initiated a diplomatic expedition to Libya. During this mission, Hasan Esad Işık, who was serving as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, affixed his signature to a letter addressed to the General Staff. This letter conveyed our appreciation for the aid provided, enquired about the magnitude of our obligation, and requested additional weaponry and resources. After obtaining the approval of the General Staff, Esad Işık deemed it appropriate for the delegation to consist of one Brigadier General and four Generals, with myself assuming the role of the chairman. Our group undertook a visit to Libya as members of a diplomatic delegation. The mission was comprised of General Cengiz Sakaralı and four colonels. The colonels originated from diverse backgrounds, encompassing training and warship production, thereby facilitating our capacity to extend military support to Libya. The next day, our series of meetings with the delegation of the Chief of General Staff of Libya was effectively ended within a single day. The beneficiaries denied the offer to provide financial support for the procurement of firearms due to their perception that it could potentially impose burdensome implications, which deterred them from discussing the matter. The transfer of the remaining weapons confiscated from the American personnel at the air base was conveyed to us, indicating that they will be sent to our location tomorrow morning. It was explicitly stated that a formal inventory of the weapons is not necessary. I communicated my absence of authorisation to receive grants in exchange. Nevertheless, I provided reassurance to the sender that I would cheerfully convey the request from Libya, which is distinguished by its amicable and fraternal nature, to my government and thereafter deliver their response. Subsequently, the colonels were briefed on the recommendations we presented to facilitate the progress in Libya, and they duly endorsed each proposal. Our delegation graciously accepted the invitation

extended by the Chief of General Staff to attend the national day celebrations of Libya, scheduled to take place in two days. During the aforementioned timeframe, Minister of Finance Deniz Baykal was in attendance to express appreciation and extend congratulations on behalf of our President to Gaddafi in observance of the national day. The main purpose of the late ambassador Semih Günver's visit to Libya was to clarify the concept that the situation in Cyprus should be understood not as an occupation, but rather as a peacekeeping mission. Unfortunately, the diplomatic mission in Libya lacked an ambassador, resulting in a second secretary temporarily assuming the ambassadorial duties. Deniz Baykal was being catered to by a young host who engaged in conversation using the Turkish language. Baykal articulated his discontent with him unable to establish communication with Gaddafi for the purpose of conveying the letter. Following that, we were appropriately informed of the arrangement of our meetings with Gaddafi and Prime Minister Jallud at 8 o'clock in the morning. I had the privilege of accompanying Mr. Baykal during his meeting with Colonel Gaddafi. One of the most captivating memories I own is the interaction that I meticulously chronicled in my publication entitled A Breath in Foreign Policy. Furthermore, the subsequent picnic dinner that we engaged in with Gaddafi, followed by our journey to Ankara aboard his private aircraft, continue to be vivid in my recollection as exceptionally intriguing memories ("Kıbrıs Barış Harekatı ve Libya'nın Teknik Yardımı", 1974).

In addition to this, in his memoirs published in 2005, when Baytok served as the head of the department of the NATO delegation in Ankara, he discusses Türkiye's involvement in Cyprus as follows:

In July 1974, Türkiye made a landing on the island, Cyprus. This is the only physical war in the history of the Turkish Republic after its establishment. Türkiye exercised its right to military involvement in Cyprus, which was granted by international law as the guarantor country for the safety of life and property of our compatriots living in Cyprus. Such a move was resorted to when peaceful avenues were completely blocked. I personally witnessed a message sent by the US Secretary of Defence Laird to his Turkish counterpart Hasan Esat Işık during the third day of the operation, saying, "Come on, hurry up and finish this operation!" I considered this as tangible evidence that the legitimacy of our Cyprus Operation was embraced by the US.

We announced the involvement of the Turkish Armed Forces in Cyprus to our allies in NATO and other countries of the world with a declaration, along with its justifications. I personally drafted the declaration sent to NATO countries. Until the operation began, some of us, including myself, were among those closed off from the ministry. Even after the operation started, although we were allowed to leave, we did not leave the ministry and tried to understand what was happening. Both Ercüment Yavuzalp and Faruk Şahinbaş had served in our Embassy in Cyprus. They knew the island and the events. However, even for them, it was impossible to follow the operation with the information we obtained from telegrams from our Embassy in Nicosia. In the early hours of the morning, the door of my office opened and Foreign Minister Turan Güneş entered. He had put his jacket on his shoulder, hanging it on a hanger with his finger. As soon as he entered, he said, "Hey Baytok, what are your soldiers doing, we can't get any information! Neither the government nor the Embassy in Nicosia knows about the events, go find out something and inform us." At that hour, I did not have the power to go to the General Staff and obtain accurate information. I spoke with a few people very close to me on the phone. I learned that the initial target of our ships in Cyprus was determined as Famagusta and then changed to Kyrenia. If this was a deception, hats off to it; but if this was a mistake, it was a huge one. The lack of coordination between the forces did not end there. Another story I heard from the commander of the Cyprus Operation, General Nurettin Ersin Pasha, confirms this. "It was not predetermined where our forces would stop in Cyprus. We were advancing in rugged, empty terrain. We took a hill, decided to stop, then went a little further. This is how we went on for a while. As we almost reached the sea from the south of the island, we asked Ankara how to continue. First, we received an order to advance eastward, but since there were British bases, we received a new order to continue westward. While advancing westward, the air force was not informed, and we began to be bombed. We sent a message to ask what the air force was doing and were only so able to stop the bombings. Upon our landing in Cyprus, Greece called for a meeting of the NATO Council, announcing its withdrawal from NATO's military integration. I prepared the instructions containing the keys issues of the speech made by our Permanent Representative Orhan Eralp at this meeting. I learned from BBC news that morning that Greece would withdraw from NATO's military integration and immediately wrote a speech text and had it signed by our

NATO Permanent Representative, who was acting as the Foreign Minister, at the restaurant of Bulvar Palas Hotel. When he learned that it was my initiative to send such an instruction and that I persistently reached him, he was pleased. Hasan Esat Bey later sent a second instruction to NATO to lead the council to persuade Greece to return to the military integration. I objected and he showed the greatness of listening to me (Baytok, 2005: 195-196).

It is intriguing to highlight Baytok's explicit statement regarding the sole assistance for the Turkish involvement in Cyprus, which came from Libya. He underscores that while Türkiye's NATO and CENTO allies, regarded as fraternal nations, remained silent during the Cyprus operation, Libya under Gaddafi's rule stood out as the only country to provide military aid and support. Baytok was tasked with leading the military delegation sent to Libya to negotiate and secure this aid. During the negotiations, a senior officer from the Libyan General Staff conveyed to the Turkish delegation that Türkiye would not be billed for the two DC9 aircraft loads of military equipment previously dispatched. Baytok, in his capacity as the delegation head, clarified that he lacked the authority to accept such a gift and insisted on consulting with Ankara. Subsequently, on the second day of negotiations, the Libyan chief of staff informed the Turkish delegation that the weapons and equipment received from the Americans at the air training base were deemed surplus and could be fully transferred to the Turkish forces. This equipment was dispatched to Türkiye while the delegation was still in Libya. In reciprocation, the Turkish delegation crafted and implemented a training program for officers in the Libyan army and navy. In addition, Baytok fondly recalls the meeting with Libyan President Gaddafi, accompanied by Finance Minister Deniz Baykal, whose prominence rose with the formation of the Ecevit-Erbakan Government. The memorable dinner in a caravan and the return journey to Türkiye aboard Gaddafi's private plane are etched as enduring memories for Baytok.

Another living witness of the Cyprus issue in 1974 and Libya's support to Türkiye is İzzettin Çopur, who was senior lieutenant second tank company commander in Cyprus at that time. He explains in his memoirs that the Libyan support was not only for one time. Need lists were announced in advance, and needs were delivered

accordingly. Libyan leader Muammer Gaddafi, who according to a Turkish colonel serving for NATO was partially trained in the Turkish Military Academy, stated in advance that he would provide all kinds of weapons and materials that the Turkish armed forces would need, including fuel, and said, *“I am ready to meet all of your needs; send a plane, and I will provide you with the weapons and ammunition you want”* (Çopur: 2024: 120).

A total of 25 tons of 2.75- and 5-inch rockets, engine oil for the planes, napalm materials, and 20 mm artillery shells were loaded onto the planes overnight. The next day, early in the morning, the Turkish group returned to Ankara from Vilesu Airport. From this information, it can be derived that Libyan support for Türkiye worked without any serious problems, although it constituted big problems for the hegemon. The embargoes that Türkiye and Libya later faced were a sign of this inconvenience. Disregarding the interests of powerful states had its consequences. A further interesting fact in this memoir is the information that Gaddafi graduated from the Turkish Military Academy (Çopur, 2024: 123). Within the framework of this thesis, this information has been tried to be confirmed; however, it is not easily accessible and still needs proof. According to a retired Turkish NATO colonel, Gaddafi graduated from Ankara and was even a student at the same level in his parallel class.²⁴

Additional illustrative examples reflecting that during the Cyprus crisis in 1974, the relationship between Türkiye and Libya took on an important dimension, marked by collaboration and support, can be observed through the activities surrounding the declaration of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and following events.

Diyanet Newspaper, reflecting the sentiments and developments of the time, underwent a notable shift in its coverage. Initially, the newspaper did not have a Cyprus agenda until February 1975, coinciding with the announcement of the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. However, following this declaration, the Cyprus issue gained prominence in the newspaper, reflecting the intensity of the situation. President of Religious Affairs Dr. Lütfi Doğan’s visit to

²⁴ Male, Former NATO Colonel active in 2011 in Libya, Ankara, 2023.

Cyprus during Eid al-Adha in 1975 and his delivery of the Friday sermon at Nicosia Selimiye Mosque became a significant event, highlighted in the newspaper (Doğan, 1975: 1). His speech, later published as an editorial, reflected a sentiment akin to a founding declaration of a new Turkish state in Cyprus, emphasising unity, resilience, and the Islamic identity. The speech of the President of Religious Affairs, Dr. Lütü Doğan, serves as compelling evidence of Türkiye's commitment to establishing a faithful Turkish presence in Cyprus. This excerpt encapsulates Türkiye's efforts during the Cyprus crisis, as portrayed in Diyanet Newspaper's coverage and the broader context of Türkiye's involvement in the region:

My brothers and sisters! We stand on the start of a new chapter in Cyprus's history - the second grand opening. With unwavering determination, hand in hand and heart to heart, alongside our valiant army and brothers, we will cement our presence in these cherished lands we defend. Here, we need to thrive in the radiance of our Turkish heritage and the guidance of Islam. Let the world hear again that we are forging a steadfast Turkish Cyprus. Through our unity and solidarity, let hostilities dissolve, for our mission is one of peace, love, and the pursuit of freedom. We pledge to cultivate joy and banish sorrow from this land. As Turks, as Muslims, we yearn for the prosperity and well-being of all humanity. May the Almighty protect our homeland, Cyprus, our beloved nation, and our courageous brothers (Doğan, 1975: 1-14).

Subsequent editions of the newspaper featured noteworthy developments, including the Mufti of Cyprus's call for economic war ("Kıbrıs Müftüsü Kıbrıs'lı Türkleri Ekonomik Savaşa Davet Etti", 1975), expressions of gratitude from Rauf Denktaş, the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, to the President of Religious Affairs ("Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devlet Başkanı Rauf Denktaş Dr. Lütü Doğan'a Teşekkür Yazısı Gönderdi", 1975), and poetic reflections on Cyprus ("Kıbrıs Zaferinin 1. Yıldönümü Kutlandı", 1975). Moreover, discussions surrounding the support provided through the opening of the Ersin Pasha Mosque in Nicosia reflected the symbolic importance of mosques in Cyprus during this period, representing a struggle for existence and the Islamisation process ("Kıbrıs'a Yapılan Yardım 202 Milyona Ulaştı", 1975). The opening ceremony of this mosque was attended by the President of Religious Affairs of Türkiye, Deputy Chairman of the Constituent

Assembly Mehmet Zeka, Deputy President and Minister of Defence Osman Örek, Turkish Cypriot Peace Forces Commander Lieutenant General Vahit Güneri, the Cyprus Mufti Dr. Rifat Mustafa and a Libyan Embassy Representative (“Kıbrıs’ta Ersin Paşa Camii İbadete Açıldı”, 1975). The inauguration of a mosque with such a gleaming ceremony holds a significant symbolic message during this period in Cyprus. It serves as a sign to the profound meaning attached to mosques in the region. Indeed, the presence of a mosque signifies more than just a place of worship; it embodies a struggle for existence, reflective of the broader Islamisation process taking place. The presence of the Libyan Embassy Representative in a ceremony of such a meaning for Türkiye, should hence be recognised as a political and diplomatic message to the international community. This courageous attitude of Libya is easier explainable in that it coincides with Gaddafi’s nationalisation and regionalisation period in foreign affairs.

Following the operation, a notable emphasis in the newspaper’s discourse is the assertion that Cyprus constitutes an intrinsic and historical extension of Türkiye, suggesting that the fractured connection was reinstated through the operation. This sentiment is exemplified in the article titled “Turk’s Weapon.”

One year ago this month, the Turkish Army reclaimed Cyprus, extinguishing Greece’s aspirations for Enosis. This marks a recurring event, as Cyprus, being Anatolia’s neighbouring island, naturally belongs to Türkiye, with Turkish presence dating back centuries. The proximity of our beaches, a mere 60 kilometres away, contrasts starkly with the distant Greek mainland, which lies 800 kilometres distant. Throughout history, the Turkish flag has flown over Cyprus, a testament to its enduring connection. However, its loss was not due to warfare or conquest but rather the consequences of political manoeuvring, loans, and ultimately, our internal vulnerabilities. Remarkably, despite countless attempts, Cyprus has never fallen under Greek rule since time immemorial. On July 20, 1974, the crescent and star once again graced Cyprus. With the blessings of Almighty Allah, this luminous beacon shall endure for eternity (Öksüz, 1975: 12).

Based on the provided information, it becomes evident once again how Libya’s steadfast support for Türkiye persists even after its initial assistance. Libya’s continued

backing, exemplified by its presence at the symbolic mosque opening, holds significant importance for Türkiye. Despite occasional fluctuations in their relationship over time, the collaboration between Türkiye and Libya during the Cyprus conflict stands out as one of the most pivotal moments in history. It showcases their joint determination, even in defiance of international influence from IOs like the UN and NATO.

Another testament to Libya's support for Türkiye during the Cyprus crisis, despite embargoes from the UN and NATO countries, comes from Orhan Koloğlu, the son of Sadullah Koloğlu, who served as the first Prime Minister in 1951. Orhan Koloğlu, a historian in Türkiye until his passing in April 2020, highlighted the significant assistance provided by Muammar Gaddafi during the Cyprus Peace Operation. According to him, without Gaddafi's tremendous support, Türkiye's planes would have been immobilised. Gaddafi even personally carried packages onto the planes, demonstrating his commitment to aiding Türkiye during this critical time. Koloğlu emphasised Gaddafi's role in breaking the American embargo, underlining the importance of his directives. Furthermore, Gaddafi's gesture of providing gasoline for Türkiye's warplanes during the Cyprus Peace Operation, without expecting any payment, symbolised his unwavering support. By "*opening the valves of the fuel tanks wide open*" Gaddafi expressed his generosity, stating, "*My oil is your oil. You can use it as much as you want*". This gesture shows Gaddafi's dedication to assisting Türkiye in its time of need (Koloğlu, 2003: 179-184).

5.3.4. The Influence of the UN and NATO

In spite of the convening of the London and Zürich Conferences in 1960, the UN officially acknowledged the authority of President Makarios' administration, which, from 1963 onwards, consisted solely of Greek Cypriots, as the sole governing body of the island. On the other side, the Turkish Cypriots declined to recognise it as such due to their exclusion from it, which they argued violated the constitution. For the sake of convenience and to maintain impartiality in this discussion, the UN adhered to the practice of referring to the Makarios administration as 'the government' and the Turkish Cypriot administration, initially led by Dr. Fazıl Küçük and later by Mr. Rauf Denктаş, as 'the leadership'. According to Turkish officials, the UN exhibited a biased

stance toward the crisis from its inception. The London and Zürich Agreements, which facilitated the attainment of constitutional independence for the island in 1960, explicitly articulated the principle of equality. In light of the UN's position, Türkiye consistently had reservations regarding its complete reliance on IOs for matters pertaining to peace and security. Indeed, the absence of a distinct Turkish presence on the island was evident. Türkiye argued that despite the UN Force in Cyprus, Türkiye's aim to safeguard the Turkish population and the continued presence of the Turkish army deployment in Cyprus served as the sole assurance for the physical survival of Cypriot Turks both as individuals and as a collective entity. Nevertheless, the UNSC challenged the legality of Türkiye's action due to Article Four of the Treaty of Guarantee, which gives the right to guarantors to take action only with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs. The result of this diplomatic disagreement on the legality of Türkiye's existence on the island ended up in Türkiye's declaration on February 13, 1975, of the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus to be a "Federated Turkish State," to the universal condemnation of the international community (UNSC 367).

Taking the UN and NATO as two peace and security organisations comparing the cases of Libya and Cyprus, similarities occur. The establishment, partition, and management style of Libya have been determined under the oversight and endorsement of the UN. As articulated in the theoretical framework of this thesis, a primary objective of this study is to demonstrate the potential manifestation of the influence exerted by the UN and NATO on a pair of countries, which may also be discernible in two other countries. After Libya's announcement of independence, the whole international arena was convinced by the newly established state. The decision of Libya's independence, as obvious in the previous section, was long discussed by powerful states such as the US, Britain, or France. This power also constituted an international hegemony, which was within the UN. Finally, the new state was recognised by the whole international arena—the UN, EU, NATO, etc. On the other hand, we have the TRNC, established by a powerless country, namely Türkiye, and still not recognised internationally. There is no other state that has the courage to recognise TRNC and to ignore the international status quo. These examples are two

prominent examples to compare the possible international influence of power and hegemony and the opposite. As a twist of fate, Libya, which was established through international consensus, will be the only state that comes to Türkiye's aid years later, defying the international consensus. Libya supported Türkiye after many years in order to oppose the power and hegemony that have years before decided about the establishment principles, form, and shape of its own state. This stance of Gaddafi is explained by an anti-capitalist national and regional policy. A political message of alliance needs to be realised by seeing that even in the opening of the Selimiye mosque, he sent his legal representative.

After publicly announcing Libya's endorsement of Türkiye's aid to Turkish Cypriots, it should be clearly expressed that the UN, in its pursuit of promoting peace and security, was also actively involved in the issue with its UNFICYP. Interesting at this point is to mention that, even though the name of the peacekeeping force is known as United Nations Peacekeeping, the decision and necessary personnel was prepared by NATO. This again reflects how the UN on one side as a peace and security organisation and NATO, normally established to prevent communism from spreading, work in coordination dependent on powerful states' interests (NATO, LOM 46/64, 1964; NATO, LOM 56/64, LOSTAN, 1964). Although, with approximately 6,500 peacekeepers deployed in Cyprus, there was scepticism towards UN peacekeeping, influenced by previous experiences such as the Congo. According to UN peacekeepers, the fundamental issue of the conflict was the refusal of either community to identify solely as Cypriot, without other affiliations (Waldheim, 1985: 84-85). Hence, despite its prolonged presence, UNFICYP could again not successfully resolve the underlying issues that led to its establishment. Moreover, it failed to prevent the escalation of the events on the island. Critics often cite these failures as grounds for condemning both UNFICYP and the broader concept of peacekeeping.

Conversely, proponents argue in defence of UNFICYP, asserting that its presence contributed to maintaining peace and stability on the island before and after the 1974 crisis (Alan, 1989: 481-500). Accordingly, the events of July and August 1974 presented UNFICYP with a significantly altered landscape compared to its original mission a decade earlier. Rather than dealing solely with an internal issue with

international implications, the force found itself embroiled in a broader international conflict. The mandate under which UNFICYP operated did not anticipate this new scenario entirely, although some aspects of the original mandate remained relevant. One potential and justifiable response would have been for the UN Secretary-General to acknowledge that UNFICYP lacked authority to function in these changed circumstances and to seek a new mandate from the UNSC. However, such a move might have damaged the UN's reputation, and there was a risk that the UNSC might not reach a consensus on a revised mandate due to heightened political tensions surrounding Türkiye's actions.

Consequently, in the absence of clear guidance from the Council, the Secretary-General cautiously extended UNFICYP's narrow mandate to alleviate the challenges posed by a conflict it could not prevent (Waldheim, 1985: 85). Following the second round of hostilities, he brought to the Council's notice the imminent need to redefine the functions of UNFICYP (UNSC, S/11473, 1974). He emphasised this point during a press conference (UNSC, Vol. XI, No. 9, 1974: 25). However, he also noted that there was not unanimous agreement among the involved parties regarding how UNFICYP should operate and what its objectives should be. As a result, he expressed his intention to ensure that UNFICYP continued to fulfil a meaningful role in the meantime (UNSC, S/11473, 1974). This entailed, with the agreement of all parties involved, transforming UNFICYP from a dispersed force across the island to one that positioned itself along and monitored the newly established demarcation line. Waldheim portrayed this as a "pragmatic" step to ensure the effective functioning of UNFICYP. In fact, according to this thesis, this action also is depicted as a shift of power into a form of influence that does not strive for an emancipatory outcome but rather a hegemonic one. The interpretation varies depending on the perspective from which the issue is analysed. For a less powerful country lacking international sway, the hegemonic nature of knowledge and action becomes evident. On the other side, a powerful nation with global influence prioritises its influence's key components: power and hegemony. Examining influence from both theoretical and practical dimensions reveals a contradiction. As per the thesis, achieving emancipatory and positive influence requires theoretical and practical realities to progress in tandem.

When theory advocates for peace and security while practice emphasises the use of power, the international influence of knowledge remains non-emancipatory, as in the case with UNFICYP trained and equipped by NATO.

An additional example of UN influence on the Cyprus crises can be seen at the happenings in Nicosia Airport. The Nicosia airport serves as a significant instance of international influence in the Cyprus conflict. In July 1974, while tensions were escalating on one side, Turkish forces refrained from seizing the airport on the other, instead advancing toward its perimeter fence. Soon the UNFICYP intervened, negotiating with local commanders from both sides to designate the airport as a UN Protected Area. The Turkish local commander's actions were deemed excessive by superiors, leading to resumed fighting in the vicinity of the airport. Immediately, strong diplomatic efforts were initiated, with messages from New York warning Ankara. Parallely, UN forces at the airport were reinforced, and troops from various contributing countries were mobilised, including media coverage of the situation. Taking advantage of the situation, Britain, as a guarantor power, bolstered its air strength at British bases on the island, demonstrating support for UN efforts. As pressure increased, Türkiye ultimately announced its decision not to forcibly assume control of the airport. Consequently, the airport remained under UN possession. However, due to the failure of parties to agree on its usage and the UN in resolving the problem, the airport has since fallen into disrepair, serving as a stark reminder of the enduring inter-communal strife in Cyprus (Waldheim, 1985: 90).

In order to be able to support the main argument of this thesis, it is of essence to also delve deeper into the NATO dimension available in the Cyprus issue. It is important to note that throughout the period from the establishment of NATO in 1949 until Cyprus achieved independence in 1960, the region was under the governance of the UK as a crown colony. Consequently, the UK's membership in NATO extended to encompass British Cyprus as well. Following the London and Zürich Agreements in 1960, NATO, like the UN, also referred to the Makarios government as the Government. During that time, NATO militarily supported the UN on the field as demonstrated in archival records. In light of the circumstances, the Turkish government felt compelled to intervene in 1974 as a means of safeguarding Turkish

interests and ensuring the continued existence of its presence on the island. Following the Turkish involvement in 1974, Greece's influence and prestige notably increased in the West, while Türkiye, despite being a formidable NATO member, felt marginalised by the alliance, particularly by the US and UK. NATO's efforts during the Cyprus crisis of 1974 failed to prevent a proxy war between Greece and Türkiye on the island, leading to direct confrontations between their regular armed forces. Despite Türkiye's military success in Cyprus, its diplomatic standing suffered in the aftermath, while Greece steadily enhanced its diplomatic position, appearing to be the winner in peacetime.

In September 1974, a month after Türkiye's second decisive invasion of Cyprus, Senator Eagleton led the Senate in urging the President to cease military aid to Türkiye and enforce an arms embargo. This action followed a significant exchange between Senator Eagleton and Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger during the Senate Democratic Caucus. Dr. Kissinger, while acknowledging Türkiye's violation of the Foreign Assistance Act by using US arms in Cyprus, opposed implementing an arms embargo due to potential adverse consequences on foreign relations with a crucial ally. Senator Eagleton, however, stressed the importance of enforcing the law, asserting that even the esteemed Secretary of State was not above it. In response to this pressure, Ankara decided in July 1975 to terminate all military arrangements with the US and suspend activities at US bases in Türkiye, except for Incirlik in southern Türkiye, which continued to operate exclusively for NATO purposes (Rudnick, 1977: 182-190). The Turkish Republic was aware of the US dominance within NATO, while this attitude is a clear indication of its dependency on the hegemonic system. Not to mention that if a state wants to leave NATO, the petition has to be handed over to the US for acceptance. Providing this fact, one understands why it is not a simple process to close a NATO command. Indeed, since becoming a NATO member in 1952, the Republic of Türkiye consistently refused to acknowledge the Greek Republic of Cyprus, opting instead to recognise only the Republic of Cyprus with two communities. Later on, due to international pressure, Türkiye changed its attitude towards only accepting the TRNC, established in 1983. Thus, the ongoing dispute over recognition led to various repercussions. In response, the GCA obstructed

administrative arrangements between the European Defence Agency and Türkiye. Additionally, GCA withheld its signature on a security agreement with Türkiye that was essential for transmitting EU confidential documents to NATO (Latek, 2012).

Up to this point, one understands that the year 1974 marked a significant turning point in the region due to the Turkish involvement in Cyprus, which elicited strong nationalistic sentiments among countries in the vicinity. In particular, Gaddafi exhibited a resolute stance during the process of nationalisation by extending support to Türkiye, sharing mutual values and interests, whether direct or indirect. As previously demonstrated, the language of Gaddafi during his endorsement of the Turkish peace operation in Cyprus in 1974 might be seen as such.

Although, Türkiye's influence as the only country recognising the Turkish Cyprus State seemed not to be as international as the UN and NATO's influence. Indeed, the main difference lies in the amount of power and hegemony. The more power and hegemony, the more influence. As the main argument of this thesis states, in order to turn negative influence into a positive one, a willingness to use power and hegemony in a positive way is required. The Cyprus issue still continues to affect Türkiye's relations with Southern Cyprus, Greece, the EU, the UN, and NATO. The UN recognises the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus according to the terms of its independence in 1960. On the other hand, since the year 1974, the primary objective of the foreign policy pursued by the GCA has been to achieve the removal of Turkish military forces and the restoration of the island's unity under Greek governance. The pursuit of this effort has predominantly taken place inside international venues, including the UN, NATO, the Non-Aligned Movement, and more recently, the EU (Henn, 2004). All these powerful organisations containing the world's most powerful states were against any regional alliance. However, despite facing repercussions, Libya persisted in supporting Türkiye on the Cyprus issue. Viewing these repercussions as a form of punishment, the question of exerting influence emerges. According to this perspective, influence transforms into an obligation driven by the intentions of a dominant hegemony.

Consequently, the nature of the influence, whether positive or emancipatory, becomes irrelevant to the hegemonic power. Theoretically, the goal is to achieve peace and security, which should typically have a positive and emancipating influence, while the practical reality is not as innocent. Regardless of the international antagonistic atmosphere, the TRNC declared independence in 1983. Türkiye, after half a century, is still the only country that recognises TRNC (Salin, 2004). The international community deems the territory of the TRNC as a territory occupied by Türkiye within the Republic of Cyprus. This occupation is regarded as illegal under international law, constituting an unlawful occupation of EU territory since Cyprus's accession as a member to the union (UNSC, 1974). Strategically, it is not difficult to understand that the existence of the TRNC does not comply with the interests of the powerful states. In order to express their claims, these states use international peace and security organisations. It is not difficult to recognise a hegemonic structure. Indeed, the form of hegemon changes; the function remains to dictate in favour of only the powerful side's interests. To be more precise, Cyprus, Türkiye and Libya are the hegemonic sphere of influence while being seen as subordinated states, whereas it is not possible to talk about an emancipatory influence. On the other side, there is an international community persisting in their own policies, regardless of the socio-cultural, historical, and political bonds in the region that have existed even before their arrival. This is a hegemonic attitude, reminding of Lord Palmerston's statement that human interests determine what persists and powerful states owe it to these interests to advance them. Applying to IOs and hiding behind peace and security discourses seems hence to be the main strategy.

5.3.5. Conclusion

As can be derived from this turning point example, all interactions surrounding the Libyan support for Türkiye during the Cyprus crisis reflect the influence of the UN and NATO on the Turkish-Libyan relationship. It further supports the critical argument that throughout their history, these organisations have been influenced by dominant nations, primarily the US and the UK, sitting in the UNSC. The instance further illustrates how the policy priorities of powerful states often diverge from the theoretical ideals of peace and security purported by peace and security organisations

such as the UN and NATO. For the Libyan regime, the case of Libya's involvement in the Cyprus conflict under Muammar Gaddafi's leadership reveals the shift towards regionalism and nationalism, challenging established power structures and the international status quo. This shift reflects broader geopolitical tensions and strategic interests, notably in the MENA region, where protecting regional natural resources and geostrategic positioning play significant roles. However, while exploring this turning point, it can be read that the exploitation of knowledge and resources by powerful states within the UN and NATO often leads to dependency rather than emancipation for MENA countries like Libya and Türkiye (NATO, LOSTAN SGWM 453-58, 2577/DAIN 140583, 1958).²⁵ The pursuit of vested interests, particularly in accessing oil and maintaining hegemonic power, has shaped international relations in the region, sometimes to the detriment of local populations and regional stability. This is how, from a realist perspective, the situation looks. But, to foster equitable peace and security in the MENA region and beyond, the whole process necessitates a critical analysis of historical contexts and power dynamics, as well as a re-examination of policy priorities within the context of international peace and security organisations.

Indeed, the Turkish-Libyan relationship during the Cyprus crisis in 1974 represents a significant episode in the geopolitical landscape of the MENA region. The rise of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya brought about significant shifts in the country's foreign policy, particularly concerning its stance on regional conflicts and alliances. Gaddafi's strategic utilisation of Libya's rich natural resources, notably oil, enabled the country to exert influence beyond its borders, including providing crucial support to Türkiye during the Cyprus crisis. This, of course, was not in favour of powerful states and their interests in the region.

On the other hand, it should be recognised that Türkiye's involvement in the Cyprus issue is partially, as in the Libyan case, related to its historical and socio-cultural ties and its commitment to protecting the rights of Turkish Cypriots. Hence, despite facing opposition from IOs like the UN and NATO, Türkiye pursued a course of involvement to safeguard the interests of Turkish Cypriots, collaborating with one

²⁵ See Appendix 20.

regional ally namely Libya. Indeed, the dynamics of the Turkish-Libyan relationship during this period reflect broader themes of interest, geopolitical strategy, and the pursuit of national security. The actions of both countries highlight the complexities of navigating international conflicts amid competing interests and alliances in the region. Furthermore, the instance of Turkish-Libyan cooperation during the Cyprus crisis constitutes an additional turning point reflecting the limitations of international peace and security organisations in effectively addressing regional conflicts. Despite theoretical principles of peace and security, these organisations often find themselves constrained by the interests of dominant powers and geopolitical realities. This discrepancy between theory and reality underscores the need for a critical examination of international relations and the pursuit of more equitable and effective approaches to conflict resolution in the MENA region and beyond.

The memories provided by individuals such as Taner Baytok, İzzettin Çopur, or Orhan Koloğlu offer in this regard important insights into the depth and extent of Libya's support for Türkiye during the Cyprus crisis. From supplying military equipment and weaponry to offering logistical support and taking part in the opening of a mosque, Libya stood with Türkiye, despite facing embargoes from the UN and NATO countries. This support not only served in favour of Türkiye in its peacekeeping efforts in Cyprus but also highlights a socio-cultural relation between the two nations. Moreover, the symbolic and diplomatic gestures, such as the opening of the Ersin Pasha Mosque and the presence of Libyan officials at significant events in Northern Cyprus, represented a political message to the hegemonic system. Next to reflecting Gaddafi's regionalism policy, these gestures served as a sign to the shared history, cultural ties, and mutual interests that bind the two nations together. As such, this turning point in history serves as a reminder of the enduring regional bonds between nations in the MENA.

To sum up, the complex and protracted Cyprus issue, dating actually back to the 1950s and exacerbated by the events of 1974, still continues to be a significant point of contention. The involvement of key actors such as the UN, NATO, Türkiye, Greece, Britain, and other regional players has shaped the narrative and dynamics surrounding the conflict up to this day. The UN's role, primarily through its

peacekeeping mission UNFICYP, constitutes a significant reflection of the limitations and failures of peacekeeping efforts in resolving deep-rooted conflicts. Despite its presence for decades, UNFICYP has struggled to address the underlying issues and prevent escalations of violence within the context of this instance. The UNSC was not objective and did not hold on to agreements in the Cyprus conflict. Indeed, recognising the sovereignty of the GCA has been a source of tension, particularly with Türkiye's involvement and subsequent support for the TRNC. NATO's involvement, primarily through the membership of Türkiye, Greece, and the UK, but the leadership of the US, has added another layer of complexity to the situation. While NATO's efforts during the Cyprus crisis of 1974 theoretically aimed to prevent a wider conflict, the outcome further strained diplomatic relations and highlighted the challenges of managing disputes within the alliance. Thus, the difficulty in solving the issue was due to the contrasting positions of various actors, reflecting divergent perspectives and interests, including Türkiye's recognition of TRNC and the international community's refusal to do so. Today, despite efforts to achieve a resolution containing diplomatic initiatives and peace talks, the Cyprus issue remains unresolved, with implications for regional stability and international relations.

The instance of Libya's support, on the other hand, is only a scene in history illustrating the broader geopolitical dynamics and alliances that influence the conflict due to the overlooking of socio-cultural, historical, political or economic facts. While Libya's backing may have been driven by its own policies, interests, and historical connections, it represents the interconnectedness of regional disputes and the influence of IOs based on hegemonic objectives. Precisely, the Cyprus issue serves as another proof in history of the complexities inherent in conflict resolution and the challenges of achieving consensus among diverse stakeholders due to the interference of IOs. The UN as well as NATO in this instance exemplified a non-emancipatory influence supporting the main argument; as long as practical realities do not align with the theoretical realities based on peace and security, there will be no positive influence leading to emancipation.

5.4. The Arab Spring as a Reflection of UN and NATO Influence on Turkish-Libyan Relations

5.4.1. Introduction

Although there are many writings about the Arab Spring as a single turning point in MENA history, the scholarly discourse concerning the relationship between Türkiye and Libya during the Arab Spring is notably deficient. Therefore, a comprehensive examination of the interactions between the Turkish government and the administration of Muammar Gaddafi during this period would provide a valuable beginning. In this regard, this section will first picture the general situation in both countries before exploring the influence of the UN and NATO on Turkish Libyan relations from a critical perspective. A forthcoming analysis will ascertain whether the influence wielded by these IOs in 2011 can be construed as emancipatory. If the answer to this question turns out to be negative, the next step will be to understand what needs to be changed to reach an emancipatory result. Given the disparate and notably severe ramifications of the Arab Spring upon Libya vis-à-vis Türkiye, the primary focus of this inquiry lies in the examination of the Libyan context. Nonetheless, in light of the objective to elucidate the influence of NATO and the UN on Turkish-Libyan relations, due consideration shall be accorded to Türkiye's stance as well. Hence, while delineating NATO's intervention and the UN's actions in Libya during 2011, the role assumed by Türkiye has also to be duly elucidated. Moreover, it is important at this point to explore to what extent the UN and NATO applied to their theoretical peace and security discourse in practice and what the expectations of the most powerful states within these organisations during the Arab Spring were.

5.4.2. A Brief Overview of the Situation in Libya and Türkiye up to the Arab Spring

Between 2002 and 2011, both Türkiye and Libya went through significant changes. Türkiye shifted from military oversight to civilian administration, while Libya faced the end of Muammar Gaddafi's rule. But before that, Türkiye and Libya started to improve their relations after the lifting of the international embargo on Libya in 2001. Soon, Turkish businesses got involved in Libya's development plans, which helped normalise relations ("Libya'ya İkinci Büyük Çıkarma", 2001). In 2002,

relations improved to the degree that Muammar Gaddafi proposed restoring a historic Turkish barrack in Benghazi, but the project did not proceed (“Libya Akıllı Çıktı”, 2002). While all this was happening, Türkiye reviewed its foreign policy framework in light of the changing political and security environment following 9/11. Türkiye made major structural changes under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party in order to balance its ties with the East and the West. Although initially, Türkiye’s emphasis on strengthening ties with Western nations was seen as a strategic oversight, potentially neglecting its regional neighbours (Başkan and Taşpınar, 2021: 15). The Justice and Development Party government, like previous governments in Türkiye, emphasised its desire to enter the EU. However, this did not seem like a clever move, according to some regional countries, such as Libya. With the commencement of Türkiye’s negotiations for EU membership in 2004, Muammar Gaddafi expressed concerns regarding the potential consequences of Türkiye’s accession to the EU. Gaddafi posited that Türkiye’s membership could facilitate the infiltration of radical Islamist groups, including notable figures such as Osama Bin Laden. But as known, Gaddafi was a character full of surprise. He could change his ideas very fast. Hence, despite his initial claims, Gaddafi soon expressed a degree of satisfaction with the prospect of Türkiye’s EU membership (“Aşırıların Truva Atı Olacak,” 2004).

As a matter of fact, in 2005, Muammar Gaddafi delivered contentious statements concerning the UNSC. Gaddafi advocated for Türkiye and Greece’s inclusion as members of the UNSC, alongside Ukraine and Iran. He critiqued the perceived deficiency in authority and prestige within the UN, asserting its limited effectiveness in solving international crises. Furthermore, Gaddafi constantly repeated the disproportionate influence of the US as a global superpower and its significant representation within the UN, suggesting inherent dysfunction within the institution (“BM’ye İlanla Savaş Açtı”, 2005). In the coming year in 2006, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan achieved a milestone of being the inaugural Turkish attendee at the Arab League summit. This was a regional success. In his address, Erdoğan underscored the imperative of collective pursuits such as pluralism, human rights, gender equality, governmental transparency, and socioeconomic equity as vital tools in confronting the occurrences of totalitarian regimes within Arab states. He stressed that adherence to

these principles held the potential to foster global peace. Although this was an important step towards emancipation in the region and theoretically the idea of Erdoğan was peaceful, it seems as if he forgot to consider the international community willing to benefit from the natural resources of the region. Since critical theorists argue that the position of a country affects the desire of international actors to increase or decrease influence, one can imagine that in the MENA region from time to time this influence reaches its peak. Back to the Arab League, this event marked the initial interaction between Erdoğan and Gaddafi, facilitating informal dialogue and acquaintance between the two leaders (“Arap Liderlerine Reform Çağrısı”, 2006: 17). Furthermore, it should be stated that bilateral economic interactions between Libya and Türkiye remained ongoing in various forms throughout the 2000’s. For instance, in 2010, Türkiye’s exports to Libya reached an amount of \$2 billion. These exports encompassed a variety of goods, including machinery, cement, iron, steel, consumer goods, jewellery, and construction materials. Additionally, Turkish investments in Libya’s development initiatives totalled \$60 million (Bölme, 2011: 12).

While the atmosphere between Türkiye and Libya was in such a good position, the tragic suicide of Muhammed Buazzi, a graduate, on December 10, 2010 in Tunisia marked the beginning of widespread public unrest and demonstrations. These initial flames, though localised, spread very fast throughout the whole region, sparking a region-wide wave of social and political turmoil. This chaos, named the “Arab Spring” within the international system, theoretically represented a struggle and uprising aimed at protesting the economic situation and poverty in the region. Although unexpected, the chain of events also spread to Libya on February 15, 2011, catching the Gaddafi administration by surprise. But interestingly, despite the international community arguing the Gaddafi administration to be a violent, powerful dictatorship and totalitarian regime, Gaddafi failed in preventing the escalation of protests, which led to an intense civil conflict in Libya, Gaddafi’s death later, and a lasting unstable country.

After the Arab Spring, the Turkish government went to a new shift in its foreign policy, this time, characterised by a strategic reorientation towards fostering deeper ties with neighbouring nations in the MENA. This evolution contributed to Türkiye’s

active involvement in regional affairs, applying to its social, cultural, historical, political, and even religious connections, particularly with Libya. As a matter of fact, as regional security dynamics changed, the intricate interactions between happenings resulting from regional conflicts and geopolitical realignments began to gradually impact Türkiye's foreign policy choices (Kubicek, 2022: 645-658). In fact, the evolution of Turkish foreign policy post-2011 not only prioritised Libya but also signified a notable departure from its traditional stance of non-interference towards a more proactive engagement in external affairs, particularly in the region. It witnessed Türkiye adopting a foreign policy framework arguably characterised by realist defensive strategies involving the establishment of alliances with regional nations and confrontations with perceived adversaries.

Nevertheless, in order to understand the influence of the UN and NATO during the Arab Spring on Turkish-Libyan relations, it is important to know that Turkish-Libyan relations in 2011 started to turn into an obligatory regional alliance again. Following Gaddafi's 42-year tenure, Türkiye and Libya began to restrengthen their ties, generally with regard to shared ideological groups. This would not be feasible if specific social, cultural, and political realities did not exist on the field. Regardless of world predominance, neither Libya nor Türkiye would be able to act. This political reality reminds us of Gramsci's organic intellectual profile. According to Gramsci's organic intellectual profile, academics must engage in social and political criticism, replication, and practice in order to comprehend the situation on the ground and make essential adjustments. Indeed, both Türkiye and Libya share cultural, historical, and religious ties. Therefore, despite hegemonic power and 42 years of Gaddafi rule, the bond between Türkiye and Libya has endured even after the Arab Spring.

The Turkish government faced a choice as soon as the Arab Spring began: should it back the demonstrators and risk a confrontation with Gaddafi, or should it avoid openly criticising him out of concern that he may restore order? At first, it seemed that Ankara chose the latter course of action. Prime Minister Erdoğan, in a public address, expressed opposition to a prospective NATO intervention, questioning the rationale behind NATO's involvement in Libya ("NATO'nun Libya'da Ne İş Var?", 2011). However, the theoretical underpinnings of Türkiye's approach to the

Libyan crisis diverged from its practical implementation as well, leading to an inability to achieve an emancipatory outcome in Libya. Taking this into consideration, this turning point aims to elucidate the unexplored social, cultural, religious, or political dynamics between Türkiye and the Libyan rebels, shedding light on why Türkiye, despite initially opposing and accusing Sarkozy of prioritising French interests over the liberation of the Libyan populace on March 20, 2011, swiftly moved to sever ties with Gaddafi's regime and called for his resignation, even offering him exile. Gaddafi's refusal to comply prompted Türkiye to align itself with anti-Gaddafi factions, notably the National Transitional Council, in 2011. While Türkiye did not perceive Gaddafi in the same light as the "Mad Dog of the Middle East," as portrayed by the Western world within the UN and NATO, it is evident that Türkiye's more proactive regional policy stance favoured Gaddafi's exile and resignation, aligning with its regional interests ("Muammar Gaddafi: The "Mad Dog of the Middle East" , 2023).

As can be understood, Türkiye was at first hesitant to jeopardise the mutually beneficial relationship established with Gaddafi before the Arab Spring began (Süsler, 2020). However, as international pressure intensified and the authority of the Gaddafi regime weakened, coupled with the endorsement of UNSC resolution (S/RES/1973(2011)) authorising necessary measures for civilian protection and the increasing possibility of military intervention, Ankara promptly shifted its position in support of NATO in Libya. In doing so, Ankara emphasised the importance of ensuring Libyan ownership over their nation. Thus, Türkiye deployed its forces to augment NATO's efforts ("Erdogan: Operasyon İşgale Dönüşmemeli", 2011). As a matter of fact, Ankara's policies since the onset of turmoil in Libya appear to have been crafted with the aim of preserving its influence in both Libya and the broader region. At this point it will be beneficial to emphasise that, where the action of a regional country against the interests of the hegemon begins, the influence of the hegemon increases. Also explained with the hegemonic sphere of influence, it is only possible to fully see it, making an evaluation from top down. The question is how this influence could be turned into an emancipatory one. Only in this way can an intellectual contribute to changing the world rather than just understanding it. Indeed,

securing Libya's support holds strategic significance for Türkiye's overarching goal of enhancing its influence not only in the eastern Mediterranean but also in sub-Saharan Africa, where Türkiye has emerged as a prominent player in recent years and as a potential threat for hegemonic states. Undoubtedly, economic considerations also play a significant role in Ankara's engagement with Libya. The Turkish government was keen on renegotiating the pre-Arab Spring agreements it had with the Gaddafi regime across various sectors, including energy and construction, with the new regime supported by the UN. Libya presents an attractive prospect for leading Turkish companies seeking to capitalise on Ankara's ties with Tripoli. Turkish business leaders have frequently highlighted Libya as Türkiye's gateway to Africa and have expressed support for Ankara's close relations with Tripoli ("Türkiye'nin Libya'ya İhracatı 826 Milyon Dolara Yükseldi", 2021).

The choice of Türkiye to cooperate with the UN and NATO in 2011 in Libya can therefore be viewed from four different angles. First of all, it shows how dedicated the Turkish government is to protecting its nationals living in Libya. Second, it shows that Türkiye acknowledges that Gaddafi will soon be overthrown, either internally or externally. Thirdly, it aligns with Türkiye's advocacy for Libyan sovereignty, encapsulated by the principle that "Libya belongs to Libyans." Finally, Türkiye aims to protect its economic interests, considering Libya's geo-strategic importance in the MENA region. However, scholarly discourse lacks adequate examination of the intricate relationship between the MB faction within the Libyan rebels and the Turkish government, constituting a profound social and religious bond between both parties. While assessing the influence of NATO and the UN during the 2011 Arab Spring in Libya, this instance also scrutinises the association between the MB and the Turkish government. The exploration seeks to elucidate the correlation between the National Transitional Council in Libya and Türkiye in a manner that enhances a critical comprehension, digging deeper into socio-cultural, economic, political, and religious facts.

By June 2011, realising the unlikelihood of resolving the conflict with Gaddafi, Türkiye officially recognised the NTC as Libya's legitimate governing authority. Throughout these phases, Türkiye prioritised addressing the humanitarian crisis and

expressed concerns about post-conflict hostilities (“Batı ve Kaddafi Makasındaki Libya,” 2011). Türkiye’s support for the emerging administration extended beyond mere recognition; Ankara committed to providing millions of dollars in aid to Libya, aimed at alleviating the crisis and addressing the needs of the population. It was of Türkiye’s and the region’s interest to prioritise the principle of protecting civilians and to actively engage in efforts to support Libya’s reconstruction until the outbreak of conflict in May 2014.

Following this initial introduction, a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the Turkish government on one side, and the rebels on the other becomes necessary. The deeper the analysis, the easier it will be to understand the reason for Türkiye’s changing posture toward the UN and NATO intervention efforts in Libya. In addition, the investigation will give a contextual framework for completely addressing the thesis statement, which is one of the primary aims in adopting the case study method. The current instance, like the previous two turning points, contends that the transformative potential of influence, typified by power and hegemony, can be fully realised only when theoretical realities connect with practical application within international peace and security organisations such as NATO and the UN.

5.4.3. Türkiye’s Engagement with Rebel Forces During the Turmoil of 2011 and the Muslim Brotherhood Dimension

The role of ‘Islamists’ and their influence on the Arab Spring, democratisation efforts, and various forms of political chaos has been a widely debated issue within the MENA, including in Libya. Libyan ‘Islamists’ played an important role in the armed revolution that, with NATO support, overthrew Muammar Gaddafi’s rule. Furthermore, certain Libyan ‘Islamist’ factions actively participated in democratic processes, including election competition, constitutional drafting, and civil society activities. However, following the failure of the democratisation effort, many Libyan ‘Islamists’ were embroiled in the ongoing civil war. Significantly, they were not all on the same page, with the majority supporting the Tripoli administration and a minority, primarily from the Salafi-madkhali movement and former terrorists, siding with the Tobruk government (Benghazi). Among these ‘Islamist’ groups, the MB, known for its influence in the broader MENA area, played an important role.

The Libyan branch of the MB, established in 1949, suppressed by Gaddafi, and dormant until the aftermath of the Libyan Civil War, publicly emerged into activity during a conference held on 17 November 2011. This event was attended by prominent figures such as Suleiman Abdelkader, leader of the Libyan MB, and Tunisian politician Rashid Ghannouchi. Later, on December 24, 2011, the Libyan MB announced that it will create a political party to run in the June 2012 elections of the Public National Conference (Khadiya, 2011). This announcement mainly reflected the comeback of the MB in Libya after the Arab Spring, which resulted in its official institutionalisation as a political organisation. Indeed, while recognising that the MB's participation in the Libyan uprising of 2011 does not directly imply causation, its significant presence underscores its influence within Libya's socio-political landscape during this transitional phase. Therefore, it is pertinent to scrutinise the involvement of the Libyan MB in detail during the uprising. Since critical theory must aim to promote emancipatory socio-cultural, economic, and political change as introduced within this study as the emancipatory political praxis, the existing influence of the MB dimension considering the relationship between Türkiye and Libya during the Arab Spring needs to be looked deeper into.

To begin with, it will be useful to go back to the Arab Spring and examine the MB dimension within the context of the uprising. After protests started, the Western media promptly characterised the events in Tunisia and Egypt as part of an 'Arab Spring', assuming them to be revolutions against authoritarianism and dictatorship. However, only a minority comprehended that the underlying causes of these protests primarily stemmed from poverty and a demand for dignity, serving as reactions to the deteriorating social conditions in the relevant countries (Hashemi, 2013: 207-221). Thinking of the happenings in a critical way, reflecting the situation as a rebellion against totalitarian regimes and dictatorships does not benefit the local population, but rather powerful states seeking to freely pursue their interests. Also, logically, one must question where ordinary citizens have the courage to act against a totalitarian authority that is not afraid to utilise military force. Imagining Gaddafi's tyrannical reign raises the question of how ordinary citizens mustered the fortitude. In the grand scheme of things, however, the Arab Spring benefited several major states within international

peace and security organisations speak of which the UN and NATO more than the local population. Essentially, it was an opportunity to infiltrate Libyan territory. Not to mention how a country's location influences whether foreign actors want to grow or lessen their influence. Unfortunately, in this situation, power and hegemony leading to influence have again been used to destroy rather than emancipate.

As mentioned once in the introduction, when a protest erupted in Benghazi in February 2011, only few anticipated that Libya would experience a phenomenon like that in Tunisia and Egypt. Libya was one of the most stable states in the region, and there was a general lack of anticipation for protests or revolts, particularly in Benghazi, where significant underground opposition movements were lacking (Mezran, 2012). Even though Muammar Gaddafi was the country's autocratic ruler, Libya had a tiny population and achieved remarkable economic success, which allowed the majority of its citizens to enjoy some degree of affluence. Widespread economic benefits were guaranteed by the nation's oil and gas sector. Through strict control over politics and security, President Gaddafi was able to hold onto power for a considerable amount of time. However, when violence erupted in the streets of Cyrenaica following the protest in Benghazi, it caught most European countries off guard, resulting in the dissemination of ambiguous and confused messages. The events even shocked Muammar Gaddafi, who responded in a confused way (Ardıç, 2012: 8-52). It soon became clear that what was happening in eastern Cyrenaica was more complicated than localised insubordination and went beyond a simple uprising. In contrast to a spontaneous riot, the coordinated nature of the acts, the quantity of weapons and ammunition, and the designation of specific targets on the ground suggested a strategic plan at work. As a matter of fact, it should be questioned why states like the US, France, and the UK responded that fast to back anti-government groups, highlighting the situation's geopolitical importance. Comparing this with the passive stance of these countries regarding the ongoing ethnic cleansing in Gaza/Palestine particularly during the period of 2023-2024 constitutes another instance highlighting the necessity for a detailed and critical examination of theory and practice.

It is interesting to note that widespread international media coverage started spreading a story about the Libyan crisis that was primarily centred on a depiction of

a brutal government crackdown in reaction to a supposedly nonviolent civilian movement. According to academics, the coverage of the Qatari television network Al Jazeera served as the main impetus for this story (Ganser, 2020: 238). Through systematic broadcasting of images depicting violence, destruction, expressions of anger, and casualties, Al Jazeera contributed to shaping a perception among the European public that Muammar Gaddafi had instigated a massacre to perpetuate his authority and privileges (“Libya Protests Spread and Intensify”, 2011). The majority of news narratives systematically disseminated to Western audiences portrayed Muammar Gaddafi’s air force as engaging in indiscriminate bombing of urban areas, resulting in a substantial number of civilian casualties. Consequently, the prevailing message conveyed was one of a massacre necessitating urgent intervention by the international community at any cost (Clifford, 2011).

Bernard-Henri Lévy, the adviser to former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, contended that Libya offered a strategic chance to topple Muammar Gaddafi at the same time. This possibility was thought to have the ability to create profitable markets in the defence and energy industries. Additionally, it has been that the former Qatari Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, favoured moderate and participatory groups, such as the MB (Khatib, 2013). Qatar and France, with the additional support of the UK, coordinated their resources, both financial and military, in an endeavour to incite a significant popular uprising in Libya. Paradoxically, however, the majority of Libyans abstained from participating in the riots, largely adopting a stance of passive observation. This passivity allowed Muammar Gaddafi’s forces to swiftly regain control over most of the territory within a few weeks and advance toward Benghazi to suppress the uprising and reassert his authority. Faced with imminent defeat, the rebels hailing from Cyrenaica, comprising a heterogeneous coalition of civilians, former military personnel, and religious entities, appealed to NATO for aerial intervention (“Did Bernard-Henri Lévy Take NATO to War?”, 2011). NATO, and notably the US, became engaged in a brief yet consequential mission aimed at targeting Libyan government assets on the ground. This operation included the destruction of local air force capabilities and the halting of loyalist forces’ advancement toward Benghazi. The bombing campaign swiftly inflicted damage on Muammar Gaddafi’s defences,

compelling him to vacate the capital and seek refuge in Sirte, his birthplace and the ancestral home of his tribe. Then, while avoiding capture, hopping from place to place, and refusing to submit to a foe he might not have even known existed, Gaddafi was killed. Many people are aware of and have documented this series of incidents (Shanker and Schmitt, 2011). Following the overthrow of the Gaddafi rule, the political climate rapidly reflected the historical separation between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The country was de facto divided as a result of this division, which was typified by a polarisation of interests. Political and military leadership eventually fell apart due to the lack of a workable plan for promoting national reconciliation. That is why a complex and fragmented network of interests emerged inside the nation as a result of the growth of urban militias and the dissolution of alliances (Zenko, 2016).

Coming to the MB dimension, the ascendancy of the MB, alongside various other Islamist factions, elicited concern from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of which have historically viewed the Brotherhood as a fundamental threat to the endurance of the Gulf monarchies. However, upon King Abdullah's death on January 23, 2015, and the subsequent ascension of Salman bin Abdulaziz as his successor, Saudi Arabia took a more moderate position toward the MB, ushering in a new phase in its relationship with the group. Hence, the UAE assumed a leading role in vehemently opposing the Brotherhood within the region (Cafiero and Wagner, 2015). These developments resulted in overt backing for Egypt and its newly inaugurated president, General al-Sisi, as well as for Haftar, who served as al-Sisi's proxy in Libya. Haftar, a former general under Gaddafi, deserted during the Chad war in 1987 and then moved to the US. Following the overthrow of Gaddafi, Haftar emerged with intentions to assume a leadership position in Libya, hoping to establish himself as the country's new authoritative figure (Cafiero and Wagner, 2015).

From this dichotomy, the Libyan crisis assumed its current dimension. On one front, Haftar levied accusations against his adversaries, branding them as perilous jihadists, thereby seeking to sway the prevalent Islamophobic sentiments in the Western hemisphere (Pedde, 2017). On the other hand, the diverse Islamist factions of Tripolitania indicted Haftar and his cohorts as agents of Gaddafi's restoration, alleging their intent to suppress the popular uprising that terminated the authoritarian regime

(Gaffey, 2016). General Haftar harboured aspirations of assuming authoritarian control over Libya akin to a modern-day autocrat. Nevertheless, 'Islamist' factions vehemently rejected what they interpreted as a resurgence of Gaddafi-era governance and staunchly resisted Haftar's narrative and its backers in the Gulf region (Saleh, 2017). Furthermore, Egypt aimed to exercise influence over Libya by supporting General Haftar's efforts to remove the MB and undermine its local political dominance. Egypt also attempted to get financial aid from the UAE by allying with Haftar in Libya (Wenig, 2017).

The MB's historical presence in Libya traces back to 1949, with their initial organised structure emerging in 1968. However, this organisation was swiftly suppressed following Muammar Al Gaddafi's coup in 1969. Under the Gaddafi regime, the Brotherhood faced severe repression and persecution, with media propaganda vilifying them as "deviant heretics" and "stray dogs," often showcasing their leaders' bodies hanging from street lampposts. As can be remembered, the term dog has also been used by Western hegemonies to describe Gaddafi, as he constituted a threat to international hegemony.

Taking this into consideration, critical researchers' argument that the form of hegemon changes while the function remains the same can be considered correct. On the other hand, one also soon understands the critical argument that dictatorship in certain historical circumstances may be the only means to create hegemony. Fleeing Gaddafi's oppression, some members established the "Islamic Group-Libya" in the US. Despite attempts to re-establish the organisation in Libya in the mid-1980s, members faced imprisonment or execution. A resurgence occurred just in 1999, with the Brotherhood initiating dialogues with the regime, facilitated by Saif al-Islam Gaddafi in 2005 and 2006, aimed at co-opting opposition groups. However, suspicions regarding the Brotherhood's motives during the 2011 revolution arose due to their previous engagements with the Gaddafi regime. Brotherhood leaders refuted these accusations, asserting their commitment to the revolution and disavowing any duplicity in their dealings with the regime (Ashour, 2012). Following the revolution, the Libyan MB sought to emulate the organisational model of Egypt's Freedom and Justice Party, which serves as the political arm of the Egyptian MB.

However, the Libyan MB party today still remains considerably smaller in scale compared to its Egyptian counterpart, encountering several challenges in navigating the evolving Libyan political landscape. Unlike the MB in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia, Libyan ‘Islamists’ have had limited engagement with the Libyan populace. The Libyan MB’s social involvement has been notably less extensive than that of its Egyptian, Palestinian, or Tunisian counterparts. For instance, while the Egyptian MB capitalised on periods of relative freedom in the 1970s and diligently cultivated mass support over the past four decades through efforts in universities, labour unions, and grassroots organising, the Libyan MB lacked similar opportunities for prolonged interaction with the Libyan public. Consequently, they had minimal chances to establish organisational structures or institutions within Libya or develop parallel networks of clinics and social services (Ashour, 2012).

Despite a history of later attempts at reconciliation with the Gaddafi regime that resulted in the release of imprisoned members, the Libyan MB embraced the 2011 revolution from the outset. Members of the Brotherhood were instrumental in organising humanitarian aid, creating revolutionary brigades, and holding important positions in the NTC, which served as a platform for the transitional era and represented anti-Gaddafi forces. Subsequently, in an effort to extend its influence within the emergent local councils across the nation, the Brotherhood registered itself as a non-governmental organisation in the following year. Concurrently, it established the Justice and Construction Party (JCP) as an affiliated political entity, emphasising its organisational independence from the movement and its inclusivity. Although the JCP attained the second highest number of seats allocated to parties in the 2012 elections, as mentioned above, its electoral performance was relatively modest compared to the successes of Brotherhood-affiliated parties in post-2011 Egypt and Tunisia (Fitzgerald, 2015: 177-204).

“The formation of the Justice and Construction Party (JCP) marked a significant milestone for Libya,” remarked Al-Amin Belhajj, head of the founding committee of the party, emphasising its establishment by the MB. *“We are a national civil party with an Islamic reference. We have Islamists and nationalists,”* Belhajj asserted, underscoring the party’s inclusive nature. The announcement on March 3,

2012, signalled Libya's trajectory toward embracing an electoral path akin to the 'Islamist' successes witnessed in Egypt, Tunisia, and other Arab nations. Following decades of severe repression of the MB under the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, the emergence of a political party in Libya represented a momentous development (Mansour, 2005).

The success achieved by the MB in Libya post-2011 prompted questions regarding their motivations during the revolution that year, allegations which Brotherhood leaders firmly refute. Fawzi Abu Kitef, the head of the Revolutionary Brigades Coalition in Eastern Libya and former deputy defence minister in the NTC, the body overseeing the revolution and subsequent governance of Libya from March 2011 to August 2012, dismissed such claims. He stated, "*No, we did not plan the revolution, and we weren't playing a double game with the regime,*" emphasising the Brotherhood's commitment to the revolutionary cause and its unequivocal stance against collusion with the former regime ("Al-Harakat Al-Islamiyya Al-Haditha Fi Libya," 2012). Under Gaddafi's rule, Abu Kitef, a well-known member of the MB, spent more than 18 years in jail, including violence at Abu Selim. Notably, the Brotherhood showed early support for the NTC, and several of its prominent members, such as Dr. Abdullah Shamia, took up positions within the NTC, including managing the organisation's finances. In particular, the Brotherhood provided early backing to the NTC, and several of its prominent members—most notably Dr. Abdullah Shamia—took up positions inside the NTC that involved managing its finances. According to Soliman Abd al-Qadr, the former General Overseer of the Libyan MB, the organisation counted around 200 members in exile and a few thousand inside Libya as of 2009, primarily concentrated in professional and student circles (Soliman Abd Al-Qadir, 2009).

While the Libyan MB acknowledges the significance of its cadre, which is crucial for its movement and newly formed party, its numbers pale in comparison to the hundreds of thousands affiliated with the Egyptian Brotherhood. During its inaugural public conference held in Benghazi in November 2011, the Libyan MB underwent a restructuring process, appointing a new leader and expanding its consultative council from 11 to 30 members. Additionally, the decision to establish a

political party was made. In the party's elections, Muhammad Swan, former head of the Libyan MB's Consultative Council, narrowly defeated Soliman Abd al-Qadr and two other candidates to assume leadership of the newly formed Justice and Construction Party (JCP). Bashir al-Kubty, the newly appointed general observer of the Libyan MB, emphasised that party participation would be based on individuals rather than group affiliations, indicating that the party would not serve as a political front. Jum'a al-Gumati, a former 'non-Islamist' representative of the NTC in London, suggested that the party aims to emulate the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, aiming for 80% membership from the MB and 20% from other affiliations to demonstrate inclusivity (Fi al-'UmqAli al-Zafiri, 2011).

In the meantime, Ali al-Sallabi, a well-known 'Islamist' activist with ties to the MB, proposed the formation of a National Rally Coalition during the transitional period that would include the MB and other 'Islamist' parties. In order to maintain control over its political representation during this transitional phase, the MB ultimately rejected the plan. The group avoided forming alliances with post-jihadist groups, such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which briefly rebranded itself as the Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC), before fragmenting into two political entities, various armed factions within state institutions like the military and security services, and militias. The goal to lessen any blowback and international scrutiny motivated this cautious approach. Moreover, the MB turned down approaches from prior affiliates such as al-Sallabi, fearing that these linkages would undermine its mid-level membership and grassroots support. The Libyan MB's efforts during this era of transition were primarily influenced by keeping control over its members, expanding its audience, and pursuing domestic and international legitimacy (Fi al-'UmqAli al Zafiri, 2011). The inclusion of Sharia as the principal source of legislation in Article one of the constitutional declarations issued in August 2011 sparked notable reactions among Western observers and Libya's liberal factions.

Similar sentiments arose when Mustafa Abd al-Jalil, the chairman of the NTC, emphasised the precedence of Sharia law and the legitimacy of polygamy during his liberation speech on October 23, 2011. Declaring Libya an Islamic state, al-Jalil pledged to eliminate regulations deemed incompatible with Islamic principles. This

stance was perceived as a triumph by various ‘Islamist’ factions, including MB, the Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC), Salafi groups, and conservative figures. Bashir al-Kubty stated that Islamic values should be the core of Libyan legislation, and that the constitution should include them (Ashour, 2015). “*The issue of Sharia is settled,*” proclaimed Dr. Abd al-Nasser Shamata, chairman of the NTC’s Crisis Management Unit, strongly reiterating Sharia’s status as the ultimate source of law. His assertion followed rallies in Benghazi and Sabha in 2011 and 2012, during which a few hundred people demanded Sharia rule. Shamata stressed the established role of Sharia in Libya’s judicial system and denied any discussion of the subject (Ashour, 2015).

5.4.4. Türkiye’s Stance During the Uprising and the Transitional Period

Amid the tumultuous protests in Egypt, (at that time) Prime Minister Erdoğan issued a public call for President Hosni Mubarak to relinquish power and heed the aspirations voiced by the Egyptian populace (“Turkey Tells Mubarak to Listen to the People”, 2011). The Justice and Development Party government pursued a comparable approach toward other Arab leaders confronting internal uprisings, such as Bashar al-Assad, Muammar Gaddafi, and Ali Abdullah Saleh. In May 2011, amidst escalating opposition and violence across various regions of Libya, Erdoğan publicly called upon Gaddafi to resign from his position. He articulated:

Future prospects of liberty, stability, peace, and justice cannot be built upon bloodshed. Consequently, we advocate for the Libyan leader’s prompt withdrawal from power, both for his own sake and for the future trajectory of the nation (“Turkey’s PM Erdoğan Urges Col Muammar Gaddafi to Quit”, 2011).

On the other side, Ankara formed strategic alliances with ‘Islamist’ movements throughout the Arab East, supporting groups like the MB in Egypt, Ennahda in Tunisia, and Hamas in Palestinian affairs. This strategy was reinforced by a major alliance built with Qatar. Following the ousting of the MB government in Egypt in 2013, Türkiye offered sanctuary to numerous Brotherhood leaders and vehemently condemned the removal of President Mohammed Morsi, resulting in strained relations with Egypt (“Turkish PM Condemns Removal of Morsi,” 2013).

During the revolutionary upheaval, the relationship between Türkiye and the Libyan MB emerged prominently. With the formalisation of the Libyan MB as a legitimate political entity post-revolution, Türkiye's evolving stance in supporting the rebels against Gaddafi became explicable. While Türkiye initially prioritised advocating for reforms and facilitating Gaddafi's peaceful transition of power, the regime's intransigence and violent reprisals against civilians, as the Western world argued, prompted Türkiye to reluctantly endorse UNSC Resolution 1970, albeit abstaining from supporting a clause enabling Gaddafi's trial at the ICC. Following military action under UNSC Resolution 1973, Türkiye was forced to shift toward preventing a full-scale invasion, protecting people, and conforming to resolution provisions. Prioritising humanitarian issues, Türkiye publicly accepted the NTC as Libya's legitimate governing organisation in June 2011, emphasising the importance of national unity. Türkiye provided substantial financial aid to alleviate societal challenges and promote stability, particularly thinking of the security risk posed to the region and the risk of \$15 billion worth of Turkish contracts in Libya ("Turkey's Image in the Arab World," 2010).

In fact, since assuming power in 2002, Türkiye's Justice and Development Party has rigorously cultivated relations with the Muslim world. Guided by the 'Strategic Depth doctrine' conceptualised by former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Türkiye sought to assert itself as a pivotal actor in the region, leveraging its geopolitical and socio-cultural advantages. Central to Davutoglu's doctrine is the notion that a nation's international influence stems from its historical and geographical depth. Türkiye's strategic location spans multiple regions, including West Asia, North Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, Europe, and Central Asia, while its historical legacy as the successor state of the Ottoman Empire fosters shared historical, social, political, cultural, and religious ties with neighbouring regions. The Justice and Development Party, under President Erdoğan's leadership, departed from Türkiye's secular Kemalist past, steering its foreign policy to evoke the nation's historical grandeur during the Ottoman era. Hence, as political upheaval gripped the Arab world with the onset of mass uprisings, Türkiye adopted a confrontational approach in its dealings with neighbouring Middle Eastern countries, influenced by Erdoğan's

strategic attitude, Ottoman ideology, and close ties with the MB.²⁶ This shift marked Türkiye's growing alignment with the Islamic world and a simultaneous rift with the West, reflecting the Justice and Development Party's pan-Islamic foreign policy orientation. The emergence of the Arab Spring in 2011 further accentuated the role of pan-Islamist ideology in Turkish foreign policy, using this aspect to build on regional interaction.

In 2012, Türkiye extended comprehensive backing to the Justice and Construction Party in Libya. Not only verbally but also physically, Türkiye started to support the MB fraction. Reports surfaced indicating that several Turkish vessels, purportedly transporting arms destined for Libyan opposition factions, were interdicted by naval units from Greece and Libya. Additionally, Egypt argued that it had intercepted containers allegedly containing Turkish-provided weapons along its border with Libya (Volpi and Gillespie, 2017).

In 2015, Türkiye threw its support behind the UN-recognised GNA in Libya, led by Prime Minister Fayaz al-Sarraj, who hails from a Libyan Turk background and maintains close ties to the MB. This strategic alignment with candidates affiliated with the MB has positioned Türkiye in opposition to other regional states and its powerful allies. Türkiye's foreign policy approach during the Arab Uprisings, coupled with its outspoken backing of the MB, has resulted in a deterioration of its reputation within the region. According to a survey, the percentage of respondents perceiving Türkiye as playing a sectarian role in the region increased from 28 percent in 2012 to 39 percent in 2013 ("The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East in 2013").

As a result, the international community saw Türkiye's activities as an expression of its own autonomous political agenda, which ran against their desire to preserve regional dominance within a framework consistent with their economic and strategic goals. Therefore, the growing belief that Türkiye is playing a sectarian role is a reflection of how its policies were perceived as polarising and detrimental to the larger objectives of the hegemon, which are to promote a submissive and controlled

²⁶ Up until the Justice and Development Party came to power, Türkiye's relationship with the MB was not good. See Appendix 10.

regional order. Seen from a critical perspective, the disapproval of Türkiye's stance by powerful countries shows a fear of losing influence over the region, since socio-cultural and political dynamics in the region are in favour of Türkiye. This disapproval also highlights the way in which knowledge and ideological alignment are leveraged by dominant powers to sustain control, suggesting that Türkiye's divergent approach was seen as a threat to the established power structures that these countries sought to preserve.

To put it briefly, powerful states in the UN and NATO have disapproved of Türkiye's position since the Arab Uprisings since it is thought to deviate from the established geopolitical and ideological frameworks that these nations uphold and support in the Middle East. The hegemonic dominance of foreign powers underpins the current order, which was perceived as being challenged by Türkiye's outspoken support for the MB and its active participation in regional affairs. According to critical theory, hegemonic structures aim to preserve their power by influencing the intellectual and physical environments of areas they subjugate. In addition to endorsing a different political vision that might challenge the status quo, Türkiye was seen as potentially upending the power balance that the international system had established to maintain its influence by supporting the MB and a government leader who was descended from Turks.

The UN and NATO's involvement as IOs that bring together the most powerful governments and the largest military resources in its decision-making authority introduces unique dynamics that demand separate examination in the following part, even though the previously provided information regarding the relationship between Türkiye and Libya constitutes a substantial portion of the larger story. This method makes it easier to comprehend influence in a more nuanced way within the context of this thesis, which calls for reformulation by taking into account both theoretical and practical realities at the same time. Furthermore, emancipatory knowledge can only result in emancipatory outcomes when the subcomponents of influence—power and hegemony, in particular—are not only conceptualised positively but also applied constructively, avoiding negative manifestations in practice. This is further supported by the analysis of the 2011 Libyan uprising.

5.4.5. Gaddafi and the International Community up to the Uprising in 2011

In 1973, Libya took over 51 percent of all non-Libyan oil companies, thus gaining control over its own black gold. This action earned Gaddafi the hatred of the international community. On the night of April 14 to 15, 1986, the American Air Force bombed the Libyan capital Tripoli and the coastal city of Benghazi. This was the first illegal war of aggression by the USA against Libya without a UN mandate. The attack was met with disapproval within NATO; France, Italy, and Spain denied the USA overflight rights. Only the British supported the attack and provided British military airbases for American planes. The American bombing campaign was called “Operation El Dorado Canyon” and killed around 100 people, including Gaddafi’s adopted daughter. The target was Gaddafi; a bomb fell very close to him, injuring him but leaving him alive (Blum, 1995).

The American president Ronald Reagan, responsible for the illegal attack on Libya, stated that it was a response to the attack on the Berlin discotheque La Belle, where three people died on April 5, 1986, including two US soldiers stationed in Germany. *“The evidence is clear. The terrorist attack on the discotheque La Belle was planned and executed on direct orders from the Libyan government,”* (“Amerikanische Streitkräfte in Libyen erfolgreich”, 1986), Reagan said. Reagan was convinced that self-defence was not only a right but a duty. It was a purpose behind the undertaken mission, a mission fully in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. *“The mission, violent as it was, will bring us closer to a safer world for decent men and women.”* (“Amerikanische Streitkräfte in Libyen erfolgreich” 1986). It was rather courageous of President Reagan to claim that Article 51 of the UN Charter gave him the authorisation to destroy Libya. According to international law, no government may take military action against another without a UN Security Council authority, which was not present in this instance. Although Article 51 of the Charter affirms the right to self-defence—stating that *“nothing in this Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN”*—the evidence regarding Libya’s involvement in the attack remains ambiguous.

Libya alerted the UN Security Council on April 14, 1986, that American aircraft carriers and ships were nearing the Libyan coast intended for a military attack, two days before the illegal attack (UNSC, 1986). The UN ignored Libya's warning. In response to the military strike, the Security Council held an emergency session on April 16, 1986. At the seminar, former CIA advisor and US Ambassador to the UN Vernon Walters claimed that Libya was directly responsible for the Berlin bombing. In contrast, Soviet Ambassador Yuri Dubinin argued that the US lacked legal authority to launch military action against another state without Security Council approval, criticising the US for unilateral action (Ganser, 2020: 231). Nine countries supported the resolution condemning the attack on April 21, 1986, but it was vetoed by three NATO members—France, the UK, and the US—who hold permanent Security Council seats. The episode revealed a pattern: NATO countries with veto power prevent the Security Council from condemning bombings in African states. In contrast, the Security Council would have condemned Libya if Gaddafi had destroyed Washington, Paris, or London in 1986. Following the Libyan attack, tensions between Tripoli, London, and Washington increased.

Later, on December 21, 1988, a Pan Am flight exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 259 passengers, including 189 Americans and 11 locals. This terrorist attack highlights the complexity and opacity of such investigations, which can take years to complete. The initial step in investigations is determining if the act is state-sponsored terrorism. Identifying the responsible state is difficult because of the efforts of state actors, such as intelligence services or military special operations, to conceal their actions. Many groups have been implicated for the Lockerbie attack throughout the years. Some researchers believe Iran was behind the terrorist attempt, seeking revenge for the USS Vincennes downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on July 3, 1988. Finally in 2001, a Scottish court in the Netherlands ruled the Lockerbie bombing as Libyan state terrorism, and Libyan intelligence operator Abdelbasset al-Megrahi was condemned to life in prison. Megrahi was released from prison in 2009, while oil played a significant role during this release. The British government sought his release in return to get access to Libyan resources for BP, as reported by *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (NZZ, 2010). Violence continued to worsen after the Lockerbie incident. British

clandestine intelligence activities were allegedly used to assassinate Gaddafi, despite being prohibited by the UN Charter. Former MI5 counterterrorism officer David Shayler said that MI6 paid £100,000 to Al-Qaeda to murder Gaddafi. At MI6, Richard Bartlett oversaw the assassination attempt. The 1996 attempt also failed because the bomb was put in the wrong position, killing seven Libyan civilians while Gaddafi survived.

This part has been delivered in order to provide the opportunity for a comparison between the Western world labelling Gaddafi as a terror-supporting state and how far powerful states can go if their interests are in danger.

In fact, despite certain shortcomings in Libya, labelling Gaddafi's 40-year rule as a terrorist regime, as some NATO media outlets have done, is misleading. Gaddafi implemented extensive social reforms and made strides in improving the human rights situation in Libya, as various UN reports indicate. Women's rights were notably strengthened, in contrast to many other countries in the Arab world, where women had no rights to education, employment, divorce, property, or income. Gaddafi resisted the dominance of international oil corporations by nationalising Libyan oil and using the revenue to provide housing for the entire population, effectively eliminating homelessness. Additionally, he enhanced social benefits for families, viewing mothers as the backbone of society. Libyan mothers enjoyed a range of advantages, including cash payments for children, free day-care centres, free healthcare facilities, and pensions at the age of 55. At the time of his assassination, Libya was undoubtedly the richest country in Africa, boasting the highest GDP per capita on the continent. Libyans not only benefited from free healthcare and education but also paid nothing for electricity and water. On the UN Human Development Index, Libya ranked 53rd. However, these positive facts were largely absent from mainstream media coverage.

Gaddafi firmly rejected the global dominance of the US. When the US established the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2008, the military regional command for the African continent, Gaddafi persuaded other African governments not to grant AFRICOM a base in their countries, much to Washington's chagrin. This compelled the US to locate AFRICOM in Stuttgart, Germany, where

neither the government nor the populace offered any resistance. Gaddafi did not shy away from voicing his criticisms of the empire. On October 1, 2009, just a few years before his assassination, he delivered a remarkable speech at the UN General Assembly, in which he condemned the failures of the UN and the abuse of power by NATO countries. He stated:

The UN Charter prohibits acts of aggression. But what has happened so far? Sixty-five wars have erupted since the establishment of the UN and the Security Council—sixty-five wars with millions more casualties than in World War II. Are these wars in the interest of the common good? No. They were in the interests of a few countries and not in the interest of the common good. If a country, such as Libya, were to attack France, the entire UN would respond, as France is a sovereign member of the UN, and we all bear the R2P the independence of states. Conversely, the UN does not provide the same protection for all nations. Members of the UN Security Council frequently resort to military action and other aggressive means. The power of the Security Council must be transferred to the General Assembly, and the Security Council should act upon the proposals made by the General Assembly rather than the other way around. There is a notable lack of respect for the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, which seems to target only small and Third World countries. Colonial powers that have inflicted harm on other nations under their rule should compensate for the damages and suffering they have caused. It is generally assumed that the leaders of major countries with permanent seats and veto power on the Security Council would protect us and promote peace. Instead, we have received laser-guided bombs from F-111 fighter jets (UNGA, 2009).

The Libyan president also criticised the illegal war of aggression waged by the US against the Caribbean island of Grenada on October 25, 1983. At the time of his speech, Gaddafi was, of course, unaware that Libya would soon be destabilised by rebels and subjected to NATO bombing without UN mandate. However, he was familiar with the fate that had befallen Grenada.

Ultimately, the Arab Spring jumped over to Libya on February 15, 2011, starting with small demonstrations involving a few hundred participants until suddenly a call from opposition groups for a “Day of Rage” on February 17 was met with several

thousand people in various Libyan cities. While the government opponents in Tunisia and Egypt largely remained peaceful, some opposition groups in Libya—similar to those in Syria—resorted to significant violence from the very beginning.

5.4.6. The UN and NATO Influence during the Libyan Uprising in 2011

As can be summarised from the paragraphs up to this part, following the year 2003, the Libyan political landscape embarked upon a gradual transformation. This period also saw Gaddafi's acknowledgment of a program aimed at dismantling the nation's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Concurrently, Gaddafi announced Libya's commitment to discontinue its WMD development initiative on December 19, 2003 (Bush and Pilat, 2013: 453). Moreover, Libya initiated a policy of transparency by permitting international inspections and ceasing its chemical and nuclear weapons programs in compliance with the regulations set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Subsequently, Libya eradicated all existing chemical weapons stocks and munitions and ratified the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 (Squassoni, 2006: 1). Libya acknowledged its involvement in the Lockerbie bombings and committed to compensating the victims, a gesture that contributed to a relaxation of sanctions imposed on the country (Brahimi, 2011: 609).

During the 2000s, both NATO and the UN opted to alleviate economic and military sanctions imposed on Libya. In a significant development, Libya secured a non-permanent seat on the UNSC for the term spanning 2008 to 2009 following the elections in 2007. As demonstrations on February 15th commenced, the initial stages of the protests were relatively peaceful (Prashad, 2012). Later on, the government opponents started to attack police officers and soldiers, representatives of the state, thereby igniting an official civil war (Guilliard, 2012). On February 15, the rebels in Zintan and al-Baida set police stations on fire. In the following days, other public buildings were also torched. Following these events, the arrest of Fathi Terbil Salwa, a lawyer who served as a representative for the families of victims of the Abu Salim prison, served as the catalyst for the increase of protests (Mezran, 2014: 309). Meanwhile, Western media and television channels such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, funded by Qatar and Saudi Arabia, promoted sentiment for a NATO intervention by

significantly exaggerating the violence of government forces (Ganser, 2020, 238). The civil war resulted in fatalities among both the rebels and civilians, as well as Gaddafi's troops. The exact number of deaths occurring between February 17 and the onset of NATO bombings on March 19 remains disputed.

In March 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama asserted that the deaths in Benghazi were justification for NATO's intervention. He claimed to have ordered the military action to protect civilians:

We knew that if we had waited another day, there could have been a massacre in Benghazi, with repercussions for the entire region and a stain on the conscience of the world (Obama, 2011).

Obama did not mention the crimes committed by the rebels at any point. On the other side, NATO was far from being a passive observer, as it actively fuelled the outbreak of the civil war by covertly supporting the rebels. Similar to the illegal attack on Serbia in 1999, where British and American special forces supported the UCK faction, thereby escalating tensions, these covert NATO operatives were also deployed in Libya long before the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 (Mirror, 2011). The British dispatched their Special Air Service (SAS) to bolster the Libyan rebels in Benghazi, who were in conflict with Gaddafi, and to sabotage Libya's military air defences. SAS units targeted and destroyed long-range surface-to-air missiles, effectively undermining Libya's defensive capabilities (Mirror, 2011). The British deployed their elite soldiers via helicopters into Libya well before the UN Security Council had authorised a mandate for military action. British Defence Secretary Liam Fox was compelled to acknowledge cooperation with the rebels, though this collaboration remained covert (Chulov, 2011). In addition to the British, the Americans were also present in Libya through their intelligence agency, the CIA, prior to the adoption of UN Resolution 1973 (Mazzetti, 2011).

In March 2011, national protests resulted in the formation of a unified opposition designated as the National Transitional Council. Many government officials, including ministers, ambassadors, army generals, and officers, resigned to join the opposition, marking a significant break from Gaddafi's regime. This led to the weakening of Gaddafi's influence and to the international recognition of the NTC. By the end of February 2011, Gaddafi had lost his control over major cities such as Misrata

and Benghazi. But Gaddafi's suspected employment of African mercenaries to buttress his position allowed his regime to maintain a military advantage over opposition troops ("Can African Mercenaries Save the Libyan Regime?", 2011).

From a critical perspective, the Libyan crisis of 2011 illustrates the relationship between hegemonic powers and subject nations, where knowledge and compliance with international law can be used as instruments for both independence and reliance. Libya's place in the global hierarchy was changed, and the willingness of international actors to interact with it was influenced, as the dismantling of its WMD program and adherence to international regulations represented a surrender of autonomous power in exchange for relief from military and economic sanctions imposed by hegemonic states. In this aspect, Gaddafi's shift toward compliance was an attempt to transform Libya's external image and recover some control over its international narrative; it demonstrates how powerful states and IOs utilise their influence to affect the political landscape of weaker states. More specifically, in order to maintain their dominance while ostensibly keeping the status quo and adhering to international norms, powerful states regularly use organisations like the UN or NATO to legitimise policies that serve their interests. In this context, the role of hegemony remains constant despite changes in the players and tools of control, highlighting the continuing struggle for dominance and influence on the international scene.

On February 26, 2011, the UNSC issued Resolution 1970, a key response to Libya's worsening crisis, imposing strict measures, including an arms embargo and a travel ban on certain regime members, including Gaddafi himself. It also resulted in the freezing of the assets of six members of Gaddafi's family. Importantly, Resolution 1970 held Gaddafi responsible for organising demonstration suppression and human rights breaches (UNSC, Res. 1970, S/RES/1970). On March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council enacted Resolution 1973, which was a critical step in dealing with Libya's developing situation. This resolution, passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorised the installation of a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace and the launch of an air campaign against Gaddafi's dictatorship. The major goal of this resolution was to ostensibly implement steps to protect people by restricting all flights within the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya's airspace (UNSC, "Res. 1973, S/RES/1973). Finally, the international community, mostly composed of the US, the UK, and France,

successfully declared Gaddafi to be a violent tyrant who must depart as quickly as possible.

Following the approval of the two UNSC resolutions, the US and its allies began negotiations on a potential intervention in Libya. Initially, the US, France, and the UK expressed a strong inclination to interfere in Libya, in contrast to Germany, Italy, and Türkiye, which had a more cautious approach to the use of force. Notably, Germany refrained from voting on Resolution 1973, expressing doubts about supporting military intervention in the Libyan conflict. Each country had different concerns and motivations for participating in the Libyan revolt. For instance, Türkiye's strategic shift reflected a new foreign policy strategy based on historical and Islamic foundations (Balçı, 2013: 310). During discussions at a Paris meeting over future NATO or coalition engagement, France launched air strikes on Gaddafi targets in Benghazi. On March 19, US and UK naval forces joined the action, launching missiles targeting Gaddafi's air defence stations, command and control buildings, and radar systems (Bhardwaj, 2012: 8). The allied air and naval strikes against regime assets reduced Gaddafi's military capabilities. These operations shifted the balance of power in favour of the opposing armies.

On March 25, 2011, NATO assumed command of the campaign against Gaddafi's forces in Libya, designating it as Operation Unified Protector. Alongside NATO members, several non-NATO partners such as Sweden, Qatar, the UAE, and Jordan contributed to the operation, albeit with limited assets such as aircraft, intelligence support, and liaison officers. These Middle Eastern countries' involvement demonstrated a wider global engagement that goes beyond Western states. Additionally, Gaddafi's military capabilities significantly declined during Operation Unified Protector. Enforcing the arms embargo, protecting people and facilitating humanitarian relief, and establishing a no-fly zone were the three primary discourses upon which NATO operated (Bölme et al., 2011: 41). At the same time, opposition forces grew in strength, controlling regime forces in crucial cities such as Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Misrata, and, eventually, Tripoli. By August 2011, opposition forces had taken control of Tripoli and were moving for Sirte. When Gaddafi lost control of these key cities, his foreign support dwindled (Sawani, 2013: 59).

What is the most important part of this turning point for this study is how the international reaction to the Libyan issue, as highlighted by UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973, demonstrates how powerful states applying to IOs use their influence to manage global conflicts in ways that benefit their interests, cementing their hegemonic authority. These resolutions, which authorise military engagement and inflict penalties, reflect how powerful countries use IOs to defend their actions while asserting geopolitical dominance. The differences in early responses between nations such as the US, France, and the UK, which were eager to intervene, and Germany, Italy, and Türkiye, which were more cautious, demonstrate the complexities of hegemonic interests, as well as the varying levels of power and influence that various states can wield within global alliances. Furthermore, the intervention in Libya shows how hegemonic powers employ military force and international law to change the sociopolitical settings of subordinate states.

The deployment of NATO forces and the involvement of non-Western nations demonstrate the adaptability of hegemonic systems, in which the form of dominance changes but the fundamental purpose of sustaining control remains constant. Strategically, Operation Unified Protector led by NATO, with its emphasis on imposing an arms embargo, safeguarding civilians, and establishing a no-fly zone, served to rearrange Libya's political system in a way that favoured hegemonic interests, which in theory should not have been the case. Thinking of one of the main sub-arguments of this study, Gaddafi's collapse, driven by international intervention and local resistance, exemplifies how dominant states frequently use power to shape global affairs in ways that support their continued dominance, emphasising the ongoing role of IOs in legitimising and maintaining hegemonic control.

Unfortunately, initial optimism about the UN as a powerful agent for revolutionary change toward democratisation has been tempered by disillusionment by its responses to events in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen since 2011. Despite significant attention from key UN organs such as the Security Council, Human Rights Council, General Assembly, and Secretary-General's office to address various issues arising from anti-regime uprisings in Libya, including the cessation of human rights violations, civilian protection, cease-fire facilitation, political reconciliation between factions, and humanitarian aid provision, the practical impact on the ground remained

limited. The contrast between resolutions and reality is evident. The difference between resolves and realities is clear.

The Security Council invoked, for the first time since its conceptual endorsement at the 2005 World Summit, the principle of the R2P the civilian population. Utilising its exceptional authority, the Council referred the reported atrocities attributed to the Libyan authorities to the ICC for investigation and potential prosecution (A/HRC/S-15/2, 2011). Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon lauded the Security Council's "decisive" action while acknowledging its limitations in singularly ending the violence and repression (Doc. SC/10187/Rev.1, 26 February 2011). To facilitate conducive conditions for negotiations between the Gaddafi regime and anti-government forces, a special envoy was dispatched to the region. Two major factors contributed to the UN's exceptionally swift response. To begin, Libya's accredited representative to the UN argued aggressively for strong action against his own government, essentially removing restrictions based on sovereign immunity. Second, the resolution's straightforward and unanimous approval was made possible by the five permanent members of the Security Council having similar views and interests. Notably, France, the UK, and the US took the lead in acting quickly in spite of warnings from a number of non-permanent members. As the Council deliberated on the next steps, it became evident that the permanent five members needed to be in agreement. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon emphasised that Resolution 1973 underscored the international community's resolve to fulfil its R2P civilians from violence perpetrated by their own government (UN Press Release, 2011). Loisel highlights a significant observation that neither Resolution 1970 nor Resolution 1973 explicitly invoked the responsibility of the international community to protect the Libyan population (Loiselle, 2013: 317-341).

Indeed, in response to a request from the League of Arab States (LAS) to deter the Libyan government's aerial assaults on cities held by anti-Gaddafi forces, the Security Council enacted a no-fly zone covering the entirety of Libya's airspace, with exceptions for flights engaged in humanitarian aid. The revised resolution only garnered 10 votes in favour, as five nations—including China, Russia, and three non-permanent members like India—abstained, in contrast to the previous resolution, which was approved unanimously. While concerns persisted regarding the scope and

aims of the suggested use of force, these countries backed nonviolent means of resolving the conflict. Evidently, China and Russia chose to abstain to avoid a negative vote, as requested by the Arab League and the African Union (UN Press Release, SC/10200, 2011). However, the permanent members of the Security Council's unity crumbled when NATO-led air operations, which were theoretically intended to protect civilians from government aerial assaults, evolved into an implied goal of deposing Colonel Gaddafi and his dictatorship. Despite growing misgivings, NATO continued military operations until Colonel Gaddafi was overthrown and murdered in October 2011. It should be stated that NATO's military intervention in Libya was considered foolish and poorly managed, resulting in a diplomatic and political divide.

As a result, the hardened attitudes of rebel groups, emboldened by NATO wins, impeded UN envoy Abdelelah al-Khatib's efforts to negotiate with the Gaddafi administration. Furthermore, resentment inside the UN developed since it was widely believed that Western countries utilised the Security Council's approval of the no-fly zone to achieve an ulterior political goal of regime change. These divides inside the Council hardened, resulting in an irreversible schism between pro-NATO permanent members and China and Russia. Ultimately, NATO's actions tarnished the concept of the R2P (Sarkin, 2016: 51-73). From a military perspective, a significant civil conflict erupted between the oil-rich Benghazi region, which sought autonomy in the East, and the forces aligned with the transitional government based in Tripoli following Gaddafi's ousting. This civil war resulted in the deaths of thousands, surpassing the casualties inflicted during Gaddafi's repressive assaults, and led to the displacement of approximately 800,000 civilians (Charron and Scherer, 2015). At least the hegemonic statement today still is in this way that Gaddafi was responsible.

At this critical point, it should be remembered that, despite initial agreement to address human rights violations and impose restrictions such as a no-fly zone, NATO's subsequent actions revealed deeper geopolitical reasons. These international peace and security organisations' practices, which were theoretically aimed at civilian protection, began to be perceived as instrumental in achieving regime change—despite the fact that this was not the goal of the UN resolution—and aligned with the strategic interests of hegemonic powers rather than the genuine humanitarian objectives they claimed to seek. Back to one of the most important sub-arguments' scenarios, the deployment of

military action, combined with the application of the R2P doctrine, demonstrates how knowledge and hegemony inside the international system can be utilised to strengthen hegemonic authority in a negative way.

Observing the abstentions of potential world powers such as China and Russia, informs how IOs, particularly the military organisation NATO, are sometimes weak in making decisions satisfying all powerful members. It also reflects how not all-powerful states support the leading hegemon's agenda. However, the end outcome, Libya's plunge into prolonged conflict and instability, demonstrates the limitations and repercussions of interventions motivated by hegemonic goals rather than real emancipatory reform. The disparity between the stated goals of international action and the reality on the ground demonstrates the critical theory's assertion that powerful states manipulate international mechanisms to legitimise their interests, thereby maintaining a hegemonic status quo that prioritises control over genuine socio-political transformation.

Following the fall of Tripoli, the UN faced heightened political complexities. The Security Council established a UN Support Mission in Libya with the objective of restoring public security, promoting the rule of law, facilitating inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation, and initiating processes for constitution-making and elections (as outlined in Security Council Resolution 2009, dated 16 September 2011). Prior to this, the Secretary-General nominated Abdelelah al-Khatib as a special envoy to support cease-fire negotiations and reconciliation efforts. In July 2012, elections were held for the national parliament, often known as the General National Congress. However, the failure to reach an agreement on the formation of an interim government jeopardised the legitimacy of both the legislative and executive branches (Bartu, 2011: 11). The situation became mired in confusion and conflict due to the involvement of numerous mediators. Allegations of disparate power centres emerging in the eastern, western, and southern regions of Libya complicated efforts for UN-led political reconciliation, despite collaborative endeavours with the African Union, Arab League, and EU. Additionally, criticisms have been raised regarding the UN's perceived bias in favour of the GNA, which lacks authority beyond Tripoli, thus casting doubts on the organisation's ability to maintain impartiality in engaging with all relevant stakeholders (Bartu, 2011: 12).

5.4.7. The Responsibility to Protect and Libya

“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly.”

-Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, 3.16.1963

During the period of post-World War II reconstruction, the international community-initiated efforts aimed at establishing global norms concerning human rights. Within the framework of drafting the UN Charter of 1945, member states articulated, notably through Articles 55 and 56 of Chapter IX, a collective pledge to uphold “human rights and fundamental freedoms for all individuals, irrespective of race, gender, language, or religion” (UN Charter, Chapter IX, 1945). Next to this, through later documents like the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention of Genocide, and later Geneva conventions outlining standards for the treatment of civilians during armed conflict or wars, the UN reaffirmed its commitment to human rights principles. Although the nature of armed conflict changed significantly throughout the Cold War era, particularly with the rise of violent proxy conflicts. Unlike past interstate battles, where civilians made up a minority of victims, internal conflicts have increasingly resulted in non-combatants making up the vast majority of casualties. According to a report by the EU’s Institute for Security Studies, since 1990, wars have claimed the lives of about 4 million people, 90% of whom were civilians. This shows that the peace and security principles of IOs remain theoretical in nature and have not produced any tangible results in real life. The need for a strong framework for preventing and responding to mass crimes was highlighted by the international community’s inability to effectively respond to the genocides in Rwanda (1994), Cambodia (1975–9), and Srebrenica (1995). A paradigm change occurred as a result of the resulting understanding, with the protection of individuals above that of the government.

At the 2005 UN World Summit, world leaders convened to create a comprehensive framework for preventing man-made catastrophic disasters from occurring. Drawing upon detailed reports by former UN Secretary-General Kofi

Annan on sovereignty, security, and human rights, as well as the African Union's "Constitutive Act" (2000), the concept of R2P emerged. R2P constituted a political commitment based on existing international laws, aimed at preventing four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon delineated the "three-pillar" framework of the R2P in his 2009 report, "Implementing the R." This framework entails the primary responsibility of the state to safeguard its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Additionally, it underscores the commitment of the international community to aid States in fulfilling these obligations and the responsibility of Member States to collectively and promptly respond with decisiveness when a State demonstrates a clear failure to provide such protection (UNGA, A/63/677, 2009).

By integrating various tools of mediation, early warning systems, economic sanctions, and military intervention, the R2P framework emerged as a potent political instrument that harmonised longstanding regional and international humanitarian laws. In endorsing R2P, global leaders affirmed that sovereignty entails the obligation to safeguard the populace within a state's borders. This acknowledgment of a state's sovereign duty to protect its citizens encapsulates the essence of state sovereignty. Emphasising the individual R2P of states aims to fortify sovereignty by enhancing its legitimacy. With the approval of R2P by UN member states, the international community committed to collectively bolstering states' willingness and capability to shield their populations. Since its inception at the UN World Summit in 2005, R2P has gained substantial traction and been reaffirmed as a fundamental principle in international discourse. Concurrently, in the same year, the African Union (including Libya) adopted the "Ezulwini Consensus," a collective African stance endorsing R2P, accentuating the role of regional organisations in protection efforts, and reasserting the Security Council's prerogative to decide on the use of force in case of mass atrocities (Ababa, Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII), 2005). According to Edward Luck, Columbia University Professor of International Relations and UN Special Advisor to Ban Ki-moon, there exists a tangible hesitancy among member states to oppose a resolution that incorporates the R2P principle. Mr. Luck contends that this reluctance stems from

member states' acknowledgment of human security as a pivotal focus of the UN and its constituent members ("International Responsibility After Libya," 2011).

The UNGA held a plenary debate in July 2009, demonstrating the broad support for the R2P idea around the world. Only four of the 180 participating countries—Cuba, Venezuela, Sudan, and Nicaragua—called for a reexamination of the established R2P principle. Notably, the World Summit Outcome Document provided a prudent definition of R2P, according to China's delegate. Key points of consensus emerged, including affirmations that the outcomes of the 2005 World Summit were not subject to renegotiation, R2P possessed legal legitimacy within the framework of existing international law, and a renewed commitment to the "three pillar" paradigm for preventing mass atrocities ("Implementing the Responsibility to Protect The 2009 General Assembly Debate: An Assessment," 2009). Despite Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's steadfast advocacy for the R2P principle, there have been no significant endeavours to depose him or impede his leadership on this matter. The Secretary-General invoked R2P on four distinct occasions throughout 2011—pertaining to situations in Cote d'Ivoire, Libya, South Sudan, and Yemen—yet he was unanimously re-elected in June of that year. This re-election occurred at a juncture when the outcome of NATO's mission in Libya remained uncertain. The unanimous support for his re-election by the 192-nation UNGA underscored the widespread recognition of his leadership and commitment to R2P ("Ban Ki-Moon Re-Elected UN Chief," 2011).

In order to solve humanitarian emergencies, the R2P idea incorporates a number of UN Charter-based techniques. These tactics include the regional dispute resolution procedures described in Chapter VII as well as the nonviolent methods like negotiation, mediation, and arbitration described in Chapter VI. Chapter VII also describes how to use forceful techniques when they are necessary. Although R2P's theoretical base is well established, its practical application is continuously being researched and developed. Calls for the use of R2P during times of crisis necessitate a timely, adaptable response that is tailored to the specific scenario. However, the absence of precise guidelines for implementing R2P's pillars leads to divergent opinions on the most effective course of action during crises.

The international community, guided by the UN, is charged with employing diplomatic, humanitarian, and peaceful means outlined in Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter to protect populations from atrocities. When national governments are unable to safeguard their citizens through peaceful methods, the Security Council, as defined in Chapter VII, is empowered to take collective action. It is critical that the General Assembly continue to debate R2P and its implications while considering international law and Charter values (UNGA Res. 60/1 Art. 138 & 139, 2005). The R2P framework, which emphasises adherence to international law and the UN Charter, does not justify unilateral intervention because it operates within the parameters set by UN member states. Although R2P does not necessarily favour military action, having such choices as a last resort is viewed as critical for a comprehensive toolset that allows for adaptable and successful responses. Military power can be crucial in halting the spread of mass crimes if it is used responsibly. Military intervention in humanitarian situations must be justified ethically by showing that the costs of inaction are greater than the costs of action. The R2P's involvement in the Libyan crisis was justified by the potential consequences of inaction, which included a high death toll, Gaddafi's prolonged control, and the consolidation of authoritarian policies. However, these theoretical facts need to be tested in practice.

Theoretically, the situation looked as follows: Early assessments by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights underscored the gravity of the situation, characterising attacks against the Libyan populace as both widespread and systematic, potentially constituting crimes against humanity ("Civil Society: UNGA Should Suspend Libya's UN Human Rights Council Membership.' Defending Human Rights Worldwide", 2011). Within three days and scarcely a week into the civilian demonstrations, Ms. Pillay corroborated findings from independent human rights organisations, affirming that "thousands may have been killed or injured" (UN, 2011). By February 26th, the UNSC had referred the case to the ICC for crimes against humanity, simultaneously emphasising Libya's R2P its citizens ("Libya and the Responsibility to Protect," 2011). In early March, the bombing of civilian-populated towns in eastern Libya by the Libyan Air Force prompted the rebels to reluctantly issue a formal request for foreign intervention. Despite repeated appeals for military

assistance by Libya's NTC over a two-week period, these requests went unanswered. On March 16th, the day preceding the passing of UNSCR 1973, Gaddafi's son and military commander, Saif al-Islam, asserted that "the military operations are finished. In 48 hours, everything will be over. Our forces are close to Benghazi." Regarding the UNSC's decision on intervention, he remarked, "Whatever decision is taken, it will be too late" ("UN Chief Calls for Ceasefire in Libya," 2011). If one were to discount the rhetoric as merely a scare tactic, the stark reality of civilian casualties could not be ignored. Prior to the NATO air operation, between February 15 and March 5, there were almost 6,000 documented civilian deaths according to mainstream media. In a study released barely one week into the protests, Human Rights Watch expressed alarm about the likelihood of more violence by highlighting Colonel Gaddafi's recognition of the systemic aim behind the violence perpetrated on the Libyan people (HRW 2.24.2011). Subsequently, American, British, and French air forces played a leading role in military operations, prompting NATO to initiate Operation Unified Protector in response. The extensive air campaign persisted for seven months until the capture and demise of Colonel Gaddafi, who had ruled Libya with authoritarian control since 1969. NATO Secretary-General's proclamation from Tripoli deemed Unified Protector as one of the Alliance's most successful missions to date. EU leaders welcomed the fall of the former regime, urging the transitional authorities to pursue democratic governance.

In practice, however, the UN resolution authorised the establishment of a no-fly zone solely for the protection of civilians and did not permit regime change. Establishing a no-fly zone and toppling a government are two very different things. As a result, the regime change was unlawful, and the NATO operation did not follow the resolution's parameters. Furthermore, the resolution specifically forbade the use of ground forces. However, prior to the passage of Resolution 1973, American and British special troops were already present in Libya. This was unlawful as well. All things considered, the intervening states' activities went beyond the scope of the UN Security Council decision and were against international law.

Hans Köchler criticised the resolution for containing the ambiguous phrase "all necessary measures," which led to arbitrary interpretations of it. He argued that the

UN Security Council employed a term that functions like a “rubber clause.” NATO, according to Köchler, exploited this ambiguity and acted more or less as an executive arm of the UN. This, he contended, is entirely inappropriate, as NATO, according to its founding treaty, is a defensive alliance meant to act only when a member state is attacked. Libya, however, had not attacked any NATO country. Therefore, NATO had no legitimate authority to intervene in territories outside its treaty jurisdiction (Ganser, 2020: 246). On the contrary, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen portrayed the Alliance not only as an effective crisis manager but also as a positive force, particularly in the context of the Libya operation (“NATO After Libya: The Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times,” 2011). In this regard, the R2P Principle is meant to be a good but dangerous concept in that it interferes with the sovereignty rights of certain countries that have not attacked another country in order to legitimise a military intervention under the alliance. While NATO demonstrated remarkable unity and efficacy in Libya, questions persist among commentators regarding the extent to which civilian lives were ultimately preserved through military intervention (“If the Libyan War Was About Saving Lives, It Was a Catastrophic Failure,” 2011). There were more deaths after the NATO intervention than before it. The principle of R2P was instrumentalised by NATO to enforce a regime change.

As per one of the main ideas of this thesis, some critics openly pronounce that the intervention was motivated not by a desire to protect civilians but rather by hegemonic interests in safeguarding investments in Libya (Buckley, 2012: 87). While the economic and energy resource aspects of the 2011 Libyan conflict are undoubtedly significant, equal attention must be paid to its security and strategic implications. Beginning with the economic dimension, it is irrefutable that Libya possesses the fifth largest oil reserves globally, estimated at 76.7 billion barrels, and accounted for 2 percent of global output before widespread hostilities disrupted production in early 2011 (“BP Statistical Review of World Energy,” 2011; NATO, AC/119-WP, 1959)

What rendered the Libyan case particularly noteworthy was not solely the credible peril posed to a sizable civilian populace but also the concerted effort to garner political and legal endorsement for the intervention prior to its initiation. Although the NTC was not democratically elected, it functioned as the de facto interim governing

body of Libya and currently holds international recognition as the legitimate representative thereof. However, at the time of the intervention, only France had officially acknowledged the NTC, and UN recognition of the NTC did not materialise until September 16th, 2011. Nonetheless, the NTC justified its selection process by asserting that its members were chosen in close collaboration with local tribes and revolutionary councils operating within liberated territories (“The Rebellion’s Leaders: Good Intentions, Fragile Legitimacy,” 2011).

The legal framework for the coalition intervention in Libya is primarily explained in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which delineates the Security Council’s authority to take enforcement actions. Hence, France, the UK, and Lebanon submitted the proposal for UNSC Resolution 1973 (UNSCR 1973). The adoption of UNSCR 1973 by the Security Council provided the legal foundation for military intervention in the Libyan Revolution. This resolution initially called for an immediate ceasefire and subsequently authorised the international community to implement a No-Fly Zone, thereby sanctioning “all necessary measures” to safeguard civilians and civilian-inhabited areas (“Security Council Authorizes ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians in Libya,” 2011). But as mentioned above, neither of the intervening countries held to the resolution framework, and the R2P turned out to be the end of Gaddafi.

As part of practical reality, on March 18, despite Gaddafi’s formal acceptance of a ceasefire, his forces continued to advance into and fire upon the southern outskirts of Benghazi. Consequently, coalition leaders announced the commencement of military intervention. In early April, the rebels offered a cease-fire calling for the evacuation of Gaddafi forces from opposition-controlled regions. However, Gaddafi rejected the plan and was decisive in searching for a solution, including himself in the scene (“Gaddafi Forces Reject Rebels’ Cease-Fire,” 2011). With this in mind, in mid-April, he met with African Union representatives and appeared to approve a “roadmap to peace.” However, despite these efforts, the opposition rejected the proposal, courageously citing its nonbinding character and failure to address Gaddafi’s removal. As a consequence, the NTC fortified its stance, insisting on the inclusion of a political process leading to Gaddafi’s departure before considering any ceasefire negotiations.

With diplomatic avenues exhausted and no credible partner for political dialogue, military intervention became the next option for toppling the Gaddafi regime. The UN Human Rights Council's International Commission of Inquiry for Libya surprisingly had a report ready that underscored threat to civilians, encompassing the use of prohibited weapons in civilian areas, deployment of mercenaries, arbitrary detention, torture, obstruction of medical access, instances of sexual violence, and the exploitation of children in armed conflict ("Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to Investigate All Alleged Violations of International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," 2011).

As the whole picture looked bad enough for Gaddafi, UNSC 1973 (UNSCR 1973) could be implemented to authorise the neutralisation of government forces to "safeguard civilians and civilian-populated areas." This authorisation extended to targeting top officials, particularly Gaddafi, if loyalist forces persist in perpetrating violence against civilians, whereas more civilian people died than before the intervention. On the other side, the arming of the opposition, purportedly violating the arms embargo imposed on Libya by UNSCR 1970 on February 26, 2011, has been addressed with "all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of Resolution 1970." Thus, as emphasised by Hillary Clinton, "the language of the resolution specifically acknowledges the arms embargo to provide a temporary exemption." ("Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' over Libya, authorising 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions," 2011). This terminology is commonplace in UN discourse and is generally understood to encompass offensive military actions without any consequences in the aftermath.

The primary political impediment to action in the Libyan crisis was perceived to be the Arab world's consent. The Western intervention ran the risk of being accused of neo-colonial imperialism if Arab countries did not express their support for it. However, they were persuaded to back the Libyan opposition by Gaddafi's long-standing animosity toward several of his Arab neighbours. There is a willingness to consider action on a case-by-case basis rather than a general need to help in humanitarian emergencies, notwithstanding theoretical grounds such as the R2P. Thus, the military intervention in Libya represented an unprecedented convergence of

strategic interests, necessitating the Security Council's prompt action. The UN and NATO's intervention in Libya has received vastly varying assessments. Some claim that the intervention prevented widespread civilian casualties and allowed Libyans to pursue self-determination, resulting in the demise of Gaddafi's regime. At this time, however, the substantial loss of life during NATO operations raises issues about the intervention's justification and effectiveness, particularly given Libya's current condition.

The truth on the ground is that, despite efforts to build peace and security, Libya remains unstable, with several outside actors influencing its affairs. While Gaddafi's regime was oppressive, Libya under his rule maintained a degree of national autonomy and profited from its own natural resources. Today, the involvement of multiple countries in Libyan affairs raises questions about their interest-oriented motives back in 2011 and the long-term impact on Libyan sovereignty and stability. It is fascinating to observe how much effort the international community put into 2011 in Libya in order to overthrow Gaddi. International intervention jets, Naval Frigate, Medical Team, Refuelling Airplane, Transport Planes, Helicopters, Maritime Aircrafts, Refuelling Tankers, submarines, and other military contribution materials were used. Among countries involved were in first place the US with special forces, 90 jets, 11 Naval Frigates, etc. Next to the US, there was the UK with 29 jets, 5 Naval Frigates, 4 Helicopters, 2 Submarines, 2 Refuelling tankers, a minesweeper, and its Special forces. France contributed to the intervention with 33 jets, 5 Naval Frigates, 38 Helicopters, 2 Refuelling tankers, and 1 Submarine. There were also countries like Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Jordan, the Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, the UAE, Bulgaria, Sweden, Romania, Spain, and Türkiye. Within the context of Türkiye's involvement given its regional location, there were not only interest-oriented policies on the field but also socio-political, religious, historical, cultural, and even ethnic.

Considering the complexities of this situation, the focus should be on how quickly and strategically the UN and NATO responded, rather than whether or not their actions were ethically acceptable. When compared to the current situation in Gaza, it is unclear why a comparable plan, as required by UNSCR 1970 and 1973, has

not been adopted. If the final purpose is not simply to enhance peace and security as theoretically stated, it raises concerns about the universality of international peace and security, as well as possible hidden goals underlying such operations.

5.4.8. Conclusion

The hypothesis posited in this study suggests that the alignment of theoretical realities with practical realities is crucial for achieving an emancipatory influence. In the context of Türkiye's involvement in Libya during the Arab Spring of 2011, this hypothesis can be examined through the lens of the relationship between theoretical foreign policy principles, practical actions, and the influence of the UN and NATO during this process. During the whole process, Türkiye's shift to the approval of UNSC Resolution 1970 signalled a trend toward backing international involvement, but with concerns. Within this context, Türkiye's eventual recognition of the NTC, as well as its commitment to humanitarian support and reconstruction activities, reflect Türkiye's wider involvement in the Libyan Revolution. This evolving stance is a sign of a pragmatic alignment of Türkiye's theoretical principles, such as advocating for civilian protection and supporting democratic transitions, with its practical actions on the ground. However, as this turning point reflects, the exploration of Türkiye's relationship with the rebels, particularly its ties to the MB faction, adds complexity to the analysis. While Türkiye's support for the rebels aligns with its broader foreign policy objectives in the region, including its ties to 'Islamist' movements, it also raises questions about the extent to which Türkiye's actions are driven by ideological considerations.

In fact, despite its aspirations to assert its influence as a regional actor, Türkiye's actions were substantially shaped by the prevailing power dynamics and hegemonic structures, primarily orchestrated by NATO and the UN. Given Türkiye's geopolitical significance and its role as a regional power, it holds a considerable importance within the context of these international peace and security organisations. Not to mention that according to critical theory researchers, subordinated states within hegemonic structures are known for being the hegemonic sphere of influence. This is not difficult to understand, provided that, controlling the physical means and

knowledge leads to the control of the mental means. It follows that the inability of Türkiye, a hegemonic sphere of influence, to make its own decisions is not surprising.

On the other hand, a critical viewpoint emphasises that power is by its very nature destructive, as the Arab Spring in Libya demonstrates. In this context, powerful states sustain hegemonic structures to serve their interests, often leveraging them, such as the UN and NATO, to advance and consolidate their dominance. To repeat, Türkiye's influence in this context would characterise it as a product of hegemony and power dynamics predominantly controlled by NATO and the UN, rather than Türkiye acting as an independent emancipatory force. Türkiye's participation in the NATO/UN intervention in Libya serves as an illustrative example among numerous other regional countries, all of which operated as geostrategic actors within the framework established by these IOs. The role of these regional countries involved in the Libyan crisis exemplifies the intricate interplay of interests and alliances among regional powers navigating within the parameters established by dominant global actors.

The events surrounding the Libyan crisis of 2011 highlight, as in the previous two turning points, also significant disparities between the theoretical constructs underpinning the actions of international peace and security organisations, such as the UN and NATO, and their practical implementations. Theoretically, the UN's response to the Libyan conflict was a reflection of its attempts to defend human rights and protect civilians from repression by the government. More precisely, Resolutions like 1970 and 1973 reaffirmed the international community's resolve to back opposition groups and hold the Gaddafi administration responsible for violations of human rights. In reality, NATO and its partners' subsequent intervention—which initially claimed to defend civilians—became part of a larger propaganda and intervention to overthrow the government. While the resolutions emphasised the R2P civilians, the military actions undertaken by NATO extended beyond the scope of civilian protection, leading to accusations of ulterior political motives and undermining the credibility of the UN's mandate.

While this was the case on the international peace and security dimension, the presence of different states exacerbated the conflict's dynamics. One out of many states was Türkiye, with the right concern for stability. Türkiye's strategic interests and concerns in the region influenced its decision-making process, causing a shift in

its foreign policy attitude from initial reluctance to active backing for opposition parties. Taking the international power structure into consideration, this shift cannot be explained as a single decision taken only by the Turkish government.

After the invasion, Libya entered a long-lasting civil conflict marked by humanitarian catastrophes and political division. The UN faced several obstacles in its efforts to promote nation-building and political reconciliation, such as conflicting power centres and a lack of agreement among interested parties. The failure to establish a stable system of governance proved how ineffective international interventions were in achieving long-term democratisation and stability. As a result, the 2011 Libyan crisis serves as a sobering reminder of the challenges of reconciling theoretical and practical realities within international peace and security organisations. The intervention in Libya demonstrated the inherent challenges in translating democratic concepts and human rights into practical action on the ground, despite excellent intentions and rhetorical commitments to these ideals. As a result, the notion that knowledge can only have an emancipatory effect when theoretical and practical realities align will be relevant in international initiatives. If not, interest-driven policies promoting peace and security will not be effective in practice.

During the events of 2011, NATO and the UN had a significant and diverse impact on Turkish-Libyan ties. As a NATO member, Türkiye participated in the military intervention known as Operation Unified Protector, which intended to implement UNSC Resolution 1973 and defend civilians. By participating in airstrikes and naval patrols, Türkiye demonstrated its support for global efforts to bring the conflict to a close. Additionally, Türkiye's stance on the matter and its bilateral relations with Libya were altered by the UN sanctions placed on Libya as well as diplomatic pressure for a political resolution. The post-conflict period saw Türkiye contributing to humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts, reflecting its commitment to the stabilisation of Libya since the opposite would have a domino impact in the region. Overall, NATO and UN actions during the Libyan uprising shaped Türkiye's engagement with Libya, balancing its strategic interests with international initiatives aimed at resolving the crisis and supporting post-conflict reconstruction.

The influence of NATO and the UN on Turkish-Libyan relations demonstrates the difficult interplay between theoretical ideas and practical reality in international initiatives. From a critical standpoint, these organisations serve as hegemonic entities that powerful nations employ to legitimise and expand their influence, frequently disguised as humanitarian and democratic support. The imposition of UN sanctions, diplomatic pressures, and the NATO intervention underscore the destructive potential of power, where hegemony is often employed in ways that exacerbate conflict and create dependencies. While Türkiye contributed to humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts under the auspices of the UN, the underlying power dynamics reveal the impossibility of achieving true emancipatory outcomes in a global context dominated by powerful states and hegemonic structures.

The reason for intervention is an example of the difference between theoretical and practical reality. In theory, R2P provides a framework for preventing and responding to mass crimes, with civilian safety as the primary focus. However, in practice, the decision to interfere in Libya was driven by a complex set of geopolitical objectives, including worries about the status quo, energy resources, and strategic allies. Although the operation was presented as a humanitarian effort to protect civilians from violence, some opponents think it was driven more by a goal for regime change and strategic considerations. This disparity between the theoretical tenets of R2P and the practical motivation for military intervention highlights the challenge of applying abstract moral imperatives to real-world conflicts, where geopolitical pressures frequently influence the course of action followed by global actors. As a matter of fact, the Libyan happening is a clear example of how theoretical and practical realities in intervention circumstances contradict each other. Furthermore, despite being guided by theoretical realities that should prioritise political discourse, national reconciliation, and the rule of law, post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Libya have proven extremely difficult due to persistent international influence, factionalism, and disagreements over government institutions. Thus, the Libyan situation highlights the significance of critically examining the gap between theoretical principles and practical implementation in foreign operations, emphasising the need for nuanced approaches and continual inspection in order to effectively address complex conflicts.

This instance offers a vivid example of how power and hegemony, while providing influence, do not result in emancipatory outcomes. The engagement of external players, most notably the UN and NATO, in the Libyan Civil War shows this complicated dynamic. Despite initial intentions framed around protecting civilians and promoting stability, the intervention ultimately resulted in unintended consequences and challenges. While the UN resolutions provided theoretically a legal basis for intervention, NATO's military campaign veered from its stated objective of civilian protection to a broader agenda of regime change, sparking a prolonged and destructive conflict. Türkiye's engagement in the conflict, influenced by its NATO membership and regional interests, further underscored the complexities of external involvement. Despite efforts to support the internationally recognised GNA endorsed by the UN, Türkiye's actions in Libya were partially also driven by its own strategic interests, including economic partnerships and regional stability. Thus, the influence exerted by IOs in the Libyan context, while wielded through mechanisms of power and hegemony, ultimately failed to yield the desired emancipatory outcomes, instead contributing to prolonged instability and conflict in the region.

5.5. The 2019 Maritime Agreement Between Türkiye and Libya as an Indicator of the Influence of the UN and NATO

5.5.1. Introduction

Before observing the influence of the UN and NATO on Turkish-Libyan relations concerning the 2019 Maritime Deal and its perception within the international community, it is imperative to first have an insight into the dynamics shaping the relationship between Türkiye from 2011 to 2019 and the specific context of the Maritime Deal. Such contextualisation will facilitate a more nuanced analysis of the influence wielded by international security and peace organisations, allowing for an assessment of whether the influence can be deemed emancipatory. At this point, it is worth noting the paucity of literature addressing the influence of the UN and NATO in the MENA region on the Maritime Agreement between Türkiye and Libya comprehensively.²⁷ This influence in theory should also end in peace and security, while the situation regarding the Maritime Agreement does not look successful, neither

²⁷ See Appendix 24.

for NATO nor for the UN. Hence, the central inquiry of this section will be focusing on the extent hegemony and power are employed by the UN and NATO to achieve actual peace and security regarding the Agreement. Thus, as can be done, for any other two countries in the MENA region, examining the historical relationship between Türkiye and Libya during important historical turning points, serves as a conspicuous avenue to explore the influence exerted by IOs. One of these turning points is without doubt the Maritime Agreement signed in 2019, that is seriously missing in the literature with its international dimension.

The 2019 Maritime Agreement reveals deeper connotations of domination and control exercised by the most powerful states within the international status quo. The agreement is specifically designed as a tool for regulating maritime boundaries and guaranteeing security. As one of the principal objectives of critical social science is to illuminate and challenge power structures to foster emancipatory change, it provides a robust framework for understanding the multifaceted implications of the deal. This way of analysing the MENA paradigms helps to recognise how hegemonic influence is perpetuated through different forms of political behaviour yet keeps its main function of domination.

The 2019 Maritime Agreement is a reflection of a critical paradigm in which IOs serve as influential foundations that aim to maintain hegemony. The agreement on one hand reflects a broader tendency to control physical resources, while on the other hand it also shapes the mental meanings through which global politics should be understood. Therefore, Türkiye as a developing regional power, is not welcomed to make an independent agreement with another regional country since this represents an obstacle to the physical and ideological expansion of powerful states within the hegemonic structure.

Furthermore, the agreement, as stated as a sub-argument within this study, highlights the dichotomy between emancipation and dependency, where the dissemination of knowledge and resources can emancipate some actors while simultaneously suppressing others. The interplay of these dynamics leads to the key question to what extent IOs, through their theoretical peace and security policies,

function in practice as instruments of neo-imperialism, dictating terms that serve the interests of the powerful at the expense of the subordinated states. In this context, the Maritime Deal is emblematic of a broader strategy where control over physical means, such as maritime boundaries, translates into control over political and economic autonomy. This critical analysis aims to unravel these layers of influence and challenge the purported neutrality of IOs, advocating for a more equitable and just global order.

5.5.2. An Overview of Türkiye's Political Attitude Starting with Mediation and Ending Up in Active Engagement

In the previous section, it was readable how Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, that time Turkish Prime Minister, during the early phase of the Libyan revolution started by opposing international military intervention in Libya and advocating for diplomatic solutions and mediation with Colonel Gaddafi. He initially criticised NATO's interventionist approach. However soon, Türkiye's stance shifted based on economic, geopolitical, and socio-cultural reasons and the fact that Türkiye was a friend of the MB in the region. Despite initial reluctance, Türkiye eventually joined the Libyan Contact Group (LCG) and supported the UNSC's resolution to establish a no-fly zone and protect civilians, highlighting its evolving position on the conflict (Hosen, 2019). This attitude of Türkiye, was the first one reflecting a proactive involvement in international resolutions and its focus on protecting civilian welfare in the region, as the status quo preferred to. Afterwards, despite various speculations about its motivations, Türkiye took an active role in the decision-making process rather than being a passive observer, aiming to influence developments in Libya. As on March 20, 2011, Türkiye initially chose to observe the situation, signalling its intent to closely monitor and impact Libya's future but soon severed diplomatic ties with Gaddafi's regime and called for his resignation and exile; the situation turned into a diplomatic impasse ("Turkey Says Offered Gaddafi 'Guarantee' to Quit Libya," 2011).

After the 2011 revolution, Türkiye swiftly recognised the NTC as Libya's legitimate representative and was the first country to appoint an ambassador to Tripoli on September 2, 2011. Türkiye maintained strong economic ties with Libya, especially through Turkish companies involved in construction projects during the Gaddafi era. Despite the upheaval following the 2011 civil war, Türkiye continued to engage

economically, though trade fluctuated significantly. Unlike oil and natural gas, which were Libya's main exports, the construction sector remained the key area of bilateral trade (Bingöl, 2020).

At the national level in Libya, on July 7, 2012, approximately seventeen months subsequent to the anti-Gaddafi uprising, the inaugural democratic elections took place, boasting a participation rate of 61.58%. The National General Congress was organised as the primary governing body. The outcome of the elections facilitated the formation of a coalition government, wherein the Justice and Construction Party secured representation with five ministers, while Ali Zeydan assumed the role of prime minister (Duran and Ataman, 2020: 15-30). The existing disagreement between the different political opinions caused a hopeless political atmosphere rather than a cohesive approach to addressing the country's challenges, as normally the aim of politics is. Hence, a comprehensive resolution to Libya's problems remained elusive, instead leading to escalating regional polarisations. Additionally, the emergence of radical Salafist groups like "Ansar al Sharia" and ISIS, who intensified their violent activities, particularly in Benghazi, created a more insecure environment (Öztop, 2021: 229). Finally, on February 14, 2014, Khalifa Haftar issued a coup declaration against the GNC via the al-Arabiya channel, which was financially supported by Saudi Arabia. Through his announcement, Haftar asserted the dismissal of the GNC and proposed the establishment of the Libyan Military Transitional Council to assume administrative control. Haftar, a former general in Gaddafi's army who was captured during the 1987 Chad War and subsequently rescued by a CIA mission three years later, had resided in the US before returning to Libya approximately 21 years later to orchestrate the coup. Benefiting from Western support due to his ties with the US, Haftar declared authority over eastern Libya, purporting to restore peace to the nation and eradicate terrorist activities. Although the question comes to mind, where did he have this courage/power from? By exploring coups, it is always interesting to see how only certain strange figures are courageous to risk such acts. One of them was indeed General Haftar. Whereby it is important to mention at this point that the international community will later also will recognise the GNA, opposing Haftar, under the umbrella of the UN.

While the international community largely remained silent in response to Haftar's attacks, the Libya Dawn Forces aligned with the Tripoli government engaged in confrontations with the Zintan militia, supporting Haftar, at Tripoli Airport. As a result of the intense clashes between these factions, the Libya Dawn Forces succeeded in seizing control of Tripoli Airport (Erdağ, 2017). Amidst ongoing conflict between opposing factions, Khalifa Haftar's assertions in July 2014, wherein he declared non-recognition of the GNC, facilitated the creation of the House of Representatives, which he could effectively influence. The convening of the House in Tobruk marked the emergence of a de facto governance framework in Libya, with the Tobruk government, supported by Haftar, standing in opposition to the Tripoli government aligned with the GNC (Kekilli, 2017: 159-180).

In October 2014, the UN initiated a dialogue process aimed at securing a ceasefire between all parties in Libya. Under the guidance of UN Special Representative Bernardino Leon, efforts were undertaken to confer legitimacy upon Khalifa Haftar's military capacities and integrate him into a prospective political solution for Libya. However, several developments, including the ascendancy of Misrata militias aligned with the GNC at Tripoli Airport and subsequent retreats by Haftar and his allied militias, along with the Libyan Constitutional Court's affirmation of the Tripoli government as the legitimate representative, led to the recognition of the Tripoli government as the sole and legitimate representative of Libya during the Geneva talks in January 2015. In almost a year, the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) was signed in Skhirat, Morocco, on December 17, 2015, culminating in the establishment of the GNA. Under the agreement, Fayeze al-Sarraj assumed leadership of the GNA as prime minister, with the Presidential Council serving as the executive branch, the Haftar-backed HoR as the legislative branch, and the GNC as the consultative and approval authority. Upon review, it becomes evident that there is still an absence of a definitive solution for the Libyan situation. The international authority, adopting an equivocal stance and failing to make a decisive impact, was unable to prevent Libya from descending into deeper chaos. Again, notwithstanding these restructuring efforts aimed at mitigating political polarisation in Libya, the agreement

failed to engender enduring stability, thereby impeding its successful implementation (Domazeti and Altun, 2018).

Throughout 2016, 2017, and 2018, Haftar's military operations targeting Tripoli persisted without interruption. Furthermore, Haftar hindered the implementation of the LPA by obstructing the activities of institutions associated with the GNA in eastern Libya. Haftar and his militias sustained their advancement in eastern Libya, culminating in the seizure of Derna on June 29, 2018, thereby consolidating control over the entire eastern region (Duran and Ataman, 2020: 20). He and the Libyan National Army (LNA), aligned with him, did not stop there, instead directing their attention towards the western part of the country (Kurt, 2021: 782). Unfortunately, the price of this lust for power was paid with a significant loss of civilian lives and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of individuals, proving the realist statement of the destructive nature of power. After a while, the conflict in Libya transcended into a proxy war, drawing involvement from regional and global actors and thus exacerbating what had already evolved into an international humanitarian crisis. Formally, the crisis assumed an international dimension with the sanctioning of NATO intervention by the UN as an international body. As mentioned above, the failure to adequately implement the LPA via the UN Support Mission in Libya impeded stability in the country and resulted in stalled UN efforts to establish peace. Hence, as in many similar cases in the MENA region, this became again an inevitable opportunity for regional and global actors with vested interests in Libya to intervene in the crisis (Mezran and Varvelli, 2017: 13-22).

By analysing the geopolitical landscape of Libya, a dichotomy in support for the conflicting factions appears. Haftar's supporters encompass a spectrum of influential actors such as Russia, the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and France, each with distinct strategic interests. Conversely, Türkiye and Qatar have aligned themselves with the GNA, constituting an opposing coalition. The US, UK, and Italy, while engaged in the crisis, have adopted more circumscribed, adaptable, and strategic policies compared to other stakeholders. This picture reflects indeed how the international community during the Libyan crisis did not care for sovereignty, peace, or security. Although one can list several reasons for that, the main explanation lies

again in the critical perspective, claiming that a country's position affects the desire of international actors to increase or decrease influence. Hence, not the socio-cultural facts are decisive in the support of Libya's factions, but its strategic location. Indeed, Libya's important strategic location is not a secret. It might also be true to state that the more influence of the international community, the more chaos. There is a chain of facts, starting exactly with the geostrategic importance of a country and ending with a destructive influence based on power and hegemony.

There is no doubt that the involvement of regional and global powers in Libya, either directly or indirectly, underscores their diverse interests, which have contributed to the exacerbation of the crisis. Notably, supporters of Haftar gravitated towards the region due to factors such as the energy-political competition in the Eastern Mediterranean and concerns pertaining to regime security (Arslan, 2021: 1-20). In this context, the US has undertaken a mission to lead political and economic initiatives within the framework of the UN and NATO, aiming to adhere to its "leading from behind" strategy. This exactly means that the US implements its policies via international peace and security organisations such as the UN and NATO. In the MENA region as a whole, as well as in Libya, it has become engaged in the process through counterterrorism endeavours. However, the objective is mainly to safeguard its interests by maintaining its military means and stability in global markets, particularly natural resources. Hence it will not be wrong to state that the US bolsters its hegemonic position by backing cooperation zones established by the Haftar faction in the region, aligning with its broader Mediterranean strategies (Arslan, 2021: 1-20). But on the other side, the US has played a pivotal role in the UNSC during the process of recognising the GNA in Libya. However, it is evident that despite the involvement of IOs such as the UN and NATO, the Libyan crisis remains unresolved.

The actions and stance of the US highlight how power and hegemony, when applied in a self-serving and interest-based manner, can have detrimental effects. To transform this influence into one that is emancipatory and constructive, policies driven by interests must genuinely prioritise peace and security, a commitment that has yet to be realised. According to this thesis, the incapacity of both the UN and the NATO to establish peace and security in the Libyan region underscores the disjunction between

theoretical principles and practical realities. While in theory such involvement often claims peace, security, and adherence to civil and sovereign rights, the practical reality on the field shows how this narrative is deeply rooted in the strategic interests of powerful states, as exemplified above with the “leading from behind” strategy of the US. This leads to the question to what extent individual countries exploit international peace and security organisations to pursue their own geopolitical objectives, utilising the rhetoric of peace and security to further their strategic aims. Such covert agendas, concealed beneath the facade of security and peace discourses, ultimately impede the achievement of genuine emancipation and sustainable peace in conflict-ridden regions like Libya. To elucidate the influence of NATO and the UN on the Maritime Deal between Libya and Türkiye in 2019, a comprehensive examination of the broader international landscape is imperative, encompassing all actors involved in Libya to varying extents. Not only applying to the UN or NATO as umbrella organisations, as is the case with the most powerful states within the UNSC, but also independent states motivated by their distinct geopolitical interests and political objectives were included in this race for Libya. For instance, Russia, Egypt, the UAE, Qatar, and Italy, among others, have sought to assert their influence in Libya through multifaceted approaches, such as military support, diplomatic engagement, economic investments, and proxy interventions. The interaction between these diverse actors was a cornerstone leading to pivotal decisions like the Maritime Deal between Libya and Türkiye. It is due to this fact that this issue cannot be analysed without considering the broader involvement of single states.

5.5.3. Foreign Actors in the Libyan Civil War

As known now, the GNA, headquartered in Tripoli, is widely acknowledged as the legitimate authority and receives support from Türkiye, theoretically the EU, and also theoretically the UN. Conversely, the House of Representatives, under the control of forces loyal to General Haftar based in Tobruk, garners backing from Egypt, the US, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, France, and Russia. The UN’s discursive support for the Sarraj government stems from its role as the architect of the comprehensive Libya Agreement, while the EU’s institutional backing is also grounded in this foundation. Furthermore, the US, as mentioned above, has assumed a role in leading political and

economic endeavours under the auspices of the UN and NATO, adhering to its “leading from behind” approach. The state claims to counter ISIS through military operations and stabilising global oil markets to mitigate instability in Libya. However, in practical reality, the US bolsters its hegemonic position by supporting cooperation zones established by Haftar’s faction, aligning with its broader MENA strategies, including the Eastern Mediterranean. Russia, on the other hand, stepped into the gap left by the US, exhibiting also a desire to increase its influence and reclaim the Soviet legacy in foreign policy, especially in the MENA region. Pursuing a “return strategy,” Russia has intervened in the Libyan crisis by providing support to Haftar, including deploying air defence systems and the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, in Benghazi and Tobruk. Leveraging its experience gained from involvement in Syria, Russia seeks to extend its influence in the Mediterranean and assert Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities in Libya, thus solidifying its presence in the region (Beccaro, 2017: 73-90).

Next to these, regional countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have as well become significant actors in the Libyan crisis, driven by different geostrategic motivations. By observing the political attitude of these countries in the context of Libya, it soon becomes clear how, by viewing democratic movements within the region as challenges to their authoritarian regimes and seeking to counter the ideological ascendancy of ‘radical Islam’, these states extend support to General Haftar. Moreover, the prospect of accessing Libya’s rich natural resources and, undoubtedly, becoming a regional partner for powerful states serves, in this case, as incentives for backing Haftar’s faction. Tragically, in pursuit of these objectives, all actors are unreserved in their provision of arms, military personnel, logistical support, and financial resources to bolster Haftar’s military capabilities and facilitate offensive operations (Beccaro, 2017: 73-90). France and Italy participate in the Libyan conflict, prioritising discourses related to counterterrorism and addressing refugee concerns, while in practical reality pursuing economic advantages for their respective energy companies (Öztop, 2021: 243). France has provided direct support to General Haftar through political and military channels, whereas Italy adopts a more adaptable

strategy, cultivating tenuous relationships with both factions involved in the conflict to position itself advantageously (Marone, 2020: 2-14).

Qatar, in concert with Türkiye, has taken a stance advocating for the legitimacy of the GNA, offering political backing to ongoing diplomatic efforts. Furthermore, Qatar aligns itself with Türkiye's strategy of emphasising stability in Libya, particularly concerning Mediterranean security. Hence, a discernible imbalance emerges in the Libyan arena, with disproportionately powerful factions supporting General Haftar's endeavours (Aslan, 2022: 20). Alternative perspectives suggest that Türkiye's support for Sarraj may stem from sympathy toward pro-Brotherhood factions within the GNA. Another viewpoint posits that Türkiye's backing of Sarraj is motivated by the imperative to secure an EEZ agreement with the recognised Libyan government, aiming to counteract perceived encroachments by Greece and the GCA of Southern Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, this discussion provides only a cursory overview of international actors in Libya, with a particular focus on Türkiye, as this thesis primarily investigates the influence of international peace and security organisations on Turkish-Libyan relations. Türkiye has taken proactive steps to address the escalating crisis stemming from Libya's political fragmentation, spearheading a dialogue-oriented strategy involving all relevant stakeholders. Operating within the UN framework, Türkiye has adopted a comprehensive approach toward Libyan factions and regional players involved in reconciliation efforts. Through diplomatic channels, Türkiye has supported peace negotiations facilitated by Bernardino Leon and actively participated in international forums such as the Libya meeting in Rome in December 2015 and the signing ceremony of the LPA in Morocco. Next to this, Türkiye has supported the outcomes of UN-mediated talks, affirming the GNA as the sole legitimate representative of Libya (İşler, 2020: 61).

Türkiye has consistently upheld its commitment to facilitating the transition to civilian governance in Libya, underscoring its bilateral engagement with the GNA through frequent high-level diplomatic exchanges. These visits have served as platforms for articulating Türkiye's initiatives to address Libya's security challenges, alongside discussions aimed at tackling military, social, and economic obstacles. Against this backdrop, Turkish enterprises have recommenced operations in Libya,

particularly focusing on the completion of power plant projects initiated prior to the onset of the crisis, with the aim of ameliorating the nation's electricity shortages. Furthermore, the Turkish Embassy in Tripoli has resumed its diplomatic functions, signifying a reinvigoration of Turkish engagement in Libya. Plans to reinstate Turkish Airlines flights to Libya have been formulated in response to the expressed desires of the Libyan populace. Nonetheless, the implementation of this initiative has been thwarted by threats from Haftar-aligned militias to target Turkish aircraft, thereby impeding its execution (Kekilli, 2017: 57). Furthermore, Türkiye has advocated for diplomatic approaches to foster stability in Libya.

However, escalating tensions and the onset of a new phase in Türkiye's Libyan policy unfolded subsequent to General Haftar's offensive on the capital Tripoli in 2019, posing a significant threat to the GNA. Against this backdrop, on November 27, 2019, Ankara and the Tripoli government inked two pivotal agreements. The first agreement, titled the "Memorandum of Understanding on the Delimitation of Maritime Jurisdiction Areas," delineated maritime boundaries between the two nations. The second agreement, known as the "Memorandum of Understanding on Security and Military Cooperation," outlining plans for heightened collaboration in defence and security realms. These accords signify a deepening of ties between Türkiye and Libya, with a specific focus on bolstering Türkiye's operational presence within Libya's borders (Duran and Ataman, 2020: 23). Before delving into the Maritime Agreement, it is pertinent to provide an overview of the Eastern Mediterranean region as well, which serves as the focal point of the agreement between Libya and Türkiye. Indeed, this geographic area holds significant geopolitical importance due to its strategic location and abundant natural resources. Moreover, the Eastern Mediterranean is characterised by complex political dynamics, historical rivalries, and ongoing disputes over maritime boundaries and resource exploitation. Understanding the broader context of the Eastern Mediterranean will facilitate a comprehensive analysis of the Maritime Agreement and its implications for regional stability and geopolitical dynamics.

5.5.4. A Picture of the Eastern Mediterranean

The Mediterranean region is a key conduit for transporting oil and gas from areas such as the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea to the EU, UK and US facilitated by important maritime passages like the Suez Canal, the Dardanelles, and the Bosphorus Straits. This highlights the region's strategic importance in global energy trade. Since 2009, significant gas discoveries off the coasts of Israel, Cyprus, and Egypt have underscored the Eastern Mediterranean's rising role as an energy hub, altering regional geopolitics. These developments are critical amid decarbonisation efforts and new LNG shipping routes, reducing reliance on foreign energy (Sartori and Bianchi, 2019). Although it excludes significant regional players like Türkiye and Libya, the EMGF, founded in 2019 and including Italy, Egypt, Israel, and Cyprus (Southern), seeks to advance regional cooperation only among certain states and a single gas market. Moreover, the EU- and US-backed EastMed pipeline project aims to offset Turkish and Libyan maritime cooperation by connecting Greece, the GCA, and Israel to the EU.

As can be derived from this picture, energy security and strategic resource deployment, especially by Türkiye and Libya, are central to discussions on the Eastern Mediterranean (Sartori, 2015: 55). Hence, the focal point of analysis in this instance pertains to territorial disputes surrounding EEZs and maritime border delineation. The situation in the Eastern Mediterranean is much more complex than imaginable. For instance, on one side, Türkiye has adopted a stance of non-recognition toward contracts signed by the GCA with international energy companies, citing the sovereign rights of the TRNC (Grigoriadis, 2014: 124-133). On the other side, since the international community (referring to the most powerful hegemonic states only) does not see TRNC as a sovereign part of the island, Türkiye's drilling activities off the coast of the island are seen as encroaching upon its EEZ. Indeed, further international concerns regarding Türkiye's actions exist about the 2019 agreement with the GNA in Tripoli, which aims to demarcate reciprocal EEZs between Türkiye and Libya. Türkiye's asserted rights, including hydrocarbon drilling activities, pose significant obstacles to any gas-related endeavours in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean that seek to exclude Türkiye.

Moreover, Türkiye's prospective control over areas contested by Greece has the potential to exacerbate tensions in the region. Türkiye's actions not only raise concerns for European nations but also for other Mediterranean states such as Egypt and Israel. Confrontations with these countries are evident on both energy-related matters in the Eastern Mediterranean and the ongoing civil conflict in Libya (Scazzieri, 2020). In accordance with that, an increase in naval deployments raises concerns about growing militarisation in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Hence it is possible to state that the risk of escalating tensions is notable, especially with such provocative actions (Axt, 2021: 133-152). It is no surprise that the Eastern Mediterranean's strategic significance has led states to assert claims over specific areas, aiming to create "safe zones" aligned with their interests. Not only regional countries, but also European nations such as France hide behind the discourse, being concerned about maintaining stability in the region amid the expansionist ambitions of some third-party states. Although their interest-based existence failed in bringing peace to the region, exactly due to the same reason. This discourse reflects how socio-cultural, economic, historical, and religious facts are disregarded by the Western hegemony in the region. Instead of referring to common values among MENA communities, the hegemon prefers to produce negative labels such as "expansionism." In this regard, one can say that also this picture shows how the function of dictatorship and hegemony remains while its name, location, and form change ("Russia's Illegal Annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol: Council Renews Sanctions for a Further Year," 2021). Indeed, one of the primary tactics of hegemons is to vilify their sphere of influence in order to portray themselves as heroes.

Reading the paragraph above, it could be concluded that the growing global demand for energy has underscored the importance of marine areas harbouring valuable resources (Deniz and Yüksel, 2020: 519–556). Since the Eastern Mediterranean basin has the majority of the region's hydrocarbon deposits, it is no surprise that the region constitutes a focal point for the competition of global energy policies to best benefit. In addition to creating chances for regional collaboration, this phenomenon has intensified tensions over maritime territories (Mitchell, 2020). Through diligent energy exploration endeavours, notable reserves of natural gas and

oil have been identified by the Western countries collaborating with regional countries, particularly along the coastal regions of Israel, Palestine, the Republic of Southern Cyprus, and Egypt (Çağatay and Arıdemir, 2019: 193). The region is estimated to contain an approximately 122 trillion cubic meters of hydrocarbon reserves (Ercan and Kılınç, 2020: 20). On a global scale, especially among coastal nations, the discovery of energy reserves, resource exploitation licensing programs, liquefied natural gas initiatives, and pipeline projects have all contributed to the region's rise to prominence (Ediger et al., 2012:74).

The emergence of new and substantial energy reservoirs in the region has prompted strategic cooperation as well as significant challenges or even conflicts regarding issues such as resource utilisation rights, commercial routes, and transportation logistics. In this regard, owing to its strategic location along energy transit routes and its substantial energy resource reserves, the Eastern Mediterranean, commanding influence over the MENA, has become embroiled in international sovereignty disputes (Algür, 2020:56). Exactly this is why the Eastern Mediterranean has precipitated debates regarding the maritime jurisdiction of coastal countries over reserves and the entitlement to benefit from their exploitation (Kakışım, 2020: 211). At the core of the maritime disputes in the region lie disagreements among coastal nations regarding the delimitation of their respective continental shelves and EEZs, as can be understood above (Esengül, 2020: 88). Especially since the 2000s, agreements delineating maritime jurisdictional boundaries, coupled with energy exploration initiatives and ensuing disputes, have propelled the Eastern Mediterranean onto the international stage. The region has garnered significant interest, not only from Mediterranean nations including Egypt, Israel, Türkiye, Greece, the Republic of Southern Cyprus, TRNC, France, and Italy, but also from non-regional stakeholders such as energy corporations, the US, the EU, and Russia.

Observing the issue in detail, it is possible to say that, in accordance with the UNCLOS, Türkiye, the TRNC, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Israel, and the Republic of Southern Cyprus, all possessing coastlines in the region, hold sovereign rights over the seabed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Consequently, these nations, alongside Greece, exert considerable influence as key participants in shaping maritime

jurisdictional boundaries (Altun, 2020). Türkiye, with aspirations for energy self-sufficiency, the establishment of a regional energy hub, and the preservation of its influence in the region, closely monitors developments pertaining to energy resources in the Mediterranean (“Egypt and Turkey’s Energy Face-Off in the Mediterranean,” 2020). Being the nation with the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, Türkiye has engaged in maritime jurisdiction agreements with select regional counterparts to safeguard its sovereignty rights in the region, as well as the rights and interests of Turkish Cypriots and Libyans.

Furthermore, Türkiye has sent drilling and research ships to the region, frequently with naval support, while Israel, on the other side, is also working to lessen its need for outside energy sources by utilising local resources. Therefore, it should be mentioned that Israel is to some point the strategic partner for the Western world, particularly the US. This should also give an insight into why EU countries are supporting Israel despite its violent actions in the region. Even international peace and security organisations like the UN and NATO do not act against Israel’s actions in the region over years. The Eastern Mediterranean is not the only reason why Israel is so important for the Western World, but of course its location is one of the main facts that needs to be taken into consideration. Simultaneously, Israel endeavours to assert its dominance in the region by bolstering its military presence to ensure the security of its energy reserves as well as its religious ambitions by ignoring the freedom and right to live of others in practice, hiding behind the discourse of antisemitism in theory (Harunoğulları, 2020: 470). Undoubtedly, in the process of transitioning from an energy importer to an exporter, Egypt is also in the game, maintaining keen interest in the regional energy resources.

Not only Egypt, but also Greece and the GCA have adopted proactive strategies in the Eastern Mediterranean, driven not only by considerations of energy security and economic benefits but also by geopolitical objectives aimed at countering Türkiye. To this end, these nations are endeavouring to delineate the increasingly significant maritime jurisdiction areas in the region through bilateral agreements. The prominent states in the area are conducting exploration activities for energy resources, which they assert as their lawful entitlement (“Egypt and Turkey’s Energy Face-off in the

Mediterranean,” 2020). To achieve this objective, the countries in the region, notably, rely on the guidelines outlined in the 1982 UNCLOS to ascertain their maritime jurisdiction areas.

Coastal states delineate these areas through both unilateral actions and bilateral agreements (Kütükçü and Kaya, 2016: 81-96). For instance, Egypt announced a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles and an EEZ extending 200 nautical miles from its coastline. In 2003, Syria as well proclaimed a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, a contiguous zone spanning 24 nautical miles, and an EEZ stretching 200 nautical miles from its shores, reflecting the interest-oriented practices on the field (Alper, 2020: 29-42). GCA, with the objective of enhancing its strategic significance in the energy sector, has authorised the issuance of licenses for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources within the designated EEZ, following the pattern observed in other coastal nations (Acer, 2019: 10). Greece is actively pursuing the establishment of EEZ boundaries in the region, aligning them with its national interests. Similarly, Türkiye entered into a continental shelf agreement with the TRNC on September 21, 2011, as part of its strategic objectives, reflecting at the same time repeatedly the recognition of the TRNC by the Turkish government (Allı and Arıdemir, 2019: 197).

Hence it is possible to say that the absence of clear delineation of maximum EEZ and continental shelf areas, in accordance with international law, has resulted in contentious claims among coastal states regarding maritime territories in the Eastern Mediterranean. This situation is exacerbated by the presence of islands in the region. The GCA has unilaterally pursued EEZ delimitation agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel and initiated exploration activities, disregarding the TRNC and Türkiye. Interestingly, Türkiye’s similar actions with the TRNC are seen as violations of international law. Such actions have precipitated diplomatic tensions, particularly with Ankara. Consequently, competition for maritime jurisdiction areas among coastal states, notably Türkiye, Greece, TRNC, and GCA, has intensified in the region.

The discovery of natural gas reserves off the shores of Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, and Palestine has prompted collaborative efforts between Cairo, Tel Aviv, and the GCA (“Eastern Mediterranean Gas: Testing the Field,” 2020). By also including the

Greek government, this endeavour aimed to bolster regional influence through the establishment of new trade routes and pipelines in favour of powerful states (Domazeti, 2019). The collaborative energy endeavours among these nations, particularly the GCA, Greece, Egypt, and Israel, have sparked confrontations by overlooking the rights of Türkiye and the TRNC. With backing from the US and the EU, these entities have engaged in regional energy ventures that contravene Türkiye's and the TRNC's legal entitlements, leading to tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Through bilateral agreements, Greece, the GCA, Egypt, and Israel have encroached upon Türkiye's EEZ and disregarded the rights of Turkish Cypriots, exacerbating the conflict dynamics in the region. By disregarding Turkish Cypriots, the UN reflects a biased stance, providing the consideration of Jews minority in the Libyan independence process. Nonetheless, as a whole, it can be summarised that the Eastern Mediterranean's energy potential, EEZs, and the entitlement to resource exploration provoke notable competition not only among regional countries but rather among hegemonic states (Bowlus, 2020).

Türkiye's legal justifications for delineating maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean include several arguments. First, Türkiye claims that the mainland's and the islands' coastal projections do not meet. The Turkish government believes that islands situated on the other side of the median line cannot be subject to maritime jurisdiction beyond territorial waters. By determining maritime jurisdiction areas, the importance of coastal lengths and orientations is emphasised. Furthermore, Türkiye claims that the GCA and Greece violate its rights as well as those of other nations, taking advantage of the complex situation of the Eastern Mediterranean's small expanse and the existence of islands.

It further argues that islands with limited lengths intersecting the mainland's continental shelf can only claim territorial waters. Moreover, Türkiye maintains that the GCA and Greece's delimitation efforts violate its rights, emphasising that the Greek Cypriot side lacks the authority to engage in international treaties on behalf of the entire island of Cyprus without resolving the Cyprus issue (Altun, 2020).

Türkiye argues that the GCA is only entitled to proclaim a 12-nautical-mile EEZ until the status of Cyprus is definitively established (Bowlus, 2020). While maritime jurisdiction areas should be delineated based on fairness, the GCA's agreements, which exclude the Turkish Cypriot side, lack legal justification. Türkiye and the TRNC contend that the GCA's agreements with other littoral states, without the TRNC's consent, breach Cyprus's EEZ rights under the UNCLOS (Kırval and Özkan, 2021: 85-112). In contrast, the GCA and Greece argue that all islands in the region are entitled to their own continental shelf and EEZ, advocating for the equitable treatment of Greek islands such as Crete, Kasos, Karpathos, Rhodes, and Kastellorizo (Meis) (Mızrak and Örnek, 2016: 13-32). Greece supports boundary demarcation based on the principle of equidistance, which would limit Türkiye's maritime jurisdiction to the Antalya Gulf and its immediate vicinity (Yaycı, 2019: 12). Türkiye, however, advocates for delimitation based on principles of equity, asserting that giving islands substantial weight would unfairly reduce Türkiye's continental shelf and EEZ relative to mainland territories (Yaycı, 2019: 20). It calls for the delineation of boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean to comply with international legal frameworks, ensuring all regional rights and interests are safeguarded (Mızrak and Örnek, 2016: 13-32).

Despite Türkiye's concerns as a regional actor with the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, other regional countries have acted to protect their strategic interests as well. The May 8, 2018 accord among Greece, Israel, and the GCA to establish the EastMed natural gas pipeline, aiming to transport gas from Israel and Cyprus's Greek Cypriot region to Crete and then to Europe, highlights a major point of contention. This initiative, according to Turkish officials, is seen as an effort to exclude Türkiye from accessing Mediterranean hydrocarbon reserves without considering its long coastline compared to all of the parties involved (El Tanchum, 2020). As a matter of fact, on January 15, 2019, the GCA, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Palestine, and Egypt established the EMGF by officially announcing their unwillingness of Türkiye's inclusion (Mitchell, 2020). This consortium signifies an alliance of gas-producing nations in the Eastern Mediterranean and seeks a strategic partnership with the EU in the energy sector. Joint military endeavours in 2020 among

Egypt, Israel, and Greece further evidence this cooperation, which dates back to the 1975 Suez Canal inauguration (“Turkey-Libya Maritime Deal Upsets Mediterranean Energy Plan,” 2019). In response, Türkiye initiated its own exploration and drilling activities, bolstered by the 2019 maritime zones agreement with Libya, to protect its rights and draw Libya into the competition for Eastern Mediterranean resources (“Turkey-Libya Maritime Deal Upsets Mediterranean Energy Plan,” 2019).

Moreover, the EU, aligning with Greece and the GCA, has intensified its engagement since 2006 to meet energy demands, diversify sources, and reduce dependence on Russian gas. The region’s security concerns, including the Libyan crisis, refugee challenges, and terrorism, have also drawn European attention, particularly from France and Italy (Esengül, 2020: 87-112). The GCA and Greece leverage their EU membership to assert their maritime claims, prompting active EU involvement in regional disputes. The EU supports the GCA’s unilateral initiatives, endorsing Greece and the GCA’s positions, including the Sevilla map, which encroaches on Türkiye’s rights. It also backs the GCA’s delineation of maritime zones and hydrocarbon exploration, overlooking the GCA’s agreements with neighbouring countries and Greece’s independent maritime boundary demarcations (Esengül, 2020: 87-112). The EU views any Turkish actions in contested maritime areas as infringing on EU member states’ sovereignty (Esengül, 2020: 87-112). Thus, the strategic interests of powerful states, masked by the hegemonic structure of such IOs, drive the discourse of rights, peace, and security, while the practical reality centres on hydrocarbon exploration.

Confronted with Türkiye’s maritime activities and naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, the EU has shown readiness to impose sanctions. In 2019, citing Türkiye’s natural gas exploration off Cyprus as a breach of international law, the EU implemented punitive actions, including suspending pre-accession assistance, postponing economic dialogues, halting aviation negotiations, and reassessing European Investment Bank credit support (Harunoğulları, 2020: 40). Even though European corporations remain active in the region, the EU supports the new pipeline initiative to connect energy zones from Israel and Egypt to Cyprus and Europe. In this regard, the GCA is of particular importance for the EU as it addresses its energy needs

and supports ongoing collaboration between Egypt and Israel (“Turkey-Libya Maritime Deal Upsets Mediterranean Energy Plan,” 2020).

Another actor within the Eastern Mediterranean struggle is Russia. Russia, unhappy with the EU’s strategies to reduce reliance on its energy supplies, seeks to influence the region’s resources through new pipeline projects. It views the Eastern Mediterranean energy reserves as a safeguard against economic undermining and aims to preserve its energy sector dominance. Russia is also strengthening ties with regional nations, especially Israel, to counter Israeli gas competition with Gazprom. Russia’s involvement in Syria bolstered its influence in the Middle East and aligns with its goal to control Eastern Mediterranean energy reserves and trade routes. Russia perceives Türkiye as a natural ally in the region.

As can be imagined, the Eastern Mediterranean is strategically important for the US as well, particularly in countering Russian and Iranian influence. The GCA has allocated resource operations to US companies like ExxonMobil and Noble Energy, enhancing the US’s role in the region. The US supports the GCA’s stance on Mediterranean energy, considers it vital for Europe’s energy security, and aims to leverage energy resources in Cyprus by revitalising the Annan Plan. It further emphasises cooperation with Israel, the GCA, and Greece through initiatives like the Security and Energy Partnership Act. Not only these initiatives, but also government-supported multinational energy corporations, such as Eni, BP, Shell, Total, Kogas, ExxonMobil, Noble, Rosneft, and Novatek, are actively enacted in the region (Ercan and Kılınc, 2020: 23). It is now no more secret that the presence of energy reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean significantly influences regional policies. This is to a great extent the reason why Greece, the GCA, the TRNC, Israel, Egypt, and Türkiye are engaged in geopolitical rivalries over sovereignty, alliances, and territorial claims, while the US, France, and Italy pursue their economic and geopolitical objectives. The EU’s quest for energy resources, the US’s efforts to maintain regional hegemony through IOs like the UN and NATO, Israel’s resource claims, Greece’s opposition to Türkiye, and Türkiye’s defence of regional sovereignty all impact Eastern Mediterranean stability. The region’s competition also affects Libya, which is facing political instability since its inception. Libya’s involvement on the other hand in the

energy competition, particularly since 2019, influences both regional developments and its political trajectory.

5.5.5. How Did Libya Get Involved in the Regional Energy Issue?

Following the Arab Spring in 2011, Libya plunged into political turmoil and instability. The failed 2014 electoral process exacerbated internal divisions, leading to two competing administrations: the internationally recognised GNA in Tripoli and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, backed by the Libyan National Army under Haftar. While Türkiye and Qatar back the GNA, the Tobruk administration is supported by the US, the UK, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Russia, France, and Greece. Despite a 2020 ceasefire—constituting one—out of many attempts to stabilise the country—and the formation of a temporary Government of National Unity, lasting stability remains far from being achieved. Due to mutual mistrust, both factions seek to strengthen their power with external support, notably from Egypt and Türkiye, who are key players in Eastern Mediterranean energy dynamics. Egypt supports Haftar, while Türkiye backs the UN-supported GNA. Libya's crisis unfolds along two primary dimensions: the exploitation of its energy resources and the broader contest over Eastern Mediterranean energy assets (Harunoğulları, 2020: 468).

Since 2019, Libya has become a player in the Eastern Mediterranean energy rivalry, driven by internal political imperatives. Both regional and external stakeholders are pursuing their objectives concerning Eastern Mediterranean energy reservoirs through Libya. The power struggle in Libya can be seen as an extension of the competition over these resources. Major regional actors, such as Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt, are leveraging Libya's political turmoil to their advantage. They have forged border delineation agreements among themselves and are attempting to impose these arrangements onto Libya (Tuna, 2020: 74-87).

Greece, motivated by the region's energy assets, aims to curtail Türkiye's maritime claims by delineating boundaries with neighbouring states based on the median line principle, using points such as Crete and Rhodes. Although Greece initiated negotiations with Egypt and Libya, it did not achieve the desired results. Amidst Libya's civil conflict, Greece unilaterally claimed a 39,000-square-kilometer

territorial sea around Crete, contravening Libya's entitlements under international law. Both Greece and Libya assert rights in the region from the Ionian Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean. It is even known that during Gaddafi's era, Libya warned Greece against asserting maritime claims near Crete (Harunoğulları, 2020: 469). On the other side, Egypt, aligning with Khalifa Haftar, seeks to consolidate sovereignty in Libya to bolster its position against Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean. The UAE supports Haftar with Israeli-origin air defence systems, indirectly involving Israel, cooperating with Egypt in the region. Of course, this circle of interaction reflects how Haftar aims to align Libya with the Egypt-Israel-UAE-Greece alliance in the Mediterranean.

Another indirect involvement is that of Russia. The Putin government, delivering its influence from Syria, supports Haftar to enhance its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean (Allı and Arıdemir, 2019: 188-202).

As a matter of fact, Türkiye sees the GNA's authority in western Libya as crucial for regional stability and resource sharing. In addition, with Türkiye's support, Libya, or better to say the Tripoli government, has safeguarded its regional interests, becoming an inevitable actor in the Eastern Mediterranean's future. While the Tripoli government has taken a proactive approach through collaboration with Türkiye, the Tobruk administration aligns with Egypt, UAE, Greece, Southern Cyprus, the US and Israel, opposing Türkiye's presence to strengthen its position against the GNA (Tuna, 2020:80).

Taking this picture as a whole in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean energy dynamics, Türkiye is working to achieve political stability through collaboration with Libya, another Mediterranean nation asserting its regional prerogatives. Türkiye's aim to augment its influence, led to the 2019 agreement with Libya's internationally recognised GNA, endorsed by the UN. Amid Libya's internal political and military rivalries, it has partnered with Türkiye to participate in the Eastern Mediterranean energy competition and address internal instabilities.

While Libya's key objective is resolving internal unrest, Türkiye's exclusion from regional energy policies has propelled it to become a significant actor in Libya. Thus, since 2019 Türkiye has deepened its engagement with the Tripoli-based

government to counter alliances that marginalise its Eastern Mediterranean rights. In this regard, Türkiye aims to thwart the EastMed Pipeline Project, which excludes both Türkiye and Libya and is championed by Greece, Israel, and Egypt (“Turkey-Libya Mediterranean Deal Is About Energy and Extending Ankara’s Influence,” 2019).

Libya’s geopolitical significance in the Eastern Mediterranean competition is a key driver for Türkiye’s collaboration with the nation, bolstered by historical and cultural ties. Therefore, in order to respond to developments in the region, Türkiye intensified its engagement with Libya’s GNA by signing the 2019 cooperation agreement covering strategically important areas such as maritime boundaries and security cooperation. This agreement marked Libya’s entry into the Eastern Mediterranean energy competition (“Egypt and Turkey’s Energy Face-Off in the Mediterranean,” 2020). Not to mention that discussions about maritime boundaries between Türkiye and Libya date back to the Gaddafi era but were disrupted by the Arab Spring. Amidst attacks by the Libyan National Army on the GNA, the Tripoli-based government sought collaboration with Türkiye. In November 2019, the GNA formalised agreements with Türkiye on maritime zones and military cooperation, eliciting responses from other Eastern Mediterranean stakeholders. This maritime boundary agreement also recognised Türkiye’s support for the GNA. Consequently, the Tripoli administration enhanced its political and military standing against the Tobruk-based government (“Turkey-Libya Mediterranean Deal Is About Energy and Extending Ankara’s Influence,2019).

5.5.6. The Emergence and Impact of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was a result of American concerns about US fishing in the Pacific. Coastal states were thus granted exclusive rights up to 200 nautical miles offshore. Therefore, states have sovereign rights over the exploration, exploitation, conservation, and management of marine resources, including the production of energy from winds, currents, and water, inside the EEZ jurisdiction. The EEZ, along with the territorial sea, enhances the coastal

state's ability to exploit marine resources, including the seabed and subsoil, through the continental shelf institution, though its jurisdiction is separate from the EEZ.

Indeed, a national proclamation is required of a coastal state that wants to make the declaration and delimitation of the EEZ. If a conflict arises, the issue goes to an international tribunal, where, according to this study, powerful actors come into the play. Theoretically, negotiations regarding delimitation have to reach a just result, whereas in reality, the final decision-making chair is included in the hegemonic system. In fact, international case law, especially from the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, has established delimitation principles now part of customary international law, binding all states. Hence, common delimitation methodologies have emerged but lack universal applicability.

The 1982 UNCLOS is the primary legal framework for maritime activities, but several Mediterranean coastal states, including Türkiye, Syria, Israel, and Libya, have not acceded to it. This has led to disputes over territorial claims and jurisdiction, with much of the Mediterranean's waters beyond coastal states' regulatory authority. It will not be difficult to comprehend that resolving these disputes is not as easy as pronounced, due to the political instability in the region lasting for decades.

5.5.7. Exploring the Turkish-Libyan Maritime Agreement 2019

During his official visit to Türkiye on November 27, 2019, Fayez al-Sarraj, serving as the President of the UN-recognised GNA, endorsed two memoranda of understandings. These agreements were crafted to establish a legal framework facilitating security and military collaboration between the respective nations. A primary objective of these memoranda was to safeguard the international legal rights of both parties concerning the delineation of maritime jurisdictional areas. The signed accords encompassed the "Memorandum of Understanding on Security and Military Cooperation" and the "Memorandum of Understanding on the Delimitation of Maritime Jurisdiction Areas" ("Turkey-Libya Mediterranean Deal Is About Energy and Extending Ankara's Influence," 2019).

The agreement received the ratification of the Libyan National Accord Presidential Council on December 6, 2019, thereby attaining legal validity within the domestic legal framework of Libya. Subsequently, it was enacted in Türkiye on December 7, 2019 (Acer, 2020: 1-5). The memorandum pertaining to maritime boundaries adhered to fundamental principles of international maritime law, including the recognition that islands do not inherently generate continental shelves or EEZs, the requirement for fair and equitable delimitation, the consideration of coastline lengths, and the preservation of Türkiye's coastal projection. In the maritime delineation memorandum, provisions were made for potential collaboration in future agreements concerning the exploitation of natural resources within areas extending from the EEZ of one party to that of the other. Additionally, it was stipulated that prior to finalising any agreement, both parties would engage in mutual negotiations should either party enter discussions with a third party regarding the delimitation of EEZs (Acer, 2020: 1-5). The memorandum of understanding concluded in 2019 has elevated Türkiye and Libya to the status of strategic allies in the Mediterranean.

Through this agreement, Türkiye has acquired considerable influence in the Eastern Mediterranean energy competition. Specifically, the agreement represents a countermeasure against the endeavours of Greece and the GCA to encircle and marginalise Türkiye within the region. By delineating and formally registering its western continental shelf boundaries with the UN, Ankara has effectively safeguarded its rights in the area (Çetin, 2020). Through its collaboration with Libya, Türkiye has effectively legitimised its natural gas activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, thus surmounting challenges posed by Greece and the GCA to its energy pursuits in the region. This accord further complicates the feasibility of future inequitable boundary delimitation agreements, rendering it challenging for Türkiye and Libya to tolerate foreseeable infringements upon their designated maritime jurisdiction areas, potentially precipitating fresh conflicts. Libya's involvement in such a memorandum is predominantly motivated by security considerations.

Compared to a prospective agreement with Greece concerning maritime zones, the memorandum substantially amplifies Libya's gains in the Mediterranean. In contrast to a hypothetical agreement with Greece, Libya stands to acquire an

additional 16,700 square kilometres of maritime territory (Harunoğulları, 2020: 475). As a matter of fact, the Turkish-Libyan agreement also sets a precedent for negotiations between Libya and Greece. With this agreement, Libya could acquire a minimum of 39,000 square kilometres of additional maritime territory. The Memorandum, although not in favour of powerful states looking for the Eastern Mediterranean resources transferred to their home country, serves as a response to Greece's unilateral delineation of energy exploration zones south of Crete following the interruption of maritime jurisdiction negotiations between Libya and Greece in 2004 due to the civil war. Thinking of it in this way, the agreement has significantly escalated the energy competition in the region, yielding profound legal and political ramifications that have reshaped the dynamics. It has presented a formidable obstacle to the regional resource-sharing aspirations of entities such as the GCA, Greece, Egypt, and Israel. Through this accord, Türkiye and Libya have signalled their rejection of Athens' expansive maritime jurisdiction claims grounded in island sovereignty within the region, dismissing overlaps with their own jurisdictional areas vis-à-vis Greece and the GCA.

Libya's endorsement of the stance that Greece should not extend maritime jurisdiction to islands has bolstered Türkiye's legal position in the region. Within this regard, the agreement has effectively halted the EastMed gas pipeline project, restricting Greece, the GCA, Egypt, and Israel from proceeding with gas transfer pipelines and exploration activities without Türkiye's consent, leading to serious economic repercussions for Türkiye (Yaycı, 2019). Indeed, the Türkiye-Libya agreement has thwarted attempts by Greece, Egypt, and the GCA to establish a maritime delimitation agreement with Libya, undermining Greece's claims over the continental shelves and EEZs of islands. This agreement has set a precedent for similar arrangements with other states, eliciting strong reactions from regional and powerful countries. The argument was that the agreement between Türkiye and Libya contravenes international maritime law, positioning the GNA against them (Kakışım, 2020).

Greece tried to handle the issue applying to the complex situation of the Cyprus island. Disregarding the TRNC, Greece has opposed the Türkiye-Libya agreement,

arguing it oversees the continental shelf of Cyprus and the islands of Crete and Rhodes (Barkey, 2019). On the other hand, the GCA has objected to the infringement on its sovereignty in the region (“Turkey-Libya Maritime Deal Rattles East Mediterranean,” 2019). Both Cyprus and Greece claim the agreement aims to appropriate regional resources, destabilise their stability, and nullify their natural gas projects in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece contended in a letter to the UN that there is no legal basis for Türkiye and Libya to establish a maritime jurisdiction agreement, given the lack of overlapping maritime zones or shared borders between them (UNGA, A/74/706, 2020). Greece further asserted the agreement infringes on its rights to delineate maritime zones around its islands and breaches the 2015 Libya Political Agreement.

On the other side, Türkiye was, and today still is sure that the agreement complies with the equity principle set down in international maritime law because of its long mainland coastline in the area. The Turkish government emphasises that islands cannot unilaterally alter coastal projections and argues that marine jurisdiction areas should be decided equitably and in conformity with international legal standards and not in favour of a group of states. Taking into account things like coastline lengths and orientations, according to Türkiye, islands situated across the median line between two mainland, should not have maritime authority that extends beyond territorial waters. Additionally, the GNA is theoretically the globally recognised government in Libya, which is another aspect supporting Türkiye’s legitimised policies.

The issue increased in its complex nature when, in an attempt to nullify the Turkish-Libyan Maritime Agreement, Greece and Egypt signed a marine delimitation agreement in August 2020, purposefully ignoring the borders set forth in that accord. Greece, without considering the rights of internationally recognised GNA and Türkiye, maintained its demand for the annulment of the Türkiye-Libya agreement concerning maritime areas and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Libya as prerequisites for advancing Libya (meant the Haftar group)-EU relations. Also, Egypt deemed the agreement illegal, viewing it as a potential impediment to their gas export capabilities, while Israel has voiced concerns about its potential to disrupt regional peace and security. Egypt did not stop at this point; it forged a maritime delimitation agreement with Greece in 2020 in response to the perceived threat posed by the 2019 Türkiye-

Libya agreements. Egypt expressed heightened unease regarding Türkiye's close ties with the GNA in Libya, particularly considering the security and military cooperation agreement between Türkiye and Libya (UNGA, A/74/628, 2019). In correspondence addressed to the UN, Egypt contended that the Türkiye-Libya agreement impedes the ability of the El-Sarraj government to independently engage in international obligations. Egypt further asserted that the agreement contravenes the 2015 Libya Political Agreement, which received approval from the UNSC. Additionally, Egypt claimed that the military cooperation agreement runs afoul of the Security Council's resolutions pertaining to Libya (UNGA, A/74/628, 2019). Subsequent to the agreement, Egypt announced collaborative ventures with Chevron, ExxonMobil, Total of France, BP, and Shell to initiate gas exploration activities off the northwest coast of Libya ("Egypt and Turkey's Energy Face-off in the Mediterranean," 2020).

Israel contended that Türkiye's unilateral actions should not impede the construction of a pipeline from the Levant region to Cyprus, Crete, Greece, and Europe. The proposed pipeline, valued at 7-9 billion dollars, is slated to traverse the designated maritime jurisdiction areas between Türkiye and Libya as outlined in the agreement. Interestingly, while critiquing the Turkish-Libyan agreement, an Israel-GCA joint exploration team dispatched an Israeli natural gas exploration vessel to Cypriot waters, disregarding the issues regarding Cyprus.

More powerful states such as the US and Russia have expressed concerns over the agreement, with the US even condemning it as futile and provocative. Similarly, the EU has criticised the agreement, asserting that it overlooks the sovereignty rights of third-party states, contravenes maritime law, and thus holds no legal status for such parties. In this regard, the issue regarding third-party states, reminds of a mentality that powerful states have been using for a long time, namely the idea that what belongs to certain regions also belongs to powerful states, whereas what belongs to powerful states is only theirs. Having said that, Türkiye rebuffed these criticisms, affirming that the Türkiye-Libya agreement, executed through proper procedures, falls outside the jurisdiction of the EU, which lacks the authority of an international court.

Hence it can be derived that the international community was convinced that the Maritime Agreement was signed in violation of international law. Furthermore, despite Türkiye's non-membership in the UNCLOS, the agreement is still binding under customary international law. Thus, pre-existing energy cooperation agreements between Greece, the GCA, Egypt, and Israel do not invalidate Türkiye's agreement with Libya. Customary international law recognises agreements to which states are not parties as binding. The UNCLOS, codified in 1958 and predating 1982, represents customary international law and binds non-party states. Therefore, Türkiye's maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean cannot be disregarded, nor do they imply endorsement of any actions contravening the convention.

Consequently, the agreement between Türkiye and a recognised coastal state in international law concerning the determination of the continental shelf is legal. However, the ongoing attempt to overthrow the legitimate government of Libya under Fayeze al-Sarraj by Khalifa Haftar and his backing raised serious concerns regarding the theoretical principle of non-intervention in internal affairs under international law, which in practice is again not the case. Discussions between Greek Foreign Minister Nikolas Dendias and Khalifa Haftar following the Türkiye-Libya agreement may further exacerbate these concerns. The principle of non-intervention, initially articulated in President James Monroe's 1823 speech to the US Congress, has evolved into an international rule, enshrined in Article 15(8) of the Covenant of the League of Nations. This principle, aimed at preserving state sovereignty, has been reaffirmed through the UNGA Resolution 2131(XX) dated December 21, 1965, which restricts the decision-making authority of IOs in matters pertaining to the internal affairs of states (Pazarıcı, 2005: 44).

The principle of non-interference in internal affairs asserts that matters falling under a state's national jurisdiction should be immune from external intervention. It staunchly upholds the notion that other states should refrain from meddling in areas concerning a nation's sovereignty. Nevertheless, an alternative perspective suggests that interventions aligned with legal principles may find acceptance within the realm of international law (Pazarıcı, 2005: 45). Conversely, the notion of the continental shelf, as enshrined in international law, pertains to the underwater extension of a coastal

nation's territory. Since its formal acknowledgment in international law, commencing in 1945, the concept of the continental shelf underwent delineation through two distinct approaches at the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea (Pazarcı, 2005: 47). In its ruling on the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases on February 20, 1969, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) underscored that the seabed region identified as the natural extension of a coastal state embodies the fundamental tenet of the continental shelf concept. As a result, the ICJ emphasised that this expanse falls within the realm of the state's sovereignty (Erdem, 2015: 329–364). Hence, Greece's involvement with a non-state actor engaged in actions against Libya's legitimate government could be construed as a transgression of the principle of non-intervention in a nation's internal affairs, which is encompassed within the domain of that nation's sovereignty. Despite all this, Türkiye will not invalidate the agreement it has made with the official state recognised by the UN due to a 'possible' danger. Türkiye is convinced that in case the agreement would have benefited the powerful, clear support would emerge. Although, at this stage, the agreement only serves for Türkiye's and Libya's good and is therefore criticised despite its legal status.

Aligned with the “Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland) Doctrine” proposed by Cem Gürdeniz, the Türkiye-Libya agreement holds historical significance in delineating maritime borders that align with Türkiye's strategic interests. The concept of “Mavi Vatan,” for the first time, represents Türkiye's active involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean to safeguard its national interests at sea while at the same time prioritising regional security. Within this regard, it is possible to state that Türkiye, within the maritime domain, aims to pursue agreements aimed at securing its maritime jurisdiction and enhancing regional influence, since the stability of the region will serve the interests of regional countries in general (Yaycı, 2019: 34). A notable example of Türkiye's adherence to the “Mavi Vatan” doctrine is the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Security and Military Cooperation with the GNA, which also includes provisions for delimiting maritime jurisdiction areas in the Eastern Mediterranean. Türkiye subsequently took steps to declare its EEZ officially through publication in an official gazette, affirming its commitment to protecting its strategic interests and asserting presence in the region according to “Mavi Vatan” principles.

Within the concept of the Mavi Vatan, Türkiye demonstrates for the first time dedication to defending its strategic interests at sea (“Milletlerarası Andlaşma Sayı: 30971, Karar Sayısı: 1815).

Therefore, the finalisation of the continental shelf and EEZ borders, marked by a 29.9 km long borderline agreement reported by Anadolu Ajansı in 2019, was a significant milestone for Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean. Approved by the Presidential Council in December 2019 and integrated into Libyan law, the borderline agreement carries historical implications for the Mediterranean’s geopolitical and geostrategic landscape. Although the international community claimed Türkiye to act against international status-quo, Türkiye and Libya have formally communicated the bilateral agreement to the UN, documented in UNGA Resolution A/74/634 of 2019 (UNGA, Res. A/74/634, 2019).

In accordance with the agreement’s points, both nations are given the authority to conduct research activities within the designated areas, thereby reinforcing their respective maritime claims and laying the groundwork for enhanced cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean (UNGA, Res. A/74/634, 2019). Since the conclusion of the maritime jurisdiction agreement between Türkiye and Libya, the two nations have emerged as maritime neighbours, sharing shores facing each other. Greece’s objections to the Türkiye-Libya agreement, citing violations of international law, have been repeatedly lodged with the UN but have not yet succeeded, according to reports from Greece’s Permanent Mission to the UN in 2019. Bilateral agreements like that between Türkiye and Libya under UNCLOS must be based on equitable principles and require mutual consent for validity. Thus, within international law, the Türkiye-Libya agreement is considered both convenient and legitimate (UNGA, Res. A/74/758; “Res. A/74/710, 2019). Comparative analysis highlights the advantages of Libya’s agreement with Türkiye over potential EEZ agreements with the GCA or Greece, expanding Libya’s maritime borders towards Crete’s waters and granting Türkiye an additional 8,900 km² of EEZ territory. Greece’s claim to exclusive rights over its islands’ continental shelf and EEZ faces challenges. However, it should be mentioned that Türkiye and Libya are following the regulation that, international maritime law only grants islands a continental shelf, not an EEZ (Yaycı, 2019: 89).

With the Türkiye-Libya agreement:

- Both Türkiye and Libya acquired the status of coastal states.
- The delineated maritime boundary line now acts as a barrier between Greece, the GCA, and Egypt, effectively hindering the signing of any EEZ agreements between them.
- Türkiye emerged as a significant influencing actor of the plans and policies of regional and global actors in the Eastern Mediterranean.
- Türkiye gained political, strategic, and psychological leverage in the region.
- Türkiye made substantial contributions to national interests by influencing energy geopolitics through the delineation of maritime boundaries.
- Notably, Türkiye signed its first-ever EEZ delimitation agreement with a coastal state.
- The agreement provided Türkiye with a solid legal and legitimate foundation for its maritime rights.
- It established the western border of Türkiye's maritime jurisdictional areas in accordance with international law, defining the western border of Türkiye's EEZ.
- The so-called Seville map, reminiscent of the Treaty of Sevres and aimed at confining Türkiye within a 41,000 km² maritime area, backed by the EU and endorsed by the GCA-Greece duo, was effectively thwarted.
- The likelihood of a Greece-Egypt or a Greece-GCA delimitation agreement, perceived as the worst-case scenario for Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean region, was eliminated (Yaycı, 2019: 162-163).

Undoubtedly, Türkiye's ability to economically bolster its newfound strategic advantage in the region will enable it to undertake crucial exploration endeavours in the Eastern Mediterranean. This agreement holds paramount importance not only for facilitating exploration activities but also for geopolitical and strategic considerations, thinking also of the socio-cultural, ethnic, and religious bond explored in the previous

section. What bothered powerful states most, regarding the agreement in place, is that actors operating in the Eastern Mediterranean, including energy companies, will be compelled to seek Türkiye's permission before conducting exploration activities or constructing pipelines. Of particular significance is the reality that the EastMed pipeline project would be subject to Türkiye's approval under the terms of this agreement ("Turkey-Libya Maritime Deal Upsets Mediterranean Energy Plan," 2020). These characteristics of the agreement lead to the fact that the international community is not clearly able to pronounce the legal status of the Maritime Agreement.

5.5.8. Observing the UN and NATO Influence on the Maritime Delimitation Agreement Between Libya and Türkiye

Contrary to the fading significance of the broader Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean remains relevant in US foreign policy, particularly amidst renewed major power tensions. Washington's moderate interventionist approach reflects its strategic calculations, considering its power within the UNSC and NATO. On the other hand, the influence of the UN on maritime agreements dates back to the 1958 Geneva Maritime Law Conferences. These conferences, alongside the Hague Codification Conference, were crucial in the development of maritime law in the 20th century. Unresolved territorial seas and fisheries difficulties prompted later the Second Maritime Law Conference in Geneva from March 16 to April 26, 1960. Not to mention that, Marine legislation negotiations are complicated, as no agreement text was reached despite efforts. Discussions during the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference focused on excessive seabed resource claims. Malta's Ambassador at that time, Arvid Pardo, supported marine resources as the "Common Heritage of Mankind" worldwide. Ultimately, lobbying led to UN Law of the Sea discussions and 1982 UNCLOS. In this regard today, marine law is based on the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which governs navigation, territorial waters, economic jurisdiction, and environmental protection. UNCLOS was a milestone in marine law, contributing to maritime security and peace. UNCLOS and other maritime agreements help resolve disputes and maintain stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. Despite these efforts, regional conflicts persist, highlighting maritime governance and security problems.

The UN and NATO should be questioned at this moment for their effectiveness. Given the evolving geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean, IOs like the UN and NATO are vital in addressing maritime issues and supporting regional stability (Haliloğlu, 2017: 42-43). Considering the preceding discussion, it is evident that the issue in the Eastern Mediterranean cannot be viewed independently of the UN. Despite the convening of conferences and the establishment of regulations, the region continues to face challenges in achieving peace and stability. The absence of regional security in the Eastern Mediterranean underscores the complexities of its geopolitical landscape. Lake and Morgan's concept of a 'regional security complex' is applicable here, defining it as a group of states affected by security externalities originating from a specific geographical area. Within this complex, the security of member states is deeply interconnected, such that actions and developments within one member state significantly impact others (Lake and Morgan, 1997).

In view of the geographical layout of the region, with the sea as its focal point, coupled with its shared historical legacy under Ottoman rule and recent geopolitical shifts affecting all political entities within it, the Eastern Mediterranean emerges as a region characterised by a complex security landscape. This assertion was recently bolstered by Stivachtis, who posited that the dynamics of energy-related security provide compelling evidence for the existence of an Eastern Mediterranean region (Stivachtis, 2019: 58). Realists contend that understanding regional cooperation presents a challenging task (Moravcsik, 1997: 528-530). Nonetheless, realist cooperation views focus on power dynamics. Realists believe cooperation increases leverage and security margins. Aligning with a regional power or creating alliances to resist a rising hegemon could boost collaboration. (Moravcsik 1997: 529). Critical researchers, on the other hand, highlight the significance of normative power, shared identity, and political culture in promoting regional cooperation. They emphasise that practices embodying a set of values serve as crucial drivers of community-building within a region (Adler and Crawford, 2004: 5). The most important difference lies in the fact that the critical perspective mainly aims to reach emancipation rather than justifying interest-oriented policies.

With Türkiye emerging as the dominant naval force in the Eastern Mediterranean, tensions within the international community surrounding gas exploration, maritime border disputes, and migration have increased. In fact, Türkiye has utilised its naval strength to convey broader strategic messages. In March 2019, it conducted its largest maritime exercise to date, known as Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland), spanning the Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Aegean Sea. The Turkish Foreign Minister asserted that Türkiye is essential to Mediterranean issues, saying that no activities can advance without it. This led to a hesitation within the international community (“Turkey Set to Begin Sets to Oil and Gas Drilling Off Cyprus,” 2019).

Considering all the information up to this point of the study, it should be questioned how an emancipatory result can be achieved with these complex dynamics? What is the ideal Eastern Mediterranean scenario? No matter what the ideal scenario looks like, in one or another way every country in the region should be included. Therefore, in the ideal scenario, Türkiye also must be fairly incorporated into the equation. To create an emancipatory influence that meets the needs of all regional countries, two strategic routes exist. First, adding Türkiye to the EMGF could boost party collaboration. Second, the UN can mediate the disagreement by encouraging intergovernmental talks and appointing a special envoy. However, this thesis argues that the UN is insufficient in playing the mediation role due to its passive and theory-based stance.

In recent times, scholarly discourse has predominantly centred on the rivalries between Mediterranean states, often overlooking the interests and strategies of global actors. But it is imperative to broaden the analysis and situate conflicts within the broader context of the evolving world order taking international peace and security organisations into consideration (Axt, 2022: 393-413). For instance, the EU, acting to a great extent with NATO’s military support, the US as an empire state, the UK, France, Russia, and China—in the Eastern Mediterranean—all act in an interest-oriented strategic manner. All aim to delineate and ascertain the nature of their interests, their level of engagement with energy resources in the region, and the strategic significance they attribute to the area. On the other hand, the UN could possibly play an emancipatory and positive role in the issue. But since it is only

theoretically unbiased, the situation in practice does not look really secure and peaceful. Additionally, it is important to understand whether these global powers align themselves with specific Mediterranean states and their issues in the region.

While a regional power possesses the capability to project power within a specific geographical area, a global power is characterised as a state exerting significant influence on worldwide affairs through the projection of (military) power. According to this thesis, it is argued that a global power, next to its influence due to its military power, is also able to have an influence through IOs such as the US and some Western powers do. The key point is that global powers as an individual state, or by applying to an international peace and security organisation, need to practically act in accordance with their theoretical peace and security discourse in order to achieve an emancipatory influence. On the other side, Türkiye is commonly regarded as a regional power, which automatically posits the country as a hegemonic sphere of influence for global powers as well as international peace and security organisations (Kegley and Wittkopf, 2019: 431).

Immanuel Kant's concept suggests that peaceful order among nations can be achieved through common legal norms and corresponding institutions (Kant, 2003: 47). Founded in 1945, the UN embraced principles advocating for states to renounce violence and uphold territorial integrity and political independence. As shown by this dedication, it complies with Kant's valued law over force. However, WWII victors' at the same time UNSC veto powers, often allowed self-interest to prevail, impeding practical implementation while establishing normative standards for conflict resolution and accountability (Axt, 1999: 83-99).

To understand the interests of global powers within the UN and NATO in the MENA, one also needs to consider mutual dependencies. Already in 1970 it has been started to discuss whether third world countries are dependent on industrialised powerful states. Interestingly, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye introduced the perspective that, in practical policy terms, the 1973 oil price crisis brought to light the extent to which industrialised oil-importing countries were reliant on producer nations (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Taking this dimension into consideration, it should be stated

that competing interests of global powers prevent any of the regional states from any political development. Another point that needs to be told, is that although the region is significant to global powers, they are hesitant to engage in direct conflict there. Instead, they apply to strategies such as collaborating and supporting terror groups while within peace and security organisations such as the UN and NATO they theoretically apply to the discourse to fight against terrorism.

The literature in this field often overlooks the influence of the UN. While IOs, as theorised by Kant, offer potential solutions, the UN's existence alone is insufficient to address issues in the MENA region, including the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Although providing theoretical guidelines for resolving maritime disputes, UNCLOS lacks enforcement measures and key regional players as signatories, which diminishes its normative force. Hence, a chronic challenge in many Eastern Mediterranean and MENA conflicts remains the absence of clear rules of engagement aligned with international law (UNCLOS, 1982).

With the agreement between Türkiye and Libya, a significant geopolitical shift has occurred in the Eastern Mediterranean, reshaping the region's political landscape. Classical hypotheses regarding the region have been challenged, particularly with regards to Türkiye's engagement with neighbouring countries. Hence, the Turkish-Libyan agreement underscores Türkiye's assertion of its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, both legally and politically, especially concerning the TRNC. As can be derived from the narrative above, during this process, principles outlined in the UNCLOS, such as fairness and equitable sharing of maritime areas, have been disregarded by some coastal countries in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece, in particular, has been accused of violating Türkiye's maritime borders by considering the region extending from Crete to the island of Meis as a single coastline.

Türkiye and the TRNC on the other hand, have protested against the GCA granting exploration licenses to multinational companies without involving Turkish Cypriots, who are equal stakeholders on the island. However, no decisive action has been taken, despite Türkiye's efforts to address these issues at the UN. As a matter of fact, the Turkish-Libyan agreement, while reflecting Türkiye's willingness to engage

in similar agreements with other regional countries secures Türkiye's maritime boundaries, invalidates Greece's maritime agreements with the GCA and Egypt, and reinforces its doctrine of the "Mavi Vatan." Not to mention that the UN played a pivotal role in providing legitimacy to the agreement by recognising the GNA as Libya's legitimate government, thereby lending credibility to the deal. The UN's mediation efforts aimed at fostering constructive dialogue between Türkiye, Libya, and other stakeholders, emphasised the importance of adherence to international norms, although its ability to address the agreement's implications was limited by structural constraints within the Security Council. Stakeholder criticism highlighted the difficulties of harmonising competing interests and creating participatory governance in maritime issues. The UN aggressively sought diplomatic solutions to agreement-related difficulties, but Security Council infighting and stakeholder interests hampered its efforts to promote enduring peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. This whole process highlighted the limitation of the UN as a peace and security keeping organisation.

Critically, global powers' UNSC response to the Turkish-Libyan agreement reflects world strategic objectives and power dynamics. The UNSC is expected to address disputes and conflicts effectively, considering the interests of its member states, especially the permanent members wielding veto power, which leads to decisions not being primarily peace and security-oriented. However, the UNSC's response to the Turkish-Libyan agreement has been characterised by a lack of consensus and unified action, highlighting the divergent strategic interests of its permanent members. While some members expressed concerns about the agreement's implications for regional stability and adherence to UNCLOS, others sought to protect their own geopolitical interests or maintain diplomatic relations with Türkiye and Libya. For example, Russia's response within the UNSC has been influenced by its strategic partnership with Türkiye in various spheres, including defence cooperation and energy projects. A similar argument is also valid in China's case. On the other hand, the US, France, and the UK have claimed that the Turkish-Libyan agreement would have a destabilising influence on regional security. This is at least what was pronounced loudly, while the whole world today is aware that many Western countries

are to a great extent dependent on natural sources of the MENA and the Eastern Mediterranean region. Therefore, the question comes to mind: how would the MENA region and the Eastern Mediterranean look like without the intervention of other states with the discourse of preventing destabilisation or keeping peace and security? The most important part in this sense is to stay the player and not to become a playground.

Regarding the influence of NATO, in the US, the Secretary of State emphasised that “energy security and supply disruptions should be regarded as challenges to the NATO alliance” (Shaffer, 2013: 114-125). During the Bill Clinton administration in 1992 and 1996, a doctrine was issued outlining the decision to acquire more warships, cargo planes, assault vehicles, and other equipment aimed at “power projection” into remote combat zones. Additionally, there were efforts by the US to transition NATO from a defensive alliance into a regional policing force under US governance (Clinton, 1996). This doctrine underscores the extent to which the US utilises NATO and its influence over the alliance. The significance of decision-making and influencing in the Eastern Mediterranean by NATO is further demonstrated by the EU’s declaration to enhance cooperation with strategic partners such as NATO, the UN, and regional partners like the OSCE, AU, and ASEAN. Accordingly, efforts should be made to cultivate more tailored bilateral partnerships with countries that share similar interests, including the US, Canada, Norway, and the UK (“A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence”, 2022). The EU’s stance also underscores the significance of the US within NATO. While numerous examples could be cited, it is widely acknowledged that the US holds considerable sway within the alliance. Therefore, it is crucial to view the situation with this detail in mind. Rather than discussing an impartial NATO, it is important to recognise that US interests often drive the agenda under the NATO umbrella.

NATO’s perspective on the conflict lines in the Eastern Mediterranean is shaped by a global geopolitical outlook, viewing the region as a critical juncture between Europe’s southern and eastern flanks (Zum Felde, 2020). This perspective, articulated by Rainer Meyer Zum Felde, highlights NATO’s view of the Eastern Mediterranean, which notably excludes Arab, African, or Turkish countries. This again reflects NATO’s preferred lens through which to perceive the region. For

NATO, the conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean are viewed as part of broader challenges to the international rules-based order, which the alliance is committed to defending. Preserving key multilateral Western institutions, such as NATO and the EU, is seen as essential for Europe to maintain its status as an international player rather than becoming a mere playing field for others. The goal of IOs, according to Rainer Meyer Zum Felde, is to be decisive players rather than passive observers, particularly in regions like the MENA and the Eastern Mediterranean. While NATO maintains its readiness to deter, prevent, and, if necessary, engage in conflict with near-peer state actors, crisis management with comprehensive civil-military missions has become increasingly prominent in NATO's mission, particularly in Europe's southern and eastern regions, including the greater MENA, as well as the Sahel. Consequently, NATO must implement strategies to uphold its position in these areas.

In a recent webinar on the Eastern Mediterranean organised by the German Atlantic Association, Ambassador (ret.) Martin Erdmann, an experienced diplomat in Turkish-NATO relations, identified three key areas of the current political conflict: 1) Türkiye's longstanding provocative military actions in the eastern Aegean Sea; 2) Türkiye and Libya's unilateral declaration of a new maritime boundary, disregarding the UNCLOS; and 3) Türkiye's unilateral licensing of natural gas exploration blocks around Cyprus (Erdmann et al., 2020). The actions of Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean are viewed as a serious concern for NATO. While some argue that Türkiye's declaration of the maritime boundary agreement does not contravene the UNCLOS, Türkiye's strategic moves pose a threat to the US-led NATO as they disrupt the status quo favoured by the international peace and security organisation. Türkiye's growing influence in the region signifies a potential awakening of social, historical, and geographical consciousness, challenging the traditional realist perspective that emphasises power and hegemony alone. NATO and Western countries may underestimate Türkiye's influence or be uncomfortable with the prospect of its future impact, as evidenced by their dissatisfaction with the maritime agreement between Türkiye and Libya ("Turkey-Libya Preliminary Deal Prompts Greece, Egypt to Push Back," 2022). Some Western states even asserted their right to approach NATO, seeking strong backing to contest the independent decisions made by Türkiye and the

UN-recognised Tripoli Government, thereby influencing regional policies. However, it seems that this assertion has been made disregarding Türkiye's strong NATO membership as a strategic regional country.

On the other hand, the lack of clarity within the UNCLOS fosters an international environment where distinguishing between right and wrong remains challenging. Consequently, power dynamics and hegemony play pivotal roles in shaping decisions, while neither the UN nor NATO, despite being powerful, are able to solve the chaos in the Eastern Mediterranean. This phenomenon can be attributed to the fact that each influential nation within IOs pursues its own interests. As Lord Palmerston famously asserted, powerful states advance by prioritising their interests. Moreover, no powerful state is inclined to remain in an organisation that does not offer tangible benefits.

5.5.9. Conclusion

To sum up, a variety of factors such as the 'Arab Spring,' natural resource discoveries, and shifting power balances have led to the MENA and Eastern Mediterranean region emerging as a central hub of geopolitical dynamics. The involvement of world powers such as the US and the UK, as well as certain EU countries, reflects the regions' strategic importance. To better benefit from the regions' geo-strategic richness, these powerful countries interact with regional states. As the turning points within the Turkish-Libyan case up to this turning point reflect, this interaction generally shows up in a form where the powerful states decide about regional happenings. After 1945, mostly these decisions are made under the umbrella of IOs having a significant impact on the region's security. One such critical decision is about the maritime borders. However, it is not possible to talk about peaceful and solution-oriented decisions regarding the maritime borders despite the existence of international peace and security organisations. For instance, despite efforts to forge marine accords and resolve conflicts through international frameworks such as UNCLOS, tensions still persist in the Eastern Mediterranean, as can be derived from this instance. Competing assertions on energy resources, territorial sovereignty, and historical accounts are applied while claiming rights in political actions despite visible intensifying regional conflicts.

An emancipatory result in the Eastern Mediterranean would require all rights of all parties to be acknowledged while only regional countries would decide about their own consumption as provided by the optimal sovereignty right. The whole process to an emancipatory security requires first the involvement of only regional countries in communication and collaboration by prioritising regional security, while as a second step the international community could be considered. Instead of excluding, incorporating Türkiye equitably into regional dialogues and inviting its participation in initiatives such as the EMGF might promote synergy and mitigate tensions. Furthermore, theoretically, the UN might serve a crucial function in mediating conflicts and enabling intergovernmental dialogues to foster peace and stability in the region; however, only by putting aside the hegemonic interests and considering socio-cultural, socio-economic, historical, and political facts of the region.

In its actual form, an analysis regarding the MENA and Eastern Mediterranean region cannot be made without expanding beyond regional rivalries and contextualising conflicts within the larger framework of global power dynamics, the interests of the most powerful states, and the changing world order. This leads to the increasing complex situation of the Eastern Mediterranean and MENA region. Adherence to international law and standards, in this case, is also no definitive solution since in practice the situation turns out to be those theoretical realities such as international law and standards are practically applied in a manner that serves the most powerful states only. In the actual instance, there is a meaning-making process for any law with unclear meaning in a way to serve a certain part of the world only. Although clearly understood, laws are also interpreted with the same attitude. Hence, in this case, this study argues that either laws and regulations, referred to as theoretical reality, must be reconsidered, or the implementation, referred to as practical reality, must correspond. Thus, in this way, knowledge derived from hegemony and power would ultimately foster peace and security.

Every single turning point in this case study leads to the conclusion that it is accurate to assert that the efficacy and rules of IOs in settling conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as in the MENA are constrained. These organisations lack the ability to organise communication platforms for regional actors only, where regional

peace and security is a main common interest. Such an attempt would remind regional countries of their inevitable socio-cultural, socio-economic, historical, and political communalities. Although not from one day to another, common regional interests would in a certain period of time lead to the question of how to reach ultimate peace and security. However, at this point, another key question arises: Is peace and security for the MENA and Eastern Mediterranean region really the aim of hegemonic structures such as the UNSC or NATO? If so, it should be started by respecting the sovereignty right, right for consumption of national raw materials, and right to decide about the form of governance, which is not the case yet.

On the other hand, the notion of the neo-colonialist nature of the UNSC or NATO necessitates a revisit. Not being a subject within this study, this perspective would necessitate a thorough comprehension of the socio-political dimension of the Eastern Mediterranean and the MENA. What can be told so far is that although mutual dependencies among powerful states may somewhat stabilise state relations, competing interests and geopolitical interests persist in negatively influencing regional dynamics. This underscores the difficulty of reconciling conflicting interests within IOs while preserving stability in the region. In such a circumstance, it would be the last wish of powerful states within hegemonic structures to see Eastern Mediterranean or MENA nations becoming influential actors and decision-makers within their own region. This would, in the long term, lead to losing the playground and the sphere of influence.

5.6. The Security and Military Agreement 2019 Between Türkiye and Libya

5.6.1. Introduction

Next to the Maritime Boundary Agreement, the Security and Military Agreement also signed between the GNA and the Turkish Republic on November 27, 2019, marks another significant development challenging the influence of powerful states within hegemonic structures. Its reception by hegemonic structures is another turning point in history, underscoring the complexities surrounding regional power dynamics and security. It is interesting to observe that, while the UN recognised the

Maritime Agreement preceding the Security and Military Agreement as valid due to its endorsement by the internationally recognised GNA, it did not react in the same way for this agreement. The influence of NATO undoubtedly played an important role in this sense. To be more precise, NATO's cautious stance reflects the reluctance of powerful states to endorse Türkiye's strategic manoeuvring.

Indeed, the MoU on Security and Military Cooperation goes beyond maritime boundaries, granting Türkiye the authority to provide military assistance to the GNA upon invitation. Unsurprisingly, international critics accused the Turkish government of pursuing unilateral interests and following an expansionist regional policy. Comparatively to the Maritime Agreement, the Security and Military Cooperation Agreement elicited much stronger international reactions. However, such a strict reaction led to criticisms within Turkish and Libyan circles that the sovereignty rights of Türkiye and Libya as regional actors to forge agreements independently are overshadowed by hegemonic intervention, raising questions about the motivations of external powers in the region. Accordingly, the involvement of certain powerful states, despite geographic distance, clearly underscores their dependency on MENA resources. Hence, the disparity in motives between Türkiye's geostrategic positioning and hegemonic powers reveals a disconnect between theoretical principles of peace and security and practical geopolitical interests in reality. In this regard, the Security and Military Cooperation Agreement and surrounding discussions serve as a turning point within the Turkish-Libyan case study to explore the discourse of peace and security, referred to as theoretical reality, and underlying power dynamics, referred to as practical reality.

As a matter of fact, the approval of the Military and Security Cooperation Agreement between the GNA in Tripoli and the Turkish government constitutes an important development in the ongoing conflict in Libya. According to this agreement, the Turkish government is committed to providing a framework for enhanced military assistance from Türkiye to the GNA, which has been engaged in a protracted battle against the armed forces of General Khalifa Haftar since April 2019. Not to mention that a similar agreement, although not actively set into force, has already been signed in 2012. Described by Presidential Spokesperson İbrahim Kalın as an "update" to a previous agreement from 2012, the memorandum outlines various provisions aimed at

improving the GNA's defence capabilities. Contrarily to the agreement in 2012, the Military and Security Cooperation Agreement in 2019 raised an international voice. Within the framework of this agreement, Türkiye commits to providing training, consultancy, material, and planning support for the establishment of a Rapid Involvement Force in Libya, signalling a deepening of military cooperation between the two nations.

Additionally, the agreement allows for the establishment of a joint 'Defence and Security Cooperation Office' and the allocation of land, sea, and air vehicles, weapons, and training bases, with ownership belonging to Libya. Consultancy for joint military planning, training, and the use of weapons, as well as intelligence sharing and the possibility of conducting "peacekeeping" operations, are also included. Furthermore, the agreement permits the deployment of 'Guest Personnel' from defence and security organisations, the donation, sale, or leasing of military equipment, and the granting of licenses for technology transfer, underscoring Türkiye's commitment to supporting the GNA's defence capabilities.

The most criticised part of this agreement is Türkiye sending troops to Libya. At the beginning of this process, the previous Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu emphasised that the decision to send troops to Libya would be contingent upon a specific request from the Libyan side, independent of the recently signed agreement. Çavuşoğlu referred to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's previous statement, indicating that Türkiye would seriously evaluate such a request if made by Libya. Çavuşoğlu further stated that the deployment of troops remains a separate consideration. He highlighted Türkiye's history of military and security agreements with Libya, underscoring the longstanding bilateral relations between the two nations in this regard. This statement from the Foreign Minister highlightes Türkiye's commitment to respecting Libya's sovereignty and the importance of any military deployment being based on mutual agreement and consent ("Libya ile Imzalanan Güvenlik ve Askeri İş Birliği Anlaşması TBMM'de", 2019).

The maritime agreement, signed concurrently with the security and military cooperation agreement, had already undergone the necessary procedural steps within Türkiye's legislative framework. Having been passed through the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), it was then submitted to the UN for registration.

According to the UN Charter, member states are mandated to register any international agreements they conclude with the UN Secretariat. While entry into force of agreements is not a prerequisite for registration, once submitted, the Secretariat assumes the responsibility of publishing all registered treaties in the United Nations Treaty Section (UNTS), reflecting the legal obligation to register agreements (Hollis, 2020). Furthermore, the Secretariat is also responsible for registering treaties among member states and non-member states, even those submitted by the latter. This detail reflects the UN's involvement in the entire process from its inception. Therefore, any discussion on the relationship between Libya and Türkiye would be incomplete without considering the role of the UN.

Not to mention that, while the UN is internationally recognised as the main organisation handling international peace and security matters, its effectiveness in this regard has often been questioned. This failure is generally explained by a biased stance. Given that the UN is predominantly influenced by the most powerful states within the UNSC, it is unrealistic to expect complete objectivity from the organisation. Similarly, the presence of NATO as an international military alliance does not necessarily foster a sense of peace in the MENA and Eastern Mediterranean region; rather, it often generates anxiety, uncertainty, and chaos. As historical analyses again and again demonstrate, achieving 100 percent peace and security is impossible. Providing this reality, this section aims to have a detailed look at the Memorandum of Understanding on Security and Military Cooperation, highlighting the contradiction between theoretical reality and practical reality within the peace and security discourse of the UN and NATO.

There are certain dynamics that will serve to comprehend the impact of the Security and Military Agreement within the international framework. First of all, there is the actual military involvement of Türkiye based on the agreement. Then, the underlying reasons for Türkiye's military engagement, the outcomes of the Berlin Conference and the influence of the UN and NATO are further dynamics important to know.

Since the Security and Military Agreement signed between the GNA in Tripoli and Türkiye on November 27, 2019, marks a significant development in the region, it also serves as an important turning point where the main argument and the sub-

arguments of this thesis can be explored and supported. First, both the UN and NATO play again an important role, acting as platforms for powerful states to exert influence within the context of this agreement. Taking the issue from this angle, Libya as well as Türkiye, as subordinated states, also in this instance, fall within the hegemonic spheres of influence of the UN and NATO. The intervention by powerful states within such IOs shows how subordinated states can become battlegrounds for hegemonic control. This dynamic is further complicated by the sharing of military expertise and technology between a less powerful Türkiye and the GNA, which can emancipate Libya by bolstering its defence capabilities but also create an interdependency. This turning point is an additional proof that reflects how the form of hegemon changes over time, while its function of exerting control remains constant. The examination of the Turkish-Libyan relationship clearly represents an example of the influence of a hegemonic structure. Although claiming for peace and security, one of the main functions of hegemony remains interest-oriented dominance. Hence the contradiction between the peace and security discourse and the reality on the field, which highlights the limitations of theoretical frameworks in addressing real-world complexities.

Looking at the unstable situation in Libya, it can be concluded that power dynamics often have contributed to this instability. In addition to this, the UN and NATO's influence have also been perceived as increasing the ongoing turmoil. In a realist perspective, this dilemma is explained by the destructive nature of power that challenges the hegemonic structure in achieving lasting peace and security. While talking about the hegemonic structures such as the UN and NATO, it rather needs to be referred to powerful states within these organisations. NATO's and the UN's actions regarding the Libyan conflict are shaped by the interests of dominant member states, reflecting the control dynamics within these bodies. Indeed, NATO and the UN serve as platforms where powerful states legitimise their actions. The handling of the Libyan situation illustrates how these organisations can be used to justify geopolitical interests under the guise of peace and security.

5.6.2. The Essence of the Memorandum of Understanding on Security and Military Collaboration for Türkiye and Libya

To obtain the comprehensive contents of the MoU signed between the GNA and Türkiye, reference to the Official Journal of Türkiye, dated December 26, 2019, with registration number 30990 is imperative. The aforementioned Security and Military Cooperation Agreement, between Türkiye and Tripoli government was approved, as stated in Decision number 1926, which is classified under the heading of “International Agreement.” In accordance with Articles 2 and 3 of Presidential Decree No. 9, this crucial agreement, formally signed in Istanbul on November 27, 2019, was validated by Law No. 7199. On December 25, 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signed the document approving this decision. The agreement’s preamble establishes the background for its ensuing clauses and initiatives.

The memorandum commences with an affirmation from the Turkish Government and the GNA of the State of Libya, denoted henceforth as the “Parties,” regarding their unwavering commitment to the principles delineated within the UN Charter. Acknowledging the significance of the “MoU on Security and Military training cooperation between Türkiye and the GNA” dated April 4, 2012, the Parties pledge to engage in various security and military endeavours while upholding each other’s sovereignty and equality. Having a deeper look into the Security and Military Cooperation Agreement at this point, will provide a better understanding for further analysis.

- The first article of the agreement aims to establish a structured framework to foster and strengthen the relationship between the Parties. Precisely, it seeks to facilitate collaboration will be outlined in Article IV.
- The second article particularly applies to the exchange of personnel, materials, equipment, information, and experiences within the domains identified in Article IV. It establishes guidelines for cooperation across these areas.
- In article III, definitions of terms and concepts applied throughout the agreement have been explained to ensure mutual understanding.

- Article IV provides a detailed explanation of cooperation areas. Accordingly, Türkiye commits to offering training, consultancy, experience sharing, planning assistance, and material support. This support is aimed at aiding the (1) establishment of a Rapid Involvement Force in Libya, integrating both police and military responsibilities. (2) establishment, upon request, of a joint Defence and Security Cooperation Office in both Türkiye and Libya, staffed with an adequate complement of experts and personnel. (3) Provision of training, technical information, support, development, maintenance, repair, rescue, disposal, port and advisory support, and allocation of land, sea, and air vehicles, equipment, weapons, buildings, and land (training bases), subject to ownership. (4) Provision, upon invitation from the Receiving Party, of joint military planning, experience transfer, training and instruction activities, and training and consultancy services regarding the use of weapon systems and equipment for the operational areas of the Land/Sea/Air Forces within the Armed Forces.

Furthermore, the Article IV includes regulations regarding:

- Security and military training and instruction.
- Participation in exercises/training or joint exercises.
- Security and defence industry.
- Conducting training, exchanging information/experience, and conducting joint operations in combating terrorism, illegal migration, ensuring the security of land, sea, and air borders, combating narco-terrorism and smuggling, EOD/PMI operations, and disaster relief operations.
- Cooperation in various fields and exchange visits between the Parties.
- Structure of defence and security forces, structure and equipment of defence and security units, personnel management.
- Intelligence exchange and operational cooperation.
- Logistic cooperation, grants, and logistic systems.
- Military medical and health services.
- Communication, electronic, information systems, and cyber defence.
- Peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and operations against maritime piracy.

- Exchange of information on military law and maritime law systems.
- Exchange of Cartography and hydrography.
- Personnel exchange for professional development purposes.
- Exchange of Guest Personnel, consultants, or units.
- Exchange of information and experience regarding defence and security
- Exchange of information regarding scientific and technological research areas.
- Exchange of social, sports, and cultural activities.
- Exchange of military history, archives, publications, and museums.
- Exchange and sharing of information in the field of Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA)

As can be understood, Article IV of the MoU between Türkiye and the GNA reflects a detailed framework for bilateral security and military cooperation. This article outlines a wide range of initiatives, including the formation of a Rapid Involvement Force, the creation of joint defence cooperation offices, and the provision of essential training, technical assistance, and equipment. It further includes arrangements for joint military planning, participation in training exercises, and collaboration in areas such as defence industry, intelligence sharing, and counterterrorism. These provisions highlight a shared commitment to strengthening the security capabilities of both nations, enhancing interoperability between their armed forces, and addressing common security concerns through coordinated efforts. Particularly, article IV reflects the extensive scope and strength of the security and military partnership between Türkiye and Libya.

Article VIII draws a framework for collaborative endeavours among the participating entities, emphasising joint strategy development, information sharing, and operational cooperation across various spheres pertinent to national security. These spheres include addressing threats targeting the signatory parties' national security interests, combating international terrorism and its associated financial networks, monitoring security developments in mutually significant regions, evaluating technological advancements and communication technologies, facilitating training initiatives, preventing the proliferation of WMD, bolstering security measures in aviation and maritime domains, combating cybercrimes, and addressing challenges

pertaining to illegal migration through concerted efforts. This articulation underscores a commitment to multifaceted cooperation aimed at mitigating shared security challenges and fostering collective resilience. The signatory parties retain the prerogative to petition for residency permits, work permits, deportation, or analogous measures concerning individuals implicated in activities deemed detrimental to security based on intelligence findings. Such requests are transmitted by the parties to the pertinent authorities for thorough assessment pertaining to residency permits, work permits, deportation proceedings, and other pertinent migration-related affairs. This process underscores a formalised approach to address security concerns while adhering to established legal and administrative protocols.

As can be derived, the memorandum, comprising a total of twenty articles, presents a comprehensive framework for security and military cooperation between Türkiye and the GNA. Covering various critical domains essential for bilateral collaboration, it elucidates operational modalities and guiding principles governing their partnership, from implementing cooperation principles to resolving disputes. Key provisions encompass the safeguarding of classified information, intelligence sharing protocols, legal considerations, healthcare services, financial matters, customs and passport procedures, and obligations derived from existing international agreements. Moreover, the memorandum outlines procedures for resolving disputes, making amendments, and conducting periodic reviews, while specifying clauses concerning its duration and termination. Highlighting mutual commitment to cooperation, the document delineates mechanisms for implementation and oversight. Executed in Istanbul on November 27, 2019, the memorandum underscores the strategic alliance between the two nations in addressing collective security challenges and fostering closer ties. Signed by Hulusi Akar, the Minister of National Defence representing the Government of the Republic of Türkiye, and Fathi Bashagha, the Minister of Interior representing the National Accord Government of Libya, the memorandum signifies mutual areas of interest (“Millîterarası Andlaşma 30990, Karar no. 1926,” 2019: 5). In swift response to the signing of the agreement, the Turkish Republic promptly gained authorisation to engage in military operations in Libya, contingent upon the approval of the UN-recognised Libyan government. Without delay, Türkiye started to exercise its military capabilities in Libya, underscoring the immediacy and

decisiveness with which actions were undertaken following the agreement's enactment. Considering the fact that both sides agreed on this agreement, it reflects the continuing relationship that is many times mentioned within this work. On the other side, it is interesting to observe how the cooperation of two regional countries, excluding any Western country, leads to international reactions. In this instance, it will be possible to state that as soon as the sphere of influence of powerful states under the umbrella of hegemonic organisations such as the UN and NATO decreases, international reactions increase. Although it needs to be understood that if an emancipatory influence is the real aim, socio-cultural facts, regional realities, as well as the historical ties among two regional nations, must be considered.

To better explore the influence of the UN and NATO on the Military and Security Agreement between Türkiye and Libya, it is essential to delve into Türkiye's military involvement in Libya. By examining this intervention, it is possible to understand why the influence of these organisations has not yet led to emancipatory outcomes. On the other hand, since a critical perspective aims to transform situations into practices that result in emancipation, it is crucial to seriously consider the on-the-ground realities to identify potential areas for meaningful change.

5.6.3. Türkiye's Military Involvement in Libya

Amidst the onset and escalation of the Libyan civil war in February 2011, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's engagement in the conflict emerged as an important aspect of Turkish foreign policy. The Ankara government strategically sought to mend its strained socio-cultural and economic relations by advocating for the formation of a cohesive central government in Libya. However, the escalating chaos and violence within the nation increasingly jeopardised Turkish regional politics, increasing the urgency of Türkiye's involvement in stabilising the situation (Frederiksen and Tziarras, 2020:11). On the other hand, in the aftermath of the events of the Arab Spring, policymakers recognised the necessity to reassess Türkiye's "zero-problem" foreign policy doctrine, acknowledging the evolving regional political dynamics and the emergence of new challenges for Ankara. To maintain its impact, Turkish foreign policy shifted from a cautious approach to a more active and proactive stance. This active policy aimed to support the MB in Libya, promote the Turkish model where

appropriate, and weaken regional adversaries. Countries opposing the MB, which had Turkish backing and gained strength during the Arab Spring, targeted all factions linked to it. Since the Libyan government was aligned with forces connected to the Brotherhood and supported by Ankara, any efforts to weaken this alignment were seen as threats to Türkiye's interests. Thus, an ideological relationship emerged between Türkiye and Libya as two regional players (Hiltermann, 2018: 16).

From 2014 to 2019, during the Second Libyan Civil War, Turkish foreign policy became more active and gradually transitioned toward military involvement. In early 2014, 'Islamist' factions aligned with the MB took control of Tripoli, causing anti-'Islamist', secular forces to retreat to Tobruk. This led to the creation of two legislative bodies: the General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli and the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk, resulting in two competing power structures. General Khalifa Haftar allied with Tobruk's central authority and emerged as a key figure against 'Islamist' influence. On the other hand, the rise of the MB in Libya alarmed neighbouring Egypt, which, following a military coup in 2013, took measures against Brotherhood members. The stance toward the MB became a defining factor in the allegiances of international actors in Libyan politics, creating an ideological schism. While General Haftar's forces received substantial military support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the US, UK, Kuwait, the UAE, and, to a lesser extent, France and Russia, the 'Islamist' coalition sympathetic to the MB, including Türkiye, Qatar, and Sudan, found indirect backing from Italy (Frederiksen and Tziarras, 2020: 14).

In early 2015, the Islamic State established a stronghold along Libya's north-eastern coastline, creating a third power centre. On December 17, 2015, the UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) led to the formation of the GNA under Fayeze al-Sarraj, emphasising a non-military resolution to the crisis and disarmament of militias. Despite so, the Tobruk-based HoR withheld approval, and internal tensions grew due to the GNA's struggle against militias and radical factions. General Haftar's LNA pressured the GNA, presenting Haftar as the defender against extremists. This resulted in a political crisis by summer 2016, with pro-GNA and anti-GNA factions, while efforts to reconcile these factions over the next two years saw limited success ("Chaos in Libya: A Background," 2017).

Arriving in the year 2019, in early April, General Haftar launched a military offensive on Tripoli, disrupting all previous peace efforts up to this date and leading to the protracted Third Libyan Civil War. As the targeting of civilians increased and the situation became worse, the GNA called Türkiye for support. Türkiye, on the other hand, referring to the agreements it had with Libya and to their socio-cultural, socio-economic, historical, and political relationship, pledged support to the GNA, providing military aid. Within the international community, Erdoğan's actions were seen as a direct challenge to Haftar, prompting the LNA to denounce Turkish involvement and threaten retaliation against Turkish naval vessels, military personnel, and economic interests. This heightened the risk of a direct military clash and potential Turkish casualties ("Turkey Wades into Libya's Troubled Waters", 2020). Hence, it is possible to state that the execution of an MoU with the GNA on November 27, 2019 concerning sovereignty in the Mediterranean and military collaboration signified the commencement of a novel chapter in Ankara's Libya policy.

Thus, Türkiye's engagement efforts were primarily aligned with its regional sovereignty policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and the MENA region, with Libya serving as a crucial ally and partner. This involvement transcended mere resource exploitation, emphasising strategic collaboration and mutual interests. Since the Military Cooperation Agreement had been expanded to encompass tangible military support, counter-terrorism training, assistance in migration management, military logistics, and expertise exchange, Libya retained the authority to activate military assistance outlined in the agreement by formally requesting support from the Turkish government ("Full Text of New Turkey, Libya Sweeping Security, Military Cooperation Deal Revealed," 2019). Upon approval by the GNA, Türkiye could deploy military units to aid Libya.

Later on, the new Provisional Unity Government assuming office on March 15, 2021, led by Abdulhamid Dbeibeh, also maintained favourable relations with Türkiye, as demonstrated by the mutual reaffirmation of the Turkish-Libyan Mediterranean Maritime and Military Accords. Today, these agreements still serve to safeguard the national interests of both Ankara and Tripoli (Kansu, 2020: 66).

In Libya, Türkiye aimed to support the Tripoli government through military involvement to safeguard its sociocultural ties, influence, and economic interests. The

GNA for the first time officially requested military assistance from Türkiye via air, land, and sea on December 20, 2019. Despite providing military aid since April 2019, advances by Haftar-led forces in December 2019 led President Erdoğan to agree for direct involvement. Erdoğan justified his active stance by evoking historical ties and the need to protect over one million Kouloghli Turks from ethnic attacks by Haftar's forces. Additionally, he framed Haftar as a "coupist," threatening the UN-recognised Libyan government, portraying Türkiye's involvement as a defence against anti-democratic subversion by nations like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and certain Western powers, and positioning Türkiye as a defender of democracy (Gürdeniz, 2018: 52).

Starting in January 2020, Ankara has sent over 100 Turkish military officers to Libya as a form of military assistance. Their major objectives were to provide support and coordination to government forces and to train Libyan partner forces. Ankara also recruited combatants from militias allied with Türkiye in northern Syria to provide military support to the Libyan government. The fighters, who were enlisted from the Faylaq al-Sham group linked with the MB and the Murad Sultan Squadron of the Turkmen resistance force, were tasked with assisting the military objectives of the al-Sarraj administration. In December 2019, Akoush and McKernan (2020) documented that the small country had already transported 650 members of the opposition armed group, the Syrian National Army (SNA), to Tripoli. This occurred even before the Turkish parliament officially authorised the involvement in Libya to support the unity government. In January 2020, an additional 1,350 Syrian combatants arrived in the country. GNA entered into a contractual agreement with them for a monthly payment of \$2,000 for a period of six months. There are several estimations of the number of Syrian soldiers present in Libya. The LNA asserts that the quantity of combatants could exceed 6,000. According to the International Crisis Group (2020), approximately 2,000 combatants arrived in Tripoli in January 2020, followed by a further 2,500 in March. Ankara justified its provision of "Syrian military assistance" by delegating tasks to others and drew a comparison between the Wagner Group and around 5,000 Sudanese personnel and 2,000 Russian military mercenaries in Libya ("Erdogan Confirms First Turkish Soldier Deaths in Libya", 2022).

In addition, Türkiye increased its provision of arms and military equipment to its allies and government forces. Prior to January 2020, the GNA acquired military drones (Bayraktar TB-2), missiles, armoured personnel vehicles (BMC Kirpi), as well as Turkish operating staff and experts from Ankara. According to the International Crisis Group (2020), many cargo ships arrived from Türkiye carrying military equipment. The Turkish Army bolstered the defence and security of crucial areas by deploying medium-range anti-aircraft missiles in close proximity to the airports in Tripoli and Misrata. In April 2020, Ankara escalated its involvement and assumed control of two warships in the vicinity of Libya's western coast. The Turkish Air Force has been deployed on numerous occasions, primarily for the purpose of deterrence and observation ("Intra-Gulf Competition in Africa's Horn: Lessening the Impact", 2019). Unsurprisingly, the supporters of Haftar also increased the quantity of weaponry supplied to the country. In January 2020, the LNA achieved its most significant military triumph since April 2019 by recapturing the city of Sirte. In February 2020, Haftar's forces initiated a missile assault on Tripoli, during which Turkish air defence missiles were employed for protection.

On February 18, 2020, a rocket launched by a squad linked with the LNA hit a Turkish vessel stationed in Tripoli, resulting in the deaths of two Turkish military personnel. Soon, an operation centre has been created by the Turkish army at Mitiga Airport, which is at the moment the only functioning airport in Tripoli. On February 28, 2020, over a hundred missiles were launched against this airport (Aslan, 2022). The Libyan unity government, with the backing of Türkiye, initiated a counteroffensive on March 26, 2020, called Operation Peace Storm, in order to assist the capital. The soldiers of the GNA achieved a military triumph in western Libya in April 2020, despite the continued conflict in and around the capital. Government forces effectively severed Haftar's supply route, so depriving their supporters of weaponry, sustenance, and fuel. As a result, GNA soldiers seized control of Sabratah and Surman on April 14, 2020, after being under the administration of Haftar-aligned security forces for nearly a year. From that location, they supervised the assault on Tripoli. The city was besieged and subjected to aerial bombardment by GNA forces; nevertheless, their efforts to seize control of it were unsuccessful until the manuscript was surrendered.

This military involvement was a real turning point in Turkish foreign policy. Throughout the entire process, the supply lines of the LNA received support from prominent nations such as the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, Russia, and the UAE. Despite opposition from all these influential nations, Türkiye strengthened its dominance over the disputed allocation of fossil resource deposits in the region and upheld its partnership with Libya on maritime jurisdiction zones by supporting Mustafa Fayez al-Sarraj (of Turkish descent) instead of Haftar.

Today, the Land Forces Command and commando forces in the Libya Task Group Command under Turkish leadership continue to offer combat support components (“Barış Destekleme Harekatı”, 2021). With this command, Türkiye is decisive in conducting a range of military and security missions in Libya, including the ability to take necessary measures, in accordance with international law, to safeguard Türkiye’s national interests against different threats and dangers. Furthermore, Türkiye aims at preventing terrorist and illicit armed factions from launching attacks on Libya in order to safeguard regional security. As a whole, this means that the President of Türkiye possesses the authority to determine the utilisation of military forces in Libya. Due to the unclear nature of these clauses, any event occurring in Libya might potentially be perceived as a menace to Türkiye’s national security. Therefore, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that multiple teams will be sent to Libya. He clarified that the army’s role would not involve direct combat but rather the coordination of other combat units that are not affiliated with the Turkish Armed units. The president’s comments regarding the “distinct groups” ignited a contentious discussion inside Türkiye’s legislative body and media outlets. During an interview on CNN Türk, President Erdoğan elaborated on the Turkish military’s role in Libya, stating the establishment of an operation centre with a lieutenant general in charge, responsible for gradually supervising this process on the ground. Furthermore, he explicitly stated that the purpose of the possible elements being in Libya was not to engage in combat or initiate warfare. Accordingly, the goal of this initiative was to aid the government in preventing circumstances that may lead to regional instability and humanitarian catastrophes. Indeed, the objective was to expeditiously draft the Constitution (“İlk Türk Askeri Birlikleri Libya’ya Ulaştı! TSK, Radar ve Hava Savunma Sistemi de Gönderdi”, 2020).

Obviously, the entire process did not occur in isolation from the involvement of the UN and NATO. The military cooperation between Türkiye and Libya inside NATO has a lengthy and established history. Accordingly, as early as 2014, Libyan soldiers underwent a 14-week training program at the Isparta Internal Security Training and Exercise Centre in Türkiye. Hence, both parties possess a comprehensive understanding of each other's capabilities and characteristics within the context of NATO. Seeing the issue from this perspective, the military and security cooperation agreement, signed in November 2019, granted Türkiye the authority to deploy in Libya as a "stabilising force" rather than as a foreign force inside the framework of two NATO military cooperation units. However, the influential five within the UN and NATO did not approve of Türkiye's presence in Libya. In this regard, Presidential spokesperson İbrahim Kalın, at the international summit on Libya held in Paris on November 12, 2021, expressed that international allies were portraying Türkiye's presence as the primary concern in Libya. Nevertheless, according to Türkiye, that statement was false. Türkiye mentioned its objective as a stabilising entity providing assistance to the population of Libya. Due to the bilateral agreement between Türkiye and Libya, it was imperative that Türkiye prevented any comparisons being made between Turkish military deployed on the field and other mercenaries (Abdurrazık, 2021). Ömer Celik, the spokesperson for the Justice and Development Party party, characterised Türkiye's military involvement as support, asserting that the Turkish Armed Forces were deployed to provide training upon the legitimate government's request. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's advisor, Mesut Casin, made it clear that Türkiye does not desire any military involvement in Libya, stating that this was unnecessary.

By observing the Turkish involvement in Libya, it is possible to support the main argument and the subarguments of this thesis again. The events in Libya underscore the negative influence of the UN and NATO, as powerful member states leverage these organisations to advance their own interests rather than fostering genuine peace and stability. While Türkiye is not seen as a powerful state, its socio-cultural, historical, and religious ties to Libyan people constitute a potential threat to powerful states. Hence there is a selective influence by the UN and NATO disregarding these important facts to be considered among two regional countries. This

selective support allows powerful states to legitimise their interventions under the guise of international norms, undermining the sovereignty and stability of weaker states. The UN and NATO, instead of acting as neutral arbiters, often become platforms where influential nations pursue their strategic agendas, perpetuating regional conflicts and power asymmetries. The international reactions regarding Türkiye's military involvement in Libya further reflect that these organisations can be manipulated to serve the interests of their most powerful members without taking into consideration sociological, psychological, and geographical realities. The influential states within the UN and NATO, such as the US, UK, France, or Russia, bolster their preferred sides, deepening the divisions and prolonging the violence. This dynamic reveals the inherent contradiction in the roles of the UN and NATO, where their theoretical commitments to peace are overshadowed by the practical realities of power politics, ultimately undermining their credibility and effectiveness in resolving conflicts.

5.6.4. Why Türkiye is Involved in Libya (“Türkiye’nin Libya Hamlesi: Çalkantılı Sularda Belirsiz Gelecek Avrupa Raporu”, 2020: 1)

According to the 2019 military and security cooperation agreement and information provided by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish army has three distinct responsibilities in Libya: (1) delivering military training, (2) providing assistance, and (3) offering advisory actions. These tasks are all in line with the agreements made between Türkiye and Libya. However, on August 17, 2020, Türkiye and Libya forged a new deal, after their previous one in 2019, with a specific focus on military training. This agreement as well encompasses a wide range of topics, including joint military drills, the security and defence sectors, counter-terrorism initiatives, efforts to combat illegal migration, ensuring security at land, sea, and air borders, and combating narcoterrorism and smuggling. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that there is a scarcity of public information regarding this collaboration.

As mentioned many times, one of Türkiye's primary purposes in Libya is to offer training. Since August 25, 2020, the Libyan and Turkish Armed Forces have collaborated at the Joint Maritime Training Centre in Al Khums. Colonel Yetkin Koçaş, leading the Libyan army, reported that 900 Libyan soldiers from 38 regions

have been trained over two years. The centre aims to train Libyan Naval Forces' leadership to modern, effective standards. The Libyan Armed Forces received "urban operations training," while Lieutenant Cüneyt Karabacak noted that the centre offers various training, including military service, combat, urban operations, mountaineering, first aid, commando training, and Turkish language education ("Libya'da Mehmetçik'ten İlk Iftar," 2022). In June 2022, the Turkish navy trained personnel from the Libyan battleship Dawn, participating in the Efes-2022 live-fire exercise in Türkiye. Both nations conducted joint operational training exercises focusing on residential counterterrorism. To increase its influence, Türkiye would need a greater ground presence. However, evidence suggests that Türkiye's objective is not to enhance its influence but to justify its presence with additional socio-cultural, political, as well as economic reasons ("Libya'da Mehmetçik'ten İlk Iftar," 2022). The Turkish Government is justifying its military involvement in Libya by providing the following arguments:

1. Military Support: Ankara officials asserted many times that they provided explicit military backing in response to the prevailing circumstances and the official appeal for aid from the Serraj government ("Turkey Wades into Libya's Troubled Waters", 2020: 3). At the very beginning of the process, Ankara and the Serraj government reached a consensus that the aid from Türkiye must be supported by an official request from the government to ensure its legality. Not to mention that following Türkiye's declaration of its potential involvement, Serraj formally asked aid from four additional states, in addition to Türkiye ("Turkey Wades into Libya's Troubled Waters", 2020: 3). On December 20, Prime Minister Serraj appealed to the US, the UK, Italy, Algeria, and Türkiye at the same time. In the meantime, president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan provided two justifications to the Turkish public for the Turkish involvement in order to protect the Tripoli government. Initially, he mentioned the historical connections with the Ottoman Empire and the offspring of Ottoman progenitors, asserting that there exist numerous Libyans who are descendants of Ottoman predecessors, despite having undergone complete Arabisation. Indeed, the Kouloghliis, which will be briefly referenced in the 6th chapter of the thesis, serve to further an understanding of why Libya and Türkiye are unable to sever their relations entirely. The Turkish president emphasised the imperative of protecting this

population. Furthermore, Erdoğan underscored the significance of legitimacy. He labelled Haftar as a “conspirator” and portrayed the assault he initiated on Tripoli as a “coup endeavour” backed by several unfriendly foreign powers towards Türkiye. Erdoğan has singled out the US, Egypt, and the UAE among these foreign powers in some of his talks, while also acknowledging Israel, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and France. It has been noted that senior Turkish officials in Ankara asserted that the populace of Libya, encompassing both inhabitants and authorities in the eastern region under Haftar’s control, is in favour of Türkiye’s military operation and is against Haftar. Privately, members of parliament in the eastern region have expressed their desire for relief from Haftar’s influence, not just in the western part of Libya but also in the eastern region. They feel compelled to outwardly show support for him, despite not truly endorsing him.

Significantly, Turkish officials asserted that their operations in Libya are lawful and completely in accordance with international law. In this regard, Emrullah İşler, Türkiye’s Special Envoy to Libya, revealed that they were prepared for criticism regarding their engagement in Libya from foreign countries. “In response, President Erdoğan made it clear that Türkiye will only intervene in Libya if formally asked,” Emrullah stated.

Ankara defended its support for Tripoli by asserting it was in response to an invitation, not an illicit foreign action. However, the international community viewed this as disregarding the UN arms embargo, as Türkiye delivered weapons and military equipment to Tripoli. Ankara officials emphasised that Türkiye’s support was legal and aimed to enhance the defence capabilities of the internationally recognised but poorly equipped Libyan government, contrasting it with other countries’ actions. Ankara criticised global entities like Russia, the UAE, Egypt, the US, and France for supporting the Haftar faction while formally acknowledging the Serraj government, calling it hypocritical. They argued that backing armed assaults against the GNA in Tripoli without renouncing its authority is contradictory. Turkish authorities also criticised Brussels and Washington for their inconsistent stance, highlighting the erosion of Western prestige in Arab societies due to their contradictory actions.

Furthermore, Turkish officials rebuked the UAE for alleging that Türkiye supports political and militant Islamists over secular groups, accusations that

Europeans accept unquestioningly. They suggested that some European nations support Haftar to curb migrant influxes, indicating a preoccupation with immigration matters. Ankara also criticised the EU's Operation Irini for disproportionately focusing on sea shipments to Tripoli while neglecting land and air routes used by Haftar's allies. They claimed Western stances are influenced by oil interests, with Russia and the US driven by their own objectives.

Ankara believed Türkiye's military assistance to Tripoli balances military capabilities, compelling Haftar to consider a political resolution through diplomatic negotiations. Without Türkiye, Haftar would only stop his attack if the Tripoli government capitulated. Turkish involvement made Haftar realise he cannot achieve a favourable outcome effortlessly ("Turkey Wades into Libya's Troubled Waters", 2020: 7). Ankara remained committed to preventing Haftar from capturing Tripoli and urged external backers to push Haftar towards negotiations. The Turkish government emphasised its readiness to support Tripoli until Haftar's allies cease their military and financial backing." ("Turkey Wades into Libya's Troubled Waters", 2020: 7).

2. Strategic Objectives: Ankara's resolve to safeguard the Tripoli government from military defeat is as well motivated by Türkiye's geopolitical goals, which involve keeping regional stability. Türkiye's notion of national and regional defence, known as the "blue homeland," extends its territorial boundaries beyond land to include the seas.

The term "Blue Homeland" was initially coined by Rear Admiral Ramazan Cem Gürdeniz in 2006. It garnered significant attention when the Turkish navy conducted a military exercise in the Eastern Mediterranean in March 2019, named "Blue Homeland." The ruling Justice and Development Party and the Nationalist Movement Party united behind this assertion, which also reinforces Turkish nationalism, garnering widespread public backing within the context of strong regional diplomacy (Lewin, 2019: 38-50).

Another strategic objective is the matter of maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkish officials maintain that there is no explicit correlation between Türkiye's military involvement in Libya and the conclusion of the maritime border's agreement. They asserted that President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Serraj signed the deal on the same day as the security and military cooperation pact purely by chance.

Nevertheless, there are researchers who argue that the sequence of events suggests that the agreement on marine limits was a strategic and clever move aimed at bolstering Türkiye's military assistance. As a matter of fact, the opposition parties in Türkiye, who first endorsed the maritime borders deal, then condemned the administration for linking it to the decision to deploy soldiers to Libya, a move they opposed.

The maritime boundaries agreement establishes a maritime boundary of 18.6 nautical miles (35 km) between Türkiye and Libya. According to this agreement, Türkiye and Libya declared EEZs, shaped like cones, to the north and south of the boundary line, respectively (Yaycı, 2019).

Libya, being the only coastal country that Türkiye has maintained positive relations with, has become a vital prospective ally for Ankara in asserting its claims over maritime domains. Meanwhile, Tripoli depends on Türkiye's military assistance ("Turkey Wades into Libya's Troubled Waters", 2020: 10). Every country except Libya rejects Türkiye's attempt to restrict its jurisdictional areas as lacking legal validity. Nevertheless, in practical terms, this accord has the potential to enable Ankara to obstruct initiatives by other nations that seek to remove Türkiye from the Eastern Mediterranean and reduce its influence ("Turkey Wades into Libya's Troubled Waters," 2020: 10).

Furthermore, there are also diplomatic reasons that need to be considered strategically. Türkiye's assertive diplomatic initiatives seek to counterbalance Greece and Cyprus, with which it has enduring conflicts, as well as the coalition of nations that oppose Türkiye, mainly including Egypt, Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, who are significant backers of Haftar and backed by the US, UK, and France. These countries had aligned themselves in opposition to factions affiliated with the MB, who attained political influence during the 2011 Arab upheavals with backing from the leading party in Türkiye. Although there are members of the MB within the GNA in Libya, they do not have significant control or power. However, Ankara interprets the existence of these components as evidence that its regional adversaries are attempting to prevent the MB from attaining power in Libya.

Türkiye's engagement in Libya serves as a powerful message to those who are trying to impede Türkiye. An analyst in Ankara suggests that Türkiye is experiencing a sense of being trapped and limited in its options, which has led it to actively pursue

new alliances, strengthen current alliances, and assert its own interests. Türkiye employs force projection across the region as a means to prevent territorial loss. An expert with deep ties to the government, specialising in Türkiye's regional politics, asserted, "In situations where Türkiye perceives the formation of coalitions by multiple countries against it and experiences a sense of being cornered, it believes it has no alternative but to take action." As the natural gas pipeline situation in the Eastern Mediterranean progressed, the need for action became pressing. As the prevailing impressions of policies aimed at limiting Türkiye's sphere of influence persisted, Ankara displayed a proclivity for exhibiting assertive military force on the ground in Syria and the Horn of Africa ("Intra-Gulf Competition in Africa's Horn: Lessening the Impact", 2019: 35).

Economic reasons are also a part strategically important. Türkiye's economic relations also influence its approach towards Libya. Türkiye anticipates economic advantages resulting from the enhanced connections of bilateral agreements on security and maritime jurisdiction. In this context, the Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen Association (MÜSİAD) emphasised that following Ankara's declaration of military involvement to support the Tripoli government, it saw a substantial surge in exports to Libya. This growth is anticipated to be largely driven by the Turkish defence industry, which is the primary supplier of weaponry to government-aligned forces. In addition, Ankara intended to provide restitution to Turkish enterprises for the financial damages they have suffered in Libya since 2011.

During the Gaddafi period, numerous construction contracts were granted to Turkish businesses. However, due to the crisis that started in 2011, a significant portion of these contracts, estimated to be over 100, were left incomplete. As a result, there are approximately \$19 billion worth of construction projects that remain unfinished. Turkish construction businesses assert that they have invested \$2 billion in equipment and other materials for these projects, and hence they see this sum as outstanding payments owed by the Libyan state. Similarly, Turkish Petroleum allocated more than \$180 million in Libya prior to the commencement of the conflict, although it did not get any profits from its drilling investment after 2011 ("Intra-Gulf Competition in Africa's Horn: Lessening the Impact", 2019: 36). Today in the weaponry sector, Türkiye has strong ties with Libya next to its practical assistance and support on the

field. Not only Türkiye, but Qatar has offered financial assistance to numerous armed groups and politicians in Tripoli who oppose Haftar, too. Specifically, Qatar has mostly funded defence equipment for the forces in Tripoli that are loyal to the Serraj administration. This financial support has been facilitated through Türkiye following the commencement of violence in 2019 (“Turkey Wades into Libya’s Troubled Waters”, 2020:13).

Up to this point, the listed reasons are similarly applicable by many other countries within the UN and NATO. However, Türkiye has additional justifications, namely its socio-cultural ties to Libya. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Türkiye-Libya relations date back to the 16th century and have evolved to the point where the Kouloghlis, descendants of Turkish-Libyan heritage, came into existence. This connection highlights not only the strategic importance but also the historical ties between both nations.

At this point, the UN and NATO are making a mistake by disregarding this socio-cultural reality on the ground. The most powerful states within the UN and NATO do not share the same profile as Türkiye concerning Libya. Therefore, they are unable to reach a solution for this ongoing problem. Despite recognising the GNA, they also support Haftar, complicating the situation further. It is interesting to note that none of these powerful countries have the same socio-cultural ties to Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean region, or the MENA. Critical researchers have serious concerns regarding this issue. As one sub-argument of this thesis states, to change the influence of the UN and NATO in the MENA into an emancipatory one, these facts need to be considered. Instead of being a sphere of influence for the UN and NATO, Türkiye and Libya, both with geostrategic important positions, should be more involved in regional decision-making. In fact, with collaboration between Türkiye and Libya, hegemonic structures have begun to understand the importance of the Turkish-Libyan position in the Eastern Mediterranean.

5.6.5. The Berlin Conference

The inclusion of the Berlin Conference in this section aims to depict the global impact and measures taken in response to the Libyan situation. This instance

demonstrates that discussions held under the aegis of international peace and security organisations do not immediately achieve peace and security.

Ghassan Salamé, Head of the UNSMIL, in cooperation with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, commenced a consultation process in Libya in September 2019. The Berlin process constitutes the second phase of the three-step plan regarding the Libyan issue, that was declared by Ghassan Salamé to the Security Council on July 29, 2019. The initial phase involved implementing a humanitarian ceasefire that commenced on August 10, coinciding with the observance of Eid al-Adha, while the final phase was to convene a broad national meeting. For the second phase, the UN collaborated with the Government of Germany, that graciously hosted the event and offered significant diplomatic assistance.

The Berlin International Conference on Libya took place on 19 January 2020. Chancellor Angela Merkel invited the governments of Algeria, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Türkiye, the Republic of Congo, UAE, the UK, and the US. Representatives from the UN, including the UN Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Libya, the African Union, the EU, and the League of Arab States, were also present. Indeed, this profile portrays already the international influence. Each country possesses its own distinct interests; therefore, it is only natural that regional countries would be more susceptible to the impact of any adverse event on both a regional and national level. The primary goals of the conference were to establish a consensus among member states regarding the Libyan issue and facilitate and ensure international support for intra-Libyan deliberations on the country's future. The findings of the Berlin Conference on Libya emphasised numerous essential aspects. Initially, there was a shared acknowledgment of the pressing necessity to tackle the political, security, and humanitarian aspects of the Libyan issue. This encompassed recognising the danger presented by outside influence, divisions within institutions, and the spread of weaponry. Furthermore, the conference highlighted the harmful consequences of these variables on global peace and security, specifically by enabling terrorist operations and illegal migration.

The Berlin Conference on Libya focused on resolving governance and security issues to achieve lasting peace. It emphasised the “Berlin Process” under UN guidance, rejecting military approaches and committing to diplomatic solutions. Participants

pledged not to interfere in Libya's internal affairs and urged others to follow suit. However, all of these participants had a word to say on how to solve the Libyan issue. Considering that each of them had its own interests in Libya, the international influence becomes inevitable.

The UN and a Libyan political reconciliation process received strong support, with emphasis on mediation efforts and reducing violence. Confidence-building measures, like exchanging captives and disarming armed groups under UN supervision, were agreed upon. The importance of countering terrorism according to international law was highlighted, with a call for enforcing the arms embargo, especially regarding Türkiye's involvement.

An inclusive political process under UNSMIL's supervision aimed at encouraging the legitimisation of elections. Fair resource allocation and neighbouring countries' involvement were emphasised for stability. Security sector reform to restore state control over force and establish national security forces under civilian leadership was prioritised. Economic reforms focused on protecting sovereign institutions and empowering municipalities. A comprehensive financial evaluation was requested to ensure the soundness of financial institutions, promoting stability and economic revival under a unified government. Participants urged adherence to principles protecting people and infrastructure, improving judicial systems, and releasing unlawfully detained individuals. Arbitrary detention cessation and aligning migration and asylum laws with global norms were emphasised. Accountability for international law breaches, such as targeting civilians and human trafficking, was stressed. There was a commitment to support Libyan institutions in documenting violations and enhancing transitional justice efforts, ensuring compliance with international standards, particularly regarding missing individuals.

The Conference on Libya finished with a strong and comprehensive plan for putting its findings into action and ensuring their successful execution. The participants made a commitment to not engage in any more military deployments or activities in order to permit meaningful discussions within the planned committee. They also expressed their complete support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Libya in carrying out the agreed-upon decisions. A post-conference coordination body called the International Follow-Up Committee (IFC)

was established. The IFC was responsible for holding plenary and technical working group meetings to monitor progress, overcome implementation challenges, and coordinate operational support. Furthermore, the findings were expected to be presented to the UNSC for deliberation, highlighting the dedication to assist in their execution as part of the Berlin process. These efforts demonstrated a thorough and synchronised endeavour to tackle the Libyan situation and establish enduring peace and stability in the area (“Pressemitteilung Nummer 31/20 Berlin Conference on Libya”, 2020).

Prior to the Berlin Summit, UNSMIL, in compliance with its UNSC mandate and under the complete authority of the UN Secretary-General, put into effect all categories outlined in the Conclusions Document. A thorough planning exercise was carried out to establish an action plan that would be executed before, during, and after the Summit. It was assumed that progress in each category would occur simultaneously. This procedure also provided opportunities for member states to lend support and collaborate with the UN. UNSMIL initiated the development of these initiatives as part of the follow-up and implementation framework established in the Berlin Summit communiqué. The political agenda focused on the Libyans’ main aspiration for the consolidation of the country’s executive, sovereign, economic, financial, security, and military establishments. UNSMIL conducted extensive discussions with the Libyan factions, including members of the HoR, as well as other important groups, in order to consider possibilities for reinstating an operational executive branch. Women and youth were adequately included in all consultations.

In accordance with Article 64 of the LPA, UNSMIL commenced the procedure to form a Political Dialogue Forum. This forum would take place outside of Libya and consist of 40 representative Libyans. The purpose of the forum was to discuss the potential reformation of the Presidency Council and the appointment of a new Prime Minister and two Deputy Prime Ministers. These individuals would be responsible for forming a government, in accordance with the agreements made in November 2017 in Tunis regarding the powers of both the Presidency Council and the government. The government was scheduled to be presented to the HoR for a vote of confidence. The establishment of a new government necessitated the unanimous consent of all parties

to terminate the existing executive authority, which would occur concurrently with the merging of presently separated national institutions.

The main goal of the HoR was to finalise the electoral legislation required to bring an end to the transitional phase. In order to achieve this objective, it was necessary to provide complete financial resources and personnel to the High National Electoral Commission (HNEC). The Political Dialogue Forum established a clear plan for strengthening and securing financial support for the High National Election Commission (HNEC). Sanctions were planned to be imposed on individuals and businesses that pose a threat to Libya's stability and hinder or weaken the political process in accordance with applicable UNSC resolutions.

The Berlin Conference introduced two economic proposals: (1) the establishment of a Libyan Experts Economic Commission and (2) a Libyan Reconstruction and Development Fund. The Commission intended to include Libyan officials and specialists who would represent the diverse institutions and geographical regions of the country. Additionally, a separate secretariat was to be included. The Commission's purpose was to facilitate an open conversation and enable current institutions to gradually align their economic and financial policies while simultaneously fostering the essential confidence for unification. Before the Berlin Conference, which took place on January 6, 2020, the UNSMIL gathered 19 Libyan technical experts to initiate the establishment of the Commission by outlining its Terms of Reference. The Reconstruction and Development Fund intended to utilise a shared planning document in order to enhance and simplify the allocation of resources towards essential infrastructure development. All these actions again show the already involvement and influence of the international community.

The security basket encompassed a sequence of measures designed to solidify the Libyan parties' agreement to a ceasefire, resulting in a thorough and enduring cessation of hostilities in Libya. These measures also aimed to stabilise the security situation across the entire country, disband armed groups, and reunite and reconstruct security institutions to establish the state's exclusive authority over the lawful use of force. The security roadmap was closely synchronised with the political strategy, and its advancement relied on certain milestones at various stages of the process. The first step entailed the creation of a Joint Military Commission (JMC) consisting of regular

military and/or police officers, operating under the auspices of the UN. This commission was formed based on the discussions and documents generated during the Cairo negotiations. The JMC served as the overarching body that established sub-committees with specific focuses, including truce/ceasefire, DDR (the reintegration of armed individuals into civil life), counterterrorism, and security arrangements/border control.

The technical working group/task force responsible for the demobilisation, disarmament, and, when necessary, reintegration of armed groups collaborated with the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence/Military Zones, and General Command of the new unity government to carry out a census of armed formations known as 'support forces'. The task force categorised groups and individuals into three distinct groups: (1) those who could be rehabilitated, (2) those who needed reform, and (3) those who should be dismantled and disarmed. Terrorists and criminals were apprehended and subjected to legal proceedings. Additionally, this group executed initiatives to provide medical care for militants and prioritise the demobilisation of young fighters. The task force also devised a strategy for the assimilation and reintegration of individuals belonging to armed groups (including the process of vetting).

Another step was the enactment of temporary security measures, beginning in Tripoli, by the ministries of interior and defence of the newly formed unity government. The task group determined the requirements for international aid and organised the distribution of this aid with the assistance of UNSMIL.

The primary duty for ensuring compliance with the existing UN resolutions pertaining to the sanctions system and arms embargo lies with the Member States. Improved and punctual adherence to current Security Council resolutions was anticipated to result in a decrease in the frequency of breaches of the arms embargo and served as a trust-building action in aid of the ceasefire and disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) endeavours. The participants in Berlin were required to pledge their commitment to adhering to the UN arms embargo and strengthening their respective national legislations. They were requested, in accordance with applicable UNSC resolutions, to assist the panel of experts in carrying out its duties by providing pertinent information. The Berlin group would facilitate the

coordination of technical support and exert pressure on Libyan colleagues to promote the execution of sanctions. The Berlin Follow-up Committee was assigned the responsibility of implementing specific measures, such as providing assistance to judicial institutions and law enforcement agencies in evaluating and examining prisoners in correctional facilities and ensuring fair legal procedures. The committee was also working towards strengthening the unity and integrity of judicial institutions, ensuring access to justice, and developing a prison roadmap that aligns with international standards.

The Committee was assigned the responsibility of implementing certain measures, such as assisting the government in putting a stop to the unjustified imprisonment of migrants and refugees and gradually shutting down custody centres. This would involve creating alternative custody methods that adhere to human rights standards. The recognition of documenting human rights abuses as a crucial factor is closely connected to enhancing accountability. Member states were encouraged to actively contribute to the provision of technical assistance and capacity building for the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCHR) and other civil society organisations involved in documenting and reporting on violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). The Berlin Follow-up Committee was asked to promote criminal justice reform in order to bring perpetrators of violations accountable. The goal was to ensure that Libya's national criminal justice system aligns with international fair trial standards. Transitional justice procedures that adhere to international standards were emphasised as crucial in ensuring long-lasting peace, justice, and reconciliation. The media's detrimental impact on the Libyan crisis, namely in exacerbating the situation and fostering division among communities, was recognised. The current method of UNSMIL to monitor hate speech was planned to be improved, and Member States were encouraged to contribute to this effort.

Despite exhaustive efforts such as the Berlin conference including the involvement of numerous IOs, the Libyan issue remained unresolved. According to this study, this dilemma is explained by the fact that theoretical discussions diverged from practical implementation in real-life situations. The impact of international peace and security organisations falls short of being liberating. The practical implementation of the aforementioned facts does not align with their theoretical formulation. Each

nation participating in the Berlin Process had its own distinct strategies and interests for being a member of the UN or NATO. Thus, there is no comparable situation on the field that involves peaceful practice.

Türkiye, through its security and military pact, explicitly acknowledges that Libya holds significance as a regional ally and a former command. This is the reason why international peace and security organisations are sceptical of Türkiye's presence in Libya and want to exert influence over Türkiye's intentions. The influential five within the UNSC and NATO are troubled by any form of regionalism, including that of Türkiye. This indicates that the impact of NATO and the UN is not limited to a specific geographical location. Therefore, all endeavours that are accurately manifested in the Berlin Process do not contribute to regional peace and security. One needs to ask whether the problem lies in the fact that the discussed theoretical solutions are not good enough, or if there is a problem in practicing them. The answer according to this thesis lies exactly in the discrepancy between theoretical reality and practical reality. Hence, the right question at hand is whose peace and security are being considered, in theory and later in practice?

5.6.6. The Influence of the UN and NATO on the Military Process between Türkiye and Libya

By observing the turning points of the case study of this thesis, one can easily see that the UN has been actively engaged in the Libyan crisis since its inception; however, it is difficult to attribute any significant achievements to this involvement. NATO, on the other hand, serves as the military apparatus through which the more influential states exert their dominance over other governments with regional or interest-based objectives. Given that this is the final turning point of the thesis, it would be intriguing to examine the influence of the UN and NATO on the relationship between two countries. One of the most intriguing ways to understand the influence is by illustrating a specific connection between influential individuals in the region and powerful states within the UNSC and NATO. Even some simple connections can, under certain circumstances, reveal the influence of IOs. Undoubtedly, one of these persons is Khalife Haftar. Haftar was born in Ajdabiya, a city in Libya. He enlisted in the Libyan military during Muammar Gaddafi's regime and actively participated in

the coup that led to Gaddafi's rise to power in 1969. During the late 1970s, he pursued military education in the Soviet Union, where he successfully completed a specialised three-year program at the M. V. Frunze Military Academy (Oakes, 2021: 99). This program was specifically designed for foreign officers who were sent to the USSR for research purposes.

In 1987, he was taken captive as a prisoner of war during the conflict with Chad. He fell into a trap and was apprehended, causing significant humiliation for Gaddafi and dealing a severe setback to his aspirations in Chad. During their captivity, he and his fellow commanders established a faction with the aim of toppling Gaddafi. He was released in around 1990 as part of an agreement with the US government. The CIA reached an agreement that allowed Haftar and 300 of his soldiers to relocate to the US under the US refugee program. He then resided in Langley, Virginia, for nearly twenty years and obtained US citizenship (Oakes, 2021: 80-90). One of the sub-arguments of this thesis is that simple connections with individuals can demonstrate the influence of a state or organisation on another state or organisation.

As a matter of fact, the conclusion of the Cold War reduced Libya's geopolitical significance, leading to the suspension of the CIA's funding program for Haftar's army. Haftar participated in an unsuccessful rebellion against Gaddafi in the eastern mountains of Libya in March 1996 and then went back to the US. He relocated to a suburban region in Washington, D.C., specifically residing in Falls Church, Virginia, until 2007. Subsequently, he went to Vienna, Virginia. Leveraging his strong connections within the DIA / CIA, he constantly provided backing for multiple endeavours aimed at overthrowing and eliminating Gaddafi. Haftar resided in close proximity to the agency's main office and fostered strong connections with multiple US intelligence services. Within the military forces that toppled Gaddafi in 2011, amidst the First Libyan Civil War, Haftar occupied a high-ranking role (Oakes, 2021).

In 2014, he held the position of commander in the Libyan Army when the General National Congress (GNC) declined to relinquish power as stipulated under its designated term. Haftar initiated a military operation targeting the GNC and its associates who adhere to Islamic fundamentalism. His campaign facilitated the organisation of elections to replace the GNC but subsequently escalated into the Second Libyan Civil War. The disclosure has emerged that Haftar, the head of the

unauthorised military forces in eastern Libya, obtained assets valued in millions of dollars in the US. Haftar, who staged a rebellion against the internationally recognised government of Libya, as acknowledged by the UN, allegedly acquired 17 properties in Virginia, USA, using funds he misappropriated from Libya (Oakes, 2021). It was asserted that all the properties were officially recorded under his ownership. Haftar's assets included a 5,600-square-meter mansion valued at \$2.5 million in Great Falls, an apartment in Falls Church, and a farmhouse (Malsin and Faucon, 2020: 1). It was reported that Haftar executed a monetary transaction of \$8 million to acquire one of these homes. Furthermore, it was discovered that Haftar, who acquired a \$700,000 equestrian estate in Boyce in July 2020, participated in international horse racing events in France and the UAE with thoroughbred Arabian horses grown on the property ("Haftar'in ABD'deki Dikkat Çeken Serveti", 2020).

Upon perusing this information, one may inquire as to why Russia is not chosen as Haftar's preferred destination of residence and wealth accumulation and why he favours the US instead. In August 2016, Haftar declined to recognise the newly endorsed GNA by the UNSC. This caused the US and its allies to conclude that he was endangering the stability of Libya. According to Libya analyst and RUSI Senior Research Fellow Alison Pargeter, Haftar might be seen as the primary hindrance to peace in Libya (Pargeter, 2020:1). This is because he supposedly worries that working with the GNA could result in the loss of his power in eastern Libya. After establishing a tight relationship with the US for a considerable period of time, he later formed an alliance with Russia in order to obtain weapons for his cause. He subsequently developed close relationships with the UAE and Egypt, whose air forces would eventually play a vital role in his military assault to capture Libyan territory. In 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron hosted him as part of his diplomatic efforts to make progress. This came after France had provided arms to rebels fighting against Gaddafi in 2011.

Haftar launched an assault on Tripoli after the LAAF quickly advanced through Fezzan earlier in 2019. This invasion was founded on two assumptions: first, that the international community would not respond, and second, that influential figures in Tripolitania would switch their loyalty. The initial assumption was verified as correct. Haftar launched his offensive while UN Secretary-General António Guterres was there

in Tripoli. Notwithstanding this transgression, Guterres flew to Benghazi the next day with the aim of persuading Haftar to halt military actions. Haftar greeted him with a chilly reception and respectfully declined to cancel the offensive (Oakes, 2021). This attitude typically reflects a power dimension behind closed doors.

However, the UNSC did not denounce the strike. Aside from receiving diplomatic support from France and Russia, Haftar had obtained approval from President Trump during a phone conversation prior to launching the attack (Oakes, 2021). Unsurprisingly, the credibility and authenticity of the UN, as well as other IOs, significantly diminished in the perspective of supporters of the GNA. GNA supporters expressed astonishment at the absence of response when the Secretary-General, who represents all members of the international community, was in a site that came under attack. Within the hallways of the GNA, there was a palpable feeling of betrayal and frustration at witnessing numerous international actors actively seeking favour with Haftar and elevating his importance above all other figures in the country. Reportedly, officials from UNSMIL remarked that the images of the Secretary-General appearing subservient to Haftar had a greater negative impact than a thousand defeated battles. Without receiving any response from the international community, the GNA enlisted a contingent of Chadian mercenaries and made direct appeals for assistance. These requests primarily pertained to armaments and were directed at Tunisia, Algeria, the UK, the US, Italy, and Türkiye. The only group that agreed as obvious in this instance, were the Turks. Ankara dispatched several military resources to Tripoli. The equipment provided, consisted of armed unmanned aerial vehicles, specifically the 'Bayraktar' TB2s, as well as mine-resistant armoured personnel carriers known as 'Kirpi'. Despite its restricted tactical scope, the impact of the event was significant in terms of boosting morale. On this occasion, the GNA emerged victorious in the race for rearmament. Turkish Special Forces utilised Turkish Korkut 35-mm self-propelled anti-aircraft guns and American Stinger MANPADs.

In addition, Türkiye relocated numerous Syrian mercenaries to Libya, accompanied by a group of trainers from the private military contractor SADAT, which is connected to President Erdoğan. This group also included several hundred Turkish military officers in uniform, intelligence advisers from the Turkish national Intelligence Service (MIT), and technicians. Furthermore, the group bolstered the

political authority of Interior Minister Bashagha of Misrata, who served as the primary procurer and coordinator of Turkish assistance.

Although the UN inaction supported independent actions that partially offset Haftar's need for foreign support, his attempt to bribe Tripolitania militias was mostly unsuccessful. As of mid-June, the fighting had resulted in a minimum of 690 fatalities, which included 41 non-combatants. Additionally, there were 4,000 individuals injured, with 126 of them being civilians, and 90,000 people who were forced to leave their homes and become internally displaced (Zucconi, 2019). On August 10th, opposing factions in Libya reached a ceasefire agreement that was suggested by the UN during the Muslim festival of Eid Al-Adha. UNSMIL made vigorous efforts to leverage it in order to rally the international community, not just to manage the war but to definitively resolve it, as stated by UNSMIL chief Ghassan Salamé. Nevertheless, both factions in Libya were unable to accept the presence of an international force tasked with overseeing the truce, which only endured for a brief period of time.

A ceasefire among the parties was no longer possible than 24 hours. The involvement of many countries in this process made the progress of a ceasefire impossible. Hence, the instance at hand, reflects how international influence does not promote peace and security, nor does it lead to an emancipatory result. Despite so, some powerful Western countries do not intend to give up on Libya. Indeed, the commencement of a new unsuccessful EU initiative in Libya, namely the Berlin Process given in detail before, coincides with this point.

It was also evident that several players in the diplomatic process while on the forefront supporting the peacekeeping discussions, as stated by a Libyan official, were simultaneously sabotaging them in secret.

Over the course of eighteen months, the Libyan crisis transformed from a proxy to an internationalised conflict. This involved the utilisation of national forces and resources from foreign powers, in addition to more conventional proxies. All of this took place within a sovereign country, with no consequences or punishment. Foreign military personnel exerted exclusive control over the majority of foreign assets and the strategic planning of military operations inside both Libyan coalitions. In this particular situation, if NATO had desired to intervene in Libya, they had three choices: (1) to align themselves with one side in the civil war; (2) to act as impartial arbitrators,

which would require disregarding the principle of local ownership; or (3) to develop a strategy that focused on addressing external factors that were fuelling conflict, with the aim of diminishing the ability of Libyan factions to engage in combat against each other.

On the other hand, EU member states initially viewed Haftar favourably for his anti-terrorism endeavours. However, his 2019 offensive took EU policymakers by surprise, prompting a sudden shift in perception. Despite earlier assertions of Haftar's benefit to European interests through his anti-terrorism efforts, his trustworthiness was abruptly called into question.

In fact, the existence and influence of the UN and NATO from the very beginning of the Libyan issue facilitated the Anglo-French desire for 'regime change', with the US reluctantly supporting it and NATO implementing it. This was done in accordance with UNSC resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011), which imposed an arms embargo and theoretically aimed to protect the civilian population in Libya, respectively. However, up until this day, no implementation was able to solve the Libyan issue. While Haftar received indirect support from the US as well as European countries for a long time, the GNA received theoretical diplomatic backing from the UN, including the significant conference in Berlin as part of a four-month German initiative in collaboration with the UNSMIL mission and a simultaneous effort by Moscow to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the crisis. This situation exactly reflects the conflict between peaceful and security-based discourse and interest-oriented practices. Even though as members of IOs, powerful states argue to support peace and security, on a single basis they act according to their interests.

Indeed, NATO's physical absence from any discussion over Libya's future has been notably unexpected. The alliance serves as the main security asset for American and European interests in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe and has previously played a crucial role in shaping Libya's destiny, as seen in 2011. Despite recent conflicts with the West regarding Libya and other regional issues, Türkiye remains a significant member state of NATO. Consequently, the organisation has been reluctant to intervene, even as proof of Russian involvement in Cyrenaica has increased in recent months. The organisation has also been weakened by conflicts among its European constituents on the appropriate course of action in Libya, as well as by the annoyance

from the US due to Europe's neglect of burden sharing. The previous NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, has advocated for NATO to embrace a stronger "political agenda" and has expressed his support for backing the UN arms embargo on Libya and the Wifaq administration in Tripoli. Exactly this posed a challenge in openly expressing criticism towards Türkiye for its endorsement of the internationally recognised administration in Libya. Furthermore, there is a possibility for conflict among NATO member states. Nevertheless, according to the West, NATO must develop an official reaction to the operations by Türkiye and Russia, particularly in light of the departure of General Haftar's forces from Sabratha (Joffe, 2020: 1-9).

To gain a comprehensive understanding of NATO, it is crucial to thoroughly comprehend its conundrum. The 2019 Libyan escalation sparked significant apprehension inside NATO circles. The proliferation of additional instability and, primarily, Russian influence appeared to pave the path for more assertive NATO measures. However, the Alliance once again found itself unable to take effective action due to concerns regarding its legitimacy and internal disagreements. These outcomes were a combination of political and strategic factors, as is often the case due to the influence of previous decisions. The immobility inside NATO resulted in the expansion of individual initiatives and subsequent internal competition, similar to what had previously occurred in the EU. This ultimately led to one of the most intense clashes between allied nations in the history of NATO. When Haftar invaded, none of the necessary conditions for timely NATO intervention to safeguard the civilian population of Tripoli were present. Both the UN and the GNA did not make a formal request for involvement, and none of the member states of NATO advocated for it. Many countries in the UNSC appeared to be tacitly supporting Haftar.' (Marcuzzi, 2022: 34), The GNA seemed to have lost faith in international fora (Marcuzzi, 2022: 112) and most NATO capitals were either resigned or confident that Haftar could end the Tripoli affair quickly. A NATO officer once stated that NATO has a policy regarding situations where the international community aligns itself against a specific action. As in the past, this strategy rendered the concept of having a NATO sheriff in town' purely rhetorical (Marcuzzi, 2022: 139).

Within the Alliance, there were three distinct positions about the situation in Libya. One group viewed the events in Libya as worrying and believed that NATO

should intervene. Another group opposed any form of involvement. The third group remained undecided. Indeed, comparable splits had arisen in the majority of NATO deployments. On this occasion, the divisions were particularly pronounced and affected both the political and military aspects of NATO member nations, as well as the organisation's administrative structure. The initial proponents of a NATO intervention reportedly were select representatives from the US, the UK, and Italy. They received backing from a faction inside NATO's administrative system, particularly within the headquarters, that advocated for a more influential political role for the Alliance. Marcuzzi reports about a NATO official stating that there is a widespread consensus on the chaotic state of Libya and suggested taking action to address the situation (Marcuzzi, 2022: 136).

The opposing faction consisted of France, Türkiye, and Nordic-Eastern European countries, who advocated for a concentrated emphasis on Russia within Europe (Marcuzzi, 2022: 139). They also received support from the headquarters, where a significant number of people had a sense of tremendous relief that NATO did not participate in Libya. One officer recalled, *"Although it may seem pessimistic, upon observing the problem, it was impossible not to think; that is not a concern for us. We are facing an ample number of issues"* (Marcuzzi, 2022: 136). The third group inside NATO consisted of Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, as well as the political leaders of most NATO member nations. However, unlike their representatives in the alliance, these leaders were uncertain about NATO's commitment (Marcuzzi, 2022: 139). The group's agreement on NATO's participation hinged on the envisioned choices and their perceived legitimacy both internationally and domestically. One possible course of action was a peace-enforcing operation, in which NATO would enforce a ceasefire and deploy an impartial force to separate the opposing factions in Libya and ensure the maintenance of peace. The latter endeavour also sought to prevent external actors from 'interfering in Libya in a manner that prioritised their own interests over those of the common Libyan populace'. NATO would respond based on a humanitarian reason ("Is There an Active Role for NATO in the Libya Conflict?", 2020).

This possibility quickly became a mere academic exercise for NATO military authorities. It received backing from certain factions within the US military, as well as

AFRICOM (Marcuzzi, 2022: 181), which was concerned about Russia's influence in the "gray zone" of power. However, it also faced widespread criticism and complaints regarding its strategic value and legitimacy (Wehrey, 2020: 27). The nations in the Central-North European region expressed strong reservations about assuming military involvement in the absence of a formal invitation from the UN or the Libyan government. In this particular situation, it was necessary to have American leadership, willing to invest significant effort and take decisive action. President Trump and his allies consistently stressed that they considered the situation a matter for Europe and had no further involvement. Although the Mediterranean does not belong to the US, none of the NATO powers were willing to pursue a foreign policy direction that contradicted the prevailing sentiment in both the UNSC and the White House ("Intra-Gulf Competition in Africa's Horn: Lessening the Impact," 2019).

An alternative approach for an intervention considered a more significant involvement of the UN, potentially with the assistance of NATO's logistical resources or assets. A plan was prepared by policy advisers for US Secretary of Defence James Mattis. The proposal suggested the inclusion of a UN contingent in Libya, with leadership provided by Muslim countries that have not previously been involved in Libyan affairs, such as Indonesia or Pakistan. Alternatively, the request might have been directed towards NATO partner states while still utilising the UN as the primary forum, with the assistance of NATO's technical support. Possible forms of assistance could include implementing a no-fly zone or establishing a monitoring system using air or satellite resources. Despite experiencing an identity crisis, NATO was widely acknowledged as the sole institution with the capability to achieve this outcome. (Chorin, 2019: 1).

Evidently, the Libyan population harboured a lack of confidence in NATO's role as a monitoring and surveillance agency. Specifically, in Tripoli, France was perceived as a friend to Haftar, which led to suspicion from the GNA on how Paris may utilise any intelligence collected by NATO. On the other side, Haftar harboured comparable suspicions towards Türkiye.

Several NATO officials were likewise puzzled by the possibility of the UN-NATO option. One of them made a comment: What actions will NATO take in the event that the Wagner mercenaries breach a ceasefire? Shall we engage in a military

airstrike against them? Even if we assume unanimous agreement from all member nations, will it be enough? What is the threshold force required to have a discernible impact? Furthermore, would it enhance our legitimacy in the eyes of the world community or diminish it? (Marcuzzi, 2022: 139).

Due to the lack of a definitive legal foundation, which was not provided by either the UNSC or the Libyan authorities, the member nations were determined to refrain from engaging in futile or foolish military actions (Marcuzzi, 2022: 181). Consequently, and likely to prevent a recurrence of the embarrassing lack of coordination they faced in 2011, NATO military leadership evaded the issue of strategy: ‘We do not engage in planning for tasks that we do not anticipate member states requesting from us (Marcuzzi, 2022: 181).

NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg and UNSMIL chief Salamé held a meeting at the NATO headquarters in Brussels on May 13, 2019. Stoltenberg expressed the Alliance’s concern about the situation in Libya and called on all parties to stop fighting. He emphasised the increasing suffering of Libyan people. Stoltenberg stated that the only remaining option for NATO involvement in Libya is to assist in the development of strong security institutions, such as a modern ministry of defence and effective security services, which would be under the control of the government upon request of Libya. The option to restart NATO’s standing offer of a defence capacity-building mission was politically acceptable and did not raise any legitimacy concerns (“Berlin’s Diplomatic Efforts in Libya: What Could Be Expected?”, 2019). Accordingly, this incident exemplified path dependence, as NATO adhered to its established framework despite the significant escalation along the southern front of the alliance. NATO maintained its identity as a political-military alliance with a primary focus on nuclear deterrence and territorial defence, a perception shared by its member states. The MENA region was deemed more suitable for projecting stability “through cooperation and partnerships” rather than for NATO crisis management (“Partnerships: Projecting Stability through Cooperation,” 2020).

Salamé reiterated the common statement that there is no military resolution to the ongoing crisis in Libya. He also expressed the complete endorsement of the UN process in the country (“NATO Secretary General, Libyan Prime Minister Discuss Situation in Libya,” 2019). Soon, NATO officials increased their communication with

the GNA, reaching a climax with a phone conversation between Stoltenberg and Serraj on May 16, 2019 to discuss a mission focused on enhancing defensive capabilities.

The prevailing perception among NATO circles was that the primary form of capacity building desired by the Libyans is to receive training and be provided with weapons. There was a prevailing inclination to remove the Libyan problem from the NATO table in order to prevent contentious internal debates and potential embarrassment. As a result, the military authorities of NATO reached the conclusion to stay prepared for any case. The sudden signing of the November 27, 2019 GNA-Ankara agreements caused an inevitable disruption within NATO. An officer from Türkiye within the NATO alliance described it as ‘perhaps the most intelligent decision that Erdoğan could have made (Marcuzzi, 2022, 184). The signing of the agreements fundamentally changed NATO’s perception of the Libyan problem. It shifted from being a crisis where member states were secretly causing significant damage to one where a member state was openly involved on the ground.

On the other side, Ankara regards Libya as a matter of national importance and will consistently refuse to cooperate on any matters related to it (Marcuzzi, 2022: 184). This led to increased rivalry between Türkiye and Italy for control over Tripolitania (Bertolotti, 2021: 22) and heightened tensions between Türkiye and France, the UK, the US, and Russia. All countries openly accused each other of engaging in a self-serving and illegal power struggle in Libya (“NATO to Investigate Mediterranean Incident between French and Turkish Warships,” 2020). The discrepancies in American actions exacerbated the situation. President Trump initially conveyed favourable indications to Türkiye over both the Libyan and Syrian matters, such as the unilateral withdrawal of US forces from Northern Syria without consulting NATO Allies. However, he subsequently issued a threat to President Erdoğan to completely destroy the Turkish economy (Wehrey, 2020: 7-48). This situation was the event that best reflected the confusion of the UN and NATO and why they could not solve the problem. There were and still are differences in discourse and practice.

During that process, Macron notably remarked that NATO was undergoing a ‘brain death’ due to its failure to solve political challenges (“Nato Alliance Experiencing Brain Death, Says Macron”, 2019). Although most Allies formally distanced themselves from such words (as said above), several secretly agreed. Some

ex-Italian delegates remarked that Macron was absolutely correct. NATO had indeed exhibited a lack of effective leadership and strategic foresight. “However, it is important to note that France has played a significant role in NATO’s political stagnation since 2011,” the Italian ambassador stated (Marcuzzi, 2022: 184).

In reaction to repeated French charges, Ankara started to utilise the consensus rule to create impediments on all potential matters. The Turkish situation grew progressively more uncomfortable for international powers. It was a topic of conversation among everyone in the corridors (Marcuzzi, 2022: 184). On June 10, 2019, the diplomatic conflict evolved into a military confrontation. As previously stated, a Turkish convoy traveling to Libya was halted by a French frigate serving within NATO. The warship approached the convoy in order to examine its cargo. According to French authorities, their ship was allegedly targeted by radar three times within a minute by the Turkish escort, which was seen as a strategic manoeuvre preceding a potential attack (De Sanctis, 2020: 40). Two longstanding NATO allies were on the verge of a military clash regarding Libya. The French withdrawal marked the conclusion of the episode, but Paris insisted on a NATO investigation. During an urgent NATO ministerial conference, eight member states supported France, while both the US and the UK did theoretically not. A diplomat from Italy characterised the NATO environment as a “peculiar orbit that progressively became more peculiar.” He added: *“The rope remains intact, but we are approaching a state of breakage”* (Marcuzzi, 2022: 184).

In order to rectify the situation, Stoltenberg said that NATO should be involved in implementing and enforcing the arms embargo in Libya (“Stoltenberg: La Nato Unita Contro La Disinformazione Russa e Cinese”, 2020). It did not make any progress or achieve a result. In addition to the Turks, whose veto was expected, the other member states showed a lack of response. Some individuals contended that a maritime operation aligned with the same UNSCR that had established the legal foundation for Irini would yield a comparable, albeit limited, effect. Some individuals perceived this mission as lacking in practical training and viewed it as a wasteful expenditure of resources with ships being sent without any productive purpose (Marcuzzi, 2022: 184). Some individuals maintained that the EU, by implementing more stringent sanctions, is the sole entity capable of addressing Türkiye’s challenges. Once Türkiye is

compelled to reach a resolution, NATO might potentially assume a role in Libya (Marcuzzi, 2022: 184).

The upheavals inside NATO provided advantageous opportunities for Russian movements. According to AFRICOM reports, a significant number of Wagner Group fighters were moved to Libya after the GNA spring offensive in 2020. The transfer was facilitated by modified Ilyushin Il-76 aircraft from the Russian Air Force. Additionally, at least 14 combat aircraft, including MiG-29s and Su-24s, were also sent to Libya. The forces provided support to reinforce the Sirte-Jufra line, which the Russians built with extensive earthworks, and bolstered the Russian diplomatic efforts during the following ceasefire discussions (“AFRICOM: Russian Fighter Jets Flown by Mercenaries Are Conducting Combat Activities in Libya,” 2020). Upon the announcement of the August truce, US observers were left with the perception that the Russians and Turks had surpassed and outwitted both the US and European parties involved. An ex-NATO officer made a straightforward remark, stating that Russia and Türkiye had effectively gained dominance over the Eastern Mediterranean region (Marcuzzi, 2022: 185).

The Alliance did not find protection by avoiding politically difficult issues and evading strategically risky situations following Haftar’s onslaught in 2019. In contrast, it had exposed it completely in the middle of the road. NATO, including its institutional entities and member nations, remained apprehensive about utilising military action in a crisis situation where the legal framework and strategic implementation of force were unclear. This proves that previous failures caused NATO to act cautious in this case.

5.6.7. Conclusion

As can be derived from the information above, the Libyan crisis has been a complex and multifaceted issue that has inevitably engaged the UN and to a certain extent NATO. Even the discussions on the basis of these organisations reflect their involvement in the issue. No matter whether applying to military sense or a peacebuilding process, all potential solutions were discussed within the framework of NATO and the UN. This means that even if there was no direct intervention under the umbrella of the UN and NATO in Libya, a leading from behind strategy was available.

This again means that, in the justice system, the security, the political system, as well as in the humanitarian dimension, the influence of powerful member states of the UN and NATO is visible from the very beginning of the process. Although the question should be, to what extent Western countries or the US could be able to understand the culture, religion, and ethnic structure and the sociological and psychological situation of Libyan people regarding the listed facts.

This thesis argues that as long as such facts are not taken into consideration in the MENA region, a definitive solution will not be possible. For instance, the case of Khalife Haftar's involvement in the conflict sheds light on the intricate relationship between financially supported influential individuals in the region and powerful states within the UNSC and NATO. Haftar's trajectory, from his military education in the Soviet Union to his alliance formations with the US, Russia, and other regional players, underscores the geopolitical and interest-oriented dynamics at play, not to mention his fortune. His actions, including military offensives and attempts to gain international recognition, have significantly influenced the course of the conflict. On the other hand, this section also reveals the challenges faced by the UN and NATO in effectively addressing the Libyan conflict and the underlying interest-crisis. Despite efforts such as the Berlin Conference and diplomatic initiatives, the lack of a coherent and unified approach has hindered progress toward a sustainable solution repeatedly. Moreover, Haftar's ability to manoeuvre between various international actors highlights the complexities of the geopolitical landscape and the competing interests at play. Wherever he went, he found support, in the West as well as in Russia. This reflects the interest driven international power structure very clear. As a matter of fact, tension between NATO member states, particularly regarding Türkiye's involvement in Libya, further complicated efforts to address the crisis effectively.

It should be stated that the Libyan crisis necessitates from its inception a more comprehensive and coordinated approach by the international community, including the UN, NATO, and regional actors. Not only the interests of single states within these IOs, but historical, socio-cultural, ethnic, etc. facts also need to be taken into consideration. This would easier lead to the recognition of the non-alignment of theoretical peace and security discourse with actions in practice. Only through collective action and the sole aim to reach peace and security can a sustainable and

peaceful resolution to the Libyan crisis be achieved. Indeed, the lack of consensus within NATO led to intense clashes between allied nations and exposed divisions both politically and militarily. Three distinct positions emerged within the Alliance, reflecting the complexities of navigating geopolitical dynamics and strategic interests. While some advocated for intervention, others opposed any form of involvement, and a third group remained undecided.

Despite calls for intervention by a certain group, in the last turning point, NATO remained cautious, preferring to focus on capacity building and diplomatic efforts. The NATO conundrum also revealed tensions between member states, particularly regarding the role of actors such as France, the US, UK, Italy, and Russia in the Libyan conflict due to interest-oriented rather than peace and security based implementations. The lack of consensus on how to address these challenges further exacerbated internal divisions and hindered effective decision-making. Türkiye was the sole country to respond to the request from Libya and provide assistance to the legitimate authority within the country. While in this regard, it is partially feasible to comprehend the influence of neighbouring nations, it is not feasible to have the same comprehension for IOs with certain power structures.

To sum up, the intervention of the UN and NATO in the Libyan issue reveals not only a negative and non-emancipatory result but also potential threats that come with the interest-oriented involvement of IOs in different regions. On one side, the UN, through its Special Representative for Libya, UNSMIL and other actors, has theoretically provided platforms for communication and peacebuilding initiatives, whereas on the other side, these efforts have failed in practical implementation. Within the framework of this thesis, this is primarily due to the fact that theoretical realities contradict practical realities. Last but not least, the involvement of Türkiye in Libya can be understood within the context of geographical proximity and historical ties between the two nations. Situated across the Mediterranean Sea from each other, Türkiye and Libya share a significant maritime border and have long-standing cultural, economic, and ethnic connections. Türkiye's involvement in Libya can thus be seen as a strategic response to safeguard its interests and maintain stability, since chaos in one country will affect Türkiye and others in the region. However, it is not that simple to explain the intervention of some powerful countries like the US within hegemonic

structures, with the discourse of keeping international peace and security. The theoretical reality of this situation is to promote stability and protect civilians, whereas the practical reality of such interventions carries geopolitical motivations and raises questions about sovereignty and the impartiality of international actors. Significantly, the actions of powerful states within hegemonic structures such as the UN and NATO bring to mind a key question of whether these structures are successful in protecting their aim and scope of existence.



6. *KULOGLHLIS* AS AN IMPORTANT FACT IN TURKISH-LIBYAN RELATIONSHIP

6.1. Introduction

Historians like as Belhamissi and Abd al Jalil Tamimi provide a nuanced view of Ottoman control in the Maghreb, contrasting it with European colonisation. Unlike European countries labelled as invaders, the Ottoman effect was distinctive. Historical documents even prove that local inhabitants frequently sought Ottoman protection, indicating acceptance and collaboration. One fact that bolstered Ottoman authority is religious solidarity. This characteristic helped to create a unique administrative system in the region, including Libya. Due to this fact, it was possible to talk about internal peace within the Ottoman State. On the other side, the “Pax Turcica” doctrine highlights this internal peace as critical to Ottoman solidarity against exterior threats. Nevertheless, the *Kuloghli*s’ long-lasting presence in Libya can be directly ascribed to the aforementioned mostly justice Ottoman administrative feature. In contrast to many other ancestral groups in the MENA region, this chapter contends that the presence of the *Kuloghli*s continues to impact the relationship between Libya and Türkiye, usually seen as the Ottoman State’s successor. Before diving into the *Kuloghli*s’ lasting impact from historical times to the present, it is necessary to review talks about their origins and historical significance.

One of the most known names when it comes to the *Kuloghli*s is Aziz Samih. According to Aziz Samih, *Kuloghli*s are people who sought asylum in the Maghreb region due to their involvement in criminal activities in their home country, mistreatment by their parents, or looking for possibilities because of their combative and courageous dispositions (İlter, 1936). Samih states that the *Kuloghli*s’ origins, can be traced back to the occurrence by a variety of circumstances. This could also be seen as the Ottoman Empire’s recruitment efforts. As known, during the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire asserted its hegemony over North Africa through maritime expeditions led by figures such as Oruç Reis and Barbaros Hayrettin Pasha, which facilitated the relocation of Turkish soldiers to the Maghreb for marine operations and protection of local people from potential threats. This selective relocation continued

until the late nineteenth century, particularly during the reign of Yavuz Sultan Selim (BOA, n.573, N 1171, 1816).

Many of these troops choose to reside permanently in metropolitan areas, resulting in the long-term presence of their ancestors there. Consequently, the number of Turkish people in the region has expanded significantly as a result of marriages between these troops and local women. Janissaries, who were normally forbidden from marrying while in service, started to frequently resign in order to marry. These marriages, gave birth to the social group known as the *Kuloghli*,²⁸ fostering integration between the two communities (Bachrouch, 1977). Today, *Kuloghli*, also known as the “Karakol Oğulları,” are widely present throughout the Maghreb. However, their historical roots and current presence remain still under examination, particularly in Libya, which was a vital outpost for the Ottoman State in the past and for the Turkish Republic in the present.²⁹ One interesting point to know about the *Kuloghli* is that this group endeavoured to build a positive reputation as they toured numerous territories in the Maghreb (Trablusgarp, 101AD). Therefore, self-identification as “murabıt,” traditionally connected with completing religious tasks, was a significant attitude of their identity. Thanks to this strategy, Muslims in North and West Africa regarded those with this title with great respect until the late twentieth century. So, the *Kuloghli* aimed to be recognised as “murabıts” during the Ottoman Sultanate era (Tarih-i İbn Galbîn der Beyan-ı Trablusgarp, 1867). But despite their attempts, this strategy failed to build their relationship with the indigenous population under the title of Kuloghli. Locals frequently mispronounced “Karakol Oğlu” and wrongly referred to unmarried janissaries as “Kuloghli” (Trablusgarp, 101AD).

Another scholar, namely Magaly Morsy, asserts that individuals of Kuloghli heritage only comprise former Janissaries who resigned from their positions and

²⁸ During the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire asserted its hegemony over North Africa through maritime expeditions led by figures such as Oruç Reis and Barbaros Hayrettin Pasha, which facilitated the relocation of Turkish soldiers and Janissaries to the Maghreb for marine operations and protection of local people from potential threats. Janissaries, who were normally forbidden from marrying while in service, started to frequently resign in order to marry. These marriages, gave birth to the social group known as the *Kuloghli*, fostering integration between the two communities.

²⁹ The phrase “Karakol Oğulları” translates to “Sons of the Police Station”. This translation implies that Libya held considerable strategic importance as a key bastion for the Ottoman Empire within the Maghreb region.

married local women (Morsy, 1984). Ahmet Kavas, also attempted to understand the historical backdrop of the *Kuloghli*s. According to Kavas' conclusions, their declining power within the Ottoman State began in the 17th century, first in Algeria, then in Morocco, and eventually in Tripoli (Libya) to a lesser extent. Notably, Kavas emphasises the *Kuloghli*s' exceptional persistence in Tripoli's surroundings, where they have maintained prominence not only in the larger Maghreb region but also across the wide Ottoman State and beyond (Kavas, 2001: 30-68). Another researcher, Tevfik Karasapan, states that the *Kuloghli*s' importance in Tripoli has not changed. In fact, during the transition era defined by the collapse of the Janissary corps and the subsequent foundation of the Asakir-i Muhammediye corps, Tripoli Governor Yusuf Pasha took proactive action. He formed a battalion of *Kuloghli* men and assigned them duties previously performed by the Janissary corps. As a result, Mahmud II gave him the renowned title of beglerbey of Rumelia (Karasapan, 1960). Later, the significance of the *Kuloghli*s became clear again during Sultan Abdulhamid II's rule.

According to İbrahim Özcoşar and Abdüsselam Ertekin's research, the Hamidiye Regiments were organised by a commission created in Tripoli in 1893. These regiments were a specialised and approved military force that worked directly under Sultan Abdulhamit II. Establishing this commission needed the inclusion of a highly skilled gendarmerie squad from the *Kuloghli*s (Yacoob et al, 2018: 253-271).

Bariş Bolat's research indicates that the *Kuloghli*s remained significant as well in Libya after sultan Abdulhamid II, during the Ottoman-Italian War between 1911-1912 (Yacoob et al. 2018: 253-271). During that time, documents reflect that, the typical Ottoman military presence in Tripoli was estimated to be between 15,000 and 20,000 soldiers. However, it is believed that this figure increased from 40,000 to 50,000 when the *Kuloghli*s support was taken into account. The *Kuloghli*s' impact went beyond the military sector, affecting fields like education, architecture, literature, and several other domains (BOA, Y.EE 122/03). In the years that followed the war, the involvement of Libyan Kuloghli people in Anatolia's struggle for independence became clear. After the independence of Libya, names like Sadullah Koloğlu, Libya's first prime minister, further reflects the continuous partnership between Türkiye and this specific group inside Libya (Koloğlu, 2001). Surnames such as Kologlu, Kuloglu,

and even *Köroğlu* are still widely used today. Considering the continuous existence of this group, the literature appears to be deficient in its investigation of the current influence. Thus, this chapter contends that the *Kuloghli*'s impact from the past to the present lasts. These assertions seek to show conclusions by tracking the *Kuloghli*'s history from its beginning to the present.

6.2. The Journey of the *Kuloghli* to the Maghreb

The beginning of *Kuloghli* history is stated to have started by the late 15th century, when the Mamluks of Egypt, mostly Turks, sought Ottoman assistance to enhance their naval force against Christian rivals (İnalcık, 1973: 239). However, later in the 16th century, fears of Ottoman supremacy hampered Mamluk-Ottoman collaboration. On the other hand, Sultan Selim I's fight against the Mamluks was portrayed as liberating Arabs from Mamluk tyranny and defending Islam against Christian dangers, which drew Arab support. The Arab support continuously increased. In this context, famous Arab historian Taghribirdi chronicled significant Arab support for Ottoman successes against Christians, particularly the conquest of Istanbul, which was celebrated throughout the Muslim world (Taghri-Birdi, 1960). This historical journey highlights the different impact of Ottoman influence on North Africa, altering political landscapes and increasing cultural bonds throughout centuries (Koloğlu, 2007). Following the conquest of Egypt, Sultan Selim I's expansion incorporated the regions from Benghazi to the Red Sea coast into the Ottoman Empire. Simultaneously, Selim formed ties with powerful regional figures such as the Sharif of Mecca and Yemen's ruler, seeking protection from Portuguese incursions.

In 1519, Tripoli sent a delegation to Istanbul seeking assistance against Spanish assault, prompting Ottoman fleets to intervene. Similarly, the ruler of Gujarat in India requested Ottoman protection, and Ottoman fleets assisted both regions. Over time, the Ottoman Empire received numerous requests for assistance from countries as far away as present-day Indonesia, demonstrating the Ottomans' extensive influence. This attraction derived from the perception of Ottoman countries as the principal refuge against expanding Christian authorities, which was appreciated by both Muslims and Jews. Next to being a state where refugees found accommodation, scholar Sauvaget's

thesis also emphasises the Ottoman state's overwhelming power, which included extensive territories, solid financial resources, competent administration, a disciplined military, modern artillery, and naval superiority in the Mediterranean. These capabilities lifted the Ottomans to a position of importance in European geopolitics, altering the dynamics of the time (Sauvaget, 1942). The Ottoman State's initial participation in North Africa was motivated by a desire for assistance from Spanish Muslims. In retaliation, the Imperial Navy, led by Kemal Reis, conducted operations on Spanish beaches and islands in 1487. Kemal Reis returned to the region in 1510 and made several expeditions, potentially establishing contact with Moroccan Arabs. These early exchanges were not aimed at territorial expansion but rather set the way for future Turkish navigators. These contacts are strategically important because they lay the framework for future Ottoman participation in North Africa, paving the way for greater exchanges and influence in the region (Öztuna, 1979: 44). In response to increased maritime activity, Turkish sailors embarked on Western Mediterranean voyages. The most prominent names among Turkish sailors are the brothers Oruç, Hizir, and İlyas, also known as the Barbarossas. These sailors are known for navigating the Mediterranean waterways of the 16th century, engaging in a variety of enterprises ranging from trade to privateering.

During this period, the Barbarossas and their compatriots had a significant impact on Mediterranean marine trade and politics. The Libyan shore, which was strategically positioned, was a popular stop for their ships. Piri Reis, in "The Book on Navigation," described Tripoli, Misallata, Barca, Tobruk, and Sellum, emphasising their importance in trade. Due to this strategic importance, Kemal Reis and his nephew Piri Reis were ordered by the Ottoman Sultan to sail in Libyan seas. While returning to Istanbul, Tripoli's request for a governor because of instability arrived, but before the Ottomans could respond, Tripoli succumbed to Spanish occupation. Indeed, the struggle of certain imperials is a fact that highlights the region's instability and the Ottoman State's difficulties in controlling its North African provinces (Kitabı Bahriye Vol. II, 2020).

Due to the presence of the Spaniards in Tripoli, caravan routes changed, resulting in major economic losses from the trading of gold powder and slaves. This

slump impacted not just Tripoli but also the surrounding settlements, causing Tripolitarians to seek Ottoman assistance one more time in 1519. Instantly, the Ottoman authority dispatched naval and military forces to Tadjura. Conflict persisted throughout the Maghreb until the Ottoman invasion of Tripoli in 1551, headed by sailors such as Turgut Reis, who later joined the Ottoman marine. The conquest of Tripoli increased Ottoman influence in the Mediterranean in general, undermining the Knights of Malta's stronghold and reinforcing Ottoman power.

Fernand Braudel emphasises Tripoli's strategic importance as a military bastion and vital link to certain states, reinforcing the city's place in Africa's interior. During the Ottoman period, the Odjaklu, or young Turkish men from Anatolia, were the dominant military force in the Maghreb region. As mentioned above, Aziz Samih İlter, author of "Turks in Şimali Africa," provides a unique perspective on North Africa during this time, highlighting how individuals seeking refuge from crime or family discord frequently found their way to the Maghreb in the first half of the 16th century, driven by a rebellious and adventurous spirit. Recruiters from Western Odjaks,³⁰ based in Istanbul, Izmir, and Antalya, called for volunteers for duty in coastal forts, promising a comfortable life and an honourable death. Once enough volunteers had been recruited, they were sent to the Mediterranean. Becoming a Janissary in North Africa required meeting specified qualifications, most notably being Turkish, giving even the lowest-ranking Janissaries better prestige than local elites (İlter, 1936).

Unlike the recruitment of Christian youth into the Janissary corps, Odjaks were routinely recruited every two to three years in Izmir, Anatolia's principal port. Approximately two to three thousand recruits were transported to Odjaks in the Maghreb. This policy sought to keep soldiers away from local intrigues. Odjaklu were mostly warriors on warships and were not allowed to marry. About 2500 Odjaklu were stationed in Tripoli, under severe discipline (Pignon, 1956). The Maghreb's ruling class was dominated by Turks, who sought to counterbalance any pro-European Christian sympathies among local rulers. Christian pirates who converted to Islam joined the Odjaklu and sought safety. Their recruitment was predicated on their

³⁰ Stations in the coast of certain regions.

seamanship abilities, yet concerns about desertion continued. Their conversion, known as “becoming Turks,” was motivated by their personal interests. Even members of the church gave up their faith, emphasising the appeal and status associated with the Odjak (Monlau, 1973: 39). Despite the Odjaklu’s marriage restriction, many of them married Arab women, giving rise to the population known as “Kuloghli,” or “son of the servant.” Soon it was recognised that the increase in Turkish population in Odjaks was not primarily due to soldiers relocating from Anatolia but rather due to marriages with local women, resulting in families with children. Those who were unable to marry while serving as Janissaries/Odjaklu could do so after quitting the military. This is how *Kuloghli*s came to be (Bachrouh, 1977: 12-19).

The Kuloghli class in Libya, although at first sight resembling its counterparts (other Janissaries in the region), is distinguished by non-Turkish mothers. Unlike previous Janissaries from other Ottoman provinces, who could marry freely within their districts, those stationed in the Western Odjaks were forced to marry indigenous women due to the difficulty of finding a Turkish spouse (Morsy, 1984: 81-96). Children born from marriages to Turkish people were not deemed Kuloghli. Over time, a distinct generation evolved, which survived as a separate class from Kuloghli in other Ottoman lands. As a matter of fact, the deployment of sailors and soldiers to the Western Odjaks and provincial centres was critical in preserving these crucial cities and areas. Soldiers, largely recruited from diverse Anatolian regions, were charged with protecting these cities. While many soldiers were of Turkish ethnicity, they were brought together from various locations for a set length of time and integrated into urban life until their service term was over. Despite the different ethnic backgrounds represented by recruiting in Istanbul, sources generally agree that many recruits were of Turkish descent.

Due to the fact that their mothers are not Turkish, the vast majority of *Kuloghli*s in the region speak Arabic as their native tongue (Hıfzı, 1911: 211-216). However, there are others who are fluent in their father’s language. They also identify as Turkish and use the word “Kuloghli,” which is Turkish. The word “Kuloghli,” which means “son of the servant,” refers to the progeny of an Ottoman soldier, implying that all people who serve in military or governmental roles are “the Sultan’s servants” (Cari,

1974: 71). Despite its Turkish origins, the adoption of the Arabic script causes the term Kuloghli to be spelled differently in Turkish, English, and French (Kavas, 2001: 33-73). Mahmud Naci defines the “Native Turk” class as the descendants of soldiers who took Tripolitania, together with their children and grandchildren. As previously said, they achieved local status through marriages between Anatolian immigrants and local women (Trablusgarp, 2012). In archival documents and literature, descriptions frequently describe Janissary contingents organised by Turgut Reis, accompanied by groups of craftsmen, and the collective known locally as “Kuloghli,” who are tax-exempt (Safi et al., 2013: 31-40).

The *Kuloghli*s started to establish dominance in the Ottoman provinces of Tunis and Tripoli beginning in the early 18th century, apart from the Ottoman State. Their participation in government in Algeria became increasingly difficult from the mid-17th century on, despite being the province where the *Kuloghli*s class began (Chérif, 1992: 318). On the other hand, they became increasingly powerful in Tripoli and Tunis. While in general, their numbers may be declining throughout the Maghreb, the major point of this chapter is that the *Kuloghli*s’ influence within the Ottoman State and later in Turkish-Libyan relations can be seen across several administrative periods in the region. During the 18th-19th century, important families from this class in the Maghreb were El-Gullt and Bu-Şlagtm in Constantine, as well as the family of Muhammad b. Osman al-Kebir in Yeliran (Chérif, 1992: 319). The Karamanlı dynasty, part of the Kuloghli elite in Tripoli (1711-1835), and some beglerbeys from this family played significant roles in regional history (Morsy, 1984: 31). In the early 18th century, Ahmed Karamanlı, a Kuloghli military figure, took control of Tripoli. It was not until ten years later, in 1722, that he gained the title of Pasha from Istanbul. The periods of Ahmed Bey (1711-1745), who served as beglerbey for a long time from this dynasty, and later Ali Bey (1754-1793), and Yusuf Bey (1794-1832) are noteworthy. The Kuloghli, a class of powerful families in Tripoli, firmly backed the Karamanlı family’s long-standing rule. Several Kuloghli administrators, including Mehmed Pasha (November 4, 1745-July 24, 1754), Ali I Pasha (July 24, 1754-July 30, 1793), Ali Burghul Pasha (July 30, 1793-January 20, 1795), II. Ahmed (January 20-June 11, 1795), Yusuf Karamanlı (June 11, 1795-August 20, 1832), Mehmed

Karamanlı (1817, 1826, and 1832), Mehmed ibn Ali (1824 and 1835), and Ali II Karamanlı (August 20, 1832-May 26, 1835) ruled in cooperation with the Ottoman State in Libya. External revenue was the primary source of income during this period, particularly privateering activities in the Mediterranean, which increased dramatically in 1711 and again between 1794 and 1805. Captives and ransoms were critical to provincial revenue. Indirect sources included tributes paid by European states for the safety of their trade ships in the Mediterranean, which increased the province's revenue. The economy relied heavily on trade between Tripoli and the Mediterranean in general, which was mainly controlled by Tripoli (Chérif, 1992: 319).

During Yusuf Bey's tenure (1796-1833), the province became more reliant on foreign borrowing as privateering dropped and the trade monopoly deteriorated. Despite these hurdles, his control remained through the imposed taxation of the population and the support of the *Kuloghli*s, assuring his ongoing dominance (Martel, 1956: 39). During Yusuf Karamanlı's reign, the army consisted of around ten thousand Kuloghli, which increased to thirty thousand by 1830. In 1881, Tripoli alone housed 1,200 cavalymen and 2,800 Kuloghli irregular infantry, which grew to 4,000 infantry by 1885, while the cavalry stayed steady. This demographic shift reflects Kuloghli's strong position and influence within the regional military structure (İlter, 1936). The Kuloghli unit in Homs, consisting of 200 cavalymen, was commanded by the Bashagha until this position was abolished in 1900. Their responsibilities included guaranteeing public and road security, as well as revenue collection, in exchange for tax breaks. This arrangement continued into the early twentieth century.

Considering the facts provided above, it can be pronounced loudly that the *Kuloghli*s had a significant effect on the Ottoman state from the 16th century until the twentieth century. They formed a strategically important group with administrative privileges in the Maghreb. While their influence spanned the whole Maghreb region, this chapter only concentrates on the Libyan contingent, arguing that only those in Libya have a lasting impact today. It is noteworthy to mention that while being aware of European division plans in the early nineteenth century, the Sublime Porte maintained a decentralised structure that allowed for regional autonomy until the mid-19th century as well for the *Kuloghli*s.

6.3. The Hamidiye Regiments

Another significant moment in Ottoman history regarding the *Kuloghli*s is Sultan Abdulhamit II's reign, which demonstrates the *Kuloghli*s' enduring influence, remaining despite transformations. During his reign, the Sublime Porte's links to Ottoman-controlled areas weakened, since Sultan Abdulhamit believed that re-establishing Ottoman dominance on a worldwide scale required retaining ties with all Muslim states. On the other hand, he sought to realise this goal in a variety of ways. In Libya, he met with the Sanussiyah Movement and the *Kuloghli*s, realising their strategic importance in the region. From 1835 onward, Tripoli was integrated into the Ottoman State, culminating in the termination of the Odjak system and the formation of a new relationship between the government and its citizens. This transitional period aimed to modernise and expand state control. Exactly at this point, it is critical to understand the interaction between the ideology of the Islamic Union and the Hamidiye Regiments. Between 1870 and 1920, the concept of "İttihad-ı İslam" (Islamic Union) was widely discussed in Muslim-majority regions such as Cairo, Bombay, Istanbul, or Singapore through European and American press outlets. It gained support from both those who adhered to Islamic principles in social life and those who did not but had an anti-imperialist stance. Various personalities, like Mithat Pasha and Mustafa Kemal, supported the concept of İttihad-ı İslam at different times and circumstances without necessarily adhering to Islamist ideologies. This is the reason why between 1900 and 1922, Muslims living under European colonial rule regarded Ottoman sultans as Islamic world leaders (Aydın, 2013: 47-69).

The concept of İttihad-ı İslam developed during a period when political and intellectual discourse prioritised state preservation over other matters. This idea is thought to have emerged in response to the pervasive impact of Pan movements in the nineteenth century, particularly the German and Slavic movements, following failed attempts to protect the state. İttihad-ı İslam is argued to have stemmed from two main sources: firstly, a conservative reaction that surfaced, particularly within Ottoman public opinion, following the Tanzimat reforms; and secondly, the growing significance of the caliphate within the Muslim world, coupled with heightened appeals for assistance from the Ottoman State due to the colonisation of Islamic

territories (Çetinsay, 2001). The assessment emphasises the importance of political and environmental elements in assessing the meaning of the Ottoman caliphate to Muslims living under colonial control. It implies that this relevance should not be interpreted as a spike in religiosity or a comeback of traditional values, especially given the continuous processes of globalisation and Europeanisation within these communities. In this sense, pan-Islamism can be distinguished from ideologies attempting to Islamise or resuscitate Islam in reaction to perceived threats from Western modernity. Instead, it might be considered an attempt to reinterpret Islam in light of its original origins, with the goal of restoring its essential qualities despite developing socio-political circumstances (Yıldırım, 2013: 1-27).

The political orientation of İttihad-ı İslam, a precursor of Islamism, evolved not largely from a theoretical framework but rather as a response to current conditions at that time. It arose from a sense of Islamic togetherness sparked by collective suffering, a sentiment thought to have begun with the loss of Crimea. Following invasions and colonial ventures in the Islamic world, İttihad-ı İslam became a natural anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist alternative. İttihad-ı İslam, despite its contemporary qualities, exhibited a singularity that challenges the secondary, subjective position commonly given to the Ottoman political class when viewed beyond the Eurocentric lens of the modernisation paradigm (Özbek, 2004: 71-90). These ideas seek to demonstrate that a political position frequently associated with Abdulhamid II's personal traits was actually more firmly based in the prevailing circumstances of the time than exclusively attributed to Abdulhamid himself. However, this does not diminish Sultan Abdulhamid's position as a crucial figure in this process during his reign. In contrast, Abdulhamid II's policies facilitated the spread of the İttihad-ı İslam ideology throughout the Islamic world. His policies are significant in regard to the concept of İttihad-ı İslam because of his ability to create manoeuvring space in the face of rising restrictions (Deringil, 2002).

One of Abdulhamid II's key initiatives was to revitalise the symbolic language associated with the sultanate and caliphate, as well as to restructure instruments in the Islamic world. His goal was to implement strategic goals through a clandestine and overt global network, using world Muslims as conduits for his efforts. Approaches that

focus solely on the Hamidiye Regiments, which are mostly made up of Kurds, sometimes neglect the larger plan that drove their development. Consequently, regiments formed or tried to be constituted in other places are frequently ignored. The foundation of the Hamidiye Regiments was motivated by several circumstances, including Abdulhamid II's İttihad-ı İslam policy, the army's dire plight, and the intense imperial encirclement of Ottoman territory. The inability to govern the army under Abdulhamid II's rule posed a fundamental weakness to the İttihad-ı İslam plan. Not only was the army lacking in technical competence and equipment, but a significant portion of it rejected Abdulhamid's views. As mentioned, the İttihad-ı İslam policy had an anti-imperialist position and evolved into a strategy co-developed with the public rather than simply being adopted by the state in regions vulnerable to imperial operations.

On February 19, 1892, Şakir Pasha, the Commander and Governor of the Vilayet of Tripolitania, received a telegram emphasising concerns regarding the inadequacies of the Gendarmerie and the *Kuloghli*s in preserving security in the face of a probable foreign attack. As a result, it was proposed that these forces be inspected by a military commission. Şakir Pasha, who organised the Hamidiye Regiments in Anatolia, presented a report to Abdulhamid II recommending a similar system in Tripolitania. The rationale for this idea was based on the need to protect the region from external threats and occupations, strengthen the Ottoman State generally, and potentially gain African support for the caliphate. Abdulhamid II approved this suggestion, and Şakir Pasha was tasked with organising the Hamidiye Regiments in Tripolitania. Subsequently, efforts began to construct these regiments in the region (BOA, YPRK.BŞK.25/43). Throughout the process, a commission was constituted in Tripoli to organise the Hamidiye Regiments. This panel first decided to construct the Hamidiye regiments alongside a renowned gendarmerie unit composed of *Kuloghli*s members. In addition, the commission prepared a memorandum, which was sent to Tripolitania with an imperial order for public reading.

According to this memorandum, a commission was formed in Tripolitania, consisting of representatives from various strata of society, including the town council, imams, mukhtars, the head of the *Kuloghli*s, sheikhs, and the commander of the

imperial army, as well as military officers (BOA, Y.EE 122/03). The commission in operation formulated a draft regulation accordingly consisting of 46 articles and submitted it to the Sultan for consideration (BOA, Y.MTV.166/36). The construction of the Hamidiye Regiments necessitated a procedural structure that included the creation of reports, documents, commission decisions, and rules. However, amidst these administrative processes, the *Kuloghli*s' attitude towards the Hamidiye Regiments appears as an important factor to evaluate. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the *Kuloghli*s population in Tripolitania reached around 30,000. The state entrusted them with many governmental tasks analogous to a constabulary, including the obligation of protecting the area from internal and external threats.

Historically, the *Kuloghli*s had exemptions from taxes and necessary services. During the formation of the Hamidiye Regiments, the *Kuloghli*s became dissatisfied with the Sultan's edict for their dissolution and the allotment of land titles, which encroached on long-held rights. This resentment resulted in an insurrection, with around two thousand *Kuloghli*s protesting these decisions outside government buildings. The turmoil reached a critical juncture, prompting a telegram to the Minister of War, warning of probable intervention by other powers having nationals in the region, as well as the prospect of Muslim violence if the situation deteriorated, and requesting guidance on proper response. In response to these developments, another telegram was sent to the Governor and Commander of Tripolitania, directing the temporary suspension of the decision to dissolve the *Kuloghli*s and instructing that no further action be taken until a military commission is convened and arrives at the location (BOA, YPRK.BŞK.25/43).

Conflicts arose subsequently between the *Kuloghli*s and the officials tasked with certifying their holdings for titling. Following a day-long battle, the *Kuloghli*s, overpowered by the state's military involvement, surrendered. Ten notable *Kuloghli*s were banished to Benghazi. Land and population surveys were done. As a result, hurdles to establishing the Hamidiye Regiments were removed, allowing the program to move forward.

Finally, on March 6, 1898, the Governor of Tripolitania, Namık Bey, sent a cable indicating that regiments had already been constituted. According to the message, training for 14 infantry battalions and 5 Hamidiye Local Cavalry regiments had begun. It also mentioned the formation of 18 cavalry regiments and 70 infantry battalions (BOA, Y.PRK. UM.41/22).

In 1901, the mutasarrıf (governor) and commander of Benghazi Sanjak dispatched a document stating that the inhabitants of Tripolitania had agreed to establish seven Hamidiye Regiments with a total of 12,000 soldiers from infantry and cavalry divisions. The military commission had fully acknowledged this pledge. Furthermore, it was claimed that the formation of these seven regiments, which included both infantry and cavalry forces, was seeking approval from the Sultan (BOA, Y.PRK. ASK.176/95).

The archival record BOA. Y.PRK. UM. 41.22 describes the number and makeup of indigenous Hamidiye infantry battalions and cavalry regiments constituted in Tripolitania Province. The investigation of this document reveals that *Kuloghli*s began actively serving in the Hamidiye Regiment following this period. Similarly, a matching document was made for Benghazi, as demonstrated by BOA. Y.PRK. ASK.175/43, implying *Kuloghli*s' possible active involvement in serving with the Hamidiye Regiment in this region as well.

6.4. Encountering the *Kuloghli*s after Libya gained Independence

Investigating the presence of the *Kuloghli*s throughout Sultan Abdulhamit II's reign reveals that the relationship between Turkish Turks and Libyan Turks has maintained unbroken. There is a considerable gap in historical evidence regarding the fate of the *Kuloghli*s between World Wars I and II. During the colonial era in Libya, the interaction between *Kuloghli*s and Turkish nationals appeared to be largely passive. Concurrently, Türkiye had its own obstacles in achieving independence and creating the new administration of the Turkish Republic. The young Turkish government concentrated its efforts on internal administrative, economic, and social difficulties, diverting attention away from Turkish ancestors elsewhere in the region, particularly the Ottoman legacy. Despite these circumstances, Türkiye, widely considered as the

Ottoman State's successor, re-established contacts with the *Kuloghli*s following Libya's decolonisation. The Sanusiyyah's historical relationship with the founding figures of the Turkish Republic provided the impetus for this newfound involvement. The Sanusiyyah and the Turkish Republic's founding squad enjoyed a friendship formed through their common battle in both Libya and Anatolia. Sheikh Ahmet Senussi, the leader of the Sanussiyah movement, participated in the Kuvâ-yi Milliye and fought with Turkish nationalists. Despite the limited information available about the *Kuloghli*s during this time period, evidence implies that the Senussiyah were willing to engage with them and other Turkish descendants. In particular, during Libya's transition to independence, the willingness becomes obvious. As the UN attempted to aid the development of a new constitutional framework, delegates from Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and the Fezzan were tasked with developing a constitution for the country. These delegates were to gather and engage in constructive discussions inside a National Assembly framework (UN, Res. 289 IV: 31). Observing these delegates, the above-mentioned unbroken relationship with Türkiye comes to the forefront.

For instance, Ali Assad al Jerbi, a renowned politician from Cyrenaica, stands out among those chosen to represent Libya during its transitional phase. He was born in Derna in 1901 and came from a family with ties to the local Turkish authority. From 1911 to 1923, Al Jerbi studied in Istanbul, with a focus on medical studies. Al Jerbi served as the Cyrenaica emirate's Minister of Transport from September 1949 to July 1950. He then took on a variety of tasks in Mahmud al-Muntasir's interim administration. Notably, he served as foreign minister from March to December 1951, health minister from March to April 1951, and minister of justice from April to December 1951. Throughout his reign, Al Jerbi prioritised the formation of the Libyan force, utilising remnants of the Senussiyah force, who had actively fought together with Turkish soldiers in combat against the Western allies throughout both World Wars. To that purpose, he provided military scholarships for ambitious recruits, allowing them to receive military training in Iraq and Türkiye. Al Jerbi also played an important role in establishing a military institution in Benghazi (UN, Res. 289 IV).

After Libya became an independent country, Sidi Muhammed İdris El Mehdi es-Senusi, commonly referred to as King Idris, became the ruler. More interestingly, King Idris chose to cooperate with a Turkish president who held the dual status of being a Kuloghli. This choice resulted in the rejuvenation and development of the connection between this particular minority and the Turkish state after. Sadullah Bey, who was born in Derne during the Ottoman era, began his professional journey as a deputy clerk and thereafter held positions as district governor in different places. He provided his services in several regions like Hassa, Buldan, Pınarhisar, Vize, Saray, and Maçka. Following the declaration of the Republic, he proceeded to fulfil his administrative responsibilities in several districts, such as Of, Sürmene, Kadınhanı, İznik, Karacabey, and Çatalca. While serving in Rumelia, Sadullah Bey faced various difficulties, including banditry, Bulgarian insurgency, and resistance against Greek occupation. After moving to Ankara, he became a member of the Kuvâ-yi Milliye (National Turkish Forces). In 1922, he took on the position of district governor of Maçka, where he energetically fought against Rumelia banditry, promoted exchange programs, defeated reactionary forces, championed women's rights, and led efforts in urban development and agricultural advancements.

Sadullah Bey, who was of Kuloghli background and skilled in Arabic, Persian, and French, was known by the nickname "Arap Kaymakam," which means "Arab District Governor." In 1947, he journeyed to Benghazi to attend to his family's matters, where Emir Senusi, whom he had previously known, extended to him the offer to become the Prime Minister of Benghazi. Upon his return to Türkiye, Sadullah Bey endeavoured to obtain consent from President İsmet İnönü, ultimately succeeding in obtaining authorisation in 1949. Sadullah Bey, in his capacity as the Prime Minister of Benghazi, played a crucial and influential part in the establishment efforts of Libya as an independent state. He supported the education of young leaders in Egypt, challenging British rule and personally financing the travel costs of pupils. Sadullah Koloğlu, who eventually achieved the position of senator in the Libyan Parliament, died in 1952, leaving behind only a small amount of personal riches despite his notable efforts. He was buried in Libya after serving as a distinguished leader of the country for two years (Çetin et al., 2016).

Aside from Sadullah Koloğlu, several individuals with Kuloghli backgrounds made substantial contributions to the newly established Libyan government. For instance, Muhammad Sakizli, a Turkish descendant born in 1892, held major governmental positions in Cyrenaica and later Libya in the mid-twentieth century. After Emir Idris announced the Emirate on June 1, 1949, a new administration was required, despite existing British influence. Sakizli was appointed Prime Minister in March 1950, after an interim administration led by Omar Pasha El Kikhia. Nonetheless, given the substantial British influence, this autonomy was largely symbolic. Sakizli's title was changed to 'Governor' of Cyrenaica after King Idris I. declared Libyan independence on December 24, 1951, and remained so until May 1952. Following that, he was appointed Minister of Education in the Libyan federal government in May 1952 and then Chief of the Royal Bureau in September 1953. Sakizli was given the task of forming a government in February 1954, although his time there was short. Following the dissolution of Libya's federal government, he was reappointed Governor of Cyrenaica from December 26, 1962, to April 26, 1963. Muhammad Sakizli died on January 14, 1976 (Ben Halim, 1992: 55). Another name serving temporarily as Libya's Prime Minister in 2014 is Ahmed Muaytik, of Kuloghli Turkish origin.

Coming to the present day, one of the most renowned politicians within this context is GNA member Fayiz es-Serraj. Born on February 20, 1960, in Tripoli, he comes from a rich family of Kuloghli background, known for their business companies and substantial property holdings ("Les Ressources de l'engagement de La Turquie en Libye," 2020). His father, Mustafa al-Serraj, was a minister under the Libyan dynasty. Fayeze al-Serraj worked in the Ministry of Housing under Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's rule. He is regarded as an important figure in Libyan politics. He was the Prime Minister of the Government of the National Accord, which was established on December 17, 2015, as part of the Libyan Political Agreement. Prior to that, he was the Chairman of the Libyan Presidential Council from 2016 until 2021. Es-Serraj also served as a member of the Tripoli Parliament (« Les Ressources de l'engagement de La Turquie En Libye, » 2020). Fayeze al-Serraj, who claimed Turkish origin, reported that his father, Mustafa al-Serraj, served as a minister during Libya's monarchy. In 2014,

he became again Minister of Housing and Public Utilities in the Muaitik Cabinet of the General National Congress (GNC).

At that time, Bernardino León, the UN envoy in Libya, proposed forming a national unity administration in October 2014. The projected government was to be led by Fayeze al-Sarraj's Presidential Council, which would have three members representing the country's eastern, western, and southern regions, as well as two ministers ("UN Proposes Unity Government to End Libya Conflict," 2015). Sarraj then became the Prime Minister of the GNA from December 2015, when it was created based on a political settlement spearheaded by the UN, to its dissolution on March 15, 2021. Prior to his first trip to Tripoli in March 2016, Sarraj narrowly avoided two separate assassination attempts. In the years that followed, the GNA struggled to establish its legitimacy as the country's governing authority, contributing to Libya's continued division. The HoR under General Haftar's rule rejected Sarraj's proposed cabinet of ministers for the GNA, forcing him to form a government without the HoR's vote of confidence. The increase of internal warfare between militias, combined with economic issues encountered by Libyan civilians such as inflation, corruption, and smuggling, has led to the depletion of the country's monetary reserves.

In April 2017, a UNSC meeting warned of the impending possibility of more fighting in Libya. The conversation focused on the government's challenges in providing basic services while also combating concerns like terrorism, illegal migration, and oil smuggling. On April 10, 2019, UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed optimism at the UN headquarters, saying that their goal remained to prevent "a violent conflict for control of Tripoli." This announcement was issued 48 hours after Khalifa Haftar's army began moving towards the city. Following the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, Sarraj resigned in March 2021.

Fathi Ali Abdul Salam Bashagha, another renowned Libyan leader of Turkish origin, was born on August 20, 1962. He previously served as interim prime minister in the GNA. In addition, he was the Minister of Interior from 2018 to 2021. Bashagha's political career is remarkable for his selection as prime minister-designate by the Libyan HoR, located in the eastern area, on February 10, 2022 ("Libya: Parliament

Names Fathi Bashagha as Interim Prime Minister,” 2022). Nonetheless, Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh of the GNA resisted his appointment, stating that he would only resign after a national election. Significantly, Bashagha received support from Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army. Following that, on May 16, 2023, the eastern Libyan parliament temporarily removed Bashagha from his position and delegated his powers to Finance Minister Osama Hamada (“Libya Parliament Suspends Rival Eastern-Based PM Bashagha”, 2023).

Muhammed Sawan, another Turkish-Libyan Islamist politician and activist, was elected to lead the Justice and Development Party in 2012. He founded this party in March 2012, with the support of the MB.

Abdulrahman Sewehli, also known as Abdel Rahman al-Suwayhili, is an additional prominent Turkish-Libyan politician and the major head of the Union for the Homeland party. His appointment as chairman of the High Council of State on April 6, 2016, emphasises his critical role in Libyan politics. His pedigree is notable since he is a descendant of Ramadan Asswehly, a well-known Tripolitanian nationalist who made substantial contributions to the establishment of the Tripolitanian Republic (“Libyada Türk Varlığı”, 2014).

The list may be much expanded, but for the sake of this study, the existing selection appropriately emphasises the tremendous historical heritage between two strategically important regional nations. All of the individuals identified have Turkish origin and have had or continue to have friendly relations with Turkish elites, as evidenced by personalities such as Fayyaz al-Sarraj. Furthermore, it needs to be stated that today Misrata, Libya, is currently home to a concentrated Turkish community. Misrata, located in central Libya, is the country’s third-largest city in terms of both geographical area and population. The Kuloghli/Köroğlu Turkish group holds significant power in this city. Muammar Gaddafi is known to have made major efforts to eradicate this city and its Turkish people but was not successful. There are still remnants of the previous regime, as well as individuals who push for Arab supremacy and those who embrace the West, who are thought to be plotting to destroy Misrata entirely because of its Turkish community. At this point, it is also important to add

how Turkish-Libyan people feel about their background. In order to exemplify this, Ali Hammuda stated:

We have always acknowledged our ancestry, and we will continue to do so without hesitation. We shall always take pleasure in it and everything related to it. It has no aspects that pose a threat, cause us discomfort, or shame. Furthermore, it represents the cherished divine desire of Allah (“Libyada Türk Varlığı”, 2014).

Out of fear and suspicion, Gaddafi refused to accept nearly all Misratis to military colleges and prevented them from holding high positions in military security organisations. In addition, he discreetly transferred the massively populous Bedouin community in Misrata that was loyal to him and assigned them to critical security positions to counterbalance the Turkish population’s influence. However, as can be derived from Ali Hammuda’s statement, Gaddafi was not successful. Libyan Turks are currently engaged in a significant war for liberation, as are their counterparts elsewhere in the MENA region.

The *Kuloghli*s’ present military force capacity is estimated to be at 20,000 people aged 25 and under, with a further 40,000 people aged 40 and higher. However, due to specific internal political circumstances, they are forbidden from openly supporting their country’s conflicts, as deemed necessary. According to field surveys undertaken in the region, the *Kuloghli*s no longer speak Turkish well. They do, however, retain their Turkish identity and presence through organised groupings and a variety of civic organisations. In this sense, the *Kuloghli*s, who have constantly maintained their strong commitment to their national identity, have just evicted Haftar’s armed forces from Misrata by lending political and military help to the legitimate administration (“Libya’da Bir Türk Gücü: Kuloğulları”, 2020). Hence today, the city of Misrata in Libya is home to a solid bloc of Turks. As a whole, this content emphasises the current expression of a historical inheritance, implying the need for further research and evaluation.

6.5. Conclusion

After considering all the data presented above, it is possible to conclude that the historical story surrounding the *Kuloghli*s in Libya provides important insights into

the complicated fabric of Ottoman influence, historical legacies, and the emerging dynamics of post-independence Libya. The *Kuloghli*s gradually became an important part of Libyan civilisation, thanks to the Ottoman State's systematic interconnection of local populations, particularly during maritime and military attempts to safeguard North African areas. Their integration covered a wide range of topics, including government, military, and cultural issues, exhibiting outstanding adaptability and resilience in the face of shifting political contexts.

Significantly, in places like Tripoli, the *Kuloghli*s wielded authority, expertly manipulating and frequently shaping the complex structure of growing geopolitical dynamics. Researchers and professionals are still investigating these individuals' origins, identities, and different contributions, providing insight into their historical effect and ongoing relevance in modern-day Libya. The long-standing connection between Türkiye and the *Kuloghli*s demonstrates the two countries' deep relationships and shared historical ties, strengthening our grasp of the complexities of Maghreb history and its interplay with larger regional dynamics. This partnership highlights not only historical relationships but also long-term connections that transcend time and place. As Libya navigates current challenges while hoping for peace and prosperity, the *Kuloghli*s' influence is inextricably linked to the country's history. This demonstrates the potential of the region's diverse populations to overcome adversity and make meaningful contributions. It also shows the continued spirit of collaboration and a shared future. Ali Assad al Jerbi, Sadullah Koloğlu, and Fayeze al-Serraj are example names representing the strong bonds between Türkiye and Libya, forged through shared history, difficulties, and familial relationships.

Individuals from Kuloghli origins have had a long-lasting impact on Libya's political trajectory, from its inception as an independent nation to today. Nonetheless, the *Kuloghli*s' considerable impact on Türkiye-Libya ties, which has continued throughout history up to this day, has not received the credit it deserves. Hence, the goal of this essay is to present an academic analysis that demonstrates the significance of this specific group in Türkiye's bilateral relations with Libya. One of the sub-arguments in this regard is that the UN and NATO, while trying to solve the Libyan crisis, do not consider such socio-cultural and ethnic facts serious. This leads to the

fact that peace and security only remain a discourse rather than being applicable on the field. Furthermore, the collaboration between Turkish nationalists like Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Sanusiyyah movement, including names such as Sheikh Ahmet Senussi, demonstrates the religious historical ties between the two regions, as well as their shared desire for freedom and autonomy. Despite internal divisions, international pressure, and economic challenges, the legacy of individuals with *Kuloghli* heritage in Libya serves as a significant reminder of the Libyan people's persistence, diversity, and interconnectedness. Their role in nation-building efforts, diplomatic endeavours, and political leadership emphasises the importance of inclusivity, diversity, and collaboration in shaping Libya's future path. Essentially, the tale of *Kuloghli* individuals in Libya represents more than simply individual triumphs or political power; it represents the long-lasting bonds between Türkiye and Libya, based on shared histories, hardships, and dreams for a better future. As Libya develops, these links will undoubtedly continue to impact its political environment and collective identity, serving as a guiding beacon amidst the complexities of modern geopolitics.

Disregarding the MENA region's major historical linkages, as exemplified with the *Kuloghli*, may impede progress toward achieving emancipatory peace and security in the region. Not only for the Turkish-Libyan case but also for any two other countries in the region, the consideration of such linkages is important. These historical ties extend beyond mere diplomatic contacts; they represent common struggles, goals, and cultural similarities that have shaped the course of the region's countries. Ignoring this broad historical context may result in a failure to understand the intricate complexities of the region's dynamics, as well as misinterpretations of current problems. To establish a more informed strategy for fostering peace and security, influential peace and security organisations must recognise and appreciate the historical linkages between Türkiye and Libya, or any other two nations in the region. Recognising these historical links as a foundation for current involvement may pave the way for comprehensive and long-term remedies that address the root causes of conflict and promote shared stability.

7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis commences by examining the redefinition of influence in CSS from the perspective of the Welsh School, with a specific focus on security as emancipation taking lessons from history. It challenges current interpretations of influence and advocates for a fresh perspective that is based on the relationship between theoretical principles and practical applications. The study not only aims at understanding the turning points, but it also explores the existence, strength, benefits, and harms of the influence. The key question it is asking after each turning point is: “What should be changed in order to reach an emancipatory influence?” Primarily, the influence of the UN and NATO on the relationship between Türkiye and Libya is examined. However, the main focus while exploring the influence has been on how power, hegemony, and knowledge interact to shape influence in a negative way. It advocates for the promotion of emancipatory socio-cultural, economic, and political change (Emancipatory Political Praxis).

To succeed, the thesis argues that the UN and NATO need to consider socio-cultural, economic, political, and historical facts within a region while implementing policies on the field. In order to improve the comprehension of the main argument and sub-arguments, historical turning points have been analysed. It has been given particular attention to the influence on internal and external matters of Türkiye and Libya and the justification behind the influence exerted by the UN and NATO. By doing so, this thesis further argues that subordinated states within such huge IOs constitute the hegemonic sphere of influence. This means that while emancipating some, knowledge, power, and hegemony make some others dependent. Furthermore, this study accepts the argument that a country’s geostrategic location affects the desire of international actors to increase or decrease influence, which automatically affects its level of dependency. Considering the critical geostrategic location of Türkiye as well as Libya, it will not be difficult to see the influence of international actors from the past to the present.

The discussion on hegemony as a subcomponent of influence within CSS illuminates the intricate relationship between power and interests in shaping international relations. In this regard, it should be mentioned that even if the form of a

hegemon changes, its function remains. Hence, as argued by this thesis, the combination of power and hegemony throughout history to the present day leads to a negative influence based on interest. It might be useful to remember Antonio Gramsci at this point, who stated that hegemony operates through the dissemination of ruling class ideologies and the internalisation of dominance. In fact, there is a limited application of hegemonic theory in critical international relations. Although scholars like Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones emphasise its relevance in understanding global and regional power dynamics. As depicted in the neo-Gramscian perspective, while knowledge is playing a pivotal role in perpetuating hegemonic structures, hegemony itself is a combination of dominance and consent. Exerting influence over national and sovereign countries and shaping the global and certain regional security landscapes, hegemony shows up through IOs like the UN and NATO.

Thinking of the importance of Türkiye and Libya to the MENA and Eastern Mediterranean region, the thesis explores the influence of these organisations interrogating the extent to which interests underpin hegemonic power dynamics. It seeks to elucidate the interplay between theoretical and practical realities within the framework of influence by analysing historical examples. In doing so, it is noteworthy that before the national states process began in history, it was easier to discern the influence of powerful, hegemonic states over others, as well as to identify which states were in conflict and what their respective interests were. At that time, states and empires publicly declared their adversaries, making their intentions transparent. However, after the meeting in San Francisco in February 1945 and the occurrence of international peace and security debates, it became easier to hide behind such discourse while acting different and interest-oriented on the ground. This divergence between rhetoric and reality complicated the understanding of international dynamics and the identification of underlying power structures. There is one fact that did not change throughout history, which is that human interests determine what persists. In the past as well as the present, powerful states owe it to these interests to advance them.

In fact, examining hegemony and power as subcomponents driving a negative influence rather than single concepts, shows the critical nature of power relations within the international system. This leads to a need for a deeper and more critical examination into the mechanisms of interest-oriented policies hiding behind

hegemonic and powerful behaviour. In addition to that, one recognises that, while significant, it must be understood within the broader context of knowledge and emancipation. Therefore, this thesis aims for a shift towards using power for emancipatory influence, emphasising the importance of aligning theoretical realities with practical realities. Providing this information, this study underscores the need for shaping an emancipatory future to address the needs of the marginalised and disenfranchised, through critical engagement and examination of historical and contemporary power dynamics, particularly after the establishment of IOs, constituting a serious shift in world history.

By recognising the decline in sovereignty rights of national states in the face of international happenings, the interplay between power/hegemony, influence, and emancipation becomes clearer. Within this context, the study calls for a change in approach guided by the principles of emancipation and social justice, not only in theory. If the complex interplay between power, hegemony, influence, and emancipation is understood, this thesis argues that, particularly within the context of the MENA and Eastern Mediterranean region, necessary changes will automatically show up. An additional fact that shows up during the examination of this region is that IOs, such as the UN and NATO, while playing a significant role in shaping global politics, often serve as platforms through which powerful states legitimise their interests in the region. However, it also acknowledges the limitations and flaws of these organisations, which are frequently co-opted by the interests of their member countries, leading to a misalignment with their intended missions. This leads to a discussion of different perspectives on the relationship between power and influence, highlighting debates among scholars regarding their interchangeability and distinctions.

While some scholars argue that power is the main application of influence, emphasising the significance of effectively utilising sources of influence to achieve desired outcomes, others are convinced that influence is a broader concept encompassing power. Taking all scholarly discussion into consideration, a critical examination of power dynamics within the global world in general and the MENA in particular, concerning the influence exerted by IOs, has been undertaken throughout the thesis. A deeper understanding of how power and hegemony shape the influence

of IOs in the MENA as well as in global politics has been provided through the adoption of a historical perspective. As a whole, this research fills theoretical gaps within history capturing CSS by introducing a novel conceptualisation of influence that integrates power and hegemony as driving forces.

As can be derived from the chapter about the methodological framework, this thesis ontologically aligns with critical social science. Within this context, it acknowledges the multi-layered nature of reality by emphasising the role of deeper structures and causal mechanisms in shaping empirical experiences. On the other hand, epistemologically, it follows an emancipatory realist approach associated with the Welsh School, prioritising the transformation of knowledge and reality to achieve social change and progress. In order to be able to uncover theoretical reality and practical reality, the research design focuses on the influence of NATO and the UN on Turkish-Libyan relations through historical case study. By adopting a qualitative case study method, detailed exploration of these dynamics has been facilitated. The implementation of a case study research design has been helpful in exploring the influence as a consequence of power and hegemony in every single turning point. Furthermore, throughout all turning points, it served as a tool to reveal the distinction between theoretical reality and practical reality.

Though this thesis argues that any two countries within the MENA could have been explored in order to proof the argument and sub-arguments of the study, the choice of the Turkish-Libyan relationship is particularly suitable due to its rich history of interactions and the geo-strategic location of both countries within the Eastern Mediterranean. Otherwise, any country would reflect the influence of global organisations like NATO and the UN. According to this study, this influence should be taken into consideration as a threat to regional security, adding to the concept of security. The choice of Turkish-Libyan relationship further provides a ground for investigating not only one but rather various forms of influence and provides the opportunity for reconceptualising hegemony and power in a positive light. By focusing on different categories of influence within this relationship, the thesis aims to illustrate the developed conceptual framework comprehensively, challenging traditional realist perspectives. Through this analysis, critical scholars can gain insights into how IOs'

influence can be transformed into an emancipatory force rather than a destroying one, contributing to broader discussions on history, security studies, and global politics.

In this regard, five chronological turning points within the Turkish-Libyan case that have been explained were helpful in supporting the main idea of this thesis. The first instance, set in the post-WWII era, revealed how Türkiye's stance at the UNGA from 1949 to 1951 laid the foundation for strong relations with Libya. This turning point underscored the UN's role in shaping bilateral ties. Moving forward to the 1970s, the second instance explored Libya's support for Türkiye during the Cyprus crisis and the subsequent influence of the UN and NATO concerns on bilateral relations. The Arab Spring in 2011 formed the backdrop for the third turning point, showcasing Türkiye's evolving stance and the UN and NATO's influence on its foreign policy towards Libya. The fourth turning point delved into the controversial maritime boundary agreement between Türkiye and Libya in 2019, highlighting the UN's involvement and the ensuing international debate. Finally, the fifth turning point examined Türkiye's deployment of troops to support the UN-recognised government in Libya, revealing the complexities of the UN and NATO involvement in the region. Together, these turning points illustrate the intricate interplay between power dynamics, regional interests, and international influences in shaping Turkish-Libyan relations, underscoring the importance of understanding theoretical reality and practical reality in the context of global politics.

Before commencing with the case study, the thesis provided a historical background of diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Libya in order to understand the dynamics and pathways of their relationship. Accordingly, the transition of Tripoli to Ottoman rule in the 16th century marked a significant turning point, with Spain's colonisation efforts prompting Libya to seek aid from the Ottoman Empire. Seeking to expand its colonial holdings, Italy, in the late 19th century and early 20th century, conducted a military campaign against Tripoli, Libya, then under Ottoman control, which was opposed by the Libyan population, loyal to the Ottoman sultan/caliph at that time. Despite Italy's military actions, including blockades and bombardments, the Ottoman Empire sought to maintain influence in the region, granting autonomy to Tripoli while negotiating treaties with Italy. Through strategic manoeuvres and

continued support from indigenous leaders like Sheikh Ahmed Senusi, the Ottoman Empire limited Italian control to coastal regions during World War I.

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire resulted in Ottoman forces surrendering to Allied garrisons as per the Armistice of Mudros. Despite delays, Ottoman troops formally withdrew from Tripoli in 1919, marking the end of Ottoman control in the region. After Italy's annexation of Libya in 1912, independence was achieved in 1951, marked by the establishment of a monarchy. Libya sought support from Türkiye and expressed even aspirations for annexation and unity with it. Bilateral relations between Türkiye and Libya have been strong, particularly in trade, economy, and security, with Türkiye recognising Libya's independence in 1952. Later on, Muammar Gaddafi seized power in 1969, leading Libya for 42 years. During Türkiye's Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974, Libya, led by Gaddafi, supported Türkiye despite international embargoes. The Arab Spring protests in 2011 led to Gaddafi's downfall and the formation of the Interim National Council Government. A civil war ensued, with General Haftar challenging the Tripoli government. Türkiye supported the internationally recognised GNA in Tripoli against Haftar with support from various nations. Greece's actions in the Eastern Mediterranean prompted Türkiye to sign a maritime agreement with the GNA to keep regional security and protect its interests. Finally, Türkiye deployed troops to Libya in 2020, approved by its Grand National Assembly, to support peace efforts and protect its interests. Türkiye's involvement has helped the GNA regain territory lost to Haftar's forces. Today, Türkiye also engages in diplomatic initiatives for peace and stability in Libya, alongside providing military support. During the whole process constituting the chronological order of the case analyses of this thesis, the influence exerted by the UN and NATO on the internal affairs and foreign relations of Türkiye and Libya has been explored.

Throughout the turning points of this study, it is obvious that, despite critical security theory suggesting that knowledge can lead to emancipation, the reality often diverges from theoretical ideals, with power and hegemony shaping global as well as regional dynamics. The thesis aimed to analyse the influence of IOs on peace and security in the MENA region, exemplifying it with the relationship between Türkiye and Libya. The above-mentioned case analyses reflect how theoretical concepts diverge with practical realities and how international influence does not promote

emancipation. Providing this information, this thesis concludes that unless theoretical reality does not proceed parallelly to practical reality, the influence of organisations like the UN and NATO may not lead to emancipatory outcomes. The reason for that is simply and clearly the fact that the most powerful states within these hegemonic organisations prioritise their interests over peace and security. At this point it will be beneficial to remember an additional sub-argument of this thesis that states: IOs are platforms where powerful states legitimise their international interests. Moreover, powerful states will not enter an organisation over which they have no control. Hence, it will not be wrong to repeat the nature of power as a destructive determinant of reaching interests.

In fact, the debate surrounding Libyan independence reflects a complex interplay of historical aspirations, geopolitical interests, and diplomatic negotiations. A desire among Libyan people for unification with Türkiye persisted for a very long time in Libyan-Turkish history, evident in many appeals and subject to journals.³¹ This desire increased particularly during the presence of Italian colonisation and British control. However, archival records reveal a discrepancy between the Libyan population's aspirations and the decisions made by the UN, which ultimately refrained from involving Türkiye in Libya's independence process. Thus, during the UNGA sessions from 1949 to 1951, many proposals and discussions emerged regarding Libya's future, however, excluding the Turkish perspective.

On the other hand, the absence of Turkish involvement in Libyan affairs, despite historical ties and expressed desires for annexation, is a notable aspect overlooked by the UN. Despite this omission, the thesis reflects that many Libyan representatives have Turkish ancestry, with enduring cultural, historical, and religious bonds between the two nations, the *Kuloghli*s being a significant example. The UN's focus during deliberations on Libyan independence primarily centred on establishing a unified and autonomous state by January 1, 1952, with the formation of a constitution by local delegates. The UN Commissioner, Adrian Pelt, was responsible for this process to succeed. Pelt engaged with local representatives from each of the three main regions: Cyrenaica, Tripoli, and Fezan. However, the UN's approach faced criticism

³¹ See Appendix 7.

for favouring select countries and lacking local involvement. Pelt's mission highlighted the ongoing dominance of major nations and the limited agency of the Libyan people. Despite efforts to foster unity and autonomy, concerns from administering powers, particularly the UK and France, delayed progress. Nevertheless, Libyan representatives, many with Turkish ancestry, played significant roles in the transitional period, including advocating for military and diplomatic ties with Türkiye. Ali Assad al Jerbi, for instance, his relations with Türkiye as well as his positions in the Libyan government illustrate the enduring influence of Turkish connections on Libyan affairs.

Furthermore, Hajj Ahmed al Senussi Sofu and Mustafa Mizran are other names maintaining strong relations with Türkiye. But despite expectations of support from Türkiye, archival records reveal a passive stance, with Türkiye favouring Libya's independence over annexation. This stance was influenced by various factors, including economic, military, and political vulnerabilities. Hence Türkiye's passive stance during UNGA talks on Libya's future is analysed from three perspectives: (1) a realist approach focusing on Türkiye's national policy to avoid association with Islamic territories, (2) practical limitations preventing active engagement, and (3) deliberate sidelining by international powers to maintain the status quo in the region. As a matter of fact, attention has been drawn to historical, geopolitical, sociocultural, and ideological factors throughout the study, shaping the interaction of the Turkish-Libyan relationship, however, overseen by the UN and NATO.

By delving into Libyan-Turkish relations during the Cyprus crisis in 1974, this research argues that Libya's support for Türkiye during the crisis warrants separate examination. It can be stated that during the Cyprus crisis in 1974, the relationship between Türkiye and Libya deepened significantly, characterised by collaboration and support. This collaboration extended to the declaration of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. On the other side, the influence of the UN and NATO in the Cyprus crisis showcased a biased stance toward it and the absence of a distinct Turkish presence on the island. Türkiye's declaration of the occupied areas as a "federated Turkish state" in 1975 faced condemnation from the international community, as evidenced by UNSC Resolution 367. The comparison between Libya's establishment, partition, and management style under UN oversight and Türkiye's establishment of the TRNC

highlights the potential influence of IOs like the UN and NATO on countries' actions. The UN, for instance, was involved in the matter, with the UNFICYP, however, not as successful as expected, whereas NATO's role in the Cyprus crisis showcased tensions within the alliance, with Greece's influence increasing while Türkiye felt marginalised. Despite Türkiye's military success, its diplomatic standing suffered, and pressure from the US led to the termination of military arrangements with Türkiye. Despite all the pressure from the international community and global repercussions, Libya continued to support Türkiye on the Cyprus issue, illustrating the complexities of international influence driven by hegemony and power.

During the period from 2002 to 2011, Türkiye and Libya experienced significant changes, with Türkiye shifting towards civilian administration and Libya facing the end of Muammar Gaddafi's rule. The onset of the Arab Spring in 2010, originating in Tunisia, led to widespread unrest and eventually conflict in Libya. The engagement of Türkiye, newly adopting a proactive engagement in the region, with rebel forces during the 2011 turmoil in Libya and the involvement of the MB, which is a common religious ideology in the MENA region, in the uprising are significant aspects of Türkiye's change in policy. On the other side, the formation of the Justice and Construction Party (JCP) in Libya, affiliated with the MB, is an important development, right after the 2011 conflict. Politically, the party primarily represented 'Islamists' and nationalists. Despite suspicions regarding the Brotherhood's motives during the revolution, its leaders denied allegations of collusion with the former regime and asserted their commitment to the revolutionary cause.

The Libyan MB's involvement in the NTC and subsequent establishment of the JCP reflected its aspiration to participate in the country's democratic transition. During the transitional phase, the Brotherhood adopted a cautious approach, declining alliances with certain factions and focusing on maintaining control over its political representation. The emergence of the JCP and the role of the MB signified a notable shift in Libya's political dynamics following the revolution. During the Libyan uprising of 2011 and its aftermath, the UN and NATO played significant roles in addressing the crisis. The UN responded swiftly with resolutions condemning Gaddafi's regime and imposing sanctions, notably Resolutions 1970 and 1973. These resolutions theoretically aimed to protect civilians and facilitate political dialogue.

However, NATO's military intervention, authorised under Resolution 1973, faced criticism for extending beyond the initial mandate of protecting civilians to supporting regime change. This led to divisions within the Security Council and undermined the concept of the R2P. Despite Gaddafi's downfall, Libya plunged into a civil conflict in which neither the UN nor NATO were able to solve the crisis. As a matter of fact, the involvement of various international actors in the Libyan civil war is explained by divergent interests and strategies. Therefore, it is possible to observe the disjunction between the theoretical principles of IOs like the UN and the NATO and the practical realities shaped by geopolitical agendas. Taking this into consideration, the present study argues that while these organisations promote peace and security rhetoric, their interventions often serve the strategic interests of individual countries rather than solely altruistic motives.

Moreover, this study highlights the maritime deal between Türkiye and Libya as a pivotal moment, reflecting Türkiye's proactive stance and its evolving foreign policy objectives. It is understandable that the Eastern Mediterranean, rich in hydrocarbon reserves and natural resources, has attracted and continues to attract the attention of the whole international community. Energy exploration initiatives, coupled with disagreements over maritime boundaries, have led to the establishment of alliances and escalated tensions in the region. Accordingly, Türkiye, with the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, asserts its sovereignty rights through maritime jurisdiction agreements and drilling activities. As readable in the study, in 2019, Türkiye and Libya signed two memoranda of understanding during Fayeze al-Sarraj's visit to Türkiye, establishing a legal framework for security and military cooperation and delineating maritime jurisdictional areas. The maritime agreement adhered to international maritime law principles, including equitable delimitation and consideration of coastline lengths. It aimed to safeguard both parties' legal rights in maritime zones and potential collaboration in resource exploitation. The agreement, ratified by Libya's Presidential Council, bolstered Türkiye's influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, countering Greece's attempts to marginalise Türkiye. Greece and other regional actors criticised the agreement, claiming it violated international maritime law and undermined their sovereignty. Türkiye defended the agreement, citing its compliance with international law and asserting its legitimate partnership with Libya's

UN-recognised government. Despite objections, the agreement remains legally binding under customary international law, and Türkiye stands firm in upholding it, emphasising its benefits for both Türkiye and Libya.

Taking it theoretically, the UN and NATO should be able to address maritime disputes due to their peaceful and security-oriented nature. But in practical terms, there is no decrease in tensions despite the efforts such as the UNCLOS. This is a sign of not working policies within IOs. In this regard, realist perspectives highlight the role of power dynamics in fostering cooperation, while critical researchers emphasise normative power and shared identity as drivers of regional cooperation. Viewing the entire process from this perspective, one must ask how the MENA region would look without the presence of the UN and NATO. How would the region look if normative power and shared identity as drivers of regional cooperation were really valued? By posing these questions, it should be repeated that this study examined the influence exerted from the top-down, starting with NATO and the UN, rather than from the bottom-up, beginning with society. The rationale behind this approach is that it allows for a deeper understanding of the interest-oriented nature of powerful states and their disregard for the socio-cultural, historical, and political realities on the ground. Only through this perspective can the true nature of these hegemonic influences be fully understood.

For instance, in the Turkish-Libyan case, it is clearly possible to talk about a shared identity, exemplified and embodied with the *Kuloghli*s. The *Kuloghli*s are a social group descended from Turkish soldiers who settled in the Maghreb region, particularly in Libya, during the Ottoman Empire's rule. Although a shared identity is available in the whole MENA region, Türkiye and Libya constitute only one example reflecting the new concept of influence driven by power and hegemony as subcomponents in a critical perspective. It is impossible to solve the crises in the MENA by overlooking the social structure, historical ties, or even ethnic issues. Therefore, within a critical perspective, international peace and security organisations only theoretically discuss peace and security. In the practical arena, power and hegemony will continue to have a negative influence.

Although the scene does not look very promising, by exploring all turning points within the Turkish-Libyan case, it can be stated that the influence of the UN and

the NATO could potentially transform into an emancipatory, positive force if the theoretical discourse of promoting peace and security were genuinely prioritised by powerful and hegemonic states in practice. If these organisations were to operate with a genuine commitment to upholding the principles of international law, human rights, and conflict resolution, their interventions could foster inclusive dialogue, mitigate conflicts, and empower marginalised communities. Embracing a holistic approach that values the sovereignty and agency of all nations, especially those in conflict zones like Libya, would enable the UN and NATO to transcend geopolitical interests and prioritise the well-being of populations. Embracing a paradigm shift towards genuine cooperation and collective security would allow the UN and NATO to realise their potential as vehicles for positive change in the MENA, advancing the principles of emancipation, justice, and human dignity for all. Up to this point, interest-oriented policy within international peace and security organisations, could be explained as the main reason for the non-alignment of theoretical reality and practical reality.

In a nutshell, the driving force of this study was the examination of specific policies of international peace and security organisations, such as the UN and NATO, in addressing global peace and security matters in the MENA region. Throughout the years, the situation in the MENA region has been and continues to be highly precarious. The MENA region's geostrategic significance results in major parties being unwilling to withdraw from it. Hence, the region looks chaotic in terms of international intervention. In this regard, the dominant governments within the UN and the NATO are actively contributing to the destabilisation of the MENA region. Interestingly, once more, these nations dedicate time to seeking methods to maintain peace and security. The UN and NATO function as overarching structures that unite the most strategic and influential countries. The impact of these organisations varies from issuing verbal admonitions to imposing embargoes and even resorting to interventions. This has an influence on regional countries, as well as the global world as a whole. Türkiye and Libya are strategically significant nations situated in a crucial geostrategic position that is shaped by the discourse on peace and security of IOs like the UN and the NATO. As can be derived after reading this work, IOs have a deficiency in comprehending the cultural and historical connections among countries in the MENA.

In theory, the staff of the UN deployed in the field has a particular obligation to uphold and adhere to local norms, culture, and practices. In order to show respect UN members, have to make an effort to familiarise themselves with their surroundings and make an attempt to learn about the local culture, religion and language. It is imperative for UN members to conduct themselves with the awareness that they are visitors in another person's residence, regardless of the extent of damage to that residence. This is especially crucial when the UN assumes responsibility for a temporary governing role. Furthermore, it is imperative that individuals interact with one another in a manner that demonstrates respect and decency, paying special attention to gender and cultural disparities (UN, S/RES/1325, 2000). On the other hand, theoretically, the UN Secretary General is tasked with ensuring that UN personnel engaged in peace-making, peacekeeping, and peace-building activities receive proper training in international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law. This includes training in child and gender-related provisions, negotiation and communication skills, cultural awareness, and civilian-military coordination. The Secretary General also calls on states and relevant international and regional organisations to incorporate appropriate training in their programs for personnel involved in similar activities (UN, A/RES/49/37, 1999).

However, all these principles in theory cannot be observed on the practical ground. It is important to consider the context and the specific problem at hand, as some UN members may object to this approach and have even the power to block it. When addressing issues, it is natural for the more powerful and hegemonic members to assume a leadership role. Unfortunately, within international peace and security organisations, these states undoubtedly possess the most significant interests, whereas most members will likely rely on their powerful colleagues to take the lead in resolving conflicts. This assumes that inside any IOs, there is an acknowledgment that certain members hold more significance than others (Alan, 1990: 100-128). When observing the issue from this perspective, theoretical principles such as respect and decency soon disappear on the practical field.

By taking a more comprehensive view, it becomes evident that the consequences of colonialism persist even after former colonies have gained independence. The underlying premise behind this remark is that the UN plays a

crucial role in upholding global power structures and holds considerable sway in the current tendency to view colonialism solely as a past occurrence. The present-day global landscape is still impacted by the historical colonial encounter, as evidenced by the enduring power dynamics between nations and the hierarchical positioning of states in global politics within the UN and NATO. Additionally, the development of neo-colonial power mechanisms through IOs has hindered the complete independence of former colonies. In addition, the UN has actively sought to explore the concept of task-sharing and cooperation with NATO due to its inability to effectively handle the growing need for global equity. From its establishment to the present day, the UN explored ways to provide a legal basis for this, arguing for more peace, security, and democracy. However, the reality in principle was distinct. According to Jeane Kirkpatrick, a former UN Ambassador, there is only one dependable assurance against aggression. It is absent within IOs. It is shown in the proliferation of democratic systems. It originates from the fundamental principle that genuine democracies refrain from invading each other and abstain from engaging in hostile behaviour.

On the other hand, the US initially hesitated to get involved in Libya but later decided to join the operation. They then transferred the mission to NATO and adopted the strategy of 'leading from behind'. This not only changed the way the US conducts war but also had consequences for the future of NATO. Recently, the US' dedication has been mainly shaped by economic concerns, disagreements about NATO's military efficacy, and the apparent American preference to assume a position in Libya. The US, in this context, serves as the most important example of interest-driven influence based on power and hegemony, disregarding the social, political, historical, and cultural connections of surrounding nations powerful in both the UN and NATO. It is indeed possible to talk about physically "the most important" state, or even hegemon. As can be derived from this study, the US is "the leading power" within NATO, which leads to the thought of military means and the "Defence Industry Complex" mentioned at the beginning of this research. Therefore, before going through possible changes to reach an emancipatory influence, the right question is, if peace and an emancipatory security really are approached?

Given the available knowledge, it is feasible to discuss multiple ideas that can effectively achieve peace and security. Not via the pursuit of hegemony and power, which leads to a detrimental influence, but rather by:

- Acknowledging and honouring the significant historical and cultural connections that exist throughout the MENA region, exemplified between Türkiye and Libya. This entails recognising the many identities, customs, traditions and historical accounts of the individuals and communities in the region. In this way, the integration of cultural sensitivity into diplomatic endeavours and peacebuilding activities by the UN and NATO would promote the development of trust and comprehension, not just in theory but also in practice. Furthermore, it would give an understanding of the inevitable interaction among regional societies.
- Ensuring that the decision-making processes within the UN and NATO are inclusive, transparent and representative, including local stakeholders from the MENA. This entails the active involvement of regional countries, in peace negotiations, conflict resolution endeavours, and policy formulation. By including is not meant the General Assembly but rather the UNSC or a decisive position in regional decision-making
- Instead of imposing external remedies, fostering inclusive discussion methods that empower opposing parties to express their grievances, aspirations, and concerns without the involvement of external influential parties. This would serve a conflict-solving process only within the parties of the conflict.
- Ensuring that all interventions and activities in the MENA adhere to the ideals of sovereignty and self-determination. Acknowledging and upholding the sovereignty and self-governance of governments and communities in deciding their own political, economic, and social paths without outside intervention or pressure. This would mean for powerful and hegemonic states to respect the right of sovereignty.
- Sovereignty and self-determination also entail the country's right to consume natural resources according to its own preferences and in a manner that is respectful. At this point, hegemonic states, need to stop exploiting and find

different solutions for their geostrategic barriers without invading in other lives.

- During times of crises, it is important to prioritise the resolution of the problem among countries in the same region that have a common historical, cultural, and social identity. This will enhance the recognition of regional security as a tangible and practical concept.
- Thinking of the “Defence Industry”, the necessity of weapon production could be reconsidered. If every state would take care for its own borders, instead turning the production of weapons into trade, the consume of weapons would also decrease which would lead to a less dangerous world, particularly in the MENA region.
- Eliminate the veto power held by the five permanent members (P5) to ensure more democratic and fair decision-making within the UN. Replace it with a system based on majority or supermajority voting to prevent one nation from blocking global consensus on critical peace and security issues.
- NATO and UN could build a control mechanism to gradually decrease military budgets and weapon production, particularly in major powers.
- Develop a system where countries engaging in aggressive actions or peace and security violation face consequences that support global equity and social development of poor countries (e.g., economic support redirected to poor nations affected by conflicts).
- NATO and the UN could cease direct or indirect sponsorship of armed groups.
- If the UN and NATO would act completely independent, the UN would not look like the organisation in which NATO legitimises its interventions.
- On the other hand, if NATO would be more careful with an intervention, in not intervening without a UN mandate, a collaboration among these organisations would look much more peaceful.
- Implementing these proposed solutions will enable the UN and NATO to return to its original purpose and transform their theoretical concepts into tangible realities in a short period of time.

Back to the new concept of influence:

Influence = Knowledge Power and Hegemony Emancipation.

Based on this theory, it is important to emphasise that comprehending the complex dynamics of Turkish-Libyan relations and the wider MENA region is obliged to consider the interplay of knowledge, power, and hegemony, all with the ultimate aim of achieving an emancipatory influence. The UN and NATO can effectively negotiate intricate power dynamics by acknowledging the importance of historical, social, and cultural connections in the region and by developing a sophisticated comprehension of local settings. It is crucial to adopt a new way of thinking that promotes inclusive decision-making procedures that honour the authority, sovereignty, and rights of all individuals involved. These organisations have the ability to utilise information as a means of empowering underprivileged populations, allowing them to actively engage in crafting their own destinies. By questioning the dominant structures of the UN and NATO, it is possible to utilise their power to promote peace, stability, and social justice in the MENA area and turn abstract ideas into tangible results. In the end, the equation of influence serves as a spark for emancipation, directing endeavours towards a future in which the values of inclusivity, respect, sovereignty, and cooperation triumph, resulting in enduring peace and security for the region, locals, and the international community.

The main argument of this thesis asserts that until theoretical reality corresponds with practical reality on the ground, the ability to achieve emancipatory influence is unattainable. The fundamental goal one should strive for is to transform the world rather than simply comprehending it. Therefore, it is imperative to initially determine the required modifications, subsequently acknowledging the impact of global organisations dedicated to maintaining peace and security. It is clear that this influence is not emancipating, as it frequently strengthens powerful states while making others dependent. To comprehend the impact of a country's position on the desire of international players to exert or withdraw influence, it is necessary to analyse the hegemonic sphere of influence, which consists of subordinate states. By doing so, the question arises: why is this influence not emancipating? The failure of international peace and security organisations to adopt an emancipatory political praxis is the reason behind the problem. This approach requires taking into account sociocultural,

economic, and socio-political aspects when working toward peace and security. Furthermore, it is important to repeat that these organisations function as venues for influential nations to validate their global objectives, impeding the realisation of emancipatory political praxis. However, it is important to note that there is always a sense of hope and gaining experience from the past might help avoid repetition. Therefore, academics particularly historians should actively participate in social and political criticism, replication, and practice as organic intellectuals, with the goal of transforming the world rather than simply comprehending it.

There is one more point before ending words, to which this thesis would like to call attention in order to properly respond to the question of how to change the world in an emancipatory way: the “Defence Industry.” Because this is such a broad issue, it will suffice to highlight a few key themes. If we dive deeper into the theoretical idea of “Defence Industry,” which is utilised in practice to express all civilian deaths in Syria, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Korea, Cambodia, Sudan, Nicaragua, Chile, Guatemala, Vietnam, Ukraine, Palestine, and so on. As a result, it would not be incorrect to claim that the concept “defence industry” is nothing more than propaganda. Considering that the US defence budget in a single year exceeds hundreds of billions of dollars, it is clear that if this amount of money were to flow for peace and security, the world would be a better place. As can be expected, the Military Industrial Complex has a “strong interest in people killing each other.” It is not difficult to understand that if humans stopped killing one another, the military/defence industry would be unable to sell their products.

The US is the world’s largest defence industry owner, followed by China and Russia. This is not to say that other countries are not interested in the defence industry. On the contrary, the worldwide arms trade is extremely large. As a result, governments manufacture and export weapons in addition to producing them for themselves. Particularly, European countries employ US arms, and the US profits from this position. This predicament adds another depth to which this work would like to draw attention, but it also represents an entirely new topic to be examined. Remembering the UN’s founding in 1945, the UN charter states that “all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force,” implying that war was effectively declared illegal in 1945. However, it quickly becomes clear that many

powerful countries have disregarded this fundamental premise of the UN Charter in order to further their own interests. Without a doubt, the US is the country that violates this precept the most. In addition, the US is the most powerful and influential member of NATO. Let one recall that NATO is the largest organisation today, responsible for international peace and security. Observing NATO's "defence" approach, it is sadly impossible to talk about reducing military sense but rather about rising military capacities, weapons systems, and other key equipment, which will again cause the death of many thousand people somewhere in the world. It is possible to read on the webpage of NATO that NATO plays an important role in helping Allies develop their military capabilities, including weapons systems, vehicles, and other major equipment. While the responsibility for developing these capabilities lies with individual nations, NATO's coordination facilitates the identification and procurement of necessary equipment, enabling members to effectively defend themselves and their allies at all times. It also ensures that national systems can integrate and operate effectively together when required. Cooperation with the defence industry is crucial to achieving these goals. NATO Allies are dedicated to maintaining the production capacity of the defence industry necessary during peacetime, crises, and conflicts. NATO serves as a crucial platform for consultation and standard setting, assisting Allies in aligning their defence procurement needs and aiding the industry in understanding these requirements to ensure a reliable supply. This situation raises significant concerns, as it primarily benefits the defence industry while leaving unresolved questions about whom these defences are meant to protect against.

If the defence is intended to counter terrorist organisations, one must question the sources of funding and weaponry for these groups. On the other hand, while countries using active weapons are not that much, another question is, where are those weapons going? This line of inquiry could extend further, but it introduces a distinct topic that warrants separate investigation. For now, it is important to reflect on how the production of weapons is encouraged through NATO, an organisation that theoretically advocates for peace and security. Under NATO's Defence Investment Pledge, allies have committed to allocating at least 20% of their GDP to defence spending. Furthermore, they have agreed that a minimum of 20% of this expenditure should be directed towards acquiring major new equipment and funding related

research and development. During the 2023 Vilnius Summit, Allied Leaders endorsed the Defence Production Action Plan to expedite joint procurement, enhance production capacity, and improve interoperability among member states.

At the 2024 Washington Summit, Allies established a new NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge, aimed at boosting transatlantic defence industrial collaboration and aiding Allies in replenishing their stockpiles while continuing to provide military support to Ukraine. This again indicates that NATO is focusing on expanding its defence and military capabilities rather than reducing them. Under the Pledge, Allies have committed to enhancing the defence industry across the Alliance by reducing trade and investment barriers among member states and providing clear demand signals through firm orders and contracts. They will adopt a more systematic approach to defence industrial development, sharing national plans and strategies to improve industrial capabilities collectively. The Pledge also emphasises delivering critical capabilities urgently to meet defence plans and support Ukraine, increasing large-scale multinational procurement to streamline orders and clarify requirements across armed forces. Additionally, it includes accelerating the adoption of new technologies to bolster deterrence and defence, fostering greater cooperation with Ukraine, the EU, and Indo-Pacific partners, reinforcing NATO standards for interoperability and interchangeability of systems and equipment, and protecting and strengthening critical supply chains, such as microchips essential for modern military technology.

This information highlights a contradiction between the UN Charter's principle of outlawing war and the increasing activities of NATO within the so-called "defence industry." Despite the UN and NATO's theoretical commitment to peace and security, powerful states such as the US, which wield significant influence in both organisations, seem to pursue contrary objectives in practice. If the substantial funds allocated to the "defence industry" were redirected towards maintaining peace and security, the real-world influence of these institutions could be markedly different. This does not imply the complete elimination of military forces but rather suggests a more restrained approach, where military resources are focused on national defence and only mobilised in response to genuine threats within their own borders. In such a scenario, the amount

and time wasted by the global “defence industry” would be redirected toward fostering real peace, a world with reduced vulnerability, violence, aggression, and poverty.



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
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APPENDICES

Appendix 1:



T. C.
Dışışleri Bakanlıđı
Tercüme Bürcü

Türk-Trablusagarp Birliđi Partisi

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışışleri Bakanlıđına

Avrupa devletlerinin iletikbalimiz hakkında aldıkları kararlar durum, mevkûr devletlerin mevrû haklarımızı tanımaması ve ülkemizin mukadderatının gahsî Manda siperi altında muhtelif emperyalist hedeflere maruz kalması neticesinde, halkımızın büyük kütlesi bu gün anda, eskiden olduđu gibi, Türkiye'ye sığınmak arzusundaadır.

Bu hedefe ulaşmak için, burada bir parti kuruldu. Zati Devletlerinin bu partiye muvafakatlerini yasa ile bildirmesini diler, en derin saygılarımı sunarım.

Trablusagarp, 7 Temmuz 1947

İlavê : Partinin kararlaştırdıđı ana prensiplerin bir sureti ilişik olarak sunulmuştur.

Türk-Trablusagarp Birliđi Partisi

imza : Mehmet Hasan El-Amir

Arapçadan türkçeye çeviren :
(A.B.)

Aidiyeti cihetile Birinci Daire Umum Müdürlüğüne takdim .
25 Temmuz 1947

Koordinasyon D.Uzum Müdürü

[Signature]

T. C.
Dışışleri Bakanlıđı
Tercüme Bürosu

Türk-Trablusgarp Birliđi Partisi

Partinin ana prensipleri

- a) İstiklâl veyahut Türkiye'nin mandası talebi
- b) Osmanlı İmperatorluğu devrinde olduđu gibi tabii hudutlarıyla
Libya'nın vahdeti
- c) Arap camiasına iltihakı.

The Turkish-Tripolitanian Unification Party asserts most Libyans want to join Türkiye.

Appendix 2:

T. C.
Dışışleri Bakanlığı
Evrak Umum Müdürüğü

Ne _____

Geldiği yer _____ Tripoli
Yazıldığı tarih _____ 21/6/47
Geldiği tarih _____ 23/6/47
Numarası _____ 2071

AÇIK TEL

Diğışleri

Ankara

Treblusgarbin T.C. İyie ile birleşmei bekkinde Partii
müne müakereelerde bulunmak üzere Türkiye için
müadelelerini itirham ederim.
Cevap: Treblus Halkiyet deftrali vasıtasile

Mehmet Hakkıoğlu

14/6/3
Gub
5

Request for Turkish annexation by the Tripoli Police Department

Appendix 3:

T. C. BAŞBAKANLIK YAZI İŞLERİ VE SİCİL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ		ÖZETİ : No 19661	
Gelen evrakın Tarihi	21/5/949	T. C. BAŞBAKANLIK CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ	Dışişleri Bakanlığına
No.	3/3393		
Yazan Memur	B.Bölükbaşı	20/5/949 tarih ve I702/6-I877 sayılı tezkereye	
Yazı tarihi	23/5/949	ektir.	
Beyaz eden	17.5.949	Libya'dan Abulesaad Müfti imzasıyla Yüksek Cum-	
Beyaz tarihi	28.5.949	hurbaşkanlığına çekilip Başbakanlığa tevdi buyurulan	
Karşılaştıranlar		ve İtalyen'lerin Libya'ya geri gelmesine Türkiye'nin	
Dosya No.	3/3393	karşı koyması dileğini kapsayan 16/5/949 tarihli tel-	
Gidiş No.	1775	yazının evveliyatıyla birleştirilmek üzere ilişik ola-	
Ekleri	I	rak sunulduğunu saygılarımla arz ederim.	
Sevk tarihi	26/5/49	Başbakan Yerine	
Kaydeden		Müsteşar	
Not :		M.B. 25.5.949	
		25/5	
-4-		030 10	267 800 19

Libyan people are asking for Turkish support against Italian colonialism

Appendix 4:

2

T. C.

BAŞBAKANLIK
YAZI İŞLERİ VE SİCİL
MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ

ÖZETİ:

1966

Gelen evrakın	Tarihi	13/5/949
No.	4/44I	
Yazan Memur	B. Bölükbaşı	
Yazı tarihi	17/5/949	
Beyaz eden	1.5	
Beyaz tarihi	18.5.1949	
Karşılaştıranlar		
Dosya No.		
Gidiş No.	1702	
Ekleri	2	
Sevk tarihi		
Kaydeden	20.5.49	

Not :

Dışişleri Bakanlığına

New-York'tan, Libya Kurtuluş Millî Kurulu Libya Murahhas Heyeti Başkanı Mansour Kaddara imzasıyla Yüksek Cumhurbaşkanlığına çekilip Genel Kâtipliğin 13/5/949 tarih ve 4/44I sayılı tezkeresiyle Başbakanlığa tevdi buyurulan ve Libya'nın bütünlüğe ve bağımsızlığına kavuşması hususunda Birleşmiş Milletler nezdinde Türkiye'nin müzaheret ^{te bulunman} etmesi dileğini kapsayan 11/5/9 tarihli telyazı ve tercümesinin bağlı olarak sunulduğunu saygılarımla arz ederim.

Başbakan Yerine

Müsteşar

M.B.
17.5.949

18/5


030 10 267 800 19

[No. 9]

Ergebnisse


Libya is asking Türkiye for support during UN independence talks

Appendix 5:



Activities of the Turkish-Libyan Culture and Friendship Association


Appendix 6:



Discussion on British Representation after Libyan Independence

Appendix 7:





Newspaper named l'Orient about the unification of Türkiye and Libya

Appendix 8:

1985	1702	617						
Evrakın Özel Sayısı								
Evrakın Tarihi								

KAPATILDI

1 / 10 / 1949

F-35

- x 1- Londra Büyükelçiliğine
- x 2- Vazington "
- x 3- Paris "
- x 4- Roma "

Hulâsa

1. 10.

İtalyan müstemlekeleri hakkında Birleşmiş Milletlerdeki delegasyonumuza verilen talimatta

1- Libyanın istiklâli prensibini koruyacak tekliflerin destekleneceği, ancak istiklâlin ne zaman ve ne şekilde tahakkuk ettirileceği hususunda mahallî şeraitte yakinen vakıf müşahitlerin kanaatine uyulması gerektiği, hükümet şekli ve birleşme meselelerinin ~~ise~~ halkın arzusu ile bilâhare halledileceği,

2- Britrenin Habeşistan ile Sudan arasında taksimi ve Somalının İtalyan vesayetine terki lehinde rey verilmesi bildirilmiştir.


Malûmaten arz olunur.

Dişışleri

12.08.2022 tarih ve 34289/17 sayılı Karar ile gazilâfi kaidetmiştir.

Türkiye's response to UN Commission instruction to keep out of this situation

Appendix 9:



Libyan people react against Türkiye's passive stance during the Libyan issue

Appendix 10:

İkinci Daire U.Müdürlüğü		Kerkük'teki Mislüman Kardeşler Cemiyetinin muzır propagandası hak.	
5			
Bağdad Büyük Elçiliğine			
Kerküklü soydaşlarımızdan olduğu anlaşılan İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi Teknik Okulu öğrencilerinden Süleyman Ücal tarafından Vekâletimize gönderilen mektubun bir sureti ilişikte sunuldu. Okunmasından da anlaşılacağı üzere bu mektupta Kerkükte Mislüman Kardeşler Cemiyetinin memleketimiz aleyhinde propagandaya giriştiği, Atatürk'ün yahudi ve Türkiye'nin bir Amerikan sömürgesi olduğu yolunda yalan yanlış haberler yayınlarak Bağdad paktı aleyhinde faaliyet sarfettiği ifade olunmaktadır. Bu haber hakkında münasip şekilde tahkikat icrası ile doğruluğu tebeyyün ettiği takdirde iki memleket dostluğuna ve Bağdad Paktı ile derpiş edilen işbirliğine muzır olan bu faaliyetin önlenmesi zımında gerekli tedbirlerin alınması için Irak Hariciye Vezaretine nezdinde teşebbüste bulunulmasını ve neticenin işarını saygılarımla rica ederim. Hariciye Vekili Vekili Y.			

Document reflecting the Turkish stance towards the Muslim Brotherhood in earlier times

Appendix 11:

2010

TELGRAF

(Örnek: B. 1)

Yol

= president turkish republic ankara servis işaretleri

T. C.
P. T. T. I. G. M.

Devlet telgraf muhabere
dolayı mesuliyet kabul etmez

+ + 2075 2272 xga 339/ bml 358 benğhazi 30 19 1120 = via radio

= did you forget our struggle beside you during your crisis
stop you lost the hope of our nation in you =
for Libya youth wakluf tuttardi kuesir + +

Takribi tercemesi:

Kendi mücadeleniz sırasında size yaptığımız yardımı
unuttunuz mu? Milletimiz size olan güvenini kaybetmiştir.
Libya gençliği namına:

(D. D. Basımevi — 4008 - 1948)

13.04.2022 tarih ve 34269117 sayılı Karar ile gizliliği kaldırılmıştır.

Libyan people are embarrassed due to Turkish stance in the Libyan issue

Appendix 12:

DAILY REPORT
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

No. 511

Wednesday, 10 May 1960

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Yesterday afternoon and this morning Commission had general debate on additional proposed articles on Economic and Social Rights.

COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN

Yesterday afternoon and this morning Commission had general debate on nationality of married women and desirability of drawing up a Covenant on that subject.

ADVISORY COUNCIL IN LIBYA

At its eleventh meeting, Council discussed Commissioner's request for advice regarding plan for constitutional development of Libya. U.S. Representative said the General Assembly had no intention of specifying form of Government to be established in Libya, whether federal, unitary or other. This matter was to be determined by representatives of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan in a National Assembly, and not by Council, Commissioner or Administering Powers. He considered Administering Powers should take immediate steps to establish local governmental institutions managed by the inhabitants. The Commissioner's plan of constitutional development seemed calculated to accomplish that end. Egyptian Representative agreed in principle with U.S. Representative, but insisted that no steps be taken in constitutional development of Libya without previous study by Council. He expressed his concern about separatist tendencies and maintained that elections should take place in the three territories according to one electoral law. For example, existing electoral law in Cyrenaica could be taken as a model. Representative of France wanted Council to have a fuller knowledge of situation in Libya before making any recommendation. He pointed out that Fezzan Assembly had been constituted according to tradition and local customs. Nevertheless, French Government was ready to consider wishes of Council as well as wishes of local population on question of elections. Representative of France warned Council not to consider the Preparatory Committee as an embryo government. Preparatory Committee's functions should be limited to objects clearly defined in documents submitted by Commissioner. Italian Representative stated his Government was ready to follow wishes of population, guided by Council and Commissioner. He considered that electoral laws should be established in full liberty, but, as far as possible on a similar basis in three territories, and without discrimination.

Discussions on constitutional development of Libya

Appendix 13:

● DAILY REPORT ●
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

NO. 565

Monday, 8 October 1951

U.N. COMMISSIONER IN ERITREA

On 5 October the Commissioner concluded his consultations concerning the draft Eritrean constitution with the inhabitants of the communities outside Asmara. Zewde Gebre Heywet, Ethiopian Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, is visiting Asmara for consultations with the Commissioner. Menasseh Lesama, Ethiopian Vice-Minister for Finance has arrived in Asmara to discuss Eritrean finance and customs with the British Administration.

THE NORMAN QUESTION

With a note dated 5 October the United States Representative transmitted, for the information of the Security Council, communications issued by the Headquarters of the United Nations Command between 3 and 5 October.

U.N. COMMISSIONER IN LIBYA

The following message has been received from the U.N. Commissioner in Libya from Benghazi: "During morning, 7 October, 11.30 local time, under scenes great and prolonged enthusiasm and in presence His Majesty King Designate, National Assembly unanimously voted Libyan Constitution".

The Commissioner returned to Tripoli yesterday.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - INDIA

Mr. Walter Neckless, Professor of Criminology, School of Social Administration, Ohio State University, arrived at Headquarters Monday, 1 October, and leaves for India as a TNA Expert Friday, 12 October. He is to remain in India for one year to advise the Tata Institute for Social Sciences, Amherst, India, and the Indian Government on the development of criminology programmes.

NOTES ON STAFF

1. Mrs. Helen Moats Zak, Chief of Inland Transport Section, left Headquarters on 5 October to attend the Fifth Pan American Highway Congress to be held in Lima, Peru from 8 - 14 October.

Voting of Libyan constitution

Appendix 14:

SELECTIVE SURVEY
No. 104 - Fortnightly Issue
30 July - 12 August 1953

LIBYA
(Item 39A)

39A. LIBYA

On 29 July, Libya and the UK signed a treaty by which the UK has obtained 20 years' rights to maintain military establishments in Libya in return for financial aid to the new kingdom. The financial needs of Libya under the treaty will be reassessed every five years and the entire agreement will be reviewed at the end of ten years.

Libyan-UK Treaty

Appendix 15 :

NO. 746

CONFIDENTIAL

DAILY REPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Monday, 4 May 1953

COMMISSION ON RACE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA

The Commission will meet as scheduled on 7 May. Mr. Santa-Cruz, one of the three members, will be unable to attend.

U.N. TRIBUNAL IN LIBYA

Information has been received that on 25 February 1953 the Government of Italy requested the United Nations Tribunal in Libya to determine whether the agreement concluded in London on 28 June 1951, between the Government of Italy and the Government of the United Kingdom, relating to the restitution of property to certain Italian institutions in Libya was consistent with the provisions of Resolution 388 (V) of the General Assembly.

COMMITTEE ON SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS

The Committee unanimously agreed that as there were no proposals submitted to it by the Secretary-General or by delegations, it should take no action at present but should reconvene if any proposals are made later.

During the discussion, the representative of China referred to the question of increasing to ten the membership of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and of eliminating the references to financial experts in Rules 154 and 155 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly (concerning the Advisory Committee). The representative of Chile made certain criticisms of the procedures of the Joint Appeals Board and the Administrative Tribunal which he had previously made in the General Assembly debate on personnel policy. He favoured making the Board into a tribunal, and making the Administrative Tribunal's decisions more binding on the Secretary-General.

SOCIAL COMMISSION

The ninth session of the Social Commission opened this morning at Headquarters. Mr. Georges-Picot made the opening address. The following officers were elected: Mr. R. B. Curry (Canada) - Chairman; Mrs. Ashedevi Arayanayagam (India) - First Vice-Chairman; Mr. Jiri Nosek (Czechoslovakia) - Second Vice-Chairman; Mr. Kaare Salvessen (Norway) - Rapporteur.

The agenda as presented in document E/CN.5/288/Rev.1 was adopted.

Agreement between the Italian government and the UK

Appendix 16:

DAILY REPORT
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Tuesday, 20 June 1950

TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

At its twelfth meeting Council began consideration of annual report on administration of Trust Territory of Pacific Islands for year ended 30 June 1949. After hearing an introductory statement by Admiral Fiske, special representative of the Administering Authority, Council proceeded to examine political, economic, social and educational aspects of the Territory.

COMMISSIONS

1. Libya: At a private meeting on 16 June, Advisory Council advised Commissioner on the conduct of consultations concerning appointment of Tripolitanian representatives to the body of 21 persons which is to meet not later than 1 July, to prepare a plan for a national assembly to draft a constitution for Libya. Council advised Commissioner to follow a procedure analogous to that used for the selection of representatives of Libyan territories and minorities on Council. Council further indicated to Commissioner that the body of 21 persons replaces Preparatory Committee which had originally been proposed and therefore is not governed by the terms of reference and mode of composition and convocation which Commissioner originally suggested. Commissioner was requested to submit result of his consultations, preferably not later than Council's next meeting on 21 June.
2. UNSCOB: In a letter dated 19 June, Greek representative replied to the charge in letter dated 11 February from the Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs that, on 20 November 1949, Greek frontier guards had abducted a Bulgarian citizen from Bulgarian territory. Greek representative said that the man had been arrested on Greek territory after offering armed resistance to the Greek authorities. He described the inconclusive negotiations for the exchange of this Bulgarian citizen and a Greek citizen who had allegedly been abducted by the Bulgarians. Copies of this letter are being transmitted to UNSCOP and to Bulgarian Foreign Ministry and will be released to Press.

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA



Commission declared Portuguese an official language of ECLA and recommended that the Executive Secretary study possibility of making it a working language.

Commission adopted two resolutions on furtherance of trade; the first dealing with trade with non-American areas, and the second on inter-American areas.

Commission withdrew from agenda maritime transport problems affecting Latin America, leaving this to "other competent organs", as recommended by Transport and Communications Commission at its fourth session. Commission will hold its closing session at 11 a.m. tomorrow.

Appointment of Libyan representative to the constitution process

Appendix 17:



inhabitants of the whole country—a fact established by solid, self-evident economic factors reckoned with throughout the country's long history.

Actually, since the inhabitants of Libya sought Turkish aid to repel the aggression of Genoa in 1520, and were rescued by Sultan Suleiman "The Magnificent," who drove away the invaders and incorporated Libya into the Ottoman Empire, the country has been constituted into an indivisible whole, not only from the point of view of administration, but also from that of the integral existence of the population as a people with distinguishing features and typical characteristics.

Even when the country was invaded by the Italians in 1911, it retained its administrative unity. It was only under the pressure of temporary military exigencies that the Italians had to divide it into two provinces—Tripolitania and Cyrenaica—but again restored its unity by the establishment of the Government, whose authority extended throughout the country, with a Governor-General resident in Tripoli.

4.—The Libyans, in the first place, demand the unity of their country from the Egyptian Frontier in the East to those of Tunisia and Algeria in the West. The Libyans and their representatives, therefore, resent and disapprove the present movement, which they fear might be meant as a prelude to the ultimate partition of the country.

The French now occupy the southern part of Tripolitania, from Ghadames on the Tunisian border

13.04.2022 tarih ve 34269/117 sayılı Karar ile gizliliği kaldırılmıştır.

to Fezzan, while the British occupy Cyrenaica and what remains of Tripolitania, applying in Cyrenaica, however, a system of government quite different from that in force in the latter territory. In Cyrenaica, the British have abolished censorship and lifted the ban on exports and imports, as well as that on travel, facilities none of which is being enjoyed by the Tripolitaniens.

All this, together with what from time to time appears in the world press on the subject, is causing a great deal of anxiety among the Libyans, who are beginning to wonder whether it is all aimed at the dreaded partition of their country between the Great Powers—Cyrenaica being assigned to Britain, Fezzan to France and Tripolitania falling once more an easy prey to the Italians, or placed under trusteeship.

The Libyans as a whole—Tripolitaniens and Cyrenaicans alike—desire therefore to make it clearly known that they resent and strongly disapprove all activities and actions tending to the eventual partition of their Fatherland. They at the same time proclaim their resolute and unshakable determination to oppose by all means at their disposal any such partition, no matter the guise under which such activities are carried out.

II.—INDEPENDENCE

5.—The Libyans, while insisting on full respect for the unity of their country, demand with equal

13.04.2022 tarih ve 34269/117 sayılı Karar ile gizliliği kaldırılmıştır.

vigour its full enjoyment of complete independence and repudiate all forms of imperialistic designs aimed at its exploitation.

Independence is not at all foreign to the Libyans, as might at first sight appear. As already mentioned, ever since the incorporation of the country into the Ottoman Empire in 1520, the Libyans have been enjoying the advantages of an independent political status, for the Caliphate Rule in Islam, which applied equally to Turks and Arabs, never interfered with the system of Government or the administrative methods in force in any Arab country. On the contrary, it extended every possible encouragement for the promotion and development of such methods, as long as they aimed at the maintenance of justice and equity among all.

Consequently, National Councils were formed in Libya, which supervised the administration of the country, while the Libyans themselves managed the affairs of the different clans and tribes, appointing from among themselves Governors and Mayors in all important towns and cities, indeed the government of the country remained for quite a long time—from 1711 to 1835—confined to one Dynasty—the Karamanlis. The Libyans likewise were fully represented in the Turkish Parliament following the establishment of the Constitutional Regime in the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the present century.

This clearly demonstrates that the Libyans have

enjoyed the benefits of self-government for ages, a system of government compatible with their ancient customs and inherited traditions, they being the descendants of Arab beduin tribes instinctively free and proud of their integrity and unfettered independence.

6.—And this is the main reason for their strong resistance to the Italians invaders in 1911, which continued for thirty long years until they finally succeeded with the help of the Allied Armies (January 1943) in driving away the invaders and getting rid of the hateful Italian rule.

The heroic struggle of the Libyans and their martyrdom in the defence of their country is well known the world over, while the barbarous atrocities of the Italian imperialists and the savage methods they resorted to in their endeavours to subjugate a free people are deeply engraved in the hearts of their victims.

We refrain here from enumerating these atrocities. Suffice it to say that they have created in the hearts of the Libyans such a feeling of bitter hatred for the Italians as to make the return of one inch of Libyan territory to the Italians the unhappiest and most impracticable of solutions, so much so indeed for the Libyans are determined to oppose such an eventuality if it will ever occur with all their might, resorting in so doing even to the use of arms.

7.—If the Libyans continued pluckily to resist the Italian invasion and unwaveringly suffered all

the infamous atrocities and indignities inflicted upon them, it is because they were born a dignified and independent race. If fact, Italian savagery has resulted in decimating the population of the country, which dropped in the last thirty years from two millions to about one million only.

8.—Undaunted by all these inhuman acts and savageries, the Libyans continued the struggle for independence in other Arab countries, particularly in Egypt. When Italy entered the war in June 1940, the Libyans's first action was to get in touch with the French Legation in Cairo. One party then left for Algiers, where they met General Noguès, with whom they agreed on the formation of an expeditionary force from the Libyans then in Tunis and Algiers to fight against the Italians in Libya, but the tragic situation in France dealt the death blow to the scheme. A second party under the leadership of El-Sayed Mohamed Idris El-Senussi, decided to form a Libyan Army to take part with the Allies in the war against Italy. This army was actually formed. It numbered no fewer than 14,000 men, led by 120 Libyan officers, and took part under General (then Brigadier) Bromilow, of the British Army, in all the battles fought in the Western Desert, side by side with the Allied Armies. It was assigned the difficult task of working behind the enemy lines, and was in fact instrumental in bringing about the defeat of Rommel's armies.

9.—This is why the Libyans hold fast to their historic right of independence. They have already established their ability to govern themselves and

manage their own affairs, not to mention the fact that large numbers of them now hold distinguished positions in the political, administrative and educational fields in other sister Arab countries as well as in Turkey, and they all look forward to the day of the independence of their country in order to place themselves, with all their power and ability, at its service.

III.—LIBYA AND THE ARAB LEAGUE.

10.—Libya is an Arab country of equal importance to the League of Arab States as any of its members. All are Arabs united by strong bonds of religion, language and race, cemented by close social and cultural ties, and rendered still stronger by equally close common interests. This is why the Libyans look forward to the League for the realization of their aspirations. They once before entrusted the League, and are to-day again confiding to it the task of taking all possible measures of a nature to ensure the realization of the independence of their country as a unit, indivisible and incapable of any division.

11.—Their case so far as concerns the political status of their country is very clear:

In the Peace Treaty, Italy renounces her so-called rights and claims to Libya, although the Libyans have never admitted or reconsigned such rights or claims, and

Appendix 18:

KISIR BASINTIDAN :

İskenderiye'de alence olarak yayımlanan "İmre" gazetesinin 17 Mart 1945 tarihli sayısından :

TRABLUSGARP

Yalçın, yeni bir Akdeniz meselesi ortaya atmaktadır. Tanin'deki bir yazısında diyor ki :

"Akdeniz meselesinin halli, Trablusgarp'ın Türkiye'ye iadesine bağlıdır. Bu memlekette, müttefiklerin kontrolü altında serbest plebisit yapılması en doğru bir hareket olur. Bu takdirde Trablusgarp ve Bingazi sularını 99 sene için kiraya verebiliriz."

İtalya'nın sulatından sonra, Trablusgarp'ın Türkiye'ye ilhakı keyfiyetinin ilk defa olarak ma ortaya atıldığını bilmeyoruz; bununla beraber bu tekliflerin sırf Yalçın'ın şahsî kanaatinden mülbem bir fikir ve müteale olmadığını tahmin ediyoruz.

İnseden insana tetkik edildiği takdirde, bu teklifin gerçekten bir hal sureti teşkil ettiği neticesine varılır.

Harp sonunda Trablusgarp İtalya'ya mi iade edilecektir? Başka milletleri idare etmekteki iktidarsızlıkları anlaşılan devletlere ortak fırsat ve serbestlik verilmez. Fakat Trablusgarp müstakil bir idareye de nail olamaz. Bu himaye altına girmesi zaruridir. Bu himaye, bu eyaletin idaresine halkın geniş ölçüde iştirakine mani olmalıdır.

.....

20 Mart 1945

KISIR BASINTI :

Berlin Radyosu (İtalyanca : 20.45 Yayını)

İstanbul'dan bildirildiğine göre, TANIN gazetesi Trablus'un Türkiye'ye ait olduğunu yazmaktadır.

Eğer Türkler ilâm ile iktifa ettikleri iki haftalık harplarına rağmen Trablus üzerindeki hak iddia ederlerse, diğer milletler İtalya'ya ve şiddetlerini kim bilir nasıl paylayacak isteyeceklerdir.

Handwritten note: 9. Trablus'un Türkiye'ye ait olduğunu yazmaktadır.

Handwritten signature: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

Handwritten initials: M.K.

Handwritten note: 13 Ocak 2012 tarih ve 34489/17 sayılı Karar ile ibrazı kaldırılmıştır.

Berlin Radio reports concern over claims in Tanin newspaper that Tripoli belongs to Turks

Appendix 19:

NATO—SECRET

001

NATO SECRET

IPT 197/242/INFO

20 August 1964

COPY NO.

CONTROL NO. 11329-B

TO THE INTERNATIONAL PLANNING TEAM

(Col Guerin, Grp Capt Stanbridge, Col Irby/Col Shaefer,
Col Bertuzzi)

SUBJECT: Defence Problems of Turkey

References: a. LOM 279/64, 14 Aug. 1964
b. IPT 197/241/INFO, 19 Aug. 1964

Reference a is attached as enclosure for your information in view of the development of the study being undertaken by the Ad Hoc Working Group and of the possible need for providing military input, as agreed at the 633rd meeting of the Standing Group held on 14 August 1964.

John L. Herndon
JOHN L. HERNDON
Lt Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Secretary

ENCLOSURE 1

1. LOM 279/64, 14 Aug. 1964

381.1

Dea

NATO's military support to Türkiye

Appendix 20:

~~NATO~~—SECRETSECRET - NATOCOPY NO. 1NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

Standing Group

Groupe Permanent

SGWM-453-58

5 August 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STANDING GROUP

SUBJECT: Strategic Estimate on the Middle East

Reference: LOSTAN 2577 (DAIN 140583)

1. At Enclosure, for your consideration, is a draft message prepared by the International Planning "A" Teams coordinating with the Intelligence Committee in reply to reference as directed by the Standing Group.

2. This will be considered by the Standing Group at its 389th Meeting scheduled for 0900 hours, Wednesday, 6 August 1958.

W. E. AEBLITT
W. E. AEBLITT
Lt Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Secretary

WEA/vv

381/MIDEAST

Doc 2

SECRET - NATO

- a. It dominates the southern flank of NATO in Europe.
- b. It includes the areas of oil production and oil distribution, from which the West, particularly Europe, draws the greatest proportion of its oil.
- c. It contains the principal lines of communication, land, sea and air, between NATO on the one hand and Iran, Pakistan, the Indian Ocean, the Indian subcontinent, and the Far East on the other.
- d. It is the land bridge between Russia and Africa.
- e. It contains valuable military bases.

The Threat to NATO's Southern Flank

2. A Russian military foothold in the Middle East would seriously threaten vital Allied communication lines and could provide the beginnings of a land bridge to Africa. Exploitation of such possibilities could lead to Soviet control of the southern shore of the Mediterranean. This, in turn, would open the Mediterranean to Russian submarines, cut the West's lines of communication, militate against Western exploitation of the Mediterranean, and isolate Greece and Turkey from the rest of NATO.

Oil Producing Areas

3. These areas and the means for oil distribution, including the Suez Canal, are of the utmost importance to the West in peace and war.

Lines of Communication

NATO's involvement in the MENA

Appendix 21:

~~SECRET~~—SECRETSECRET - NATOCOPY NO. 1IPT 119/28 (Final Draft)13 November 1956Pages 1-411, incl.
(Encl pages 1-6, incl.)

ALLIED COMMANDS SUBORDINATE TO THE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ALLIED FORCES

MEDITERRANEAN

NOTE BY THE INTERNATIONAL PLANNING TEAM

References: a. IPT 119/27/D
 b. SG 152/3 (Final)
 c. C-M(54)63
 d. MEM-106-54
 e. SHAPE AG 2509 PPO of 26 June 1956

INTRODUCTION

1. Reference b proposed the establishment and activation of certain Allied Area Commands subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean (CINCPACMED). By reference c the North Atlantic Council approved the action recommended in reference b.

2. While reference b defined the boundaries of the area commands to the extent that this was possible at the time, the following boundaries were left undefined or have since been amended:

a. The boundary between the Western and Southeast Mediterranean Areas.

b. The boundary between the Western and Central Mediterranean Areas.

c. The boundary between the Central and Southeast Mediterranean Areas.

334/SHAPE/MEMO/320

SECRET - NATO

thence along the Southern coast of Turkey. The Eastern limit is the Levant coast. The Southern limit is from the Western boundary along the Southern shore of the Mediterranean to the Eastern boundary.

2. All area boundaries exclude national coastal waters, and all islands remain under the command of their national commanders.

FUNCTIONAL COMMANDS

3. The following functional commands will be activated for exercises and in the event of war:

a. Submarines Mediterranean. Short title - SUBMED.

Under the command of Commander Submarines Mediterranean, short title - COMSUBMED, with headquarters at Malta.

b. Submarines Northeast Mediterranean. Short title -

SUBMEDNOREAST. Under the command of Commander Submarines Northeast Mediterranean, short title - COMSUBMEDNOREAST, with headquarters at Ankara.

c. United States Fleet Air Wing Mediterranean. Short

title - USFAIRWINGMED. Under the command of Commander U.S. Fleet Air Wing Mediterranean, short title - COMUSFAIRWINGMED, with headquarters at Naples.

4. COMSUBMED will be directly subordinate to CINCPACMED, and will control all Allied submarine operations in AFMED exclusive of the MEDNOREAST area. COMSUBMEDNOREAST will be subordinate to COMEDNOREAST, and will control all Allied submarine operations in



ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

198

1110 BRUXELLES

41.88.88
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41.88.88

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
18th January, 1971

PO/71/32

To: Permanent Representatives of Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

From: Secretary General

ESTABLISHMENT OF NATO WEAPONS TRAINING FACILITIES
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA

Reference: MCM-88-70 ✓

Permanent Representatives will recall that on 16th December, 1969 the Defence Planning Committee in Permanent Session, and later, on 11th June, 1970 the Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial Session urged that studies of the development of NATO Mediterranean weapons training facilities be expedited(1).

2. The study was put in hand because of political developments in Libya as a consequence of which the training facilities in that area will no longer be available.

3. In the meantime, the urgency of the matter has been stressed again at the Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee on 2nd December, 1970(2).

4. The initial study by SACEUR stated that there exist valid operational requirements for various types of NATO weapons training facilities with the highest priority on air training and that both the desirability and feasibility of forming such centres had been clearly established(3).

-
- (1) DPC/R(69)28, page 8; DPC/D(70)14, paragraph IV, 4(h)
(2) DPC-VR(70)24, Part II, page 12
(3) SHAPE letter 1880/20-5-2/70, dated 5th May, 1970

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

-1-

NATO's strategic involvement in the Mediterranean

Appendix 22:

NATO—SECRETSECRET - NATOCOPY NO. 1

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE

1233

COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

Standing Group

Groupe Permanent

SGM-192-57

15 March 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE

SUBJECT: Search and Rescue Cathode Ray HF/DF Plan

References: a. AG 1527 SIG/EL of 30 Jun 55
b. AG 1527 SIG/EL of 20 Jun 56

1. The eight stations in the NATO area listed in the "Utilitarian Plan" given at reference a, as modified by paragraph 9 of reference b, i.e., with the addition of BORDEAUX and the setting up of a sub-coordination center at BORDEAUX, is approved, as to military necessity, by the Standing Group.

2. The Standing Group agrees that the addition of a station in Morocco and a station in Libya would increase the effectiveness of the network. Information available to the Standing Group indicates that these two stations are not suitably equipped, nor is there a national requirement to re-equip them. Further, these stations are outside the NATO area and would not be eligible for financing as NATO common infrastructure without specific NAC consideration of the political implications and agreement on the conditions under which they would be included.

3. You are requested to consider alternative locations

NATO establishes military base in Libya

Appendix 23:

Libya
Terrorism



**UNITED
NATIONS**

Security Council

S

LETTER DATED 9 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Addendum

IMPACT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 748 (1992) DURING THE PERIOD FROM
15 APRIL TO 15 NOVEMBER 1992

Since it was first imposed on 15 April 1992, the implementation of Security Council resolution 748 (1992) has caused injury to the Libyan Arab people in various humanitarian and economic aspects of life, as follows:

Humanitarian impact

As a result of the implementation of the aerial embargo on the Jamahiriya, its citizens and various categories of aliens resident and working there have been exposed to a number of negative and highly dangerous humanitarian effects and repercussions, of which we give examples below.

It has been impossible to send abroad approximately 5,445 critically ill patients, who cannot be treated locally and require direct transport abroad by air. We mention in particular the urgent cases who would formerly have been transported by air ambulances or other passenger aircraft, such as cardiac patients, complex embolism patients, kidney transplant cases, separation of the retina cases, patients requiring brain surgery, neurosurgery or spinal transplants and various burn and cancer cases. One hundred and fifty of these seriously ill patients have died while being transported by land to the airports of neighbouring States, owing to the severity of their condition and the length of the journey.

The halt in air travel has delayed the arrival of the bodies of Libyan citizens who died abroad and also the transportation to their countries of the bodies of aliens who died in the Jamahiriya. The number of aliens who died in the Tripoli municipality alone during this period was 118. In addition, there

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24961/Add.1
18 December 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

92-83086 3675g (E) 191292 201292

(...)

Impact of the UNSC sanctions on Gaddafi

Appendix 24:

7 Aralık 2019 CUMARTESİ

Resmî Gazete

Sayı : 30971

MİLLETLERARASI ANDLAŞMA



Karar Sayısı: 1815

27 Kasım 2019 tarihinde İstanbul'da imzalanan ve 7195 sayılı Kanunla onaylanması uygun bulunan ekli "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükûmeti ile Libya Devleti Ulusal Mutabakat Hükûmeti Arasında Akdeniz'de Deniz Yetki Alanlarının Sınırlandırılmasına İlişkin Mutabakat Muhtırası"nın onaylanmasına, 9 sayılı Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnamesinin 2 nci ve 3 üncü maddeleri gereğince karar verilmiştir.

6 Aralık 2019

Recep Tayyip ERDOĞAN
CUMHURBAŞKANI

Turkish-Libyan Maritime Boundary Agreement on Exclusive Economic Zone

Appendix 25:

26 Aralık 2019 PERŞEMBE

Resmî Gazete

Sayı : 30990

MİLLETLERARASI ANDLAŞMA



Karar Sayısı: 1926

27 Kasım 2019 tarihinde İstanbul'da imzalanan ve 7199 sayılı Kanunla onaylanması uygun bulunan ekli "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükûmeti ile Libya Devleti Ulusal Mutabakat Hükûmeti Arasında Güvenlik ve Askerî İş Birliği Mutabakat Muhtırası"nın onaylanmasına, 9 sayılı Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnamesinin 2 nci ve 3 üncü maddeleri gereğince karar verilmiştir.

25 Aralık 2019

Recep Tayyip ERDOĞAN
CUMHURBAŞKANI

Turkish-Libyan Security and Military Agreement