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**KURULUŞUNDAN GÜNÜMÜZE MODERN HINDİSTAN'DA
İSLAMOFOBİ**

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**ISLAMAPHOBIA IN MODERN INDIA SINCE
ESTABLISHMENT**

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SCIENTIFIC ETHICS PAGE

I declare that in the preparation of this thesis, scientific ethics and academic rules were meticulously complied with, that all the information in the thesis was obtained and presented within the framework of ethical behavior and academic rules.

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Bağımsızlığın oluşumu sırasında Hindu milliyetçiliğinin ortaya çıkmasından bu yana, Müslüman toplumun yaşamında fark edilen yeni fenomenler, son zamanlarda BJP milliyetçi yöneticilerin iktidara gelmesiyle büyük ölçüde ağırlaşan, yakın ilgi ve inceleme konusu haline geldi. Çalışmanın odak noktası, Hindistan iç politikasında İslamofobi çerçevesinde Müslümanların marjinalleştirme başta olmak üzere Hindistan'daki dinler arası ilişkilerdir. Bu tezin önemi, modern Hindistan'da Müslümanlara yönelik düşmanlığın büyümesiyle İslamofobik tezahürlerin kapsamlı bir çalışmasına duyulan ihtiyaçtır. Araştırma, Müslüman karşıtı duyguların yükselişinin ve aktivasyonunun nedenlerini bulmayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma kapsamlı bir siyasi analiz yapmak ve İslam'ın modern toplumdaki rolünü tarihsel olaylar ve Hint modernleşmesi üzerinden değerlendirmeye yöneliktir. Ayrıca, Narendra Modi liderliğindeki Bharatiya Janata Partisi ve Hindu milliyetçisi Sangh Parivar örgütünün yetkililerinin politikaları aracılığıyla modern Hindistan'daki İslam karşıtlığının önkoşullarını ve gelecekteki etkilerini belirlemeyi hedefliyorum. Seçilen konunun disiplinler arası projeksiyonlarını ulusal, bölgesel ve uluslararası açılardan ele almak için tarihsel, politik, kültürel, kronolojik ve karşılaştırmalı bir sistemik analizini yaptım. Metodolojik olarak istatistiksel verilerin yanısıra Rusça, Türkçe ve İngilizce dillerindeki çalışmaları inceledim. Böylece birincil belgeleri, bilimsel literatürü, basılı ve elektronik medyadaki yayınları, kullandım.

Anahtar kelimeler: İslam, Müslümanlar, Hindular, Narendra Modi, Hindistan, İslamofobi, BJP, RSS, Sangh Parivar,



ABSTRACT

ABSTRACT

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Since the emergence of Hindu nationalism during the formation of independence, new phenomena noticed in the life of the Muslim community have become the subject of close attention and scrutiny, which has been greatly aggravated by the recent rise of BJP nationalist rulers to power. The focus of the study is the inter-religious relations in India, especially the marginalization of Muslims within the framework of Islamophobia in Indian domestic politics. The significance of this thesis is the need for a comprehensive study of Islamophobic manifestations with the growth of hostility towards Muslims in modern India. The research aims to find the reasons for the rise and activation of anti-Muslim sentiment. The study aims to make a comprehensive political analysis and evaluate the role of Islam in modern society through historical events and Indian modernization. I also aim to identify the preconditions and future effects of anti-Islamism in modern India through the policies of the officials of the Bharatiya Janata Party led by Narendra Modi and the Hindu nationalist organization Sangh Parivar. I made a historical, political, cultural, chronological and comparative systemic analysis of the chosen topic to consider the interdisciplinary projections from national, regional and international perspectives. Methodologically, besides statistical data, I examined studies in Russian, Turkish and English languages. So I have used primary documents, scientific literature, publications in print and electronic media.

Key words: Islam, Muslims, Hindus, Narendra Modi, India, Islamophobia, BJP, RSS, Sangh Parivar.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAGSP	: All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad [Assam Popular Struggle Association]
AAMSU	: All Assam Minority Student Union
AASU	: All Assam Student Unions
ABRM	: Akhil Bharatiya Ramayana Mahasabha [All-India Hindu Grand Assembly]
ABVP	: Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad [All India Students' Council]
ANHAD	: Act Now for Harmony and Democracy
BJP	: Bharatiya Janata Party [Indian People's Party]
BJS	: Bharatiya Jana Sangh [Indian People's Association]
BMS	: Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh [Indian Workers' Union]
CAA	: Citizenship Amendment Act
CAB	: Citizenship Amendment Bill
CoIA	: Citizenship of India Act
CPEC	: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
EIC	: East India Company
EVS	: European Values Study
HMS	: Hindu Mahasabha [All-India Hindu Grand Assembly]
ICCPR	: International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
ICHR	: Indian Council of Historical Research
ICP	: Indian Congress Party
INC	: Indian National Congress
J&K	: Jammu and Kashmir
LoC	: Line of Control"
MHRD	: Ministry of Human Resource Development
ML	: All India Muslim League
NCERT	: National Council of Educational Research and Training
NPR	: National Population Register
NRC	: National Register of Citizens
PM	: Prime Minister
PRC	: Pew Research Center
RSS	: Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh [National Volunteers Corps]
RSS(w)	: Rashtra Sevika Samiti [National Women Volunteers Committee]
UDHR	: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	: United Nations
UNOHCHR	: Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights
US	: United States
UT	: Union Territory
VHP	: Vishwa Hindu Parishad [World Hindu Organization]
WVS	: World Values Survey

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INTRODUCTION

In the XX-XXI centuries, religious differences are becoming more relevant and widespread among the causes of modern conflicts in a number of communities. And here we should agree with G. Rogochaya that an important task of today for countries is to rethink the place and role of religion in the modern world and politics. Because the processes of desecularization of religion and secularization of politics significantly affect the nature of religious relations throughout the world. These processes lead to inevitable consequences, such as an increase in the level of religiosity and an increase in the potential for conflicts (integration and disintegration) in this area¹. Religious conflict is usually considered to be a conflict between representatives of different faiths or a conflict based on intolerance towards other people's religious beliefs or practices. Over time, religious conflict in the context of socio-political and socio-economic interaction takes the form of ideological or political competition².

These consequences of the clash of religious passion are associated with trends in the politicization of religion and the religionization of politics. Perhaps Z. Bauman was right that the latest trend is “even more dangerous and often accompanied by much more bloodshed. Although both tendencies are essentially not separable like Siamese twins³. Religion itself is a very unique weapon and widely used by various political forces to justify territorial and other claims, to justify violent methods of political struggle. It is the politicization of religion in the context of conflict that can pose the most serious threat to stability and hinder the search for optimal solutions in conflict resolution⁴. The translation of a conflict of religious values into a conflict of social and political interests is a complex and unpredictable process. Unfortunately, such trends have been noticeable in recent years in India.

¹ Rogochaya G. P., *Religioznye konflikty v Sovremennom mire: podkhody k issledovaniyu* [Religious Conflicts in the Modern World: Approaches to Research], Business Book, 2019, p.264

² Luchsheva L.V., *Religioznye otnosheniya i religiozniy konflikt* [Religious Relations and Religious Conflict], VEPS, 2017. No. 4. p.283

³ Bauman, Z. *Living on Borrowed Time*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010, p.55

⁴ Voskanyan S. S., Ermakova S. S., *Religiya kak instrument politicheskogo manipulirovaniya istoricheskie aspekty i sovremennost'* [Religion as an instrument of political manipulation: historical aspects and modernity], *Islamic studies*, 2013, no. 2., p.15

Actually, India has been one of the most multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries in the world since ancient times. India is the birthplace of many religions, where world religions such as Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism, Jainism were born, which later found their adherents in many countries of the world. Other religions that have become widespread in the country are Islam and Christianity; they arose outside its borders, but, once in India, they acquired many typically Indian features⁵.

Despite the complex confessional composition of the population, it has always remained predominantly a Hindu country with 80% inhabitants. It is around Hinduism - this ancient national religion of India - that the country's cultural, social and political unity has been built in all ages. The second predominant religion is Islam with about 14% of followers⁶. This is a rapidly growing minority. In absolute numbers, Muslims in India are second only to fellow believers from Indonesia and Pakistan. According to a study by the Pew Research Center, India by 2050 will become the country with the largest Muslim population in the world and will overtake Indonesia⁷. The Indian government does not want to admit this and looks at it with horror. However, the officially scheduled 2020 census, which was postponed due to the global coronavirus, has yet to take place⁸.

Today we are witnessing such stubborn sectarian wars in South Asia, namely India. In this context, the evolution of relations between Hindus and Muslims is extremely indicative, since communal relations are of paramount importance in India. For almost 75 years of the formation of the country's independence, the ascent did not subside, both externally and internally. Interreligious relations are now moving into the category strategic global problems, the solution of which should be the subject of careful and in-depth study and international settlement along with the problems of

⁵Gorokhov S.A., Religiozni faktor v politicheskoi zhizni sovremennoi Indii [Religious factor in the political life of Modern India], vestnik Series 1:,Regional Studies, 2011. No. 2..p.21

⁶ Abul Hussain, Religions in India, Journal of Emerging Technologies and Innovative Research, 2021, Volume 8, Issue 5, pp.1-2

⁷Conrad Hackett, By 2050, India to have world's largest populations of Hindus and Muslims, april 21, 2015, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/21/by-2050-india-to-have-worlds-largest-populations-of-hindus-and-muslims/>

⁸ Bharti Jain, Census may have to wait until next year or even 2022 if Covid-19 situation does not improve, The Times of India, 29 September 2020, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/census-may-have-to-wait-until-next-year-or-even-2022-if-covid-19-situation-does-not-improve/articleshow/78374925.cms>

disarmament, security, human rights and other issues. This thesis attempts to explain the complex relationship between Hindus and Muslims, as well as analyze their roots. Through this historical prism one can find the prerequisites for conflict and for peace. The analysis then moves on to current events, where some of the previous themes show up in social violence.

Thereby, concerns of politicians and scientists about the religious situation in India are understandable, since the historical resentment of the Muslim population goes back to the colonial period, in the initial stages of which the unity of Hindus and Muslims was preserved. Since in those periods the Muslims lost their former privileged position and were clearly hostile towards the British⁹. After gaining independence from Britain, there was a division in the Indian subcontinent along religious lines into Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India. Although this partition was aimed at easing religious tensions, as a result, it was the beginning of a destabilization of relations between the two countries, as well as internal communities. The process of division of British India left a bloody trail in the hearts of Muslims and Hindus. It is worth noting that this boundless conflict claimed a million lives, including the lives of the founder of modern India, Mahatma Gandhi and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi¹⁰.

The former leading Indian National Congress party, which adheres to the principle of "Unity in Diversity", failed to bring the conflict to zero. In the parliamentary elections of 2014, the Nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party won the elections, and the leader of the party, Narendra Modi, was elected as a Prime Minister of India. The main ideology of the BJP is Hindutva. This concept appeared in India during the period of the national liberation struggle and has been successfully used by socio-political parties more than once to raise the national spirit. The BJP has close ideological and organizational ties to the much older Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sang (RSS). They advocated the restoration of India in line with Hindu culture and called

⁹ Kashnikova V.I., Rol' religioznogo faktora v kontekste natsionalnoy bezopasnosti indii na primere vzaimootnosheniya induistov i musulman [The role of the religious factor in the context of India's national security (on the example of the relationship between Hindus and Muslims)], Vestnik, 2014. №3, 133

¹⁰ Ian Talbot, The 1947 Partition of India and Migration: A comparative study of Punjab and Bengal, , p. 324

for the creation of a strong unified state of the Hindu Rashtra (Hindu nation)¹¹. The strengthening of the influence of the ideology of Hindu nationalism in India was called the "saffronization" of political life.

Today, Hindutva in India is an effective tool for patriotic education. It has the status of a stable ideological, political, cultural and religious-philosophical phenomenon. This concept appeared in India during the period of the national liberation struggle and has been successfully used by socio-political parties more than once to raise the national spirit. RSS activists make no secret of their hostility towards minorities, in particular Muslims, who make up the largest religious minority in India¹². These nationalist organizations of the Sangh Parivar act categorically against the Constitution, completely ignoring its secular and tolerance. In fact, the Constitution of India 1950 officially declares the state to be secular (amendments of 1976) and allows to profess any religion, being loyal to the religious feelings of the Indians¹³.

Muslims in India under the leadership of nationalists are treated more negatively than followers of other faiths. Since according to Hindutva worldviews, Muslims are demonized as perfidious "aliens" who seek to impose their values on infidels through violence, high birth rates, and the radicalization of "good" Muslims¹⁴. Moreover one of the main conclusions of this concept was that India, being the homeland of the Hindus and the territory on which the Hindu shrines are located, cannot be a place of residence and worship of Muslims and Christians. In anti-Muslim rhetoric, Muslims are often associated with terrorism and extremism, and the presence of Muslim communities is presented as a threat to national security. Thus endanger the original civilization of the Hindus. Muslims in such an atmosphere of alienation often experience fear, anxiety and mistrust¹⁵.

¹¹Gita Sahgal, *Hindutva Past and Present: From Secular Democracy to Hindu Rashtra, Feminist Dissent*, 2020, p.26

¹² Milan Vaishnav, *Religious Nationalism and India's Future*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019, p.18

¹³ Milan Vaishnav, *Religious Nationalism and India's Future*, p.16

¹⁴Yakovlev A. Yu. *Indusslo-musul'manskie otnisheniya v Indii: ot nelyubvi do nenavisti* [Hindu-Muslim relations in India: from dislike to hatred], 2012, pp. 91

¹⁵Yakovlev A. Yu. *Mezhkonfessional'nye konflikty v Indii: indusy protiv musul'man* [Interfaith conflicts in India: Hindus against Muslims], *Islam Studies*. 2013. No. 4. p.62

According to a 2017 Pew Research Report, about a quarter of the world's countries (52 countries) still struggle with high levels of religious strife within their borders. These include the most populous countries such as China and India, resulting in a total of about 5.5 billion people (77% of the world's population) live in conditions of de facto restriction of religious freedom or religious hatred. These indicators show us a significant increase since 2017 in religious social hostility, including violence and persecution by certain individuals and groups¹⁶. Moreover, Muslims and Christians, together making up more than half of the world's population, are persecuted in the largest number of countries.

Since 2014, the period of the rule of the BJP party in India, cases of pogroms, robbery and persecution on a religious basis have become more frequent. Religious unrest has long been a normal part of life in India¹⁷. With the re-election of the nationalist BJP party in the 2019 parliamentary elections, sectarian conflicts and discrimination against Muslims have become more frequent and even rose to its peak. Since, a number of anti-Muslim laws and Islamophobic measures have been adopted in 2019. These discrimination poses a threat to India's Muslim minority and fuels long-standing religious tensions in the country. And of course, counting on a tolerant and humane attitude in countries where the faithful are a minority is sometimes quite difficult, especially if an Islamophobe with fascist manners gets to power there.

The thesis analyzes the transformation of the policy of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India in relation to religious minorities on the example of the Muslim community. This research work explains the theoretical and practical relevance of a comprehensive study of the prerequisites and causes of Islamophobia, the forms and levels of its existence in Modern India. The purpose of the thesis is to study Islamophobia in the socio-economic and political processes and its impact on Muslim minorities.

¹⁶ Pew Research Center, A Closer Look at How Religious Restrictions Have Risen Around the World, July 15, 2019 <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2019/07/15/a-closer-look-at-how-religious-restrictions-have-risen-around-the-world/>

¹⁷ Ahmed Shahid, Islamophobia Relies on Stereotypical “Imperialist” Thinking, March 4, 2021 <https://news.un.org/ru/story/2021/03/1397982>

CHAPTER ONE

THE ORIGINS OF ISLAM IN INDIA

1.1. Historical Background: The Emergence of Islam in India and Before

In a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural modern Indian society followers of Islam, Christianity, Sikhism, Buddhism and Jainism live side by side with the traditionally dominant adherents of Hinduism. Thus, it is one of the most diverse and mixed geographies of the world in terms of beliefs¹⁸. According to shown dates of the World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values Study (EVS) in 2020, about 86% of the country's population considered themselves religious people, and only 3% of Indians adhere to atheistic beliefs¹⁹.

Today, Muslims are the second largest community in the country after Hindus, making up 14.2% of the total population. In fact, India has the third largest Muslim population in the world, with over 195 million after Indonesia and Pakistan (Table 1.1)²⁰. The majority of Muslims in India profess Sunni Islam - more than 85%, approximately 12-20% of Muslims profess Shiite Islam²¹.

Table 1.1. Muslim population (top 5 countries) as of 2022.

№	Country	Muslim population	Percentage
1	Indonesia	229,000,000	12.70%
2	Pakistan	200,400,000	11.10%
3	India	195,000 000	10.90%
4	Bangladesh	153,700,000	9.20%
5	Nigeria	99,000,000	5.30%

¹⁸ H. Hilal Şahin, Ekber Şah'in sosyo-kültürel ve dinî reformlarının toplumsal hayata etkisi [The impacts of reforms of Akbar Shah's on social life of India], Journal of History School (JOHS), June 2015, Issue XXII, p. 121

¹⁹ Colin Mathers, Religiosity and Atheism in 2020, <https://colinmathers.com/2020/09/05/religiosity-and-atheism-in-2020/>

²⁰ World Population Review, <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/muslim-population-by-country>

²¹ K.S. Petrova, Osobennosti radikal'nogo islamizma i ekstremizma v Sovremennoi Indii [Features of Radical Islamism and Extremism in Modern India], Vostok, 2019, p. 166

There are many different theories today about how India became such a predominantly Muslim country. Politically, some try to portray Islam as foreign to India, insisting that it only exists because of the Arab invasions as well as effects of Muslim Persian traders and travelers. It took several centuries for Islam to spread in India.

In fact, South Asia, like other sedentary societies, has been invaded by nomadic tribes for centuries. The Indian subcontinent was often attacked from Iran and Central Asia, that is, always from the northwest. Early XIII century - mid XIX century the Islamic period in the history of India includes the reigns of Islamic sultanates and parallel Hindu states up to the English colonization.

According to Arabic sources, Islam came to South Asia at a very early period, long before the Muslim invasion of India. The history of Islamic emergence in this subcontinent dates to the VII century. Even before the Prophet Muhammad in the 600s, Arab traders have maintained contacts with their Indian counterparts. Merchants traveled regularly to the west coast of India to trade commodities such as spices, gold, and African goods. Naturally, when Arab merchants began to convert to Islam, at the same time they became the bearers of the new religion and carried out intensive missionary activity, spreading it everywhere²².




Figure 1.1. The Departure of Islam to the Indian Subcontinent

²²*Egypt Today*, Do you know how Islam spread in the Indian subcontinent? (29 May 2017). <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/4/5996/Do-you-know-how-Islam-spread-in-the-Indian-subcontinent>

However, Islamic societies were not only composed of Arabs but also various nations such as Persians, Turks and Afghans had also an impact on India (See Figure 1.1). In this context, dynasties, sultanates and empires established from the early ages and led by Muslims dominated the region for mid XIX centuries. Thus, we can consider the period of Islamization in India *in two periods*. Firstly, from the beginning of the 8th century, the raids of Muslim Arabs, in this context, the administration of the Umayyads and the Abbasids must be considered. Secondly, the Delhi Sultanate in the 10th century, is characterized mainly by Turkish and Afghan rulers from Central Asia and Afghanistan²³.

The first major expansion of Islam into India, as noted above, took place in the 8th century during the Umayyads, under the leadership Muhammad Ibn Qasim. Sindh and parts of the Punjab were the first to fall under the Muslim rule. However, the conquest of Sindh was not easy, it was possible after the third attempt. Today, Sindh is called Bab-al-Islam (Gate of Islam) as it led to the spread of Islam to South Asia and the Muslim communities of India²⁴.

Muhammad Ibn Qasim conscientiously fulfilled the duties assigned to him and became a generous and noble commander for his subordinates. This was recognized not only by his friends, but also by opponents. Thanks to such characteristic features, he did not meet resistance on his way to India, most of the cities voluntarily came under the control of Muslims without a fight. He was loved by both the army and the people. It can be said that his operation was most of a rescue nature, as in some cases the oppressed Buddhist minorities turned to the Muslim armies for protection from the Hindu rulers. In all the territories he conquered, he built mosques and acted only for the spread of Islamic culture. In two years he conquered many cities. It may very well be that if this brilliant commander had been given time, he would have conquered all of India.²⁵

²³Arshad Islam, "The civilizational role of Islam in the Indian subcontinent: The Delhi sultanate" *Intellectual Discourse*, 25:1 (2017), p.103

²⁴The Arab Invasion of Sind under Mohammed-bin-Qasim, 2014, <https://www.mapsofindia.com/history/battles/arab-invasion-of-sind-under-mohammed-bin-qasim.html>

²⁵ Muhammad Sultanov, Muhammad ibn Kasim – zavoevatel' Sinda i Pendzhaba [Muhammad ibn Qasim - the conqueror of Sindh and Punjab], 2018, <https://islamdag.ru/lichnosti/49082>

Under the rule of the Umayyads, however, the anti-Umayyad attitude gradually grew paving the path to the establishment of the Abbasid Caliphate. In the struggle for the throne, the Abbasids came to the support of the Shiites. Muhammad was captured and executed in 743, and the Umayyads were almost completely exterminated by the Abbasids. The religious policy of the early Abbasids was distinguished by the desire to maintain a balance between the various currents of Islam and non-Arab cultural traditions²⁶. Further Muslim conquests were no longer led only by Arabs but also by Turks and Central Asian Mongols who converted to Islam. In history, the invasion and conquest of South Asia by Muslim rulers is considered mainly from the 13th to the 16th centuries. Some historians consider them the bloodiest in human history. Because, in comparison with the Arabs, the Turkish raids on India were much more ruthless and destructive²⁷. Mahmud Ghaznevi, e.g., was a Turkic conqueror ruling southern Afghanistan and the founder of the Turkic Ghaznavid dynasty who annexed almost the entire territory of Punjab and Sindh to his possessions. The two most important motives for invasion India were, firstly, the accumulation of Indian vast wealth and, secondly, the spread and strengthening of Islam²⁸. Mahmud had 17 trips to India, accompanied by the plunder of the country, mass destruction and enslavement of the local population²⁹. The extracted treasures were used to build and decorate mosques, madrasahs and palaces. With these conquests, Mahmud was able to bring Islam to the far corners of India. The first attempts were made to subjugate the conquered peoples not only by force, but also through dialogue, using the language of the conquered people³⁰. In general, his works of spreading Islam is great

²⁶ Vesilya Shemshek, A General Evaluation Of Islamic Civilization History, Atlas journal, Vol:6, Issue:25, 2020, p:86

²⁷ Elliot, Sir Henry Miers. The history of India, as told by its own historians: the Muhammadan period, Volume 11 , London, 1867, p 98.

²⁸ Mahmud Ghazni's Invasions of India, 2014, <https://www.mapsofindia.com/history/battles/mahmud-ghazni-invasions-of-india.html#:~:text=Between%201009%20AD%20and%201026,India%20was%20in%201027%20AD>
²⁹ Yakubovsky A. Yu. K voprosu o proiskhozhdeniy i kharaktere Gaznevidskogo gosudarstva [Mahmud Ghaznevi. To the question of the origin and character of the Ghaznavid state] // Ferdovski, 1934, p.25.

³⁰ T.V. Shahzad, Muslims and Indians: ways of interaction (from rise of Islam to the Ghaznavids) [Musul'mane i Indiiytsy: puti vzaimodeistviya (ot vozniknoveniya Islama do Gaznevidov)], Belarusian State University Minsk, 2021, p.194

because, during and after his raids, several thousand people converted to Islam, several Muslim colonies were founded³¹.

Sultan Mahmud revived cultural and commercial life between the Indian peninsula and the Islamic world. Thus, the rise of Islam in the region coincided with the Turkish-Muslim invasion of medieval India³². Since he never had the intention of maintaining a permanent presence in the northwestern subcontinent, he used a policy of demolishing Hindu temples and monuments to suppress any Hindu action that would wage war against the empire. For these actions, he received the title *But shikan* (Crusher of idols). These raids and invasions especially hurt Buddhism and prompted many Buddhists either convert to Islam or flee to Tibet and Southeast Asia. As a result, Buddhism as a religion in India practically died out, although its influence in other countries continued to spread. Due to the vandalization of Indian art, architecture and sculpture, even the economic situation has been greatly damaged³³. Despite the ruthless attacks, the efforts of Mahmud has helped rooting of Islam in the land of India.

Subsequent Muslim conquerors viewed India not as an object for robbery but as a kingdom for themselves and their descendants. Further, Muhammad Ghori/Shahabuddin Muhammad (AD 1173–1206) ascended the throne of Ghaznevi, avenging him for the death of his ancestor Muhammad ibn Sur. Unlike Ghaznevi, Ghori is not such a great conqueror but he was the real founder of Muslim rule in India³⁴. If Mahmud Ghaznevi was only interested in the wealth of India Ghori's strategy was quite the opposite, he wanted to establish his permanent political control

³¹Na, The Great Ghaznavid Dynasty (c. 962—c. 1186), [http://materiislamica.com/index.php/The_Great_Ghaznavid_Dynasty_\(c._962%E2%80%94c._1186\)](http://materiislamica.com/index.php/The_Great_Ghaznavid_Dynasty_(c._962%E2%80%94c._1186))

**Mamluk* in Arabic means "belonging". The Mamluk phenomenon appeared in the 9th century, when, in order to increase the power of the army, warriors were recruited from among the slaves who wanted to convert to Islam and learn military skills, in order to then fight in the interests of the Lord.

³²Mahmūd-ı Gaznevî Kimdir? Mahmud-ı Gaznevi'nin Hayatı, Türkiye diyanet vakfi islam ansiklopedisi [Who is Mahmud-i Ghaznavi? Life of Mahmud-i Gaznevi, Turkish religious foundation islamic encyclopedia], <https://www.sabah.com.tr/sozluk/biyografi/mahmd-i-gaznev-kimdir-mahmud-i-gaznevinin-hayati>

³³Mitresh Singh, Mahmud Ghaznavi: An interesting Bi-lingual Silver Dirham post Somnath expedition, 2013,p.8 https://www.academia.edu/50061473/Mahmud_Ghaznavi_An_interesting_Bi_lingual_Silver_Dirham_post_Somnath_expedition

³⁴ Muhammed Ghori, Gk Scientist, <https://gkscientist.com/mohammed-ghori/>

there. Thus, he appointed generals in each conquered territory to govern the empire in his absence. Under Ghori's rule, the Turkish army was excellently organized as well as distinguished by skill and speed. A skilled leader with well-thought-out tactics captured the most important territories of India among them Punjab and Delhi for further invasions of the Indian subcontinent³⁵.

However Ghori had no offspring, so he knew that one of his closest lieutenants should inherit his place and take control of his empire when he left. He chose some of his most talented slaves and brought them up with the special training usually given to princes. Thus, Ghori laid the foundation for the subsequent Turkish Islam ruling dynasties of India namely, Delhi Sultanate, whose apex later reached the Mughal Empire (see Figure 1.2)³⁶. After his sudden death, his favorite and most trusted slave, the viceroy-appointed Qutb al-Din Aibak assumed control and the title of Sultan, became the first emperor, founder of the first Dynasty of Ghulam slaves (*Mamluks**)(1206-1526 CE)³⁷. He was known as Lakh Baksh for his generosity as he made many generous donations. He built the first mosque in India known as *Quwwat-ul-Islam* (Power of Islam) in Delhi. The sultan was in many ways the head of the administrative system. From that moment began the transformation of Delhi into the capital, which controlled the vast territories of the subcontinent³⁸.




Figure 1.2. Chronology of the Delhi Sultanate (1206-1526) in Indian Subcontinent.

The chronology of the period of Delhi Sultanate is as follows (Figure 1.2.):

³⁵ Part9. Establishment And Expansion Of The Delhi Sultanate, history module -2, india, p.135

³⁶Saurav Ranjan Datta, Muhammad Ghori, 2019, https://www.worldhistory.org/Muhammad_Ghori/

³⁷Pogorelova M.S.,Istoriya razvitiya Deli: politicheskie strategii i sintez kul'tyr [History of the development of Delhi: political strategies and synthesis of cultures], St. Petersburg, 2018, p.19

³⁸Sabri Khizmetli, Orta gasyrlar tarihy zhane orkeniet [Medieval history and civilization], 2015, p. 230

1. Mamluk Dynasty (1206-90 CE)
2. Khalji Dynasty(1290-1320CE)
3. Tughlaq Dynasty(1320-1413CE)
4. Sayyid Dynasty(1414-51 CE)
5. Lodhi Dynasty(1451-1526 CE)³⁹.

During the empire period, 33 different sultans have ruled over this divided area from the capital Delhi. These various sultans became famous for their administration of justice, development of resources, religious tolerance, and patronage of education, art, and architecture⁴⁰. Thanks to the entire period of the reign of the Turkic Sultanate, the capital function of Delhi was laid, and in the subsequent history of India, this city could no longer play a secondary role⁴¹.

For the Delhi Sultanate, the administrative structure, along with the religious discourse of the *ulema* (Theologians), allowed for the creation of a docile population over which sovereign political power was exercised. The main goal of the ulema was to spread and maintain the Islamic religious and moral order⁴². However, throughout the entire period of the sultanate there was a constant struggle between various Turkish and Afghan groups so the lack of unity and constant change of sultans led to the collapse of the Delhi Sultanate⁴³.

The policy of Islamization of the local population was continued by the rulers of the following Mughal dynasty, who came to power after the collapse of the Delhi Sultanate. Thus, 16th century is the birth of a new powerful state in India - the Mughal Empire (1526-1858)(see Figure 1.3.).

**The Ulema* as a group consisted of persons who acted as preachers and guardians of the Islamic religion.

³⁹NCERT Solutions for Class 7 Social Science History Chapter 3:The Delhi Sultans, p.31

⁴⁰Fouzia Farooq, Trust-Based Relations In Delhi Sultanate Power Politics, Quarterly Journal of the Pakistan Historical society, 2019,published by Humdard Pakistan, pp.9-16

⁴¹ Pogorelova M.S., Istoriya razvitiya Deli: politicheskie strategii i sintez kul'tyr [History of the development of Delhi: political strategies and synthesis of cultures], p.31

⁴²Riazul Islam, C.E. Bosworth, The Delhi Sultanate, 1998, p.284

⁴³Part 10. Establishment of The Mughal Rule, Medieval history of India, Module-2, p.155

*Actually the term Mughal was not very popular for the dynasty or the empire during the glory days of the empire. The name "Mughals" appeared already under the English colonialists, neither the founder of the Empire nor his descendants called themselves that. The term Mughal became more popular and was preference in the 19th century, when the empire was in decline and collapsing. In fact, the term "Mughal" was used by the population in India to refer to all Muslims of North India and Central Asia.




Figure 1.3. Establishment, Expansion and Decline of Mughal Empire.

In 1526, the troops of the conqueror named Babur (1483-1530) invaded India. He was born in Central Asia and was a descendant of the Turkic conqueror Timurlane on his father's side and the Mongol ruler Genghis Khan on his mother's side⁴⁴. At the age of 11 (or 12 in some sources), Babur inherited the throne in Bukhara (located within current territory of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) and at 15 he entered the struggle for Samarkand, the capital of the possessions of Timur's heirs. Having suffered a defeat, Babur gathered a new army in 1504 in Kabul, the capital of modern Afghanistan, and from there he began a campaign against India⁴⁵.

Undoubtedly, the Mughals made attempts to propagate the "true faith", at certain moments in history, these attempts became persistent and even took harsh forms. However, from the very beginning, the task of the complete Islamization of India, with its colossal size and thousands of years of pre-Islamic traditions, was perceived by most representatives of the new dynasty as overwhelming, at least within the historical horizon accessible to them. Babur, as well as subsequent rulers from the Mughal dynasty, who professed Sunni Islam in its Central Asian version, demonstrated relative religious tolerance⁴⁶. Only in this way it was possible to maintain power over a country alien to the conquerors in ethno-confessional terms. In addition, many dogmas and values of Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism and Jainism looked similar to the dogmas and values of Islam for people from Central Asia⁴⁷.

Intuitively, the dynasty tried to realize another, more modest, but no less difficult task - to create productive synthesis of Islamic and traditional Indian culture, as well

⁴⁴Md. Abdullah Al Zobair, *The Mughal Empire / The reign of emperors and their contribution*, p.1

⁴⁵ M. Athar ali, *The Mughal Empire And Its Successors, Political history*, p.303

⁴⁶Beverly Hollinhead, *Religious Toleration in Mughal India*, The owlcation, July 13, 2022 <https://owlcation.com/humanities/Religious-Toleration-in-Mughal-India>

⁴⁷Andrey Kortunov, *Uroki Velikikh Mogolov: kak gibnut velikiye imperiy* [Lessons of the Great Moghuls: how great empires perish], 2021, pp.3-4

as the organization of society. Babur's grandson, Akbar (from Arabic means great)(1556-1605), who can rightfully be called the most prominent representative of the dynasty, made especially progress in this direction. He not only dramatically expanded the territory of the empire, turning it into an undisputed regional hegemon, but also carried out many progressive administrative and social reforms⁴⁸.

An exceptionally important step was the abolition of the so-called “jizya” - an additional tax on Hindus and other Indians who did not want to convert to Islam. The Great Mughal thereby recognized equality of the empire’s all subjects of before law and the equality of all assemblies of confessions professed in states⁴⁹. Moreover, Akbar was not afraid to draw attention of the Hindu Rajas to higher positions in the civil administration, encourage religious disputes and finance the construction of not only mosques, but also Hindu temples from the state treasury⁵⁰. Akbar’s next desire was to create a spirit of love and harmony among his people by eliminating all the racial, religious and cultural barriers among them. He well understood that it was impossible to achieve unity without spiritual influence on his subjects. Akbar's reformism in the religious sphere went so far that with the support of the outstanding theologian and his grand vizier Abul-Fadl Allami, he even tried, as a compromise with the Hindu majority and the Muslim clergy, to create a new syncretic religion that combined elements of Islam, Hinduism, ancient Jainism, Zoroastrianism, and Christianity⁵¹. According to Khalis Biyiktai, such a religion can replace religions that divide nations. It contributes to the retention and reconciliation of peoples and to their rapprochement⁵².

⁴⁸ Ezad Azraai Jamsari. Mohamad Zulfazdlee, Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor, Akbar (1556-1605) And India Unification Under The Mughals, International Journal of Civil Engineering and Technology (IJCIET), 2017, pp. 769-771

⁴⁹ H. Hilal Şahin, Ekber Şah'in sosyo-kültürel ve dinî reformlarının toplumsal hayata etkisi [The impacts of reforms of Akbar Shah's on social life of India], Journal of History School (JOHS), June 2015, Issue XXII, p. 116

⁵⁰ Yy., The Mughal Empire in India, Chapter 18, pp.517-519

⁵¹ Andrey Kortunov, Uroki Velikikh Mogolov: kak gibnut velikie imperii [Lessons from the Great Moghuls: How great empires perish], RSMD, December 31, 2021 <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/uroki-velikikh-mogolov-kak-gibnut-velikie-imperii/>

⁵² Halis Biyiktay, Timurlular zamanında Hindistan Türk imparatorluğu [The Turkish Empire of India during the Timurids], Turkish Historical Society publications, VIII. no. 5., 1941. p.79-80.

As a result, he achieved his goals by realizing religious thought. This religion was called *din-i-illahi* (divine faith), which was a synthesis of various religions. He proclaimed himself the founder of this new religion and sought to ensure loyalty of the whole ruling elite⁵³. Through the help of this religion and a whole complex of reforms, Akbar sought to create a new society in India to be proper Indian, neither Muslim nor Hindu. Therefore, national integration, forming under a single central administration the “Mughal Union” was his ultimate goal⁵⁴. But the new religion turned out to be too difficult for the subjects and did not take root in India. Thus, attempts of the rulers to instill a new syncretic religion failed. No matter how hard Akbar tried to establish his "divine faith", the Muslim nobility stood their ground, and after his death, Islam again became the religion of the court⁵⁵.

As a result, this mixture of cultures has affected arts, education, politics and language. From the Mughal armies, where soldiers from different backgrounds communicated, another new language emerged. That language, Urdu (originated from the Turkish word *ordu*, that means army, soldiers' camp⁵⁶), was a mixture of Arabic, Persian and Turkish, it was made as the official language by Akbar and is still the state language of Pakistan⁵⁷.

Akbar left a deep imprint on Indian consciousness. Further descendants of Akbar did not aspire to develop the achievements of their great predecessor and step by step departed from tolerance, moving rather by inertia⁵⁸. This led to the emergence of

⁵³Tanmay Kulshrestha, Akbar's religious policy, Pp.6-7

⁵⁴Bedrettin Basuğuy, Bâbürlü İmparatorluğu'nun siyasi tarihi üzerine bir değerlendirme [An Evaluation On Political History Of Bâbur Empire] Bingöl University Journal of Social Sciences Institute, Vol: 3, Issue: 5, Spring 2013, p.38

⁵⁵A.V. Ivanov, S.M. Zhuravleva, Severnaya Indiya kak territoriya mirotvorchestva i kul'turnogo dialoga [North India as a Territory of Peacemaking and Cultural Dialogue], Culture and Society, №3 , 2017, pp. 147

⁵⁶Abdul Jabbar, Sajid Iqbal, Resources for Urdu Text Stemming, ResearchGate, November 2016, , pp.1-6

⁵⁷Ezad Azraai Jamsari, Mohamad Zulfazdlee, Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor, Akbar (1556-1605) And India Unification Under The Mughals, pp. 773-778

⁵⁸Sembina A.N., Indiya v kontse novogo vremeni. Imperiya Velikikh Mogolov i ee padenie [India at the end of modern times. The Mughal Empire and its fall], 2007, p.33

various fundamentalist and nationalist groups that divided the state, and a wave of inter-religious conflicts swept the country⁵⁹.

A desperate attempt to stop the decline of the Mughal Empire stretched for half a century under the reign of Akbar's grandson Aurangzeb (1658–1707). During his reign, the empire territory reached dimensions unprecedented in the entire history of centralized states in South Asia⁶⁰.

This new ruler of the empire strictly observed Islamic laws and restored the priority of Muslim customs, and also erased all the achievements of the Hindus under Akbar. For example, he brought back the hated tax of jizya on non-Muslims and dismissed Hindus from high positions in his government⁶¹. The growing Islamic fanaticism of Aurangzeb in time was expressed particularly in the destruction of the already erected Hindu temples and the prohibition of the construction of new ones, in the confiscation of the property of Hindu merchants and entrepreneurs⁶². These all caused a number of unrest, revolts and uprisings, hatred from his Hindu subjects⁶³. Due to the harsh and discriminatory attitude and policies of Aurangzeb towards his Hindu subjects, the traditions of good neighborliness, political and cultural ties between communities, developed during the first Mughals, were destroyed heavily. India entered a period of violent internecine conflicts that led to the collapse⁶⁴.

In 1707 with the death of Aurangzeb, various external and internal factors caused the fall of the Mughal Empire, such as the absence of a strong ruler capable of maintaining the integrity of a large empire, and as a result, the separation of the Sikh and Maratha confederations from the empire, foreign intervention and subsequently

⁵⁹ T. S. Rasulova, Djelaladdin Akbar - provozvestnik i sozidatel' kosmicheskoy evolutcii [Jalaladdin Akbar - the forerunner and creator of cosmic evolution], Proceedings of the Intern. sci.-soc. conf., 2011, p.10

⁶⁰ Audrey Truschke, Aurangzeb - The Life and Legacy of India's Most Controversial King, Stanford University Press, 2017, p.7

⁶¹ Anuraag Khaund, Akbar And Aurangzeb- The "Saint" And The "Villain"?, IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, Volume 22, Issue 3, 2017, p.5

⁶² Yy., The Mughal Empire in India, p.520

⁶³ Dr. Anjali Yadav, Decline of the Mughal Empire, pp.2-3

⁶⁴ Ashish Das, Did Aurangzeb's policies mark a reversal of Akbar's policies?, www.academia.edu, p.9

was turned up a state of chaos⁶⁵. After the era of Aurangzeb, many colorless figures changed on the throne of the empire, but the empire was no longer capable of new upsurges. This led to the end of Muslim hegemony over the Indian subcontinent^{66,67}.

Almost all the centuries of the existence of the empire coincided with such stages of European history as the era of great geographical discoveries and the first bourgeois and industrial revolutions. Since ancient times India has attracted the attention of merchants, European monarchs and all sorts of adventurers. The Portuguese, Spaniards, British and French ones sought to gain a foothold on the *Hindustan** peninsula⁶⁸. The most successful of all was the English East India Company (EIC). As in the 17th and 18th centuries, British merchants ousted other Europeans from India⁶⁹.

The Indian subcontinent later became the “pearl” of the British Empire, and during its formation the EIC reigned supreme here⁷⁰. In fact, in 1600 it was created in order to organize and protect British colonial trade economic interests in the region⁷¹. However, the Great Mughal emperors did not even feel threatened by European merchants. In 1613, Jahangir allowed the EIC to trade throughout India at a fixed rate of duty and later after him, his son Shah Jahan allowed the construction of trading posts⁷². These moments helped the British East India Company to consolidate its position in India.

**Hindustan* - the name is applicable both to designate modern India, and for the geographical space from modern Afghanistan to Indian Ocean.

⁶⁵ Belmekki Belkacem, The impact of British rule on the Indian muslim community in the nineteenth century, 2007, p.30

⁶⁶ C. C. Hazewell. “British India.” The Atlantic Monthly, November, 1857, p. 88.

⁶⁷ Chhao Chhu-cheng, Raskad Mongol'skoi imperiy [The collapse of the Mongol Empire], Kazan, Scientific publication, 2008, crp. 85-87

⁶⁸ Bocharnikova Ya.V., Istoriya indo-musul'manskogo konflikta v XX-XXI vv. [History of the Indo-Muslim conflict in the XX-XXI centuries], St. Petersburg, 2021, p. 20

⁶⁹ Svyatoslav Knyazev, "Tseliy subkontinent stal dzhertvoi nasiliya": kakuyu rol' Britanskaya Ost-Indskaya kompaniya sygrala v mirovoi istorii [The whole subcontinent became a victim of violence”:

⁷⁰ Bruce Brunton, The East India Company: Agent of Empire in the Early Modern Capitalist Era, Social Education, 2013, 77(2), p. 78

⁷¹ Güven Uludaşdemir, İngiliz Sömürgeciliği –Güneş Batmayan İmparatorluk 18.yüzyıldan bugüne [The Empire That Never Sets From the 18th century to the present], Haziran 9, 2020, <https://azomedya.com/ingiliz-somurgeciligi/>

**Sepoys* are hired warriors recruited from among local residents exclusively from Hindus and Muslims.

Choosing between the Mughals and European colonizers, many local Indian elites preferred Europeans, relying on their rich experience in maintaining a balance between the Portuguese, Dutch, French and British. As the future showed, these hopes were not destined to come true since the balance of power between Europeans eventually gave way to undeniable British dominance⁷³. The British, with the help of cunning and complicity with the local princes, managed to gradually fill the gap left by the Muslim rulers, establishing their hegemony in the Indian subcontinent. The arrival of the British colonialists meant the advent of a new, at the same time, a dark era for Muslims. Hindus were the main beneficiaries of British rule. They took advantage of many opportunities offered by the British in all spheres of life⁷⁴. If for the Hindus this meant only a change of masters, and for the Muslims - the loss of all privileges such as power, title, richness and dignity⁷⁵. Since that period, the Islamic past of India has been traced less and less, and then completely forgotten.

In 1857, the Sepoy Revolt began, mass discontent caused by the Europeanization of the country, namely because of the reform of the traditional foundations of Indian society, excessive taxes, the exploitation of the *Sepoys** in continuous wars in Southeast Asia, the constant British interference in religious affairs and violation of the religious feelings of Hindus and Muslims. The entry into service of the British colonial troops in India of the Enfield Pattern 1853 rifle served as the final impetus to the Sepoy uprising that was brewing in 1857 - due to the fact that the paper of the shell of the cartridges was supposedly soaked in *pig* and *cow fat*, which was unacceptable to either Muslims or for Hindus (for detail see Figure 1.4.). There is also the role of Wahhabi propaganda here: the strengthening of fears about the social reforms of the British colonialists, which was regarded as an attempt to turn India

⁷² S. Knyazev "Tseliy subkontinent stal dzhertvoi nasiliya": kakuyu rol' Britanskaya Ost-Indskaya kompaniya sygrala v mirovoi istorii [The whole subcontinent became a victim of violence": what role did the British East India Company play in world history] August 2018, <https://russian.rt.com/science/article/541812-istoriya-ost-indskaya-kompaniya>

⁷³ Hamza Shahid, *Decline And Disintegration Of The Mughal Empire*, pp.28-29

⁷⁴ Belmekki Belkacem, *The impact of British rule on the Indian muslim community in the nineteenth century*, 2007, p. 32

⁷⁵ Belmekki Belkacem, *The impact of British rule on the Indian muslim community in the nineteenth century*, p.33

into a Christian country⁷⁶. This circumstance was an important reason for the desire of Hindus and Muslims to unite.




Figure 1.4. 1853 Enfield Rifled Musket served as the final impetus for the Sepoy uprising.

Initially, the goal of the rebels, both Muslims and Hindus in general, was to restore pre-British conditions in the subcontinent. The interests of the Muslim rebels were the desire to restore their former imperial glory. In modern India, it is interpreted as the first war for independence and as a popular uprising against the colonialists⁷⁷. But, unfortunately, this great rebellion failed, and this was due to the lack of unity among the rebels, since the diversity of their interests served as an obstacle to the development of any sense of national feeling. The anti-colonial uprising was brutally suppressed⁷⁸. In that moment, the period of the Mughal Empire ended in 1857 after the last ruler of the empire, Bahadir Shah II, was defeated in a battle with the British army⁷⁹. The rebellion ended the power of the British EIC and led to its replacement

*By *English crown* means, after the defeat of the uprising, Great Britain itself assumed direct control of India: the English parliament and the royal house.

⁷⁶Shpet, M.M., *Vosstanie bengal'skikh sipaiev 1857-1859 gg. i otnoshenie k nemu predstavitelei razlichnykh techenii Indiiskoi obshestvennoi mysli* [The Rebellion of the Bengal Sepoys 1857–1859. and the attitude of representatives of various currents of Indian social thought towards him], 2016, p.51

⁷⁷O.G. Sidorova, *Indiiskoe vosstanie 1857–1858 gg. v Angliyskoi literature i izobrazitel'nom iskusstve* [Indian Rebellion 1857–1858. in English Literature and Fine Arts], 2013, p. 99

⁷⁸Paul F. Dupuis, *The Sepoy mutiny of 1857 : a causal study*, www.researchgate.net, 2022, p.12

⁷⁹Sneh Singh, *How the British East India Company managed to colonise India for nearly 200 years*, August 14, 2017, <https://yourstory.com/2017/08/east-india-company/amp>

by direct rule of *the English crown**⁸⁰(see Figure 1.5). Thus, a simple trading company turned into a colonial power ruling for 200 years⁸¹.



Figure 1.5. The state of India before and after the revolt of 1857-58 under the British control.

A new milestone in the history of Indo-Muslim relations was colonial period. Naturally, the confrontation between Muslims and Hindus, which had developed in India long before the establishment of British rule, continued to be one of the serious factors in the country's social and political life under the new regime⁸². After the 1857 rebellion, the British were alarmed at the solidarity of Hindus and Muslims against a foreign oppressor. In this regard, attempts were made to divide consciousness between the two communities⁸³. The British actively used the fragmentation of India and the internal contradictions of the communities and encouraged them by provoking further conflicts among themselves⁸⁴. The principle

**"Divide and Rule"* is the tactic of creating, amplifying, and exploiting contradictions, differences, or disagreements between two or more parties to control them. Often used by a weaker minority to control the majority.

⁸⁰Patil Amruta, *The Crown Rule (1858 - 1947) - Indian Polity Notes*, Jul 6, 2022

⁸¹V. V. Vysokova, K. A. Sozinova, E. Yu. Chemyakin, *Britanskaya Imperiya: dialog kul'tur i tsivilizatsiy* [British Empire: Dialogue of Cultures and Civilizations], Ural University Press, Yekaterinburg, 2019, p.46

⁸²V.V. Kuchma, *Osobennosti natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya v Indii: etno-konfessional'nyi i gosudarstvenno-pravovoi aspekty* [Features of the national liberation movement in India: ethno-confessional and state-legal aspects], 2011, p.17

⁸³Shashi Tharoor, *The Partition: The British game of 'divide and rule'*, 10 Aug 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/8/10/the-partition-the-british-game-of-divide-and-rule>

⁸⁴Bocharnikova Ya.V., *Istoriya indo-musul'manskogo konflikta v XX-XXI vv.* [History of the Indo-Muslim conflict in the XX-XXI centuries], St. Petersburg, 2021, p. 22

of "*Divide and Rule*"^{85*} became the main in managing the domestic policy of the British in India.

The sad event of 1857 was a good opportunity for the British to get rid of the last remnants of the Mughal Empire once and for all, as well as curb Muslim influence in Indian society. At the request of some senior figures in the Indian government, they have succeeded in reducing the number of Muslims in government positions (see Table 1.2.)⁸⁶. Muslim property was confiscated and the Muslim community was plunged into a major economic crisis that led to degradation and poverty⁸⁷. Thus, Muslims faced a new horrendous discriminatory policy in all spheres of daily life, including the public service. In addition, many profound changes took place that disrupted the old order established by the former rulers, the Mughals, centuries ago. In the course of this process, the lands that became British colonies were tried to be Christianized, and Islam excluded from public life. Also, the schools of Islamic education were usurped, as the rights of Muslims to education were also usurped⁸⁸. This alienation greatly affected not only material interests, but also their pride as a ruling minority for more than ten centuries⁸⁹. In addition, they began to experience a new feeling of backwardness and fear of the Hindus⁹⁰.

Table 1.2. Muslim And Hindu Appointments to Government Positions. Source: G. Ali Khan 2004: 55-56⁹¹.

Gazetted Posts	Europeans	Hindus	Muslims	Total
Covenanted Civil Services	260	0	0	260
Judicial Officers in the Non-Regulation Districts	47	0	0	47
Extra Assistant Commissioners	26	7	0	33
Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collectors	53	113	30	196
Income-Tax Assessors	11	43	6	60

⁸⁵Güven Uludaşdemir, Böl ve Yönet – Dünya Nasıl Yönetiliyor? [Divide and Rule – How the World is Ruled?], June5, 2020, <https://azomedy.com/bol-ve-yonet-divide-et-impera/>

⁸⁶Belmekki Belkacem, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Muslim Cause in British India, De Gruyter, 2020, pp.13-14

⁸⁷Belmekki Belkacem, The Impact of British Rule on the Indian Muslim Community in the Nineteenth Century, *Revista De Filologia Inglesa*, 2007, pp.39-42

⁸⁸Francis Robinson, The British Empire and Muslim Identity in South Asia, *Journal of the Royal Historical Society*, Vol. 8, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 277-279

⁸⁹Enrique Baltar Rodriguez, The origins of Muslim nationalism in British India, *Journal of Arts & Humanities*, Volume 06, Issue 05, 2017, p. 58

⁹⁰ Enrique Baltar Rodriguez, The origins of Muslim nationalism in British India p. 61

⁹¹Ali Khan, G. "Educational Conditions of Indian Muslims During the Nineteenth Century." *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*. Ed. Ansar Zahid Khan. Bait al -Hikmah at Madinat al-Hikmah, Karachi, 52:1 (January-March 2004): 57-58.

Registration Department	33	25	2	60
Judges of Small Cause Court And Subordinate Judges	14	25	8	47
Munsifs*	1	178	37	216
Police Department	106	3	0	109
Public Works Department (Engineer Establishment)	154	19	0	173
Public Works Department (Subordinate Establishment)	72	125	4	201
Public Works Department (Account Establishment)	22	54	0	76
Medical Department Offices Attached to Medical Colleges, Jails, Charitable Dispensaries, Sanitation And Vaccination Establishments And Medical Officers in Charge of Districts, etc.	89	65	4	158
Department of Public Instruction	38	14	1	53
Other Departments such as, Customs, Marine, Survey, Opium, etc.	412	10	0	422
Total	1338	681	92	2111

The real basis of British colonialism was economic exploitation and racial discrimination. During the period of direct rule of the crown, India was shaken by a series of outbreaks of famine and epidemics (cholera and plague etc.), which consequentially claimed the lives of about 60 million people (see Table 1.3.)⁹².

Major Famines in India (Deaths estimates in millions)				
Before British Rule (1000 - 1745)		British Era (1770-1947)		
Century	Famines	Years	Famines	Deaths
11th	2	1770-1800	4	21
13th	1	1800-1825	5	1
14th	3	1825-1850	2	0.5
15th	2	1850-1875	6	5
16th	3	1875-1900	18	26
17th	3	1900-1925	1	0.23
18th	4	1925-1947	1	5

Table 1.3. Major Famines in history of India. Source from <http://modernworldhistory-levelfive.blogspot.com/2015/11/december-3-2015-british-imperialism-in.html>

The horrendous plight of the Indian people was testified not only by Indian, but also by many foreign researchers, including the American historian Will Durant. He concluded in his book *The Case for India* that:

⁹² Pulakes Purkait, Neeraj Kumar, Ramesh Sahani, Sumit Mukherjee, Major Famines in India during British Rule: A Referral Map, 2020, p.62

"The appalling poverty in India is an indictment of her foreign government which cannot be justified... This is absolutely different from Muslim domination. Since the Muslim invaders came to stay and their descendants considered India their home. Collected wealth through taxes, they spent in the development of India, its crafts, agriculture and other resources, enriching literature and art. "If Britain had done the same, then India would be a prosperous country today. Year after year Britain despoils one of the greatest and gentles nations."⁹³



Picture 1.1. Starving people in India.

Initially, many Indians, who found themselves not just in poverty, but on the verge of exhaustion, expressed their protest against the colonial policy of Great Britain peacefully, going to rallies and demonstrations. The political activity of the population of India intensified even more during the First World War.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the British faced a new problem - nationwide anti-English movements. After the Sepoy uprising, they realized the danger of their position and the need to divide society in order to prevent new nationwide uprisings. The entire public of India, including the British, came to a single firm conviction that the ethno-confessional confrontation between the two main communities of India had reached such a degree of tension that their further coexistence within the framework of a single state entity turned out to be fundamentally impossible⁹⁴. But the British were not going to leave after their rule a strong state with great potential. It was religion in the hands of the British that became a tool to achieve their ambitions and goals. According to Francis Robinson, British rule led to religious and political

⁹³ Durant Will. The Case for India. Simon and Schuster. New York, 1930, p. 55.

⁹⁴V. V. Vysokova, K. A. Sozinova, E. Yu. Chemyakin, Britanskaya Imperya: diyalog kul'tur i tsivilizatsiy [British Empire: Dialogue of Cultures and Civilizations], pp.152-154

divisions and attendant hostility within the communities, leading to a greater partition of India in 1947⁹⁵.

Initially, this process was by no means designed for the emergence of two states. In the independence movement, a shadow of rivalry and mistrust emerged between the Muslim minority and the Hindu majority. Indian nationalism first emerged in organized form in 1885 in Bombay, now Mumbai in the form of the Indian National Congress (INC) led by Mahatma Gandhi. Mahatma Gandhi, a key figure in the Indian independence movement. He has always advocated general, interfaith and non-violent action against the colonizers. The dream and goal of Gandhi was to build a state on a national, not a religious basis. Meanwhile, Gandhism was immediately adopted by the INC as a fundamental ideological concept. An adherent of the same doctrine, but with an even greater bias towards socialist values, was Gandhi's comrade-in-arms Jawaharlal Nehru, who in 1927 became chairman of the INC.

The constant aggressive actions against Muslims raised signal for this society to become more conscious and united. These events provoked the emergence of Muslim nationalism. According to the consensus reached at the time when all Islamic movements were united, it was planned to create an independent Islamic state of India on these lands⁹⁶. The British authorities took advantage of the anti-Congressist sentiments that prevailed in a significant part of the Muslim society. With their support in December 1906 in Dhaka The All India Muslim League (ML) was formed, headed by Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

In the 1930s, philosopher and politician Muhammad Iqbal and his friends put forward the "Two Nations Theory". According to this theory, religion is the main factor in determining the nationality of Indian Muslims⁹⁷. The leader of the ML M.A. Jinnah believed that Islam and Hinduism were not only two religions, but also two social groups with completely different customs⁹⁸. A deep study of the history of this land proves that the differences between Hindus and Muslims were not only in the

⁹⁵The British Empire and Muslim Identity in South Asia, p.288

⁹⁶Aijaz Ahmad, Indian Muslims Against British Rule, Createspace Independent Pub; 2nd edition (19 February 2015), pp.131-135

⁹⁷ Ishtiaq Ahmed, The 1947 Partition of India: A Paradigm for Pathological Politics in India and Pakistan, Asian Ethnicity, Volume 3, Number 1, March 2002, p.13

⁹⁸ A.V. Panin, Muhammed Ali Jinnah i razdel Indii [Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Division of India In 1947], Proceedings of the conference, Lipetsk, 2020. p. 16.

struggle for political dominance, but also in clashes based on religious hostility. Despite living together for over a thousand years, they continued to develop different cultures and traditions. These fundamental differences separate the two societies and form two different nations⁹⁹. This was emphasized by the constant rivalry that developed between the two main, authoritative political actors of the time: INC and ML¹⁰⁰. Both of them claimed to ensure the interests of the corresponding religious community, considering India's past as a battlefield between two hostile "nations"¹⁰¹.

It became clear to the new and at the same time the last British governor, Louis Mountbatten, that it was impossible to continue to maintain the illusion of a single Indian state. Despite the efforts and resistance of Gandhi and Nehru, as a result a division occurred. On June 3, 1947, Mountbatten at a press conference announced the known plan as the *Mountbatten Plan*, as well as the independence date of August 15, 1947. The plan, which included partitioning the Muslim-majority provinces of Bengal and Punjab, effected the virtual division of British India into two separate dominions of India and Pakistan.



Picture 1.2. L. Mountbatten discusses partition plan with J. Nehru and M.A. Jinnah.

The British Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act 1947 on 18 July 1947. According to act British India was divided into two new independent dominions of India and Pakistan and abolished British suzerainty over the princely states (see

⁹⁹Davut Şahbaz, The Two Nations Theory and It's Role In The Establishment of Pakistan, Academic Journal of History and Idea, 2020, Ankara, pp. 212-213

¹⁰⁰David Motadel, Islam and the European Empires, Oxford Scholarship, 2014, p.35

¹⁰¹ Vanina E.Yu. Ot «obshiny» k «natsy»: Indi'skie musul'mane v kontseptsiyakh Britanskikh orientalistov [From 'community' to 'nation': Indian muslims in the concepts of British orientalists], Minbar. Islamic Studies, 2019, pp. 718.

Figure 1.6). The independent possession of Pakistan included two enclaves, East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (present-day Pakistan), came into existence on 14 August 1947 when Muhammad Ali Jinnah became its first Governor General. India became an independent after the day, on August 15 1947, and Jawaharlal Nehru was a Prime Minister, while Mountbatten became the country's first Governor General. Gandhi was Father of the Nation¹⁰².



Figure 1.6. Map of India before and after the Partition.

It is important to note that the mentioned decision on the division concerned only 11 British princely states of India (hindi. *British Raj**). The largest of them are: Hyderabad, Mysore, Travancore, Cochin, Bhopal, Gwalior, Indore, Jammu and Kashmir. The rest territories of Hindustan ruled by local dynasties, although at that time under British control, were considered independent, and could choose whether to join India, or Pakistan, or remain independent¹⁰³. Hindu and Sikh majority areas were assigned to the new India, while Muslim majority areas: Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, Khyber Patunkhwa (Pashtunistan) and all of Bangladesh were assigned to the new state of Pakistan. However, states that are in the center of the country and have no border ties with Pakistan had to make the decision to stay with India due to geographical conditions (See Figure 1.7.).

¹⁰²Demidov V.A., Kak Razoshlis' puti Pakistana i Indii [How the Paths of Pakistan and India Diverged], 'Chronos' Multidisciplinary Sciences, no 6, 2021, p.14

¹⁰³ Michelguglielmo Torri, A History of India, Chapter 16, Partition And Independence 2013, p. 40
British princely states - The center and south of the country, as well as the far north, occupied 562 principalities (about half of the territory of all of India with a population of about 25% of the total population of the Indian Empire). The principalities had separate vassal agreements with the colonial government, and were not ruled directly by the British, but indirectly by rule through Indian rulers.




Figure 1.7. British princely states in the Indian subcontinent before 1947.

Some of the territories were initially disputed. In this regard, in order to determine and demarcate borders of Bengal and Punjab into two countries, a Commission was created under the chairmanship of *Sir Cyril Radcliffe*. The demarcation line - *Radcliffe Line* was published on 17 August 1947.




Figure 1.8. Partition by demarcation of the Radcliffe Line.

In the end, this led to the most terrible and bloody partition of the provinces of Bengal and Punjab, which was accompanied by constant intercommunal violence and the largest mass migration, which no Indian leader could have foreseen. As a result, more than million people on both sides died due to religious fury and violence on the peninsula. The total number of migrants from India to Pakistan and back has

exceeded 15 million people¹⁰⁴. Women and children were abducted en masse, most were subjected to violence and forced marriage¹⁰⁵. According to the Indian scientist U. Butalia, there were at least 75-100 thousand female destinies crippled¹⁰⁶. The "geographical trauma" caused by the aftermath of partition left deep memories, creating an atmosphere of enmity and suspicion between India and Pakistan that continues to this day¹⁰⁷.

However, it should be noted that the decision to divide the two independent states by no means removed the ethno-confessional contradictions that had accumulated for centuries in Hindustan. And that the division of India had just the opposite effect is the bitter truth¹⁰⁸. The consequence of this is the birth of a terrible nationalism. From the very first days of their independent existence, India and Pakistan found themselves in an interstate confrontation, which repeatedly resulted in open armed clashes (Indo-Pakistani wars). These contradictions acquired a new quality, having formed two levels of ethno-confessional confrontation, interstate and intrastate¹⁰⁹. The danger of intra-state conflicts in both countries continued to persist. In fact, there are more Muslims in India (35million) than independent Pakistan(total number of population 31 million¹¹⁰), and this is just one of the great anomalies of the misguided division of India: territories predominantly inhabited by Hindus and Sikhs went to India, and Muslims to Pakistan¹¹¹.

¹⁰⁴ Ishtiaq Ahmed, *The 1947 Partition of India: A Paradigm for Pathological Politics in India and Pakistan*, p.9

¹⁰⁵ Yakovlev A. Yu. *Indusslo-musul'manskie otnisheniya v Indii: ot nelyubvi do nenavisti* [Hindu-Muslim relations in India: from dislike to hatred], 2012, pp. 89

¹⁰⁶ Butalia U. *The Other Side of Silence. Voices from Partition of India*. New Delhi, 1998, p.249

¹⁰⁷ Sadia Ahmed, *Hindu-Muslim Fragmentation: A Consequence Of India's Colonial Legacy*, 2, 2021, <https://www.humanrightspulse.com/mastercontentblog/hindu-muslim-fragmentation-a-consequence-of-indias-colonial-legacy>

¹⁰⁸ V.V. Kuchma, *Osobennosti natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya v Indii: etno-konfessional'nyi i gosudarstvenno-pravovoi aspekty* [Features of the national liberation movement in India: ethno-confessional and state-legal aspects], 2011, p.24

¹⁰⁹ Sadia Ahmed, *Hindu-Muslim Fragmentation: A Consequence Of India's Colonial Legacy*, Human Rights Pulse, 2021, <https://www.humanrightspulse.com/mastercontentblog/hindu-muslim-fragmentation-a-consequence-of-indias-colonial-legacy>

¹¹⁰ Samina Mahsud-Dornan, *Pakistan, Population Programmes and Progress*, The Ulster Medical Society, 20 May 2007, p.122.

¹¹¹ Anis Mahomed Karodia, *A Historical Perspective The Emergence Of Islam And Muslim Identity In India: British Colonialism And Indian Congress Leadership In The 'Vivisection' And Partitioning Of India*, *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review*, Vol. 3, No.9; April. 2014, p.2; S.A. Gorokhov, *India Religiya, Demografiya I Politika* [India Religion, Demography and Politics], *Asia and Africa Today*, No. 7, 2011, pp.27

1.2. Indian's People Conversion into Islam.

Islam took several centuries for Islam to spread in India. According to G.A.Oddie, “conversion” in Indian life means rather a noticeable change in communication, behavior or inner life¹¹². Of course, one should not deny the fact that the transition from one worldview, ritual system, symbolic universe and way of life to another is a complex process that often takes place in the context of intercultural contacts and conflicts and, thus, socio-cultural consequences are inevitable¹¹³.

According to Omair Anas, Islam came to India due to three factors: Firstly, Muslim merchants who conducted their business in good faith enjoyed great confidence in helping to spread Islam across the peninsula. Secondly, the followers of Sufism contributed to the spread of Islam in Central Asia. Thirdly, the Muslim rule that lasted here for several centuries. Muslim Turkic rule was established in India in the 11th century and they ruled with high tolerance and respect for differences in culture and religion, traditions and culture of the local population¹¹⁴.

There are different opinions regarding the conversion of the population of South Asia to Islam. However, one can follow below on the given theories:

A. Theory of Immigration

This theory suggests, a bulk of Muslims are descendants of settlers from the Iranian plateau or Arabs. It is evidenced by the above-mentioned Arab conquests through 7th and 8th centuries), the expansion of the Turkic (of Iranian origin) and Mongolian people from 11th to 17th XI-XVII centuries. Besides, trade between Muslim Arabs and Indians led Islam spread in the coastal cities of India through both Arab traders and converted locals.

B. Theory of “Religion of the Sword”

¹¹²G.A.Oddie, “Religion in south Asia: Religious Conversion and Revival movement in South Asia in Medieval and Modern times” Delhi, 1991, p.13

¹¹³Larlameng K Gangte, Conversions to Christianity and Islam in India: Historiographical Survey of the Recent Literature, *Senhri journal of multidisciplinary*, Vol.II, No. 1, 2017, pp.12-23

¹¹⁴ Omair Anas, *The Nation-State in the Transition of Islamic Thought in the Indian Subcontinent*, *Siyasat Arabia*, Issue 49, 2021, p.

This theory emphasizes the role of military force in the spread of Islam since Muslims used political violence and jihad allegedly the Hindus of India were given the choice between death and conversion to Islam¹¹⁵. It could also mean that Islam spread to India politically, establishing its power¹¹⁶.

C. Theory of “Patronage Religion”

This theory argues conversion was prompted by pragmatic reasons such as tax exemptions and greater social mobility for Muslims who became the ruling class. Pre-modern Indians converted to Islam, for the pursuit of social improvement or prestige, also to obtain some non-religious favor from the ruling class - tax exemption, promotion, and so on. An excellent example is the Rajput policy pursued by the Akbar¹¹⁷. As you know, one of the significant features of Akbar's government was the degree of participation of the Hindus, and especially the Rajputs¹¹⁸. Rajput princes rose to the highest ranks of generals and provincial governors in the service of the Mughals¹¹⁹. Discrimination against non-Muslims was reduced by the abolition of taxation of pilgrims and equality. In addition, Akbar has been far more successful than any previous Muslim ruler in enlisting the support of the Hindus at all levels of his administration¹²⁰.

D. Theory of “Sufism”

This theory argues that Sufis actively preached in India and won trust of the local population. Over time, the tactics of spreading Islam changed to contain strong elements of Sufism¹²¹. So it became “softer” Islam containing “very mystical”

¹¹⁵ M A Khan, *Islamic Jihad : A Legacy Of Forced Conversion, Imperialism, And Slavery*, New York, 2009

¹¹⁶ Richard M. Eaton, *Approaches to the Study of Conversion to Islam in India*, pp. 107-108, <https://jan.ucc.nau.edu/~sj6/eatonapproachconversion.pdf>

¹¹⁷ Adarsh Saini, *Mughal Rajput Relations*, www.academia.edu, 2019, p.5 https://www.academia.edu/42214414/Mughal_Rajput_Relations

¹¹⁸ Kalam Chouhan, “The Rajput policy of famous Mughal Emperor Akbar and Aurangzeb”, *Impact Journals*, vol. 2, issue 4, apr 2014, p.142

¹¹⁹ S. Inayet A. Zaidi, *Akbar and the Rajput Principalities Integration into Empire*, p.17

¹²⁰ Kenneth A. Ballhatchet, *Akbar Mughal emperor*, Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Akbar>

¹²¹ Muhammet Zuhur, *Sihizm'in oluşumunda İslam'in etkisi [The Effect of Islam on the formation of Sicism]* Yildirim Beyazıt Üniversitesi, Ağustos 2016,p.9

elements¹²². In the 11th and 12th centuries, Sufism entered India with the arrival of Sufi saints from Arabia, Iran and Central Asia¹²³. After their consolidation, India has become an important center of Sufi ideology¹²⁴. Sufis have made great efforts to ensure the peaceful coexistence of representatives of different religions within the same society, although Muslims were a minority in it¹²⁵. With the expansion of the Muslim empire and despite interfaith conflicts, the Sufi movement spread throughout the Muslim world¹²⁶.

E. Theory of “Religion of Social Liberation”

This theory means that Buddhists and members of the lower castes were oppressed in Hindu states, so they made the decision to convert to Islam¹²⁷. In general, Islam took root in India due to the existence of a caste system there. The oppressed position of the lower castes in Indian society stimulated conversion to Islam, which does not recognize caste barriers¹²⁸. The equality offered by Islam was more attractive than the organized racism of the caste system¹²⁹.

The main groups of the population, due to which the growth of Islam took place, were undoubtedly representatives of the lower castes and the untouchables, who sought in Islam deliverance from their unenviable fate, from the repressive power of the social system¹³⁰. In fact, Dalits (untouchables) are outcasts - such a low status that they don't fit into a highly stratified caste system¹³¹. Among the upper classes of

¹²²Anthony Shih, *The Roots and Societal Impact of Islam in Southeast Asia: Interview with Professor Mark Mancall*, *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Volume 2, 2002, pp. 114 – 117.

¹²³Arthur F. Buehler, *Sufism in India*, 2018, pp. 254-255

¹²⁴3.Taneeva-Salamatshaeva, *Istoki Sufizma v Srednevekovoi Indii*, [Sources of Sufism In Middle India] *Oriental Literature*, Moscow, , 2010, p. 7

¹²⁵Unit 2 The Sufi Movement With Reference To India, p 12-14
<https://egyankosh.ac.in/bitstream/123456789/38181/1/Unit-2.pdf>

¹²⁶Omar Anas, *The Nation-State in the Transition of Islamic Thought in the Indian Subcontinent*, *Siyasat Arabia*, Issue 49, 2021, p.63

¹²⁷Ram Puniyani, *Dalits Embracing Buddhism, Islam to Escape Caste Atrocities*, 2010, p.2

¹²⁸Michael T. Kaufman, *Lowly Hindus in India See Islam As Their Salvation*, *The New York Times*, 1981
<https://www.nytimes.com/1981/08/14/world/lowly-hindus-in-india-see-islam-as-their-salvation.html>

¹²⁹Zafarul-Islam Khan, *Low caste Hindus to convert to Islam*, *The Milli Gazette*,
<https://www.milligazette.com/Archives/01112002/0111200275.html>

¹³⁰V. B. Hans, *Dalits in India: From Marginalization to Inclusion*, *Jai Maa Saraswati Gyandayini*, An International Multidisciplinary e-Journal, 2016, Vol I. Issue 4, p.450

¹³¹Carol Honsa, *Hindu 'untouchables' converting to Islam for a chance at a better life*, *The Christian Science Monitor*, 1981
<https://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0730/073047.html>

the Indian population, only in rare cases did they convert to the Muslim faith. In some cases, this has allowed the upper strata of the Indian population to enjoy all the benefits of a privileged position.

1.3. Significant Demographic Growth of Muslims

The vastness of India in all dimensions, close and multifaceted historical ties with other peoples make its demographic study difficult and possible only to one degree or another. The rapid growth of the Muslim population in India is a major concern for government leaders. In fact, the results of the census make it possible to foresee the likely risks, many of which are the potential for confrontation over religious differences between the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority.

“Religious demographics” is an important indicator for political stability. Because the change in the shares of confessional groups is determined by the combined contribution of three components: natural growth, migration growth, and religious conversion¹³². In today’s India population plays the key role in the formation of the country’s religious portrait.

As noted above, after Indonesia and Pakistan, India has the third largest Muslim population in the world¹³³. Meanwhile, the number of Muslims in Hindustan (meaning India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) is approaching 600 million¹³⁴. But, researchers come to different conclusions regarding the number of religious communities in India, e.g., the figures of K. Davis¹³⁵ is somewhat different from each other and differ from Sh. Chandrasekhar¹³⁶. But all studies show in general terms the same picture: the predominance of Hindus, whose share slowly but steadily declines during the colonial period and increases sharply after the secession of

¹³²S.A. Gorokhov, R.V. Dmitriev, Osobennosty Demografii religioznykh obshchin Indii in the beginning of XXI B [Features of Demographics of Religious Communities of India In the Beginning of XXI], Vestnik, Tomsk., 2016. № 406. p.57

¹³³Jeff Diamant, The countries with the 10 largest Christian populations and the 10 largest Muslim populations, PEW, 21 September 2021, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/09/21/key-findings-about-the-religious-composition-of-india/>

¹³⁴World population review, <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/muslim-population-by-country>

¹³⁵K. Davis. The Population of India and Pakistan, Princeton University Press; 1st edition, New Delhi, January 1, 1959, p. 25

¹³⁶Sh. Chandrasekhar, Indian population, Publishing house of foreign literature, 1949, p. 49.

Muslim Pakistan. The great relative importance of the Muslim community, whose share is slowly and steadily growing, reaching a quarter of the population at the time of partition and falling to a tenth after it; a small proportion of other communities (see Table 1.4.)¹³⁷.

Table 1.4. Distribution of Indian population by religious communities according to census reports,% (1881-1951)¹³⁸.

Religious community	1881	1891	1901	1911	1921	1931	1941	1951
Hindus	75.09	74.24	72.87	71.68	70.73	70.67	69.46	84.98
Muslims	19.97	20.41	21.88	22.39	23.23	23.49	24.28	9.91
Followers of tribal beliefs	2.57	3.26	2.88	3.17	2.97	2.26	2.26	0.47
Christians	0.71	0.77	0.98	1.21	1.47	1.77	1.91	2.35
Sikhs	0.74	0.68	0.77	1.00	1.06	1.28	1.46	1.74
Jains	0.49	0.51	0.47	0.41	0.39	0.37	0.37	0.45
Buddhists	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.05
Parsis	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Other	0.32	-	-	-	-	-	0.11	0.03

The figure 1.9. shows that the number of followers of Islam was constantly growing up to the division of the British colony. From 19.97% in 1881, the number of Muslims in 1941 reached 24.28% of the Indian population. The significant part of the Muslim diaspora got across in 1947-1948, in 1951 their share was 9.91%¹³⁹. The total number of immigrants from India to Pakistan and vice versa exceeded 15 million. In addition, the massacres and pogroms that broke out during the years of independence and ended at the end of 1947 caused demographic damage, taking, according to various estimates, from 200 thousand to 2 million human lives¹⁴⁰. According to the 1951 Indian census, 2% of the population were refugees¹⁴¹.

¹³⁷ V. V. Petrov, *Narodonaselenie Indii Demograficheskaya Kharakteristika* [Population of India Demographic Characteristics], Nauka Publishing House, Moscow, 1978, p. 97

¹³⁸ K. Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan*, p. 178; Census of India, 1951. Paper № 1. Table D-II. Religion. New Delhi, 1959

¹³⁹ Yakovlev A. Yu. *Indusslo-musul'manskie otnisheniya v Indii: ot nelyubvi do nenavisti* [Hindu-Muslim relations in India: from dislike to hatred], p. 85

¹⁴⁰ Chereshneva, L.A., *Problema nezavisimosti i razdela kolonial'noi Indii v 1939-1947gg. bor'ba politicheskikh sil* [The problem of independence and the division of colonial India in 1939-1947: the struggle of political forces], Lipetsk, 2009, p.655

¹⁴¹ Daniel Mackrell, *When and why was India partitioned?* metro.co.uk, 11 Nov 2018, <https://metro.co.uk/2018/11/11/when-and-why-was-india-partitioned-2-8125960/>




Figure 1.9. The share of Muslims in the population structure of India (1881-2011).

There were about 50 million Muslims in India in 1881, that is, one fifth of the country's population; by the time of the partition, about 100 million people professed Islam - approximately a quarter of the population; after the partition, about 40 million Muslims remained within India, or a tenth of the population. According to the 1951 census, there were 35 million, i.e., almost 11% of the population, and in 2011 more than 172.3 million, or 14.2%, there is a marked increase in the proportion of Muslims.¹⁴² Thus, the proportion of Muslims in the total population of the country continued to increase slightly.

After gaining its independence in 1951, India conducted the first census. A census was conducted in the country every 10 years. All censuses since 1951 have been conducted under the Indian Census Act, 1948¹⁴³. The most recent census was taken in 2011, and the next one was scheduled to take place in 2021. As a result, the Government of India, was unable to complete its planned own census in 2021 due to the coronavirus and postponed it until June 2022¹⁴⁴. In 2022, the country plans to conduct one of the largest population censuses in its history. Therefore, the thesis

¹⁴²Stephanie Kramer, Population Growth And Religious Composition, Pew Research Center September 21, 2021 <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/09/21/population-growth-and-religious-composition/>

¹⁴³The Census Act, 1948, <https://censusindia.gov.in/nada/index.php/catalog/40409>

¹⁴⁴Bharti Jain, Census may have to wait until next year or even 2022 if Covid-19 situation does not improve, The Times of India, 29 September 2020, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/census-may-have-to-wait-until-next-year-or-even-2022-if-covid-19-situation-does-not-improve/articleshow/78374925.cms>

will analyze the growth of Muslims based on the latest results of the 2011 census, in comparison with the previous results of the 1991 census¹⁴⁵(Table 1.4.).

Table 1.5. Dynamics of the number of adherents of the largest religions and their share in the population of India, 1991–2011¹⁴⁶.

Religious community	1991		2001		2011		Increase			
	Mln	%	Mln	%	Mln	%	1991-2001	%	2001-2011	%
Hinduism	687.6	82.0	827.6	80.5	966.3	79.8	139.9	20.3	138.7	16.8
Islam	101.6	12.1	138.2	13.4	172.3	14.2	36.6	36.0	34.1	24.6
Christianity	19.6	2.3	24.1	2.3	27.8	2.3	4.4	22	3.7	15.5
Sikhism	16.3	1.9	19.2	1.9	20.8	1.7	3.0	18	1.6	8.4
Buddhism	6.4	0.8	7.9	0.8	8.4	0.7	1.6	24.5	0.5	6.1
Jainism	3.4	0.4	4.2	0.4	4.5	0.4	0.9	26.0	0.2	5.4
All population	838.6	100	1028,6	100	1210.9	100	190.9	22.7	182.8	17.7

As a result of census 2011, 79.8% of the Indian population professed Hinduism, 14.2% were Muslims, 2.3% were Christians, 1.7% were Sikhs, 0.7% were Buddhists, 0.4 % - by Jains. The seventh confessional group - 0.9% in 2011 - unites adherents of all other religions (tribal, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, etc.) and people whose religious affiliation has not been established. During the period 2001-2011, while the entire population of India grew by 17.7%, the number of Muslims increased by 24.6%, Hindus - by 16.8%, Christians - by 15.5%, Sikhs - by 8.4%, Buddhists - 6.1%, Jains - 5.4% (see Table 1.5.)¹⁴⁷.

According to statistics, Islam in India has witnessed tremendous population growth from year to year compared to other religions in India. In fact, it is the fastest growing religion in India over the past 50 years. However, according to Figure 1.9, India's dominant Hindu community of about 966 million is the largest Hindu community in the world. It should be noted that since the independence of India in

¹⁴⁵Vijaita Singh, Government anticipates protest during Census, The Hindu, 27 February 2022, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/govt-anticipates-organised-agitation-during-forthcoming-census-exercise/article65087607.ece>

¹⁴⁶S.A. Gorokhov, R.V. Dmitriev, Osobennosty Demografii religioznykh obshin Indii v nachale XXIv. [Features of Demographics of Religious Communities of India In the Beginning of XXI] p.57

¹⁴⁷Stephanie Kramer, Population growth and religious composition, PRC, September 21, 2021 <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/09/21/population-growth-and-religious-composition/>

1947, there has been a gradual decrease in the relative number of Hindus in the country. Thus, since 1951, the proportion of adherents of Hinduism in the population has decreased by 5% (from 85.0 to 79.8%), while the proportion of adherents of Islam, on the contrary, has increased by the same figure (from 9.9 to 14.2%)¹⁴⁸.




Figure 1.10. Significant growth of the three major religions since the 1950s.

Muslims are present in decent numbers in almost all states of India. Table 1.4. shows that Muslims not only retained their share of the population in the states but also quite increased it between 2001 and 2011¹⁴⁹. Jammu and Kashmir is the only Indian state with the seventh largest Muslim population. The results show us that the demography of Muslims varies from state to state in India.

Looking at the percentage of Muslim population by state in the Table 1.4., Lakshadweep ranks first with 96.58%, followed by Jammu and Kashmir (68.31%), the only two Muslim-majority states in the country. Other states with a high concentration of Muslims are: Assam (34.22%), West Bengal (27.01%), Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (19.26%)¹⁵⁰, which states account for more than half (53%) of the country's Muslims (see Table 1.5.).

¹⁴⁸BS Reporter, India's population at 1.21 billion; Hindus 79.8%, Muslims 14.2%, newspaper business-standard, 2015 https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-s-population-at-1-21-billion-hindus-79-8-muslims-14-2-115082600038_1.html

¹⁴⁹Stephanie Kramer, Religious demography of Indian states and territories, Pew Research Center, September, 21, 2021 <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/09/21/religious-demography-of-indian-states-and-territories/>

¹⁵⁰Mehar Singh, Religion in India: Religious Composition of Population and Religious Regions, Research Journal ARTS, 2019, Vol. 18 (1) p70

Table 1.6. Dynamics of the share of adherents of Islam in the population of some administrative-territorial units of India, 2001-2011¹⁵¹.

Administrative territorial Units	Share of Muslims in the population, %		
	2001	2011	Difference 2001–2011
Uttarakhand	11.9	13.9	2.0
Assam	30.9	34.2	3.3
West Bengal	25.2	27.0	1.8
Kerala	24.7	26.6	1.9
Goa	6.8	8.3	1.5
Jammu and Kashmir	67.0	68.3	1.3
Haryana	5.8	7.0	1.2
Delhi	11.7	12.8	1.1
Lakshadweep	95.5	96.6	1.1
Maharashtra	10.6	11.5	0.9
Chandigarh	3.9	4.8	0.9
Dadra and Nagar Haveli	3.0	3.8	0.8
India	13.4	14.2	0.8
Pondicherry	6.1	6.1	0.0

In western India, Muslims are most numerous in the states of Maharashtra (13.0 million) and Gujarat (5.8 million), where a significant part of them live in large cities such as Mumbai, Pune, Ahmedabad. The largest Muslim community in southern India lives on the Malabar coast, in the state of Kerala, where 8.9 million Muslims are located¹⁵². The record rates of Muslim population growth in Assam and West Bengal are most likely due to the immigration to these states of many Muslims from neighboring Bangladesh (see Figure 1.11.)¹⁵³.

Thus, the results of the population census first confirmed the fact, extremely painful for Indian society, of a further decrease in the proportion of Hindus in the country's population. The growth rates of their numbers are significantly lagging from indicators of the Muslim community of India, traditionally considered in the country, due to its multiplicity, the “second majority”.

¹⁵¹ S.A. Gorokhov, R.V. Dmitriev, Osobennosty Demografiy religioznykh obshin Indii v nachale XXIv. [Features of Demographics of Religious Communities of India In the Beginning of XXI], p.58

¹⁵² K. Alan Kronstadt, India: Religious Freedom Issues, Congressional Research Service, 2018, pp.5-6

¹⁵³ R. B. Bhagat, Transition in Hindu and Muslim Population Growth Rates: Myth and Reality, Mumbai, November 2015, pp.8-9




Figure 1.11. India's Muslims as a Percentage population.

Since according to *The Economist*, private research shows that there are 177 million Muslims in India, or 14.6% of the country's population¹⁵⁴. This shows that although the birth rate in India is falling, the birth rate among Muslims is falling more slowly than among other faith groups. The number of Muslims in India is growing steadily every year. According to the Indian census, the Muslim population is increasing by 3-5 million annually based on growth rates over a decade (Table 1.7.)¹⁵⁵.

Table 1.7. Muslim Population growth rate.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total population</i>	<i>Muslim population</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
1951	361088090	35856047	9,93%
1961	439234771	46998120	10,70%
1971	548159652	61448696	11,21%
1981	683329097	77557852	11,35%
1991	846427039	102586957	12,12%
2001	1028737436	138159437	13,43%
2011	1210726932	172245158	14,23%

¹⁵⁴ Agra, Growing, and neglected, 02 March 2013, The Economist, <https://www.economist.com/asia/2013/03/02/growing-and-neglected>

¹⁵⁵ Ravi Shekhar, Distributional Pattern of Muslims in India, International Journal of Innovative Studies in Sociology and Humanities (IJISSH), New Delhi, Volume: 3 Issue: 11, November 2018, pp.30-31

Ruling ICP Party in India 2004-2014 concealed the results, fearing that these indicators of the modern confessional structure of the last 2011 census could become an important propaganda trump card for their political rivals, primarily Hindu nationalists from the Bharatiya Janata party, who would use them in the 2014 parliamentary elections. These fears have indeed come true. Since, with the coming to power in 2014, the BJP published this data¹⁵⁶.

The parliamentary elections in India, held in April – May 2014, turned out to be the most unsuccessful for the INC in the entire history of this party, which is more than a hundred years old. The *Bharatiya Janata Party*'s (Indian People's Party, BJP) advent to government, headed N. Modi, made further *concealment* of official data on the religious structure of the Indian population meaningless, and they were finally published.

As a result, it became clear that in the religious structure of the population of the state in the last decade of 2001–2011 there have been significant advances. First, fears about a decrease in the proportion of Hindus in the population of India below the psychologically important level of 80% were confirmed. The “golden” scale of the “reproductive” scales is increasingly leaning towards Muslims, leaving Hindus in second place, influencing the political situation in the demographic superpower of the 21st century and warming up without that relations between these confessional groups have been tense since the days of British rule¹⁵⁷.

¹⁵⁶ S.A. Gorokhov, R.V. Dmitriev, *Osobennosti Demografii religioznykh obshin Indii v nachale XXIv.* [Features of Demographics of Religious Communities of India In the Beginning of XXI], p.62

¹⁵⁷ S.A. Gorokhov, R.V. Dmitriev, *Osobennosti Demografii religioznykh obshin Indii v nachale XXIv.* [Features of Demographics of Religious Communities of India In the Beginning of XXI], Vestnik, Tomsk, 2016. № 406. p. 62.




Figure 1.12. Population Growth Forecast for India's Major World Religions by PRC.

Undoubtedly, the Hindus retain their predominance over the rest of the ethno-religious groups in India, but its Muslim population will exceed even the population of any Muslim country in the world Figure 1.12.¹⁵⁸ Since according to this report, the growth in the number of Muslims will be faster than the overall growth in the population of the Earth. The growth of the Muslim population will be provided mainly due to the high birth rate and a larger proportion of young people in the population of Muslim countries¹⁵⁹.

1.4. Influence of Islam in India

Islam has become part of the very fabric of Indian civilization and culture. Muslim rule was characterized by a high level of assimilation and syncretism, and it also quite influenced the social behavior and ethics of the Indian population¹⁶⁰. As a result of a complex historical process, Muslims in India have had a unique experience of being a minority without neither losing their identity nor their ties with non-Muslims. Hindus and Muslims are representatives of two different cultures, worldviews and lifestyles, have been living side by side for centuries. Undoubtedly, throughout the centuries, both traditions interacted, assimilated, but still remained separate. There

¹⁵⁸ Conrad Hackett, By 2050, India to have world's largest populations of Hindus and Muslims, April 21, 2015, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/21/by-2050-india-to-have-worlds-largest-populations-of-hindus-and-muslims>

¹⁵⁹ PRC Report The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050, April 2, 2015 <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2015/04/02/religious-projections-2010-2050/>

¹⁶⁰ Burjor Avari, Islamic Civilization in South Asia: A History of Muslim Power and Presence in the Indian Subcontinent, Routledge, New York, 2013, p.68

was no real fusion of cultures¹⁶¹. According to Tara Chand, it is not possible to argue about the extent of Muslim influence on Indian life in all departments. But nowhere is it more clearly seen than in customs, in domestic life, in music, in dress, in marriage ceremonies and fairs, as well as in court institutions and etiquette¹⁶².

According to M.N. Srinivas and S.V. Kamath as they singled out both negative and positive aspects of Islamic influence of on Indian society¹⁶³.

The negative possible impact of Islam on Indian society:

1. The Muslim invasion of India hastened some of the unwanted tendencies that had already manifested in Hindu society. K.M. Panikkar noted that if prior to the 13th century Hindu society was divided horizontally, then after the introduction of Islam and Muslim rule it was divided vertically. Thus, Islam divided Indian society from top to bottom into two distinct parts such as Hindus and Muslims¹⁶⁴.

2. Implementation of Purdah (*curtain* in Persian) system meaning a conservative garment underlying the religious, social, and spiritual seclusion of women in dominant Muslim countries such as those of South Asia. This tradition started by Muslims and later adopted by Hindus, especially in India, which entails isolating women from prying eyes with clothing. Islam have profoundly affected the position of Indian women¹⁶⁵. However, this system limits women's mobility and behavior and their personal, social, political and economic activities outside the home.

3. Another an unpleasant feature of social life that penetrated Hindu society through Muslims was slavery, which later evolved into the slave trade¹⁶⁶. Slaves

¹⁶¹Ch. Santa Kumari, Impact of Islam on Indian Culture: Bhakti and Sufi Movements, Department of History Study Materials, 2019, p.2 <http://www.khemundicollege.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/HISTROY.pdf>

¹⁶²Tara Chand, Influence of Islam on Indian Culture, Hesperides Press, USA, November 12, 2006, pp.120-125

¹⁶³M. N. Srinivas, India: Social Structure?, Transaction Publishers, 1980, p.13

¹⁶⁴K.M. Panikkar, A Survey of Indian History, Asia Publishing House, Mumbai, January 1, 1971, pp.50-52

¹⁶⁵Puja Mondal, The Impact of Islam on Indian Society, www.yourarticlelibrary.com <https://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/islam/essay-on-the-impact-of-islam-on-indian-society-1548-words/6145>

¹⁶⁶Zehua Chen, The Status and Identity Evolution of Indian Slaves during Delhi Sultanate, 2020 3rd International Conference on Interdisciplinary SOSHU, Francis Academic Press, 2020, p.225

were part of the social system of the Delhi Sultanate¹⁶⁷. It was practiced among the sultans, amirs and nobles to keep men and women slaves¹⁶⁸. Slavery in India continued in the 18th and 19th centuries and only in 1843 was abolished in the dominions of the EIC through the Indian Slavery Act.

4. Hindus, in fear, began to marry women at an early age in order to avoid they are torn to pieces by Muslims¹⁶⁹. Consequently, this led to an increase in the number of child marriages and further became a tradition. Gradually marriages with children became forced¹⁷⁰. The rise in slavery and child marriages were as a result of the practice of Muslim rulers to show their power, position and status to the world¹⁷¹.

5. Islam is committed to the abolition of privileges and the elimination of all forms of discrimination against the poor and the weak to ensure equality¹⁷². In his work, L.D. Jenkins underlines that as members of the lower castes and untouchables began to convert to Islam massively in order to prevent further growth in their numbers, attempts were made in society to tighten caste rules and everyday rules of behavior¹⁷³. In this regard, new rules and restrictions regarding castes and marriage among the Hindus were also established and became more stringent¹⁷⁴.

6. In the history of the reign of Muslim rulers there happened the destruction of the idols and sacred temples of the Hindus. Also in many cases, the ruined statues of temples, remains and even stones destroyed by the Delhi sultans were used to build

¹⁶⁷Sunil Kumar, Service, Status and Military Slavery in the Delhi Sultanate of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries”, Bloomington, 2006, p.91

¹⁶⁸Fouzia Farooq, The Delhi Sultanate: A Slave Society or A Society with Slaves?, Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXX, No.1, 2009, p.23

¹⁶⁹Child marriage is a bane in India: A glance at several shocking facts, India Today Web Desk , New Delhi, July 23, 2018 <https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/gk-current-affairs/story/child-marriage-india-1293581-2018-07-23>

¹⁷⁰Anju Malhotra, The Causes, Consequences and Solutions to forced in Child Marriage in the Developing World, International Center for Research on Women, D.C. Washington, July 15, 2010, pp. 2-3

¹⁷¹Andrea Major, Slavery, Abolitionism and Empire in India, 1772-1843, Liverpool Studies in International Slavery LUP, March 15, 2012, pp.22-24

¹⁷²Leonova I.V., Pprintsip ravnopraviya v musul'manskoi prave, [The principle of equality in Muslim law], Man: Crime and Punishment, 2009, p.54

¹⁷³L.D. Jenkins, Religious Freedom and Mass Conversion in India, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019, p.57

¹⁷⁴Thomas Schirmacher, When Indian Dalits Convert to Christianity or Islam, they lose Social Welfare Benefits and Rights they are Guaranteed under the Constitution, IIRF Reports Vol. 2, No. 6, March 2013, pp.6-7

mosques and other buildings. In his memoirs, Firoz Shah Tughlah describes how he destroyed temples and instead built mosques and killed those who dared to build a new temple¹⁷⁵.

The possible positive influences of Islam on Indian society

1. Islam brought equality to India and played a liberating role for the peoples, the lower castes, oppressed by the burden of inequitable social systems, denied the caste system and untouchability. Islam left a serious mark on the general system of cults Hinduism. The Indian scholar Swami Vivekananda recognized the positive impact of the Muslim conquest, and according to him, Islam saved a fifth of the population who chose to become Muslims¹⁷⁶.

2. So, thanks to the influence of Muslims, a new sect of Sikhs that challenged not only Orthodox Hinduism, but also Islam in the person of the Great Mughals. Sikhism emerged from the fusion of Islam and Hinduism at the beginning of the 16th century in Punjab¹⁷⁷. Sikhism, taking some Islamic ideals like a monotheistic faith and an egalitarian attitude towards the caste system, introduced a new and different religion¹⁷⁸. The word "*Sikh*" in the Punjabi dialect means "disciple". Nanak *Guru* (mentor) is considered the founder of this religion¹⁷⁹.

3. The wealthy Hindu classes were influenced by Muslim dress, etiquette, recreation, and other activities.

4. Islam affected to Indian music and musical instruments. Almost all Muslim rulers except Aurangzeb patronized and promoted this kind of art¹⁸⁰. Especially

¹⁷⁵Willem Brownstok, Stanford Mc Krause, Islam: Ot mongol'skih vtorzhen'y i do muslimanskih osvajden' dili [Islam: from Mongolian invasions to Muslim conquests in India], Cambridge Stanford Books, pp.130-132

¹⁷⁶Hussain Randathani, Swami Vivekananda on Islam and Muslims, 2017, p. 7

¹⁷⁷Sumaira Safdar, Fatima Riffat, Robina Shoeb, Anam Iftkhar, Reimagining Sikh Religion, Origin and Growth: An Overview, Journal of the Punjab University Historical Society, Volume No. 31, Issue No. 1, January - June 2018, pp.226-227

¹⁷⁸Muhammet Zuhur, Sihizm'in oluşumunda İslam'in etkisi [The Effect of Islam on the formation of Sikhism] p.33

¹⁷⁹Pavlyuchenko K.S., K voprosu o vozniknobenii, ideologii i strukture sikhizma [On the issue of the origin, ideology and structure of Sikhism], Vestnik, 2011, №1, p.132

**Qawwali* is a performance of Sufi poetry to the music, distributed mainly in Pakistan and northern India.

during the reign of the Mughals in India, two separate traditions of Indian classical music arose; the North Indian Hindustani and the South Indian Carnatic¹⁸¹. Indian musical instruments were transformed, and new instruments were produced, like *Sitar*¹⁸². The fusion of Hindu, Arabic and Persian styles of music led to the new evolution of light songs - *Qawwalis*. Several new musical forms were also developed, of which the most popular so far in modern Indian music are Dhrupad and Khayal¹⁸³.

5. In general, during the reign of Akbar, art and science were at their highest stage of prosperity. He encouraged the development of the sciences. Since the Great Akbar was a connoisseur and aficionado of literature, on his orders, many Indian works were translated into Persian, and Muslim texts into Sanskrit. Histories of the Great Moghuls were written in Persian on his order. In total, during his reign, more than 40 thousand books were translated, the richest library was collected with more than 24 thousand volumes¹⁸⁴. It is also worth noting that under the Great Akbar, painting flourished - the famous miniature, where the Persian and Indian artistic traditions themselves organically converged¹⁸⁵.

6. Indian architecture took on a new form with the rise of Islamic rule in India towards the end of the 12th century. The main contribution of the Mughals to the Indian subcontinent was their unique architecture¹⁸⁶. The Mughal Muslim dynasty built magnificent palaces, tombs, minarets and forts that even today stand in Delhi, Agra, Jaipur, Lahore, Sheikhpur and many other cities in India and Pakistan¹⁸⁷.

¹⁸⁰Kaleem Kawaja, Muslims' Contribution to the growth of Music in India, October 3, 2010, <https://www.caribbeanmuslims.com/muslim-music-in-india>

¹⁸¹Jagran Josh, Music in Medieval period: Persian influence, 2012, <https://www.jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/music-in-medieval-period-persian-influence-1344325409-1>

¹⁸²Gulsher Khan, The Cultural and Social Transition during the Muslim Period, Punjab, 2016, p.144

¹⁸³Chakravarth E., Influence of Islam on Indian culture, 24 May 2011, <https://www.indiastudychannel.com/resources/141215-Influence-of-Islam-on-Indian-culture.aspx>

¹⁸⁴A. V. Ivanov, S. M. Zhuravleva, Severnaya Indiya kak territoriya mirotvorchestva i kul'turnogo dialoga [North India as a Territory of Peacemaking and Cultural Dialogue], Culture and Society, №3, 2017, p. 147

¹⁸⁵A. V. Ivanov, S. M. Zhuravleva, Severnaya Indiya kak territoriya mirotvorchestva i kul'turnogo dialoga [North India as a Territory of Peacemaking and Cultural Dialogue], p. 148

¹⁸⁶Gulsher Khan, The Cultural and Social Transition during the Muslim Period, p.142

¹⁸⁷Tara Chand, Influence Of Islam On Indian Culture, The Indian Press, Allahabad, 1936, p.138

Muslims introduced to Indian architecture new elements, such as: the using of forms (instead of natural); lettering by using decorative letters or calligraphy; inlay and using of colored marble, painted stucco and brightly colored tiles¹⁸⁸. New works of arts and crafts were introduced in the country; for example, papermaking, enamels, metals and jewelry, etc¹⁸⁹. The merge and synthesis of Hindu and Islamic cultures led to the development of new styles of architecture whose living examples are the Red Fort, Jama Masjid, Qutab Minar, Taj Mahal, etc¹⁹⁰.

7. Muslims brought their own languages to India, especially Arabic and Persian. On the other hand, the language of the Muslim invaders changed under the influence of the languages of the local population, they switched to Urdu using the Arabic alphabet essentially¹⁹¹. The linguistically related languages Urdu and Hindi, the official languages of Pakistan and India respectively are also known as Hindustani. Urdu is the result of a mixture of Persian, Arabic and Turkish words and ideas with concepts and languages of Sanskrit origin¹⁹². The Hindi language was also influenced by Muslim contacts in vocabulary, grammar, comparisons and styles. Literature in India is heavily influenced by the Turkish-Afghans and Arabs.¹⁹³

8. Overseas commerce and trade, which had previously ceased, was revived again under the influence of Islam on Hindu society¹⁹⁴. India began to trade with foreign countries, mainly with the countries of the Middle East. With the help of Islamic *Shariah** courts¹⁹⁵, a unified commercial and legal system emerged from Morocco to Mongolia and Indonesia. Although administration and political

¹⁸⁸ K.S. Mukund, History Of Architecture -III Islamic & Colonial Architecture, p.6

¹⁸⁹ Jijo Sudarshan, Indo-Islamic Architecture (Indian Culture Series – NCERT), JUNE 7, 2017 <https://www.clearias.com/indo-islamic-architecture/>

¹⁹⁰ Anup Kumar Rajput, An introduction to Indian art, National council of educational research and training, 2012, pp.109-110

¹⁹¹ Tara Chand, Influence Of Islam On Indian Culture, p.139

¹⁹² Tariq Rahman, Language, Religion and Politics, open Edition, 2008 <https://journals.openedition.org/remmm/6019?lang=en>

¹⁹³ Mrs. Joynab Khatun, The contributions of Islamic education to the Indian Literature and Language, Scholar Publications, Volume-II, Issue-VII, August 2016, pp. 86-87

¹⁹⁴ Emel Sunter, Hint Düşüncesi ve Hint Düşüncesinin İslam Düşüncesine Etkisi Üzerine [On Indian Thought and Its Influence on Islamic Thought], No. 18, 21-40, April.2019

**Shariah* or Islamic law is defined as a set of prescriptions that define beliefs, as well as forming the religious conscience and moral values of Muslims. They are fasten in Islamic canon law based on the teachings of the Qur'an.

¹⁹⁵ Kajal Bhatia, Pranav Desai, Islamic Finance- An Indian Perspective, 2017, p.2

dominance were largely in the hands and influence of Muslims, economic life and economic growth continued to be more controlled by Hindu society¹⁹⁶



¹⁹⁶Sai Priya, History of Islamic Slavery in India, Slavery in pre Islamic India [Video], Youtube, 00:04, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uLYyaA5Ubes>

CHAPTER TWO

REVIVAL OF HINDU NATIONALISM

2.1 Disagreements between Muslims and Hindus

The main reason for the disagreement between the largest faiths in India, obviously, lies in the very nature of Islam and Hinduism, as well as in the traditions, beliefs, ideas and values generated by religions. Islam and Hinduism are fundamentally different from each other and even in many respects are opposite, which causes not only intolerance, but also mutual hostility between representatives of the two faiths. Violence against each other undermines the relationship between Muslims and Hindus¹⁹⁷. To understand what separates Muslims and Hindus, let's compare the basic ideas of the two religions.

Table 2.1. Comparison of the main characteristics of Islam and Hinduism¹⁹⁸.

Characteristics	Islam	Hinduism
Scale	Islam is one of the three Abrahamic faith religions; Muslims live on all continents; there are many Muslim populated states in the world.	Hindus live in several countries of South Asia.
Openness	It is addressed to all people, regardless of nationality, race, origin, etc.	Hindu cults do not involve foreigners in them.
Outward orientation	Adepts consider it their duty to spread Islam	Hindus are closed.
Procedure for adoption	It is only necessary to say: "There is no deity, except Allah, and Muhammad is His Messenger. "	There is no generally accepted rite of passage for a cult.
Monotheism	There is only one God	Polytheism prevalent
Founder	Prophet Muhammad.	There is no founder.
Sources	The Koran and the story of the life of the prophet - Sunnah.	There are no books that every believer is required to study.
The codification of religious norms	The norms are clearly formulated in the Quran, Sunnah and other sources, making up the system of Islamic law.	Norms, forms of deity worship, rituals, etc. vary depending on state power, and the spread of Indian technology to the rest of the world (Kabir, 1944). Islamic architecture of India gave the world such masterpieces as the Taj Mahal - Built by order of the descendant of Tamerlane, the

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¹⁹⁸ Yakovlev A. Yu. Indusslo-musul'manskie otnisheniya v Indii: ot nelyubvi do nenavisti [Hindu-Muslim relations in India: from dislike to hatred], pp. 83-84

		<p>padishah of the Baburid empire Shah Jahan, in memory of his wife Mumtaz Mahal, and the Delhi Jama Masjid - the main mosque of Old Delhi in India. Traditionally, Muslims in India lived mainly in cities.</p> <p>Today, the country has more than 300 thousand operating mosques, many ancient Muslim architectural monuments, there is a special Muslim legislative body, world-famous religious universities, thousands of communities and organizations. 3 out of 12 presidents of the country were followers of Islam, several prime ministers were also, etc (Ahmed, Aug 31 2020).</p> <p>It is a fact that Hindus and Muslims have contributed to the evolution of the common cultural heritage in India.</p>
Community cohesion	Muslims form a single community - the ummah	Hindus are permanently disunited.
Social hierarchy	The equality of all Muslims before God is proclaimed.	Ideas of social inequality and caste are promoted
Religious hierarchy	There is no one between God and man.	There is a privileged caste of priests, the brahmanas.
Helping fellow believers	One of the main duties of a Muslim is to help needy brothers in faith (zakat).	Poor people are regarded as negative karma and payment for sins of a past life. The poor man deserves blame rather than help.
Religion of rulers (state leadership)	Muslims can only be ruled by the most worthy and noble Muslim.	The religious affiliation of the leader of the country does not matter much.
Fight for faith	Muslims are ready to die for Islamic ideals, it is a great honor for him and his family. Such a person will become martyr to go to heaven.	If a Hindu will fight for faith, it is more likely for those who go along with-it such as social benefits, rather than ideological principles.
Image of gods, people and animals in temples	It is forbidden to post images of God, people and animals.	The paintings and statues of gods in temples are the main objects of worship.
Sacred places	Mecca	There is no similar symbol.

According to Akhilesh Pillalamarri, the origin of the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India is a function of disagreement between different communities with different views of modernization. This phenomenon is not only unique to South Asia, but can be found

all over the world, anywhere where there are coexisting peoples and nations in the vicinity¹⁹⁹.

Relations between these denominations have been difficult throughout Indian history. There were several incidents of sectarian violence against Muslims after the Partition of India. The reasons for this violence against Muslims are varied. The complex interaction of two cultures and civilizations and the political confrontation between the main religious communities of India is rooted in the pre-colonial past. It is believed that these roots go back to the history of India – historical hostility of Hindus and Muslims; discontent with the Islamic conquest of India during the Middle Ages, the policy set by the British colonialists, the memory of the mass casualties that accompanied the partition of British India into the Islamic State of Pakistan and India with a Muslim minority. To understand today's tensions between Hindus and Muslims, one must examine the historical roots of intercommunal conflict by looking at the background of the relationship.

Speaking of the bloody Hindu-Muslim clashes that accompanied the last two decades of the colonial era and especially the time of partition, many historians like, Shashi Tharoor, Alex von Tunzelmann, Neil Stewart etc.²⁰⁰, often point out as the main reason for the provocation of the British authorities, allegedly inciting, in accordance with the principle of “divide and rule”, one community to another.²⁰¹

Since the perception of the British conquerors, Indian Muslims were initially regarded as an alien element in Indian society, as cruel conquerors who spread their faith as the “religion of the sword”. According to this concept, the population of India was divided into two homogeneous and warring “communities”: Hindus (Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, etc. were also attributed to them) and Muslims²⁰². Where, at

¹⁹⁹ Akhilesh Pillalamarri, The Origins of Hindu-Muslim Conflict in South Asia, The Diplomat, March 2019 <https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/the-origins-of-hindu-muslim-conflict-in-south-asia/>

²⁰⁰ Shashi Tharoor, The Partition: The British game of ‘divide and rule’; Alex von Tunzelmann, Indian Summer, Henry Holt Publisher, New York, 1947; Neil Stewart, Divide and Rule: British Policy in Indian History, Science & Society, Vol. 15, No. 1, Guilford Press, 1951, p. 53

²⁰¹ Akhtar Hussain Sandhu, Reality of 'Divide and Rule' in British India, ResearchGate, 2009, p.3

²⁰² Vanina E.Yu. Ot «obshiny» k «natsy»: Indi'skie musul'mane v kontseptsiyakh Britanskikh orientalistov [From ‘community’ to ‘nation’: Indian muslims in the concepts of British orientalist], p.704

the same time, two critically important circumstances were ignored: the concept did not take into account regional, social, ethno-cultural, linguistic and other differences within each of the communities imagined by the British and the fact that the majority of Indian Muslims were not descendants of the conquerors, but, on the contrary, local natives who converted to Islam²⁰³. They have retained many elements of their pre-Islamic existence, they were and to this day remain closer in culture, language and way of life to the Hindus of their region than to co-religionists from other Indian territories and foreign countries. British colonial policy was based on such Orientalist concepts; through the education system and the press, they have broadcasted to the Indian elite, which not only itself began to think in terms of homogeneous “communities”, but also quite logically transformed them into “nations”, thus laying the foundations of the communalist trend in Indian nationalism²⁰⁴. This paved the path for the “theory of two nations” that later flourished as the idea of Pakistan and the bloody partition of British India in 1947.

Within a few months after the independence of the countries in Punjab and Bengal, where the tragic events began even before the granting of independence, that there were riots characterized by extreme cruelty and violence, which most of all contained aspects of ethnic cleansing²⁰⁵. The division of the Punjab and Bengal were extremely painful. A new border by decision of the Radcliffe Line was cut in half across the Punjab, resulting in 5 million Sikhs and Hindus living in Pakistan and 5 million Muslims in India. This caused a real massacre and mass emigration of the population. On both sides of the borders, the communities that made up most of the population drove out and destroyed their neighbors, who found themselves in a minority. Columns of refugees were subjected to the most severe attacks. Thousands, even tens of thousands of girls, women and children were abducted. Fear-stricken people fled - filling entire trains, setting off on the road in wagons or on foot. In a short time, hundreds of thousands of people died, the number of refugees reached 10

²⁰³Vanina E.Yu., *Srednevekove Myshlenie: Indiiskii variant* [*Medieval Thinking: Indian variant*], Moscow, Vostochnaya Literatura, 2007, p.370

²⁰⁴Vanina E.Yu. *Ot «obshiny» k «natsy»: Indi'skie musul'mane v kontseptsiyakh Britanskikh orientalistov* [From ‘community’ to ‘nation’: Indian muslims in the concepts of British orientalists], pp. 713.

²⁰⁵Ian Talbot, *The 1947 Partition of India and Migration: A comparative study of Punjab and Bengal*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 330

million (See Picture 2.1.), as a result of which the new governments of India and Pakistan faced enormous problems in terms of aiding and returning refugees to normal life.



Picture 2.1. Overcrowded trains by Refugee heading both ways to India and Pakistan, 1947

In addition, from the end of 1947, Kashmiri refugees would be added to them, and then, in 1950, a million people had to change their place of residence in Bengal. Approximately from 14 to 18 million people eventually left as a result of the division of their places of permanent residence²⁰⁶. Undoubtedly, all that happened is firmly entrenched in the historical memory of the peoples. We can agree with the statement of V.V. Kuchma that partition failed to put an end to the hostility between Hindus and Muslims, but on the contrary, their relations only worsened. So, it led to the emergence of two levels of confrontation in South Asia: interstate and intrastate²⁰⁷ as mentioned above. News of the pogroms in the Punjab reached Kashmir, where three-quarters of the four million principalities of the Maharaja were Muslims, thus riots swept Jammu, the southern part of the principality, where many Hindus lived. Many Muslims were slaughtered²⁰⁸.

**Maharaja*- the highest title of princes in India, as well as the person who bears this title.

²⁰⁶Ian Talbot, *The 1947 Partition of India and Migration: A comparative study of Punjab and Bengal*, , p. 324

²⁰⁷V.V. Kuchma, *Osobennosti natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya v Indii: etno-konfessional'nyi i gosudarstvenno-pravovoi aspekty* [Features of the national liberation movement in India: ethno-confessional and state-legal aspects], *Vestnik* No. 5, Volgograd, 2011, pp.25-26

²⁰⁸Catherine Rey-Schirr, *Deyatel'nost' MKKK v Indotane posle razdela Indii (1947–1949gg.)* [ICRC Activities in Hindustan after the Partition of India (1947-1949)], *International journal of the red cross*, 1998, p.77 -78.

In August an uprising broke out in the Poonch district among the peasants and Muslims who served in the troops of the *Maharaja**. The uprising marked the beginning of the Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir) movement, which later received the support of Pakistan. The tension continued to grow until the invasion of Kashmir on October 22, 1947 by Pashtun warriors from the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan came to the aid of their fellow believers. This led to great destruction, accompanied by massacres, robberies, rapes and kidnappings²⁰⁹. When the invaders threatened the capital of Kashmir, Srinagar, the Maharaja fled to India and asked the Governor General Lord Mountbatten to send Indian troops to help him, where he agreed on the condition that the Maharaja sign a letter of accession to India. Thus, on October 27, the Indian armed forces entered the battle near Srinagar and liberated most of the Kashmir valleys. The armed struggle continued throughout 1948 and resulted in the death of many civilians, as well as new massive population movements. This bloody struggle ended with the help of the UN Security Council, where a resolution was proposed to conclude an agreement on a ceasefire and a truce. The agreement entered into force on January 1, 1949. It was secured by a bilateral agreement on the establishment of a demarcation line signed by India and Pakistan in Karachi on July 27 of the same year. Subsequently, Kashmir became the cause of several Indo-Pakistani wars at once.

The gradual deterioration of interfaith relations occurred throughout the 20th century. One of the bloodiest episodes in the history of the country was the events of December 1992: supporting the initiative of the then the BJP leader Lal Krishna Advani, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) campaign and other parties began to demand the reconstruction of the Hindu temple of the Lord Rama in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, which subsequently led to the destruction of the Muslim *Babri*

**The Babri Mosque* was built in the 16th century by the Mughal emperor Babur on the territory of the Rama temple destroyed by Muslims (as claimed in the Hindutva). Since the 1940s, the old first name Masjid-i-Janmasthan ("mosque of origin") has been renamed to "Babri Masjid", which comes from the name of the Mughal ruler Babur.

²⁰⁹Khodatenko Evgeniy nikolaevych, *Osoby pravovoi status shtata dzhammu i kashmir v mekhanizme territorial'nogo konflikta mezhdue Indiei i Pakistanom* [Special legal status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the mechanism of the territorial conflict between India and Pakistan], *Business in law*, 2009, No. 1, pp. 110-112.

*Masjid**. Under the pretext of fighting for the restoration of the Hindu temple, the BJP, in fact, sought to earn political capital by opposing the world of Islam. According to statements mosque was built on the ruins of a pre-existing Hindu temple²¹⁰. According to Hindu legend, the Lord Rama was born on Ayodhya²¹¹. In fact, there is limited documentary evidence to support this hypothesis, historians still dispute that this is the birthplace of Rama²¹².

According to a study by Neha Khetrpal, the very first signs of discord between Muslims and Hindus were reported as early as 1855. Later, the British colonialists played an important role in aggravating the dispute over the Babri Masjid. In 1859, a fence was built around the monument and allowed Hindus to enter the monument from the east gate and Muslims from the north gate. Since 1949, under the influence of one of the Hindu nationalist party Akhil Bharatiya Ramayana Mahasabha (ABRM), Hindu activists have broken into the mosque and erected statues of Lord Ram, Lakshman and Goddess Sita. The Muslims were unhappy with this, after which the gates of the mosque were locked by the government²¹³.

This demolition of the mosque in 1992, in turn, caused great riots and religious unrest between Muslims and Hindus throughout the country, provoking several months of intercommunal unrest, which further spread to major cities such as Mumbai, Surat, Ahmedabad, Kanpur, Delhi, Bhopal and several others. At result, more than 2,000 people, mostly Muslims, died.

The pogroms were stopped only by the troops. For a long time afterwards, there happened disputes between Muslims and Hindus. In order to stop the war and find a compromise, the case for the assignment of the land was taken to court, which ultimately ruled in favor of the construction of Ram Mandir. Land for a mosque with an area of 2 hectares was also found in Ayodhya, so none of the denominations was

*In 1925 the Union of Voluntary Servants of the Motherland(RSS) was established. It was the only revivalist organization that continued to exist after India's independence, both legally and illegally.

²¹⁰Stephen Knapp, Lord Rama: Fact or Fiction p.2
https://www.academia.edu/37931242/Lord_Rama_Fact_or_Fiction_Historical_Geography_and_Archaeological_material

²¹²K.B.Srinivasan, A Case Study on Demolition of Babri Masjid, International Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics, Volume 120 No. 5, 2018, p.1623

²¹³Neha Khetrpal, Babri Masjid, Army Public School, India, 2018, p.2

infringed²¹⁴. It is worth noting that among those who in 1991 demanded the return of the temple to the Hindu community was an active member of the BJP Narendra Modi, who then vowed that he would return to the holy city of Ayodhya only when the Rama temple appeared there. Now Modi, already as the Prime Minister from the BJP, has laid the foundation stone for the construction of this temple²¹⁵.

The verdict was challenged by all parties involved in the Supreme Court of India. The Ayodhya litigation that has been going on for more than half a century calls into question the very possibility of making a final decision. Today, this conflict can be kept under control only maintaining the territorial and legal status quo in Ayodhya²¹⁶.

One may consider appropriate to touch upon the *clash of civilizations* put forward by the American political scientist Samuel Huntington. Civilizations are dissimilar in their history, language, culture, traditions and, most importantly, religion. For Huntington, the differences between civilizations are very large, and they are more fundamental than, for example, than the differences between political ideologies and political regimes. Since for centuries the most protracted and bloody conflicts were generated precisely by the differences between civilizations. As he emphasizes, it is within civilizations that there is a high risk of tribal wars and ethnic conflicts with a high potential for escalation, since neighboring regions and countries that are close in racial, geographical origin, religion and culture (like Pakistan) are also involved in this circle. It is impossible not to agree with his truthful concept that indeed today the whole world is witnessing the clash of Hindu and Islamic civilizations²¹⁷.

2.2.Narendra Modi's Intention and the BJP's Activity

Under Narendra Modi's leadership, violence against religious minorities and communities, especially Muslims, has multiplied. Here the question arises: Why is

²¹⁴Prof Peter W Edge & Dr M.C. Rajan, sacred sites and state failures: A case study of the Babri Masjid/Ram temple dispute in Ayodhya, pp. 10-12

²¹⁵Sriram Ramakrishnan, View: PM Modi, Ayodhya and Lord Ram, The Economic Times, August 15, 2020,<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/view-pm-modi-ayodhya-and-lord-ram/articleshow/77371211.cms>

²¹⁶V. Timofeeva, Konflikt v Ayodh'e: Istoria Voprosa Sovremennoe Sostoyanie [Conflict in Ayodhya: History of the Question And Present State], Oriental State, 2014. № 1, p. 82

²¹⁷Huntington S., Clash of Civilizations and remaking of world order, Simon&Schuster, New York, 1996, pp.40-44

the current Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi so indifferent towards Muslims? Why are all his policies aimed at anti-Muslim sentiment? In order to better understand what drives this man, and why he has such hatred for Islam, let's look at his biography.

In fact, even at the age of eight, Modi's views were significantly influenced by the ideology of the nationalist Hindu organization called *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (Union of Voluntary Servants of the Motherland* RSS) where he apparently had a dislike for Muslims²¹⁸. He often attended their meetings and then became its agitator.

During WWII, the RSS leaders admired Adolf Hitler. The RSS, as a large paramilitary organization, acted in imitation of the Nazi Party in Germany. However the RSS has been banned several times in India since in 1948, after its former member Nathuram Godse shot dead Mahatma Gandhi while praying. In 1972 Modi became RSS *Pracharaka**(agitator) and served for almost ten years, until at the end of 2001 he became the Supreme Minister. Pracharakas form the backbone of the organization. Their life is entirely devoted to serving society, they have no family²¹⁹. In 1975-1977, during the ban, Modi participated in the underground publication of his propaganda leaflets. The norms and values of this organization still largely determine his thinking and actions. He is a leading proponent of *Hindutva* (Hindu nationalism) who advocates Hindu hegemony in Indian society²²⁰. The lifting of the ban on the activities of the RSS was only possible when the party made a commitment not to participate in politics. It is for this reason that the RSS established its political wing as the BJP as its front political organization and this party governs India today²²¹.

**The Sangh Parivar* literally meaning "Family of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh" the collection of Hindu nationalist organisations spawned by the RSS.

* *Pracharaka*- a person appointed to propagate a cause through personal contact, meetings etc.

²¹⁸Kenneth Bo Nielsen, Alf Gunvald Nilsen, Hindu Nationalist Statecraft and Modi's Authoritarian Populism, 2022, pp.93-94

²¹⁹Kashin V.P., Narendra Modi Voskhodyashaya "Zvezda" Indiiskoy politiki [Narendra Modi a rising star in Indian politics], Asia and Africa today, 2021, № 10 (663). pp. 54-55.

²²⁰Noor Ul Qamar, Rising Hindutva and its impact on the Region, South Asia and World Politics, Islamabad, 2021, pp. 2-3

²²¹ ²²¹Patnaik Prabh, Hindutva - fashizm i gonenie na svobodnuyu mysl' v Indii [Hindutva - fascism and the persecution of free thought in India], Bereginya.777, 2017, p.146.

In 1985 Modi joined the nationalist BJP. Despite the fact that the *Bharatiya** then formally separated from the RSS, nevertheless, it retained in its policy and most of the characteristic of right-wing Indian nationalists, including the nationalist ideas of Hindutva. In addition, the BJP actively maintains ties with *the Sangh Parivar (RSS family)* group*²²². In 1988, Modi became a secretary of the branch of this party in the state of Gujarat. In 1995, he actively participated in the election campaign of the BJP. In 2001, he was appointed as a Chief Minister of the Government of the State of Gujarat and successfully held this position for a record in the history of the state for about 13 years (until May 2014). Under his rule, the state of Gujarat developed into an economic miracle²²³.

Modi was under suspicion that he organized the pogroms against Muslims in the western Indian state of Gujarat or turning a blind eye to inciting sectarian and communal strife, genocide of the Muslim minority during the pogroms. He was accused of inaction and even of inciting attacks in Gujarat 2002 against Muslims. The reason for the pogroms was a terrorist attack on a train in which a large group of Hindu pilgrims was traveling, where 59 of them were eventually burned alive²²⁴. The Muslim minority were immediately detained. Barely a day later was to start a pogrom against the Gujarati Muslims, which is unparalleled in post-independence Indian history. More than 2,000 Muslims were brutally murdered, and more than 200,000 were displaced for permanent residence. It is worth noting that this was the first and only state-sponsored pogrom against the local Muslim population on a global scale, which was broadcast frequently on TV channels. The population was indifferent and did not react to these riots with shock and condemnation of the

**Bharatiya* - the term "Bharat" is the ancient Sanskrit name for the sub-region, which radical circles in the BJP usually contrast with the concept of "India" as the brainchild of Western colonialism, corrupted European influence. The RSS was founded in 1925 as a social and cultural association with the aim of opposing British colonialism and the Muslim movement in India.

²²²L.A. Chernyshev, Osobennosti vzaimodeistviya politicheskikh partii i terroristicheskikh organizatsii v Indii na sovremennom etape [Features of political parties and terrorist organizations interaction in India at the present stage], Society: politics, economics, law, Vol.8, no 97, Moscow, 2021, pp. 2-3

²²³Rau Johannes, Vzlet Indii pod rukovodstvom Narendry Modi [Rise Of India Under The Leadership Of Narendra Modi], Modern Scientific Thought], Moscow, 2019, pp. 151-152

²²⁴Andreas Patasis, Jamie Kwong, Brian Kerrigan, Narendra Modi and the Indian Election, pp.3-4
https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/1050/docs/Case_Studies/Narendra_Modi_and_the_Indian_Election.pdf

pogrom²²⁵. The judicial investigation into Modi's role in these events continued in India until 2012, when the Supreme Court of India found Modi not involved in inciting religious hatred. However, in 2005 Modi has been sanctioned by the United States by being deprived of his US visa for "serious violations of religious freedom"²²⁶.

In June 2013, Modi became the head of the BJP's election campaign for the Lok Sabha elections, in September of the same year he became the BJP's candidate for PM²²⁷. During the election campaign of 2013-2014 acted under the slogan "*Nationalism is our inspiration. Development and good governance is our goal.*" Modi was appointed by the President as the 14th PM²²⁸.




Figure 2.1. Results of Indian elections 2014 and 2019. Source from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-48366944>

Today, the BJP under his leadership has become one of the two leading national parties in India, the second strong and streak victory, with 37,4% votes, in the

²²⁵ Britta Ohm, Public against Democracy: the case of the Gujarat Pogrom 2002, 2 October 2012, www.academia.edu, p.2

²²⁶ Aziz Haniffa, Modi NOT eligible for diplomatic visa: US embassy, May 04, 2012, Rediff.com <https://www.rediff.com/news/report/modi-not-eligible-for-diplomatic-visa-us-consulate/20120504.htm>

²²⁷ Kozlova A. A. Narendra Modi - lider i sozdatel' sovremennoi Indii, [Narendra Modi - the leader and creator of modern India], *Modern and Recent History*, 2021, Issue 5, p. 248

²²⁸ Nuzhdina A.N., *Portfolio: Premier-Ministr Indii Narendra Modi* [Portfolio: Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi], 2018, Krasnodar, pp.1-31

parliamentary elections in 2019, signifies the continuation of India's single-party government²²⁹ (See Figure 2.2.). Thus, the BJP expanded its seats even further, growing from 282 seats to 303. One should recognize the role of the most popular politician Modi is great, since at the moment there are no rivals among the opposition able to compete with him in oratory²³⁰. Through his successful rule, the BJP has attracted voters from various castes who primarily identify as Hindus²³¹.




Figure 2.2. Vote share of INC and BJP in general elections, 1962-2019. <https://scroll.in/article/925074/verdict-t-2019-in-charts-and-maps-bjp-started-poorly-congress-nearly-drew-a-blank-from-phases-4-to-6>

It is worth recalling that since independence, the Indian National Congress (INC) headed the government for a long time. The INC was the oldest and the largest party in the country adhered to the principles of Gandhism and the basic idea of "*unity & diversity*", always advocated freedom of religion and positioned itself as a secular party²³². But over the past few years, the INC has been smashing losing to the BJP in parliamentary elections, remaining stable at 19.5% (see Figure 2.2.). Despite the worldwide covid-2019 pandemic, the election campaigns were moving forward in the country and crowded rallies were in full swing. The general elections in India

²²⁹Ronojoy Sen, Indian Elections 2019: Why the BJP Won Big, Institute of South Asian Studies, No. 666 – 1 June 2019, p.1

²³⁰Djagdish Hatri, 7 Faktorov «s» Modi, opredelivshix vybory v Indii [7 factors with Modi that determined elections in India], Russian political science, № 2 (11), 2019, pp 56; Srinivasan Ramani, Analysis: Highest-ever national vote share for the BJP, The Hindu, 24 May 2019, <https://www.thehindu.com/elections/lok-sabha-2019/analysis-highest-ever-national-vote-share-for-the-bjp/article27218550.ece>

²³¹Niha Masih, Narendra Modi's BJP wins key Indian state elections, March 10, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/10/india-uttarpradesh-elections/>

²³²Dmitry Abramov, Sekularizm, Fundamentalizm i Tolerantnost' v sovremennomi Indii [Secularism, Fundamentalism and Tolerance in Modern India], Russia and the Muslim world. 2006. No. 3. p.130

were held in nine rounds from April 7 to May 12, 2019. The official turnout was 66 percent - that is, more than half a billion voters participated in the vote²³³. According to T. Jacob John, the Indian virologist for political parties elections are more important than the risk of spreading the virus²³⁴.

According to E.A. Bragina, for the first time the government of the country was headed by a person born in independent India. The new cabinet was composed mostly of members close to him, from Gujarat, where he was born and was a successful governor during 2002-2014²³⁵. In his election campaign, he emphasized the need for a different style of government in the name of "New India".

On the agenda of Modi and his government is the desire to make India a *vishvaguru**(leading power)²³⁶. But Hindu nationalist organisations - Sangh Parivar turned out to be much more interested in domestic politics such as social and cultural issues and relations with Muslims (or with Pakistan in particular) than in foreign policy and global issues²³⁷.

Accordingly, the PM Modi's current ruling party and its active promotion of Hindu nationalism has been blamed for the surge in intercommunal violence in India since it came to power in 2014. Because under his rule, religious minorities live in anxieties for their safety because they are targeted by the Hindutva agenda, treated as second or third-class citizens²³⁸. Since 2017 to today, India has seen an increase in hate crimes, often religious attacks, by Hindus against Muslims (see Figure 2.3). Modi has been criticized for hushing up these crimes, party leaders increasingly raising anti-Muslim topics.

²³³ Andrei Sharogradsky, "Novaya Era" indusskikh natsionalistov["New Era" of Hindu Nationalists], May 16, 2014 <https://www.svoboda.org/a/25387885.html>

²³⁴ Gerry Shih and Shams Irfan, India's coronavirus cases rise as omicron spreads — and as election season heats up, January 5, 2022 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/01/05/india-coronavirus-elections/>

²³⁵ E.A. Bragina, Kabinet Narendry Modi - Sdvigi v Ekonomike Indii [Narendra Modi's Office - Shifts in the India's Economy], West - East, Journal 2015, p.136


²³⁶ Gurharpal Singh, Hindu nationalism in power: Making sense of Modi and the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance government, 2014–19, Sikh Formation, Routledge, 2019, pp.317

²³⁷ Ian Hall, Narendra Modi and India's Normative Power, International Affairs, Oxford University Press, January 2017, p.120

²³⁸ Salim Khan, Modi, Muslims and Media: Voices from Narendra Modi's Gujarat, Manushi Publications, New Delhi, 2014, pp.17-18

Rising Cases of Hate Speech and Hate Crime in India against Muslims and Christians: 2014-22

In eight years the total count of 'hate speech and hate crime' against Muslims (646) and Christians (232) has risen.



*The numbers pertaining to hate speech and hate crime has been filtered from ANHAD's document
Source: ANHAD • Created with Datawrapper

Figure 2.3. Increasing incidence of hate speech and hate crimes in India: 2014-2021. Resource from <https://thewire.in/communalism/from-speech-to-crime-to-genocide-its-clear-to-see-how-hate-travels>

A recent Act Now for Harmony and Democracy (ANHAD) report shows that hate speech and hate crimes are mostly directed against Muslims (73.3%) and Christians (26.7%) in India. During 2014-2022, under the control of the BJP, there were about 900 cases of hate speech (54%) and hate crimes (46%). Modi's first term coincided with a surge in violence against minorities. During his second term, there was a slight decrease. However, these figures only show reported cases, and unreported cases exceed the statistics given²³⁹.

2.3. Hindutva. Hindu Rashtra.

In 1949, the Constitution of India was based on secularism, and it was only in 1976 that the 42nd Amendment introduced secularism as a founding principle of the state in the preamble of the Constitution and the statements “socialist” and “secular” were added to the definition of India by Indira Gandhi²⁴⁰. Secularism in India was originally based on two important principles: First, the state neutrality towards all religions, enshrined in articles 25-28 of the Constitution and grouped in a special

²³⁹ Jayant Pankaj and Deshdeep Dhankhar, From Speech to Crime to Genocide, It's Clear to See How Hate Travels, 09 agosto 2021 <https://thewire.in/communalism/from-speech-to-crime-to-genocide-its-clear-to-see-how-hate-travels>

²⁴⁰ Constitution of India 1949, Rajkumar Singh, Secularism in Indian Constitution: Dimensions of Dilemmas, Armenian Journal of Political Science, 2(5) 2016, p.142

section called “The right to freedom of religion”²⁴¹. Second, ban on religious parties. The Constitution does not allow the merge of religion and state power²⁴².

Unfortunately, Indian politics turned out to be far from secularization in practice. This has begun with the Hindu nationalist and religious political leaders who demand that the Hindu religion be given special rights and a special place in the political and public life of the country. Unconstitutional actions are committed by the state by intervening in religious affairs. This is evidenced by the bloody interfaith events in India at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries²⁴³.

Today, politically, India has entered a post-secular phase in the development of politics and statehood. The dominant era of secularism, which began with the reign of J. Nehru and restrained religion from the political process, has come to an end, and now Hinduism is able to have a direct political impact, causing fear among religious minorities, both Muslims and Christians²⁴⁴. R. Kothari argues that the practice of secularism in India has lost its former value, which has led to religious identity has become an important political category that is used by political parties in their strategic interests²⁴⁵. Incidents of anti-Muslim sentiment are politically motivated and become a part of the strategy of major Hindu nationalist political parties such as the Hindu Mahasabha (HMS, in eng. 'All-India Hindu Grand Assembly), Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), as Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP, in eng. "World Council of Hindus"), an association of trade unions for Hindu workers - Bharatiya Mazdur Sangh (BMS), Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad Youth Organization (ABVP) and its combat detachment - Bajrang Dal (BD, "Strength Detachment"), the women's organization Rashtra Sevika Samiti (RSS (w)), Bharatiya

²⁴¹Coleman D. Williams, *Freedom of religion and the Indian Supreme Court*, 2019, p.7

²⁴²A.A. Isaeva, *Soderjanie svobody sovesti i indiiskaya doktrina «osnovnoi religioznoi praktiki» Konstitutsionno-pravovoi obzor [The Content of Freedom of Conscience and the Indian Doctrine of “Basic Religious Practice”, Constitutional and Legal Review]*, Vestnik.Tomsk, 2021. № 463. pp. 219–220.

²⁴³V. R. Atnashev, V. A. Ovchinnikov, *Indiiskii natsionalizm i ekstremizm: opyt dlya Rossii (politiko-pravovye aspekty)*, [Indian Nationalism and Extremism: Experience for Russia (political and legal aspects)], Management Consulting, 2013, pp. 19-20

²⁴⁴Galina Stankevich, *Religiya kak aktor politicheskogo protsessa traditsionnogo Vostoka (na primere Indii i Shri Lanka)* [Religion as an actor in the political process of the traditional East (on the example of India and Sri Lanka)], vlast', 2011, No 10, p.160

²⁴⁵Kothari R., *Communalism in Indian Politics*, Rainbow Publishers, Ahmedabad, 1998, p. 8

Janata Party (BJP, "People's Party"). All of them are part of the so-called "family", headed by the "cultural" organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, which to this day plays a fundamental role in promoting the "*Hindu Rashtra*"(idea of a single Hindu nation) and Hindutva²⁴⁶.

A new phenomenon in Indian domestic politics at the end of the 20th century was the Hindutva movement, which quickly became a powerful political force. The *Hindutva* as a term was introduced by one of the main ideologists of the religious community Hindu Maha Sabha (HMS) Vinayak Savarkar. He, in his book *The Essentials of Hindutva* written in 1923, defines the term in its literally meaning of Hinduness or belonging to the territory called *Hindustan*²⁴⁷. The history of India was considered by Sarvarkar as the history of the confrontation of the Hindu nation with foreign conquerors, that is, Muslims and Christians. The meaning of Hindutva is to unite all Hindus, which include not only Hindus of all numerous directions and sects, but also representatives of other purely Indian religions - Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists. According to Sarvarkar, they are the true masters of India, who should determine the political face of the Indian state. However, in contrast to the representatives of the "all-India" national liberation trend, Hindutva supporters saw a danger to India not only in the British colonialists, but also in representatives of other cultural and religious groups. They meant Muslims and Christians, although among them the vast majority were ethnic Indians. Sarvarkar, evoking a sense of uniqueness and patriotism, says in his book in today's free from colonial rule, India should become a Hindu Rashtra - the state of the Hindus. The main idea of the author was to move away from Hindu "internationalism" consisting of a mixture of different peoples and cultures, to Hindu "nationalism" singling out the Indian state and its citizens (Hindus) as a nation different from other peoples and cultures of this region²⁴⁸. In the 1930s the then HMS

**M.S. Golwalkar*- an Indian political and religious figure, early Hindu nationalist thinker, the second Supreme leader of the RSS organization. And wrote a kind of "bible" of this organization - "The Bundle of Thoughts"

²⁴⁶ Dmitry Abramov, *Seku'larizm, Fundamentalizm i Tolerantnost' v sovremennomi Indii* [Secularism, Fundamentalism and Tolerance in Modern India], p.129

²⁴⁷ Savarkar Veer. *Essentials of Hindutva*. Nagpur, 1928, pp. 15-16.

²⁴⁸ Evgenia Vanina, *Proshloe vo imya budushego: Indiiskiy natsionalizm i istoriya* [Past for the Future: Indian Nationalism and History], *Bulletin of the Russian Nation*, 2009, p. 116 (E.Yu., *Proshloe vo imya budushego: Indiiskiy natsionalizm i istoriya* [Past for the Future: Indian Nationalism and History], 2009)

leader B. Parmanandom formulated the main ideas in the slogan “One nation, one religion, one language and one culture”²⁴⁹. The main task was to unite the divided Indian people in order to achieve a brighter future for them. Hindutva adherents reject of inclusive nationalism, namely the democratic vision of a “brotherhood of equal citizens”, reformation of societies in this way to re-establish the old hierarchies. Parmanandom also shares Sarvarkar's vision that Hindustan is the land of the Hindus²⁵⁰. As historian Suvira Jaiswal states the caste system is central to institutionalized Hinduism and, naturally, to the ideas and plans of Hindutva supporters²⁵¹.

Hindu nationalist thinker *M.S. Golwalkar** argues that during the period of the Muslim conquests of India and the colonial period, genocide was carried out against Hindus, by Muslims and the colonialists. He accuses Nehru and Gandhi, however, as well as the colonial administration, for calling for Indo-Muslim unity, since, in his opinion, this was the way of turning all Hindus into Muslims and independence was achieved at the cost of losing the Hindu nation. Mohan Bhagwat, head of the RSS, in 2018, states that thanks to Muslims, Hindutva appeared, and without them there would be no Hindutva²⁵².

The Sangh Parivar, which has an anti-Muslim, anti-Christian, anti-West and anti-secularization attitudes while waging an active ideological struggle primarily against representatives of those religions that they consider alien since they came to India with the help of conquerors and violate the Hindu unity of the country²⁵³. Thus, the adoption of Christianity or Islam, the religion of the invaders and oppressors, is in fact a betrayal of the motherland and the national interests of the country²⁵⁴. They

²⁴⁹Yakovlev A.Y., Religious and ethnic minorities rights and freedoms legal confirmation in India, European Proceedings of Social and Behavioural Sciences, 2020, p.2639

²⁵⁰Patnaik Prabh, Hindutva - fashizm i gonenie na svobodnyuyu mysl' v Indii [Hindutva - fascism and the persecution of free thought in India], Bereginya.777, 2017, pp.145-155.

²⁵¹ Suvira Jaiswal, Caste: Origin, Function, and Dimensions of Change, Manohar, 2000, p. 21

²⁵²Hilal Ahmed, Making Sense of India's Citizenship Amendment Act 2019: Process, Politics, Protests, Asie.Visions, No. 114, June 2020, p.12

²⁵³Solodkova O.L., Rost khristianskoi obshiny v Indii i hindutva [Growth of the Christian community in India and Hindutva], Rudn Vestnik, Moscow, 2015, p 34.

²⁵⁴Yogesh Snehi, Hindutva as an Ideology of Cultural Nationalism, Social Change, 2003, Vol. 33, No.4, pp.16

also claim that Muslims acquired a “homeland” in the subcontinent through the partition, and the remaining Muslims after the partition are disloyal to India²⁵⁵.

However, Hinduism is losing out to other religions in the competition for the confessional space due to the transition of Hindus to other religions in form of “flight from Hinduism” by most of the representatives of the Dalits. It can be assumed that about 90% of the Muslim community in India is made up of converts from the lower castes and their descendants, the same picture is emerging with the transition to Christianity²⁵⁶.

The rise in the number of Muslims in the past has been viewed as suspicious. Since the Muslim rulers were considered barbaric and wicked, it was clear that Islam could only spread to the subcontinent through barbarism and enmity. Thus, the Hindutva argues that the significant growth of Muslims is a function of the massive conversions imposed by ruthless Muslim rulers. Thus, Hindutva implied that (1) it was only out of fear that Hindus turned out to be Muslims, (2) all Muslims in the region originally preached Hinduism, and therefore (3) Muslims today can and should be converted back to Hinduism, since their ancestors- Hindus became Muslims by the alternative of death. Muslims are also accused of being portrayed as bandits for (1) conquering land and partitioning Hindustan into India and Pakistan, and (2) depriving India of secularism and religious equality²⁵⁷. The strengthening of the influence of the ideology of Hindu nationalism in India was called the *saffranization* of the country.

In India, tendencies gradually began to appear towards securing a privileged position for Hinduism in the country based on the Hindutva, which led to an increase in religious and communal confrontation in the country. Today Hindutva in India has become a steadily ideological, political, cultural and religious-philosophical phenomenon. Hindutva is a regular feature in Indian political publications, Internet

²⁵⁵Hassan Arshad Gondal, Secularism and Liberalism in India: A Case Study of Modi’s Era, Journal of Indian Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, July– December, pp.231

²⁵⁶Gorokhov S.A., Dmitriev R.V., Formirovanie konfessional'nogo prostranstvo Indii: Opyt Istoriko-geograficheskogo Analiza [Formation of the Indian religious space: A historical and geographical analysis], Istina, Moscow, 2019, pp.94

²⁵⁷Prashant Waikar, Reading Islamophobia in Hindutva: An Analysis of Narendra Modi’s Political Discourse, Islamophobia Studies Journal, Volume 4, No. 2 Spring 2018, pp.167-168

forums; philosophical and scientific treatises are devoted to it, it is studied in Indian educational institutions, it is an instrument of political struggle actively used by both its supporters and opponents²⁵⁸.

Actions by Hindutva forces against Muslims include Hindu-Muslim violence; attempts to return and restore Hindu temples; contemplating deportation, attempting to Hinduize Muslims by forming a culture that would assimilate Muslims²⁵⁹. Hindutva adherents justify anti-Muslim violence as essential to the “legitimate” creation of a Hindu nation.

As Leonova O.G states Hindutva researchers make a huge mistake by associating India only with Hinduism, they forget the initial national idea “Unity in diversity”, since India stands on diversity and pluralism, and has always been a multi-religious and poly-confessional country. Achievements of Indian history and culture are not usually divided according to confessional criteria. Therefore, without understanding this, it is impossible to understand all the richness of Indian culture and history, to which all religions of the country have made their precious contribution for many centuries. It emphasizes that religious identity, on which the current leadership is focused, is not the only and priority criterion for identifying its citizens²⁶⁰.

²⁵⁸ Smirnov Maxim Georgievich, *Ideologiya khindutvy i ee dvoistvennost'* [Ideology of the Hindutva and its duality], *Vestnik*, 2004, pp.97-99

²⁵⁹ R. M. Mukhametzyanova-Duggal, *Politika v otnoshenii religioznyh men'shinstv v Indii* [Policy towards religious minorities in India], 2015, pp.121-122
https://elar.urfu.ru/bitstream/10995/35087/1/uv6_2015_14.pdf

²⁶⁰ O.G. Leonova, *Indiya: edinctvo v raznoobarzii. Fenomen Indiiskogo sekulyarizma* [India: unity in diversity. The Phenomenon of Indian Secularism], pp.237-239

CHAPTER THREE

ANTI MUSLIM ATTITUDE AND POLICY OF BJP AFTER RE-ELECTION

3.1. Islamophobia.

In fact, Islamophobia appeared at the same time as the spread of Islam, but its scale was insignificant. Islamophobia has the deepest historical roots, but it has become especially noticeable in recent decades. A sharp increase in Islamophobia around the world was observed after the attacks of 9/11 in 2001 and wars waged by the United States in Muslim countries. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Muslims around the world live in a situation of de facto “presumption of guilt”. Fear of Islam has become the standard²⁶¹.

In fact, there are many interpretations of the term “Islamophobia”. One of them became firmly established in the political discourse after the publication in 1997 of the Runnymede Trust report, consultative document, entitled *Islamophobia: A Challenge For Us All*, where it says that, it is a complex, ambiguous and multi-layered socio-political phenomenon including various forms, methods and levels of manifestation. In this widespread consultative report Islamophobia comprehensively tackled for the first time and made 60 recommendations addressed to public authorities and to any organizations.²⁶² At the ordinary level, Islamophobia manifests itself as certain moods based on irrational fear (phobia) of Islam and concomitant various forms of negative reactions to Islam, associated with ignorance and a distorted idea of the historically established special way of life, traditions, customs and mores of Muslims. It also represents hatred, stigmatization, racism, extremism, xenophobia, and discrimination in everyday life, in the mass media, etc. In other words, Islamophobia is a phenomenon imposed on people for a specific purpose. Even Islamophobia as a psychological weapon has been skillfully developed and prudently introduced into non-Muslim societies as it has been used in internal and external political struggles and in the international arena to achieve some political,

²⁶¹I.O. Storchilov, Rost Islamofobii v SSHA posle sobytii 11, Sentyabrya 2001, [Growth of Islamophobia in the USA after the Events of September 11, 2001], 2019, p.120-128

²⁶²The Runnymede Trust, A Challenge For Us All, 1997, p.4 <https://mcislamofobia.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Islamophobia-a-challenge-for-us-all-without-cartoons-1.pdf>

economic, ideological and other goals at the national, regional and global levels²⁶³. In fact, another one of the causes of Islamophobia is the stereotyping of people. However, stereotypes are based on limited, inaccurate, one-sided information and experience to create misconceptions and misunderstandings about other people's values and behaviors. Numerous and various factors have contributed to the spread of Islamophobia in India. These factors are often interrelated, but in general, they can be divided into five groups: historical, demographic, opposition of enemies, the awakening of Islam and the revival of the self-consciousness of Muslims, the spread of violence and cruelty allegedly coming from Islam²⁶⁴.

A series of various terrorist attacks in South Asia, especially in India, such as the Red Fort attack in 2000, the Indian Parliament attack in 2001, the Mumbai attack in 2008, the Delhi bombing series and the Uri attack in Kashmir in 2016, mainly sponsored by cross-border terrorist organizations, fostered Islamophobia. Any terrorist activity against India has a negative impact on the whole of South Asia and this contributes to the growth of Islamophobia²⁶⁵.




Figure 4.1. Islamophobia, a visual summary. Source from the report of the Runnymede trust, Islamophobia a challenge for us all²⁶⁶.

²⁶³ A. M. Kanakh, Islamofobia kak yavlenie XXI veka [islamophobia as a phenomenon of the XXI century], Minsk, 2013, p. 263

²⁶⁴ Radjabov N.S., Islamofobiya i podhody k ee opredeleniyu [Islamophobia and approaches to its definition], Vestnik of the Tajik National University, "Sino", Dushanbe, 2013, pp. 182-185

²⁶⁵ Roy Abraham Kallivayalil, Abdul Qadir Jilani, Adarsh Tripathi, Islamophobia, mental health and psychiatry: South Asian perspectives, Consortium Psychiatricum, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2020, p.80

²⁶⁶ The Runnymede Trust, A Challenge For Us All, 1997, p.11

Unfortunately, Islamophobia and continued discrimination against the Muslims of India have become the characteristics of the contemporary sectarian politics of the Hindu nationalists. Most of the anti-Muslim and anti-Christian campaigns or political parties over the past decades can be directly or indirectly attributed to the RSS and its various branches ideologically linked to it. The Modi government sees Islamophobia as a means of manipulating Muslim society for its own strategic interests. Today, Hindu nationalists actively benefit various forces and the media for the purpose of political, religious, national manipulation, spreading hatred among communities, inciting conflicts and confrontations. Thus, an effective part of the Sangh Parivar strategy was to use the Indian press and other media outlets as a springboard to broadcast the threats in changing demographics of the Muslim population and the rise of Islamic extremism. The hatred and fear towards Muslims caused fictional fake news. Over the past five years social media platforms Telegram have been inundated with anti-Muslim propaganda, memes, fake or counterfeit videos depicting Muslim community in India as anti-Hindu.

Since 1990, BJP supporters in the film industry have begun make efforts to portray “trends of Islamophobia” for the country. This trend reached its peak with film *Mission Kashmir* depicting Islamic terrorists planning to assassinate the PM. It should be noted that only recently on March 11, 2022, a new film in Hindi language, *The Kashmir File* was shown in all cinemas across India containing deeply Islamophobic motives. During Modi, 's governments confessional politics was determined using Islamophobic rhetoric and attempts to change historical facts, discriminatory migration policies, and condemnation of interfaith marriages²⁶⁷.

Saffranization, cited above, is a term describing the broad reorganization of Indian society in terms of social, political, educational and cultural, namely from a secular, democratic, pluralistic and diverse nation into a non-secular national Hindu Rashtra. The term comes from the rich color of *saffron* (between yellow and orange) today associated with the Hindutva nationalist movement and the leading right-wing party

²⁶⁷ K.S. Petrova, *Sovremennaya konfessional'naya politika v Indii (na primere Musul'man)* [Modern confessional politics in India (on the example of Muslims)], Education and Law. 2021, p.429

BJP in particular, and with the clothes worn by the upper caste Brahmins (see Picture 3.1.)²⁶⁸.



Picture 3.1. Modi-supporting people dressed in saffron colors.

In 2014, a joint strategy meeting took place between the BJP and the RSS as they aimed to rewrite the history taught in the Indian school curriculum. Thus, the BJP reorganized the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) and the Indian Council of Historical Research (ICHR), launched an attack on secular and scientific teaching, demanding that textbooks conform to the BJP's Hindu nationalist platform. Thus, saffronization of education began in all states but the states where there were few votes of the BJP refused to implement. And in states where pro-BJP prevailed, textbooks were extensively modified in favor of a Hindu nationalist narrative.

The RSS leaders worked with the Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD) to completely change the education system. They promoted their like-minded people to leadership positions in the universities and major research institutes of the country²⁶⁹. The goal of the RSS approach in education is to educate a younger generation committed to Hindutva. These changes included eliminating caste

²⁶⁸ Jaspal Naveel Singh, *The Sociolinguistic Saffronisation of India*, November, 2020, pp.59

²⁶⁹ Mridula Mukherjee, *Communalisation of Education The History textbook controversy: An overview*, p.5-6

exclusion and violence throughout Indian history and eliminating or minimizing the contribution of Muslims to Indian society²⁷⁰.

The earlier secular history textbooks have been replaced by new revised NCERT textbooks. Indian Muslims are treated in educational textbooks as a non-indigenous social group and foreign, enemies to the subcontinent. The role of Muslims in the historical events of India was deliberately belittled²⁷¹. Secular Indian historians have denounced this interpretation as a distortion. Also in the books, the cruelty, barbarism and persecution of Hindus by the certain Muslim rulers are constantly highlighted, calling them religious fanatics: Mahmud of Ghaznevi, Jalaladdin Khilji and Aurangzeb. In the new textbooks, they are shown as cruel, destructive intolerant. The Emperor Akbar is portrayed as a just and trustworthy “Indian” ruler. Certainly, nationalists reject any form of assimilation between Islam and Hinduism²⁷². Moreover, schoolchildren in Gujarat began to be taught about Nazism and how to deal with foreigners. The textbooks included glorified Hitler, saying: “Hitler is our leader, and we love him²⁷³. Historical revisionism, leading to changes in school textbooks and curricula, only advances the interests of the ruling party.

The pandemic coincided with major socio-political events in India. Indian general elections hosted a nationwide protest against the the CAA and the NRC, the abolition of the special status of Jammu Kashmir and the *Tablighi Jamaat* religious community in New Delhi. Islamophobia merged with the coronavirus pandemic. During the global pandemic, when the whole world was fighting against the COVID-19, India was busy fighting another threat -the hatred of Muslims. Indian Muslims have been the victims of conspiracy theories circulating in the country that they are the cause of the disease²⁷⁴. The unexpected rise in the number of manifestations of

²⁷⁰Ram Punyani, RSS-BJP: Manipulating Education for Hindutva, pp.1-2

²⁷¹D.E. Isakova, Hindutva kak forma Indiiskogo nactionalizma, [hindutva as a form of indian nationalism], Russian Journal of Nationalism Studies, 2019, № 1-2, pp. 68-69.


²⁷²Niharika K Sankrityayan, Portrayal of Muslims in Medieval India in History Textbooks, pp.13-18

²⁷³Atamjit Singh, Fascism and Nationalism in Today's India, pp.2-3
https://www.academia.edu/35853865/Fascism_and_Nationalism_in_Todays_India

**Tablighi Jamaat*- The organization was founded in India in 1926 by Muhammad Ilyas. The followers of the current claim that they do not interfere in politics and adhere to moderate Islam.

²⁷⁴Shweta Desai and Amarnath Amarasingam, #CoronaJihad: COVID-19, Misinformation, and Anti-Muslim Violence in India, May 2020, p.3

Islamophobia associated with COVID-19 is caused by a gathering organized by the Islamic missionary movement *Tablighi Jamaat**. The event was held in the capital of India on March 24, where about 16,000 people took part²⁷⁵. The next day, as soon as the Indian authorities announced the discovery of many cases of coronavirus infection among Muslims who were present at this massive religious gathering in Delhi, Narendra Modi introduced a nationwide quarantine. Many see this gathering as the reason for increase in the number of the COVID-19 cases of in India despite many other religious gatherings in India during the same period. As Hindu leaders began to perceive the virus not as an entity spreading across India, but as a conspiracy by Indian Muslims to purposefully infecting the population²⁷⁶. To stop the possible spread of the infection, all participants and their contacts about 25000 throughout the country were tracked and quarantined (see Figure 3.1.). As a result, a criminal case has been concluded against the Tablighi Jamaat members for disobeying government lockdown orders. The Interior Ministry canceled visas and blacklisted all foreign Islamic preachers present²⁷⁷.



²⁷⁵Saikiran Kannan, The coronavirus trail left behind by Tablighi Jamaat, 2020, <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/the-coronavirus-trail-left-behind-by-tablighi-jamaat-1661905-2020-03-31>

²⁷⁶Hajira Maryam, Coronavirus in India: A Public Health Disaster in the Making?, TRT World Research Centre, 2020, p.8

²⁷⁷Paula Thompson, Islamophobia in India: Hindu Nationalism + COVID-19 = 'Corona Jihad', Islamophobia Studies Center, 2020, p.11

Figure 3.2. Participants who participated in the meeting and interaction contacts. Source from <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/the-coronavirus-trail-left-behind-by-tablighi-jamaat-1661905-2020-03-31>

The BJP called the Jamaat meeting a “Taliban crime” and “corona terrorism”. Some mainstream media even yelled “#Coronajihad” and #TablighiJamatVirus, the hashtag went viral on social media. According to Tenmozhi Soundarajan, executive director of *The Equality Labs*, “Corona Jihad is the new idea that Muslims are using the coronavirus to fight Hindus”²⁷⁸. After that, social networks were inundated with calls for a social and economic boycott of Muslims, false accusations and fake news spread about the deliberate spread of the virus²⁷⁹. According to media reports, instead of exploding grenades, new “terrorists” allegedly spray coronavirus. They deliberately spit on fruits, sneeze, cough, vomit in public transport and indoors as part of their new “attacks”²⁸⁰.

Islamophobia has many different names and forms; another one is “Love Jihad”. The direction of policy is the fight against interfaith marriages due to the Islamophobic theory called Love Jihad. Nationalists believe that Muslims deliberately spread Islam through marriage, especially men allegedly tricking them into marrying Hindu women. They understood the Love of Jihad as a strategy carried out by Muslim fundamentalists to increase the population in order to outnumber the Hindus in demographic terms²⁸¹. Consequently, the opponents of such jihad fear the loss of Hindu identity. The right-wing Hindu nationalists are propagated by false claims that first Muslim men lure Hindu women into marriage, and then they are sold in Arab markets, and in this regard encourages Hindus to protect Hindu women, thus exacerbating anti-Muslim attitudes²⁸². Thus, in 2014, propaganda campaigns and popular incitement and appeals were organized by a part of Hindu publicists against

²⁷⁸Billy Perrigo, It Was Already Dangerous to Be Muslim in India. Then Came the Coronavirus, April 3, 2020, <https://time.com/5815264/coronavirus-india-islamophobia-coronajihad/>

²⁷⁹Hannah Ellis-Petersen, Coronavirus conspiracy theories targeting Muslims spread in India, Mon 13 Apr 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/13/coronavirus-conspiracy-theories-targeting-muslims-spread-in-india>

²⁸⁰Brahma Prakash, Muslims as contagion: The image of “terrorists” carrying COVID-19 in India, 2020, <https://indianculturalforum.in/2020/04/23/muslims-as-contagion-the-image-of-terrorists-carrying-covid-19-in-india/>, p.1

²⁸¹Krzysztof Iwanek, Love Jihad " and the stereotypes of Muslims in Hindu nationalism, *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*, 2016, p.358

²⁸²Hatem Bazian, *Islamophobia In India Stoking Bigotry*, Islamophobia Studies Center, 2019, p. 87

the Love Jihad, against its alleged “abductions” and the conversion of Hindu women by Muslim men, ranging from accusations of rape and forced marriages, ending with escape, love, luring and selling in Arab markets²⁸³. Following the example of the state of Uttar Pradesh, four other states are introducing a similar law, and several more are considering the possibility of enacting this kind of law²⁸⁴.

The purpose of this imaginary campaign is to evoke in Indian men the qualities of courage, masculinity, honor, and the call to protect girls in this way incites against Muslim men. It turns out that Love Jihad is just another orchestrated conspiracy, a propaganda strategy used by the BJP to gain love and respect for political gain. As, in practice, there is a lack of evidence to support the legitimacy of Love Jihad, it was just an emotional mythical crusade, a “tasty” political fantasy²⁸⁵. Also, in order to avert all possible fear and at the same time threat, at the initiative of the Defence Minister of India Rajnath Singh and the Minister of Home Affairs Amit Shah, Hindu nationalists began to introduce in some states’ laws against conversion, called “Religious Freedom” laws, intending to control “forced conversion”. But this initiative further gave birth to other laws that make it almost impossible for Hindus to convert to the *Abrahamic faith*^{*286}.

As a result, today the change of religion is prohibited by law in seven of the 29 Indian states: Gujarat, Arunachal Pradesh, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh, in Tamil Nadu this law is at the adoption stage²⁸⁷. Under this law, couples belonging to different religious groups must notify the district judge of their decision two months before marriage. The judge has the right to decide whether the conversion to another religion was legal or not: if coercion against one of the spouses is proven, then the perpetrator faces a prison term of up to

²⁸³Charu Gupta, Allegories of ‘Love Jihad’ and Ghar Vapasi: Interlocking the Socio-Religious with the Political, *Archiv Orientalni*, 84, 2, 2016: 314

²⁸⁴K.S. Petrova, *Sovremennaya konfessional'naya politika v Indii (na primere Musul'man)* [Modern confessional politics in India (on the example of Muslims)], *Education and Law*. 2021, p.430

²⁸⁵Kathinka Froystad, Sound Biting Conspiracy: From India with “Love Jihad”, *Religions* 2021, p.5

**the Abrahamic faith* – a common name for Christianity, Islam and Judaism.

²⁸⁶Hatem Bazian, *Islamophobia In India Stoking Bigotry*, p.98

²⁸⁷Gorokhov S.A., Dmitriev R.V., *Formirovanie konfessional'nogo prostranstvo Indii: Opyt Istoriko-geograficheskogo Analiza* [Formation of the Indian religious space: A historical and geographical analysis], *Istina*, Moscow, 2019, p.92

10 years in prison. At this stage, it remains unclear what sanctions Muslim women who marry Hindus may face.

Following this the ultra-right nationalist organization, *Vishwa Hindu Parishad* (In English, VHP), announced its intention to implement the *Ghar Vapasi* project. The RSS created in 1995 this reconversion project *Ghar Vapasi*, is a Hindi term, has been literally meaning “welcome home” or “reconversion” presented as a return to the true origins of the original religious identity. This program is implemented by radical Hindu organizations and aims to convert Indians of minorities to Hinduism, organized in different parts of the country. Hindutva groups seek to introduce Hindu majoritarianism. Their mission is to saffronize the country²⁸⁸. So, claiming that the ancestors of today’s Muslims and Christians had once been misled and converted by missionaries by luring them into making false material and educational promises. The pretext was to prevent terrorism, communal violence and protect marginalized people. They have selected 200 districts and 50,000 villages across the country, heavily tribal from the lower castes and *Dalit* areas, where strict measures will be taken to convert Christians and Muslims back to their “original true religion”. In 2014, the Nationalists, as part of this program, set the goal of forcibly “converting” at least 4,000 Christian families and 1,000 Muslim families to Hinduism in Uttar Pradesh. They raised a reconversion donation in advance, setting the amount at Rs 200,000 (\$3,200) for a Christian and Rs 500,000 (\$8,000) for a Muslim²⁸⁹.

As Praveen Togadia general secretary of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) puts it: “Once the whole world was Hindu, where there inhabited seven billion Hindus, and now their number is only one billion. Ghar Vapasi began to denationalize Islam and Christianity, contributing to their “alienation”, so the transition from all over the world to the Hindu nation is happening fast. Their return to Hinduism is not a novelty, but simply their homecoming, returning to their ancestors’ traditions²⁹⁰. According to Hannah Arendt, anti-conversion in combination with *Ghar Vapasi*

²⁸⁸ John Mohan Razu, Hindutva + Moditva = Ghar Wapsi, 2020, p.3, https://www.academia.edu/10240073/Ghar_Wapsi

²⁸⁹ Roy Lazar, Ghar Waspi - Which or Whose Home?, 2018, p.10.

https://www.academia.edu/17871994/Ghar_Waspi_Which_or_Whose_Home

²⁹⁰ Charu Gupta, Allegories of ‘Love Jihad’ and Ghar Vapasi: Interlocking the Socio-Religious with the Political, p.313.

exploit of the economic vulnerability of a minority group by providing a great way for an individual to transform from anti-national to national, from exile to home, from coercion to voluntariness, from stateless to citizens, from outsider to assimilated insider²⁹¹.

The *Ghar Vapasi*, like the love jihad, is constantly calling on Hindus to avenge past abjections and historical mistakes of conversion. Also, the ongoing dual strategies of anti-conversion/re-conversion can be seen as an attempt to tighten religious identity and boundaries. This program was widely condemned. Critics of the practice of reconversion argue that it entails either coercion, or violence, or bribery²⁹². They claim that there is no place in India for representatives of other religions, especially the Abrahamic faith. They are left with the choice of either converting or completely submitting to the “Hindu” nation²⁹³. But giving up their current religious beliefs is the only way for the Muslims and Christians of India to be considered Hindu and take a place in the Hindu nation²⁹⁴. On the other hand, the complete absurdity of this program is that the Dalits were from the very beginning outcasts in Hinduism, which is completely built on traditional hierarchical thinking. Consequently, they were forbidden to enter Hindu temples, to participate in Hindu rituals. So where does this mercy in *Ghar Vapasi*, come from? Before converting the Dalits and lower castes, the leaders must first put the caste system in order.

The *Ghar Vapasi*, strategy and forced conversions cannot be supported because the very notion of returning home is fraught with hidden violence. This is another strategy that is contrary to the Constitution. In turn, justifying their actions, Parivar says that they use the same methods of Islam and Christianity, namely through force or seduction. So, the main question they ask is: if other religions can do it, why not Hinduism? It turns out, according to their statements, in order to attract converts,

²⁹¹Samir Gandesha, Ghar Wapsi or Reconversion?, Canada, p.6
https://www.academia.edu/34923538/Ghar_Wapsi_Oct_2017_Edit_doc

²⁹²Dale Luis Menezes & Amita Kanekar, ‘Ghar Wapasi’: Owner of the House, or Servant?, 2020, p.4

²⁹³Yashasvini Rajeshwar, Roy C. Amore, Coming Home (Ghar Wapsi) and Going Away: Politics and the Mass Conversion Controversy in India, Religions, 2019, p.7

²⁹⁴M. Katju, The politics of Ghar Wapsi, Researchgate, 2015, p.12

Hinduism adopted the strategies of the “enemy”²⁹⁵. *Ghar Vapasi* is predominantly geared towards these poor Dalits and is done to preserve and maintain the supremacy of the Hindus (upper castes). The state here manipulates the economic backwardness of the people as an instrument. Evidently, here the followers of *Hindu Rashtra* (Hindu state) are motivated by the political interest of supporting the lower castes by converting them to Hinduism, they can establish a numerical majority for to continue their dominance²⁹⁶.

The ongoing reconversion by the leaders of the RSS is a clear threat to modern democracy. It is also very strange that Hindu nationalists themselves prohibit by law Hindus from converting to Islam or Christians, threatening Muslims with court or fines for forced conversion, while under the *Ghar Vapasi*, they themselves are allowed to convert non-Hindus by force. They explain it that coming home is not to be taken as a conversion, as it is a natural desire to return to real historical roots.

The use and status of the triple *talaq* (divorce) in India has been the subject of controversy and debate. In fact, four methods of divorce are outlined in Islam: *talaq* (divorce by husband), *hula* (divorce by mutual consent of two spouses), *faskh-i-nikah* (dissolution of marriage) and *tafwid-i-talaq* (divorce at the initiative of the wife). It is *talaq* that is widespread in marital disputes in today’s Muslim world and has become a topic of contention²⁹⁷. Among them, it is *talaq* that is widespread in marital disputes in today's Muslim world and has become a topic of contention in India. This type of divorce is banned in many Islamic countries. India is one of the few countries where this practice has been preserved in law²⁹⁸. Those who question this practice raise issues of justice, gender equality, human rights and secularism.

²⁹⁵Yashasvini Rajeshwar, Roy C. Amore, Coming Home (Ghar Wapsi) and Going Away: Politics and the Mass Conversion Controversy in India, p.10

²⁹⁶Nikhil Walde, Political Economy of Ghar Wapsi: A perspective from below 1-2, 2015, https://www.academia.edu/33849336/Political_Economy_of_Ghar_Wapsi_A_Perspective_from_Below

²⁹⁷Vasundhara Mohan, Triple Talaq: The Damocles’ Sword, 2019, p.4 https://www.academia.edu/28141279/triple_talaq_the_damocles_sword

²⁹⁸Azza Bimantara, Structural and Cultural Violence behind Triple Talaq in Indian Muslim Community, April 2018, Conference: International Conference and Workshop on Gender, p.282

Muslim family affairs in India have long been regulated by the Muslim Personal Law Application Act of 1937 even before independence²⁹⁹. Thus, it replaced the so-called “Anglo-Muslim law” previously in force for Muslims and became mandatory for all Muslims in India. According to this Act Triple Talaq, instant divorce was a form of Islamic divorce used by Muslims in India³⁰⁰. This allowed any Muslim to officially divorce his wife unnecessary paperwork, only uttering the word “talaq” three times in front of his wife and witnesses, no matter in what form: orally or written. Moreover, with the development of modern technology, with electronic means, divorce has become even easier. Recently, Indian Muslim men have increasingly resorted to the “triple talaq”, and often sent messages to their wives with this word via instant messengers or SMS³⁰¹.

On July 30, 2019, the Indian Parliament declared the practice of triple talaq illegal and unconstitutional, and approved a The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill by the Minister of Law and Justice, Ravi Shankar Prasad, banning the right of a Muslim to immediately divorce his wife from 1 August 2019³⁰². It provides that an instant triple talaq in any form is illegal and invalid, the husband faces up to three years in prison with fine. The amount of the fine is determined by the justice of the peace³⁰³. It is noteworthy that in many Muslim countries, including neighboring Pakistan and Bangladesh, such a law has long been adopted.

For years, Muslim women in India have complained that they live in constant fear of being on the streets. The reason for this problem to be considered by the Supreme Court was the numerous petitions from human rights activists and women’s Islamic organizations. The debate involved the Government of India and the Supreme Court of India and is linked to the debate on a unified civil code in India. Muslim organizations accuse the government of interfering in public affairs and believe that

²⁹⁹The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937
<https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1937-26.pdf>

³⁰⁰Ine Versigghel, Talaq, talaq, talaq, Belgin, 2020, p.24

³⁰¹M.N. Starikova, "Troinoi talak" v Indii za ili protiv? [Triple Talak in India: For or Against?], Asia and Africa today, 2018, p.75

³⁰²The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, Ministry of Law and Justice, New Delhi, 2019, pp.1-2 <https://Egazette.Nic.In/Writereaddata/2019/209473.Pdf>

³⁰³Gender Justice And Human Rights Of Muslim Women With Reference To Triple Talaq Ordinance, 2018

this practice should be considered by community leaders, and not by the government³⁰⁴. Kamal Farooqi, a member of the All-India Muslim Personal Law Council, expressed his dissatisfaction and citing the fact that this is contrary to the constitutional right of the Article 14 to freedom of religion. According to the NCP leader Supriya Sule criminalizing the triple talaq for Muslim women would create a hostile environment. As a husband is imprisoned, there is no opportunity for reconciliation. Ghulam Nabi Azad, who is a leader of the opposition in the upper house of parliament called the new law politically motivated and aimed at destroying Muslim families through internal strife. Former Union Minister for Minorities, Naqvi said in July 2020 that the number of cases of triple talaq has decreased by about 82% since the law against “social evils” passed. Meanwhile, activists claim that not many men were arrested even after filing a complaint, and even a few people were released on bail a few days after being detained³⁰⁵.

The propaganda of Islamophobic articles and some less informed sources has led the general public to assume that Islam allows husbands to divorce their wives at will and at any time. In fact, talaq only exists for extremely unavoidable circumstances. If possible, it is best to avoid divorce and resolve everything with a truce. Islam allows divorce in exceptional cases.

A cow protection group aimed at protecting Hindus from Muslim attacks, formed in 2000 in Western India in Maharashtra. This group works very closely with RSS . They seize trucks transporting livestock to slaughterhouses and send the drivers to the police³⁰⁶. In 1995, the Maharashtra Animal Welfare Act was enacted, prohibiting the slaughter of cows and bulls. But it entered into force only in 2015, after the

³⁰⁴Starikova M.N., Gendernyi faktor v deyatelnosti musul'manskikh obshchestvenopoliticheskikh organizatsiyi' v sovremennoi' Indii [The gender factor in the activities of Muslim socio-political organizations in modern India], 2020, p.21

³⁰⁵NEWS18.COM - official page, Two Years of Triple Talaq Law: All About the Legislation That Banned Instant Divorce by Muslim Men, 2021, <https://www.news18.com/news/india/two-years-of-triple-talaq-law-all-about-the-legislation-that-banned-instant-divorce-by-muslim-men-4033220.html>

³⁰⁶Nakamizo Kazuya, Dismantling Democracy: The 2019 Indian General Election and the Formation of the 'BJP System', Vol. 66, No. 2, April 2020, p.82

approval of Modi. Violators face severe penalties of 10,000 rupees (about \$170) or five years in prison³⁰⁷.




Figure 3.2. Cow Related Hate Crime in India. Source from Nakamizo Kazuya, Dismantling Democracy: The 2019 Indian General Election and the Formation of the ‘BJP System, p.78

3.2. Abolition of the Special Status of the predominantly Muslim state of Jammu and Kashmir

In order to better understand what is happening in Kashmir now, it is necessary to look back at the history. At the time of the partition of India and Pakistan, each state was faced with the task of deciding where to join. As mentioned above, the separation led to great pogroms in many states of India and also affected the state of Kashmir. Kashmir, under the then ruler of Maharaja Hari Singh, was a Hindu with a majority of Muslim subjects, remained in a difficult position. In several districts of his principality, an uprising broke out against the Maharaja³⁰⁸. On October 21, 1947, the militia of the Pashtun tribes from the territory of Pakistan, and then the “Pakistani volunteers” invaded the principality to help the rebellious fellow Muslims. As a result, Singh had to seek military assistance from India to protect himself and his dynasty from the invasion. In response, India demanded to conclude an accession agreement, which was subsequently signed. This invasion of the two countries laid

³⁰⁷ The Maharashtra Animal Preservation Act, 1976, 2016
<https://lj.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/Upload/Acts/H%2062-2016.pdf>

**de facto* - is a international legally unrecognized but is in fact considered a border.

³⁰⁸ A.E. Thompson, The Kashmir Conflict: Evolution and Prospects For a Solution, 2012, p.16

the foundation for the Kashmir conflict and the subsequent three Indo-Pakistani Wars (1947-49, 1965, 1971)³⁰⁹.

By January 1, 1949, hostilities had ceased, and in August, under the control of the UN, “a Ceasefire Line” was drawn, dividing Kashmir into two parts - controlled, respectively, by India and Pakistan. The ceasefire line has become *de facto** border between India and Pakistan³¹⁰. India succeeded in asserting its control over almost 60% of the entire Kashmir Valley and the Jammu region, as well as the highland region of Ladakh. And only 30% small parts of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the high regions of Gilgit-Baltistan fell under Pakistani control³¹¹. The Chinese part - 10% of the territory of the former principality, occupied by the Chinese authorities by 1962, now the Aksai-Chin region, as well as part of the Trans-Karakorum tract (See Figure 2.2.). Originally called the Ceasefire Line but was renamed the Line of Control (LoC) following the Simla Agreement, July 3, 1972. Conflicts on the LOC arise so often that not all official sources have time to fix them. The 2019 Indo-Pakistani conflict was the biggest military standoff that brought two nuclear-weapon states to the brink of war³¹².



³⁰⁹Hau Khan Sum, Ravichandran Moorthy, The Genesis of Kashmir Dispute, Asian Social Science, Vol. 9, No. 11, 2013. p.155

³¹⁰Gökhan Tekir, Prospect theory and Indian policy towards Kashmir, International Journal of Management Economics and Business, Vol. 17, No. 4, Ankara, 2021, pp.1123-1125

³¹¹Gita Howard, India's Removal of Kashmir's Special Protection Status: an Internationally Wrongful Act?, the Journals at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository, 2021, p.496

³¹²Ivanov N.S., Gnedash I.A. Indo-Pakistanskiy konflikt: problema uregulirovaniya pri uchastii OON [Indo-Pakistani conflict: the problem of settlement with the participation of the UN]. 2017. p. 283.

Figure.3.2.The Delimitation of Kashmir. References: BBC, (2019). Kashmir territories profile. Retrieved July 1, 2020, from, <https://www.bbc.com/news/worldsouth-asia-11693674>

Among the main factors that provoked the emergence of the conflict, one can highlight the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in the framework of the One Belt One Road project, which aggravated relations between India and Pakistan since the Kashmir confrontation intensified with the addition of another participant - China. This project, according to Ministry of India, became a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India since its route passes through disputed territory in the Kashmir region Pakistani-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and through Gilgit-Baltistan (a district in Pakistan), which the India declares as its own, inalienable and required territory illegally held by the CPEC. India sees high economic stakes in the CPEC that will push China to ally with Pakistan in the fight for Kashmir³¹³. In turn, the Chinese leadership still adheres to the principle of balance, non-interference in the bilateral conflicts but indirectly takes the side of Pakistan and contributes to the settlement of the conflict, promoting the ideas of economic integration in the region³¹⁴.

On the issue of India's national security in the neighborhood, there is also noticeable rapprochement between Pakistan and with the US, which is still negotiating with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Modi's government is fearful that the group could divert its resources to J&K and India in support of Pakistan. Thus, in order to counter the mounting external pressure, India realized that it must strengthen internal coherence and take steps to better insulate itself from possible future destabilization attempts from external adversaries³¹⁵.

Even before the week of independence, namely on August 5, 2019, both houses of the Indian Parliament (*Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha**) by a two-thirds majority approved the bill proposed by the decree of President Ram Nath Kovind to abolish

**Rajya Sabha* - the upper house and *Lok Sabha* - the lower house

³¹³Ivliev I. I., Global'nye i regional'nye aspekty Indo-Pakistanskogo konflikta [Global and Regional Aspects Indo-Pakistan Conflict], Century of Globalization, 2021, p. 95

³¹⁴M. R. Zaripov, A. G. Spiridonov, Mesto Kitaya v Indo-Pakistanskom konflikte v 21 veke [China's place in the Indo-Pakistani conflict in the 21st century], International Journal of Humanities and Natural Sciences, 2019, p. 50

³¹⁵Omar Zahid, Kashmir: The BJP's Greater India Project, 07/12/2019, p.2 https://www.academia.edu/41217477/Kashmir_The_BJPs_Greater_India_Project

the special autonomous status of the Indian state of J&K. It was introduced by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the country Amit Shah. The authorities also proposed dividing the state into two “Union territories (UT)”: Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, the first with the preservation of the legislative assembly, the second without. Now the state comes under the direct control of the center of Delhi, like other states. In addition, after the change in the Constitution, all citizens of India are entitled to buy land in Kashmir³¹⁶.

It should be emphasized that the adoption of Articles 370 and 35-A was one of the main initial conditions for the entry of part of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir into India, which entered into force in 1957. What is written in this Article 370 and 35A of the Constitution? Based on this article the state of J&K - the only one of the 29 Indian states - has its own separate constitution and flag, as well as independent decision on all matters except those related to foreign affairs, defense and communications. According to Art. 35-A, the state government has the right to determine its “permanent residents”. Who have special privileges and rights to have a residence permit, buy real estate there, work in the government³¹⁷. According to Alexei Kupriyanov, since BJP foundation in the 1980s, advocated the elimination of the special status of the region, but never before had a sufficient majority in parliament to implement these plans³¹⁸. When the BJP had enough opportunity to fulfill the promise, they included this as part of the BJP’s 2019 election program.

According to the Modi’s government, Kashmir should live by the same laws as the rest of India. In addition, decisive steps were supported by many opposition parties. The vast majority of Indians support the government's decision³¹⁹. The Indian

³¹⁶Nazir Hussain Paswal, Syed Irfan Haider Jafri, Sabahat Fatima, Historical Analysis of the Abrogation of Article 370, Tathapi (UGC Care Journal) ,Vol.19, Issue 42, June 2020, pp.161-162

³¹⁷Lubna Haroon, Nazir Hussain, Indian Constitutional Rearrangements in Jammu & Kashmir and the Responses of Kashmiri Diaspora, A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2, July - December, 2020, pp. 246-247

³¹⁸Alexey Kupriyanov, Narendra Modi zhestko lishil Dzhammu i Kashmir vsekhn privilegii [Narendra Modi severely deprived Jammu and Kashmir of all privileges], daily Journal of Profile, 08/06/2019; Tapan Bose, Kashmir after Revocation of Article, 2021, p.2-3 https://www.academia.edu/72740970/Kashmir_after_Revocation_of_Article

³¹⁹Ghulam Mustafa, Adnan Aslam, Muhammad Nawaz Bhatti, Abdul Qadir Mushtaq, Muhammad Arslan, Ambivalence Constitutional Developments in India during 2019: Impacts and Implications on Muslim Community, Journal of The Research Society of Pakistan, 2020, pp.600-602

government's decision to change the status of the state of J&K looks completely different depending on how it is viewed: from the point of view of Indian domestic politics or from the point of view of the situation in the region. From the point of view of the internal structure of India, this step by Modi looks quite logical. Amin Shah claims that this Article 370 has always been the source of all the negative consequences in the J&K: economic underdevelopment, lack of democracy, corruption and rampant terrorism.

A former Minister of the Union and a member of today's BJP, Arif Md Khan believes that autonomy for a particular state always tends to bring inequality between other states and more often acts as an obstacle to nation-building. The solution is either to extend this special status to all states, or to abandon it and create an equal federal structure³²⁰. As planned, the status of UT for J&K and Ladakh creates the basis for greater control and effective management by New Delhi, paving the way for their socio-economic development³²¹. A certain isolation of the state and the peculiarities of the device hinder its development. The authorities assure that now, with the abolition of the special status, everyone, and not just the Kashmiris, will be able to do business in the newly formed union territory. As a result, this should ensure an influx of investment and a sharp economic recovery in the region. Furthermore, ethno-confessional contradictions in J&K are one of the main reasons for the activation of extremist groups in the region. Kashmiri radicals have settled in Islamabad-controlled Azad Kashmir and enjoy the full support of the Pakistani intelligence services³²². It was terrorist activity that became one of the main reasons why New Delhi decided to limit autonomy in order to fight separatist groups. Thus, the government intends to put an end to the long-term Kashmir conflict and ensure its national security. Strange as it may seem, this move by India, while at first glance leading to escalation, may well lead eventually to defusing the situation in Kashmir. However, if one observes the situation from the point of international politics, this

³²⁰ Rahul Mohanty, Ananya Pali, Abolition of Special Status for Jammu and Kashmir: Cross Road in Indian Democracy, *Quest Journals Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Science*, 2021, p.37

³²¹ Fitri Adi Setyorini, Takdir Ali Mukti, The Revocation of Kashmir's Special Status by Narendra Modi Administration in 2019, *Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2, December 2020, pp.142

³²² Suman Kumar, The Kashmir Problem: Article 35 A & 370, *Indian Journal of Social Enquiry*, Vol.12, No.3 September 2020, pp. 87-88

step by the Indian government is fraught with considerable risks. Minister of Home Affairs Amit Shah call these actions a long overdue “reorganization”³²³. However, Modi’s critics describe it as a blow to the heart of India’s secular identity and democracy. Today, J&K is the only region of India with a predominantly Muslim population (more than two-thirds), they reacted negatively. The abrupt decision of the government of India was a serious threat to Muslim Kashmir to establish Hindu hegemony, the religious demographic transformation of society, since Delhi opened the door to mass migration from other states.³²⁴ On the other hand, the mechanism of the adopted decision certainly agitated the Muslim population of Kashmir, thus creating the basis for the further growth of separatist sentiments.

The *India Today* states that, from March 31 to the end of 2020, over 3.2 million citizens - residents of various parts of India have received the right to own property in Kashmir. In addition, they were given a residence permit and allowed to work on an equal footing with the local population³²⁵. The Indian authorities foresaw everything and prepared well for this operation by introducing a restrictive policy. They deployed tens of thousands of troops to the region before the day of liquidation, cut off the state’s communications with the rest of the world by cutting off the internet and mobile communications, placed hundreds of Kashmiri politicians (Mehbooba Mufti, Omar Abdullahi etc.) under house arrest, and banned tourists from entering to quell possible protests³²⁶.

From a geopolitical point of view, the situation in Kashmir, a historically unstable region where territorial disputes between India and Pakistan, India and China, constantly unfolded, remains explosive. It is worth highlighting that in this region the

³²³Bogatyrev Alim, Daova Milana, «Kashmirskiy faktor»: perspektivi neutralizatsii Indo-Pakistanskogo konflikta v kontekste transformatsii konstitutsionno-pravovogo statusa regiona [“Kashmir factor”: prospects of neutralizingthe Indo-Pakistani conflict in the context of transformation of the constitutional and legal status of the region], education and law №11, 2020, p.16

³²⁴Bogatyrev Alim, Daova Milana, «Kashmirskiy faktor»: perspektivi neutralizatsii Indo-Pakistanskogo konflikta v kontekste transformatsii konstitutsionno-pravovogo statusa regiona [“Kashmir factor”: prospects of neutralizingthe Indo-Pakistani conflict in the context of transformation of the constitutional and legal status of the region], p.14

³²⁵Muhammet Nazım Taşcı, Two years have passed since the abolition of the special status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, 04.08.2021

³²⁶Fitri Adi Setyorini, Takdir Ali Mukti, The Revocation of Kashmir’s Special Status by Narendra Modi Administration in 2019, *Journal of International Studies*, p.146

interests of not only regional forces, but also several world powers, such as the United States, Great Britain, Russia, France and Japan, intersect, and there is also a high subversive activity of terrorist groups³²⁷. In this regard, the decision of the Modi government *a priori* could not but resonate both in the South Asian subcontinent and in the world³²⁸.

3.3. Amendments in the Citizenship Law

On December 11, 2019, the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) passed in the Indian Parliament and came into force only on January 10, 2020. The controversial bill aims to grant citizenship to immigrants. Although, the original Citizenship of India Act (CoIA) 1955 prohibited illegal immigrants from becoming citizens³²⁹. Among the numerous amendments on the CoIA, none of them contained a religious aspect. Now, the 10th Amendment with its underlying religious overtones, has created another religious conflict. As a result, it provoked a wave of protests, especially in the north-east of the country, bordering Bangladesh. Indian Muslims considered innovations violating the constitutional principles of a secular state and universal equality.

The amendments introduce two key innovations to the CoIA. According to the first, refugees and immigrants, who are Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis (Zoroastrians) and Christians from three neighboring Muslim countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan “who were forced to seek refuge in India due to religious persecution or fear of religious persecution” will not be considered illegal migrants under if they entered India on or before 31 December 2014. It turns out that if any citizens are considered legally fit but entered after the specified date will be deported. These rules apply to persons without documents or with documents whose validity has expired³³⁰. The second innovation allows cited individuals to obtain Indian citizenship in a shorter period. Now a foreigner can obtain Indian citizenship

³²⁷ A.Z.Hilali, Historical Developments of the Kashmir Problem and Pakistan’s Policy After September 11 (2001), Perceptions, 2004, p.77

³²⁸ Alexey Zakharov, Izmenenie statusa Djammu i Kashmira: mejdunarodnoe izmerenie [Changing the Status of Jammu and Kashmir: An International Dimension], Valdai Discussion Club, 08/19/2019 https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/smeny-statusa-dzhammu-i-kashmira/#masha_0=2:74,2:124

³²⁹ The original Citizenship of India Act, 1955 https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/4210/1/Citizenship_Act_1955.pdf

³³⁰ John Mohan Razu, CAB and NRC the Framework for "Hindu Rashtra", 2020, p.1

if he has lived in the country for the last 12 years. Representatives of these religious minorities will be able to obtain citizenship after living in the country not for 12 years, but for 6 years. The beneficiaries of the bill can live in any state of the country³³¹. However, the provision contained in it causes real paranoia among 200 million Muslims and minorities across the country, because the new law gives citizenship only to non-Muslim immigrants³³². This circumstance has raised great fears among India's already marginalized Muslim population that they will be relegated to the background as second-class citizens. It was this situation that caused a stormy resonance in society, which grew into a mass protest. The law itself began to be called anti-Muslim, since, according to the protesters, it is based on an attempt to make Islam a marginal religious movement, which, of course, is the most real discrimination on religious grounds.

Opponents of the law draw attention to the fact that it infringes on the rights of Muslims and ignores other ethno-religious groups that fled to India from persecution in neighboring countries: Tamils from Sri Lanka, Buddhists from Tibet, Uighurs from China and the Rohingya people from Myanmar³³³. For example, in the end of 2018, the government has sent dozens of Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar and condemned by the UN and human rights groups. In their defense, the authorities justify themselves under the pretext that Muslims are not persecuted in Muslim-majority countries. Refuting all criticisms, New Delhi covers it up with the fact that the amendments, on the contrary, are aimed at protecting confessional minorities from persecution taking place in countries with a predominantly Muslim population. Thus, it turned out that in order to protect against discrimination, the Indian Parliament passed vice versa discriminatory law³³⁴. This hasty bill is so controversial that it does not specifically describe why citizenship is excluded from illegal immigrants belonging to other neighboring countries or religious minorities from these three Muslim countries (Pakistani Ahmadis). However, the inclusion of

³³¹ Shiva Tiwari, Constitutionality of Citizenship Amendment Act(CAA), 2019, p.2

³³² Ayşenur Aygül & Mobassera Jahan Fatima, Examination of Indian Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in the Context of Hindu Nationalism, Ankara, 2021, p.23

³³³ Rishvanth Reddy Mucheli, Sociological Understanding of Anti-CAA Protests in India as Social Movement, 2021, p.1

³³⁴ Saroj K Rath, Citizenship Act & Its Implications, 2020, 5-6
https://www.academia.edu/41625744/Citizenship_Act_and_Its_Implications

Afghanistan in this list seems ridiculous. India and Afghanistan do not share a common border. The BJP did not clarify its legal selection criteria³³⁵. Although the main purpose of the bill is to deprive them of a full vote in elections, as the BJP knows that they will vote against.

It is interesting that the term “religious persecution” itself does not appear in the final text of the CAA, only being mentioned as a legal argument in defense of the amendment³³⁶. This strategic omission requires a specific explanation. It is also not clear enough how the government intends to protect the interests of the non-Muslim religious minorities without a well-defined administrative and legal apparatus that determines the nature of religious persecution in foreign territory³³⁷. The former INC leader Rahul Gandhi tweeted that the law ridicules India’s religious openness and goes against the very idea of a secular India. Rahul equates these fascist actions of the government with Nazi Germany and Hitler. A lot of opponents are also of the same opinion as Rahul Gandhi³³⁸.

Experts from the UN Human Rights Office said the amendments are discriminatory, undermining the founding principle of the Indian Constitution that provides for the equality of all before the law, regardless of race, nationality or religion. They believe that by accepting the amendment, India has violated its obligations under the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Consequently, India has lost its global position as a world leader in the field of human rights, the crime of apartheid, minority rights and social justice. The Human Rights Watch

³³⁵Hilal Ahmed, Making Sense of India’s Citizenship Amendment Act 2019: Process, Politics, Protests, 2020, p. 19

³³⁶The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, Ministry of Law and Justice
[https://prsindia.org/files/bills_acts/bills_parliament/2019/Citizenship%20\(Amendment\)%20Bill,%202019.pdf](https://prsindia.org/files/bills_acts/bills_parliament/2019/Citizenship%20(Amendment)%20Bill,%202019.pdf)

³³⁷ Professor Michelle Foster and Dr Adil Hasan Khan, Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019 And International Law, 2021,
https://www.academia.edu/41325245/The_Poisonous_Law_The_Citizenship_Amendment_Act_2019
 1-2

³³⁸Anyone who supports CAB is attacking and attempting to destroy foundation of our nation’ says Rahul Gandhi, economictimes, 10 Dec 2019 <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/anyone-who-supports-cab-is-attacking-and-attempting-to-destroy-foundation-of-our-nation-says-rahul-gandhi/videoshow/72454302.cms>

(HRW) also states that the CAA violates India's international legal obligations, contrary to Articles 14 and 15 of the Indian Constitution:³³⁹

Article 14 - The State shall not deny to anyone equality before the law or equal protection of the law in the territory of India. Article 15 - The State shall not discriminate against any citizen solely on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of these.

This classification solely based on religion is not reasonable and contrary to international norms and standards. So, experts of HRW argue that faith cannot be a condition of citizenship and that the fate of Indian refugees cannot depend on a cynical political agenda. The country should view the refugee problem as a humanitarian crisis, not as a political tool. Specific legislation is needed establishing a refugee policy based not on faith or ethnicity but on the need to provide protection to those fleeing violence or persecution. And some fear that the new law may, on the contrary, lead to a massive influx of new migrants or refugees³⁴⁰.

3.4. Assam's National Register of Citizenship

Moreover, the new amendments to the legislation are closely intertwined with another controversial document, the National Register of Citizenship (NRC), public registry containing the names and related information to identify all Indian citizens, adopted in the summer, in August 2019. Diversity in ethnicity and cultural traditions, with a predominance of Indo-Aryan and Austro-Mongoloid elements, makes Assam a melting pot³⁴¹. Besides, the development of nationalism in the colonial period and the set of several identity issues in the post-colonial period make the entire region a tense area. Since the state has gone through various forms of cultural experience and stages of socio-economic development³⁴². This structure of society has developed due to constant migrations, both external and internal. But, unfortunately, in connection with this diversity, later periodic clashes, constant separatist tendencies

³³⁹Narender Nagarwal, *The Poisonous Law: The Citizenship Amendment Act 2019*, December 2019, p.2

³⁴⁰Human Rights Watch, "Shoot the Traitors", *Discrimination Against Muslims under India's New Citizenship Policy*, 2020, p.17

³⁴¹Kiseleva S., Moskalenko E, Razvitie "plav'lnogo tigelya" na territoriy shtata Assam [Development of a "melting pot" in Assam], *The scientific heritage*, No 77, 2021, p.21

³⁴²Nipan Haloi, *Ethnic conflict in North East India: A case of Assam with special reference to B.T.A.D.*, *International Research Journal of Interdisciplinary & Multidisciplinary Studies (IRJIMS)*, Volume-I, Issue-X, Assam, November 2015, p. 20

and ethnic conflicts occur in the state of Assam. The most important factor in these clashes is the rapid growth in the number of immigrants. The government's failure to effectively control the influx from Bangladesh has resulted in a demographic imbalance in Assam. After Indian independence, the first law, the Immigrants Act, 1950, was passed to regulate this issue, where, based on the 1951 census, the NRC was to be formed.³⁴³

After the Partition of India in 1947, there was a massive migration along religious lines: Bengali Hindus from Bangladesh moved to neighboring Indian states such as West Bengal and Assam, while Muslims from those places migrated to Bangladesh. However, this massive migration created tensions among the locals and indigenous people of Assam, leading to the creation of anti-Bengali movements such as *Bongal Kheda* (Kick the Bengalis out).

Anti-Bengali sentiment and Anti-immigrant movement in whole is deeply rooted and intensified in the state of Assam in the 1970s. Separation of Bangladesh caused to another influx of refugees from Bangladesh. After massive strikes against the dominance of immigrants in the state, the government of Rajiv Gandhi signed an agreement with the leaders of the Assam movement, advocated by All Assam Student Unions (AASU) and All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP), to end the unrest³⁴⁴. Thus, as a result of six years of rule by the student movement, the Assam Accord was finally reached. Thus, according to the so-called Assam Accord of 1985, foreigners who arrived in Assam before March 25, 1971, were to receive citizenship. Accordingly, by amendment, those who migrated to Assam after March 25, 1971, will not be eligible for Indian citizenship³⁴⁵. But in fact, in practice, foreigners who came to Assam after this period continue to be detected. In addition,

³⁴³ Kiseleva S., Moskalenko E, Razvitie "plav'lnogo tigelya" na territoriy shtata Assam [Development of a "melting pot" in Assam], The scientific heritage, p.22

³⁴⁴ Problems of Foreigners in Assam, Memorandum of settlement, https://assamaccord.assam.gov.in/sites/default/files/swf_utility_folder/departments/assamaccord_med_hassu_in_oid_3/portlet/level_1/files/The%20Assam%20Accord%20-%20English.pdf; Prabhash K Dutta, What is Assam Accord of 1985 and how amended citizenship law challenges it?, India Today, New Delhi, December 13, 2019, <https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/what-is-assam-accord-of-1985-and-how-amended-citizenship-law-challenges-it-1627965-2019-12-13>

³⁴⁵S. Podoplelov, Bremya Assama: Problemy Nelegal'noi Migratsii iz Bangladesh v Indiu' [The Burden of Assam: Problems of Illegal Migration from Bangladesh to India], Asia And Africa Today, 2019, p.62

these leaders submitted the first memorandum demanding that the NRC be updated to exclude “foreigners” and protect the rights of indigenous Assamese. Since then, this registry has not been updated until recently³⁴⁶. Starting in 2015, after the adoption of the Supreme Court’s decree to update the NRC, updating the list began and the final list was published on August 31, 2019.

At the present stage of migration policy in the state of Assam, there are significant population growth rates than the average for India. To strike a balance in society, in 2019 the Indian Parliament passed the Citizenship Amendment (CA). Thus, the northeastern state of Assam became the first state in India to update the NRC. To apply for the NRC, people had to show documentary evidence that they or their ancestors were born in Assam before 25 March 1971, the official date of Bangladesh’s independence. Politicians believe that thanks to the register of citizens, ethnic and religious clashes will be resolved³⁴⁷.

In 2015, 33 million people living in Assam were asked to provide documents proving their Indian citizenship dating back to before the 1971 war. More than ten approved documents, namely, land documents, certificate of citizenship or permanent residence, life insurance policy, government-issued license or certificate, employment record, bank account, birth certificate issued by the competent authority, certificate of education, and tax or land receipts are required to be submitted for NRC review³⁴⁸. In the latest updated list, about 1.9 million people, where the majority were Muslims, did not make it to the list of state citizens. According to the latest 2011 census, Muslims made up 34.22% of the state’s population³⁴⁹. The Indian authorities treat them as illegal migrants, even though these people have been living in the state for decades. The bill sparked massive protests in different parts of India, especially in the northeast. According to Amjad Ali politician, such a policy is aimed

³⁴⁶ Ractim Goswami, *Illegal Influx, Land Alienation And Socio-Ethnic Conflicts In Assam*, 2020, pp.23-24

³⁴⁷ Human Rights Watch, “Shoot the Traitors”, *Discrimination Against Muslims under India’s New Citizenship Policy*, p.62

³⁴⁸ Yasmin Saikia, *The National Registry of Citizens: Violating Muslims, Violating Humanity in Assam*, globalcit.eu, October 18, 2019, <https://globalcit.eu/the-national-registry-of-citizens-violating-muslims-violating-humanity-in-assam/>

³⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch, “Shoot the Traitors”, *Discrimination Against Muslims under India’s New Citizenship Policy*, p.63

primarily at identifying, inciting religious intolerance and discrimination in the country. Some residents are afraid of deportation while others fear that their lands will be flooded with migrants from neighboring Bangladesh because of the new CAA law³⁵⁰.

Chief Minister of Bengal Mamata Banerjee also denounced the BJP's policy of turning its own population into refugees in their own country. Among the critics of the law were the Assam Minority Student Union (AAMSU), they argue that the NRC will lose its original meaning (the Assam Agreement), since the excluded illegal non-Muslim immigrants will receive citizenship through the CAA, most of them are Bangladeshi Hindus³⁵¹. As for the Assamese themselves, they protest and object to granting citizenship to any immigrant, no matter whether Muslim or non-Muslim³⁵².

CAA and NRC are closely related. According to the BJP plan, the first is the implementation of the CAA giving citizenship to everyone except Muslims, and the second is the implementation of the NRC helping to identify “infiltrators”³⁵³. They also claim that NPR and NRC are connected: The NPR will be the basis for the all-India NRC, where all residents (citizens and non-citizens) of the country will register through the collection of demographic and biometric data under the 1955 CA and its rules³⁵⁴, and names will be added to the NRC from there. After the bill had passed from the lower house of Parliament, Shah reaffirmed his plans to roll out the NRC of the entire country. The difficulty for people is that they cannot always collect all the documents necessary to confirm citizenship, which leads to errors and the imprisonment of innocent people. Muslims who fail to provide their NRC documents

**heimatlos* – stateless, person without Citizenship

³⁵⁰ Arunabh Saikia, Are migrants in Assam forcibly taking over indigenous land?, Scroll.in, Feb 16, 2020, <https://scroll.in/article/950237/are-migrants-in-assam-forcibly-taking-over-indigenous-land-the-reality-is-more-complex>

³⁵¹ Suhrid S.Ch., Bengal’s concerns over CAA, Aug 04, 2022 <https://frontline.thehindu.com/cover-story/article30328461.ece>; We will not accept NRC update in Assam: AAMSU President, September, 2019 <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/We-will-not-accept-NRC-update-in-Assam-Aamsu-president/articleshow/12412894.cms>

³⁵² Parisha Bareja, Nikunj Gupta, Aastha Mittal, A Study on Socio-Economic impact of National Register of Citizenship (NRC) in Assam, IJRASET, Volume 8, Issue VI, Mumbai, June 2020, pp.79

³⁵³ Chhokar, J.S., The Bias Against Muslims in the CAA-NRC Fulfills a Promise the BJP Made in 1996, The Wire. <https://thewire.in/communalism/muslims-nrc-caa-bjp-1996>

³⁵⁴ Rinkumoni K., Pralhad G.J., Preview of Assam Accord and updates of NRC, International Journal of Research in Social Sciences, Vol. 8 Issue 12, December 2018, p.787

will become *heimatlos*, as they are not protected under the CAA like the other six religious believers.

What awaits those who will be excluded from the list? They will have 120 days to appeal and prove their citizenship to regional quasi-judicial bodies called *Aliens Tribunals*, some of which are already in place. The tribunals will decide on these cases within six months from the date of the appeal. It is reported that up to 400 tribunals will be set up to consider this list. According to reports, after all legal remedies available under the law have been exhausted, those identified as “illegal” migrants will be detained in detention camps until they are deported. The government is currently building 10 prison camps for those who do not appeal. Oppositionists in India believe that at this pace, the NRC could leave many Muslims and the poorest people stateless.

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CHAPTER FOUR

AN OUTSIDE VIEW ON MODI'S POLICY

4.1. Visual Experience of Countries

Most of the laws and bans passed after 2019 regarding religious minorities are accelerated steps towards realizing the dream of the RSS's *Hindu Rashtra* (state of the Hindus). RSS, with its Sangh Parivar, has longed since its inception to turn India into a *Hindu Rashtra* that excluded Muslims from full citizenship and forced them to live as second-class citizens. They adhere to the view of their main ideologist, the philosopher M.S. Golwalkar, who was inspired by Adolf Hitler, he argued that India belongs to Hindus and that national minorities should be treated in the same way that the Nazis treated the Jews. In his book he linked RSS inextricably to the fascist ideology of Nazi Germany³⁵⁵. Golwalkar, argues in his *We or Our Nationhood Defined*:

The non-Hindu people of Hindustan must either adopt Hindu culture and language, must learn and respect and hold in reverence the Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but of those of glorification of the Hindu race and culture ... In a word they must cease to be foreigners, or may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment—not even citizens ' rights". ..³⁵⁶To keep up the purity of the Race and its culture, Germany shocked the world by her purging the country of the Semitic Races - the Jews. Germany has also shown how well nigh impossible it is for Races and cultures, having differences going to the root, to be assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindustan to learn and profit by³⁵⁷.

He admired how Hitler so quickly reorganized their nations from the wreckage of the war to build a powerful economy and army under the auspices of patriotism and nationalism. Golwalkar's argument was that Germany proved that two nations in one state were impossible³⁵⁸. He even accepted Holocaust is an effective way to deal with India's minorities.

³⁵⁵ DHIRENDRA KJHA, Guruji's Lie The RSS And MS Golwalkar's Undeniable Links To Nazism, 2021, <https://hindutvawatch.org/gurujiis-lie-the-rss-and-ms-golwalkars-undeniable-links-to-nazism/>

³⁵⁶ M. S. Golwalkar, *We or Our Nationhood Defined*, 1938, Bharat Publications, Nagpur in 1939, p 55.

³⁵⁷ M. S. Golwalkar, *We or Our Nationhood Defined*, p61.

³⁵⁸ <https://www.opindia.com/2018/06/on-45-death-anniversary-the-golwalkar-was-a-fascist-who-drew-inspiration-from-nazism-propaganda-must-be-exposed/>

The current policy of the leadership of the BJP can be said to imitate the fascist policy of Hitler. Today, many experts see Narendra Modi's rule as similar to Hitler's. For example, in the 1930s, Germany passed many laws prohibiting intermarriage between communities. In India in 2018, the BJP implemented the same laws in seven states between Muslims and Hindus. The Germans in the Nuremberg Laws excluded Jews from their citizenship, and India has since adopted the CAA and, through the implementation of the NRC, intends to exclude Muslims³⁵⁹.

Atamjit Singh clearly states that Hindu nationalism is backed by ardent fascist fanatics and is a very unique weapon for them. Because the fascists, always emphasizing and elevating the "nation" and its "people", establish and show their superiority over other "nations" and "peoples". They also tend to suppress rebellion within the nation and people, calling them anti-nationalists³⁶⁰. As Umberto Eco says, the first call of a fascist is a call addressed to the invaders³⁶¹. According to political editor Kartikey Sharma, by 2024 the country will be under the ten-year rule of the authoritarian fascist regime of the BJP³⁶². But no matter how much they deny, today we see the main fascist signs. According to an article titled "Fascism Anyone?" historian Lawrence Britt, analyzed all the fascist regimes, identified 14 common characteristics. Referring to this, today's BJP party has shown such signs of fascism as: a powerful manifestation of nationalism striving for unity, identifying enemies, militarism, controlling the media, religion and the ruling elite are closely connected, contempt and suppression of intellectuals, obsession with crime and punishment, striving for political gain³⁶³.

In early 2022, Gregory Stanton, founding president of the *Genocide Watch*, says there are visible signs of Muslim genocide in India. He said that genocide does

³⁵⁹ The CAA/NRC Distilled India Suresh Kodoor,
https://www.academia.edu/42082165/The_CAA_NRC_Distilled

³⁶⁰ Atamjit Singh, Fascism and Nationalism in Today's India, p.1
https://www.academia.edu/35853865/Fascism_and_Nationalism_in_Todays_India

³⁶¹ Mohammad Alamgeer, The Shadow of Fascism on Democracy in India, 2019,
https://www.academia.edu/40880415/The_Shadow_of_Fascism_on_Democracy_in_India

³⁶² Pieter Friedrich, Disaster for Democracy: How The Modi Wave Has Flooded India With Fascism 2, 2019, <https://areomagazine.com/2019/05/28/disaster-for-democracy-how-the-modi-wave-has-flooded-india-with-fascism/>

³⁶³ Laurence W. Britt., Fascism anyone? Fourteen common characteristics, 2004,
http://coat.ncf.ca/our_magazine/links/54/54_48-49.pdf

not have to be like the mass extermination of Jews like the Germans; rather, it will take the form of mob violence slowly creeping into the minds of the majority. Indeed, in Stanton's words are true, today's situation of minorities in India is of great concern³⁶⁴. As William F. Meinecke, Jr., says: "Citizenship denial has now become an ingenious weapon used to vilify and persecute certain groups as "foreigners" to the nation. Discriminatory laws restricting certain groups from citizenship or basic services could serve as a warning sign of more extreme measures to come."³⁶⁵

India, like its neighboring country Myanmar, has amended an anti-Muslim discriminatory citizenship law. It should be noted a similar law on citizenship was adopted in 1982 in Myanmar, recognizing eight ethnic groups as "national races", which includes 135 ethnic groups³⁶⁶. But the Rohingya Muslim population has been disenfranchised, even though people live there for several generations. The government regards as illegal migrants and infiltrators from Bangladesh. Otherwise, they were required to take citizenship by naturalization through "strong evidence" that their ancestors had lived in Burma prior to its independence in 1948 - a majority that could not be provided. As a result, operations of persecution and ethnic cleansing began, and subsequently the Rohingya refugees had to migrate *en masse* and flee to neighboring countries.

Eventually, Myanmar was isolated, and the authorities were convicted of the crime of genocide by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). India has been subject to international criticism and condemnation too but is unlikely to face international isolation like Myanmar. To guard against this, it is worth understanding the CAA and its significant influence on the foreign policy and society of India. Since the sequence of the adoption of the law and the course of events in Myanmar is a good warning and a lesson for India.

³⁶⁴ Jayant Pankaj and Deshdeep Dhankhar, From Speech to Crime to Genocide, It's Clear to See How Hate Travels, The wire, 22 April 2022, <https://thewire.in/communalism/from-speech-to-crime-to-genocide-its-clear-to-see-how-hate-travels>

³⁶⁵ Ali Khan Mahmudabad, The Citizenship Amendment Act- India's Nuremberg moment, 2019, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/counterflows/the-citizenship-amendment-act-indias-nuremberg-moment/>

³⁶⁶ Bidisha Biswas, Srobana Bhattacharya, India's Citizenship Policies Find Parallels In Neighboring Myanmar, 2020, <https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2020/03/19/indias-citizenship-policies-find-parallels-in-neighboring-myanmar/>

It is worth noting that Rohingya refugees were not included in the recently passed CAA law, which proves the law is clearly discriminatory. In addition, the Indian government deported some 40,000 Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar. Thus, more contrary to the international principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits sending a person to his home state if he has a “well-founded fear of persecution” there³⁶⁷.

In addition, the CAA's current anti-Muslim immigration policy is almost similar to Trump's "travel ban" immigration policy in 2017, which became known as the "Muslim ban"³⁶⁸. The decree had strict restrictions on entry into the United States for Muslim-majority countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Later in 2020, the ban was expanded to include the following countries: Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Nigeria and Tanzania³⁶⁹. World media and politicians condemned the decree, saying it was directed against Muslims. In fact, this program was part of Trump's more comprehensive Islamophobic agenda. The White House administration dismissed the criticism, saying that this is a false interpretation, in fact, the ban is supposedly aimed only at protecting the country's border and more effectively combating the terrorist threat³⁷⁰. January 21, 2021 new President, Joe Biden canceled several decrees of his predecessor Donald Trump, including the ban on the entry of citizens from a number of Muslim and African countries into the country³⁷¹.

It is worth noting that Hindutva Nationalism is very similar to Israeli Zionism. *Zionism* is a Jewish national movement that aims to unite and revive the Jewish people in their historic homeland of Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel). Supporters of both ideologies advocate ethnic nationalism, the purpose of which is to define citizenship and one's belonging to the ancient past. Zionism and Hindutva, leaned on

³⁶⁷Shubham Verma, What India Can Learn from Myanmar's Citizenship Law, 2020, <https://www.newsclick.in/What-India-Can-Learn-from-Myanmar-Citizenship-Law>

³⁶⁸Banu Gökarıksel, The Body Politics of Trump's "Muslim Ban", *Journal of Middle East Women Studies*, 2017, p. 469

³⁶⁹Emily Cury, From the Patriot Act to the "Muslim Ban", *Claiming Belonging*, 2021, p.55

³⁷⁰K.A. Beydoun, "Muslim bans" and the (re)making of political Islamophobia, 2017, p.1741

³⁷¹Proclamation on Ending Discriminatory Bans on Entry to The United States, January 21, 2021 https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/Immigrants/Travel_Ban_Repeal_Fact_Sheet_FINAL.pdf

religious identity, require the purification of Muslims in order to achieve the desired utopia³⁷². India and Israel have significant similarities, such as: both countries had religious oppression before partition; both were colonies of the British rulers; gained independence after the WWII; and in both it was accompanied by violence, bloodshed, the generation of refugees and the exchange of population; in addition, disputed territorial problems persist³⁷³. Much of the admiration for Israel in India and their rapprochement probably comes from the perception of a common enemy. Modi and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have a shared ambition to build Suprematist democracies with one culture, one race, and one nation³⁷⁴. Non-Jews are being scapegoated and treated as second-class citizens in Israel, while Palestinian history is being appropriated and cut from the textbooks, much of this is happening in India as well.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made an official visit to Israel, becoming the first Indian leader in history to visit a Jewish state. Delhi is driven to change milestones by the desire to gain access to Israeli weapons and technologies, as well as the threat of Islamic extremism³⁷⁵. Modi has begun borrowing the Israeli model of violence, which kicks off the joint exercise of the Indian and Zionist police to fight terrorism every year since 2015³⁷⁶. Since PM Modi's official visit to Israel, seventy-five security personnel have been sent to Israel for the first time to learn the best technology and Israeli tactics used to quell the uprising, as well as the use of technology for internal security and counter-terrorism³⁷⁷. In turn, Israel not only possesses such technologies, but, along with Russia and the United States, is among

³⁷² Aamir Raza, Why the followers of Hindutva support Zionist Israel, June 10, 2021, <https://muslimmirror.com/eng/why-the-followers-of-hindutva-support-zionist-israel/>

³⁷³ Lyn Julius, Should we compare India and Israel, The Article, 2019, p.1

³⁷⁴ Hatem Bazian, Israel, India and the Islamophobic Alliance, Islamophobia Studies Center, California, 2021, p.12

³⁷⁵ Vinay Kaura, The Modi Government's Policy on Israel: The Rhetoric and Reality of De-hyphenation, Strategic Assessment, Volume 19, No. 4, 2017, p.86

³⁷⁶ PBNS, DRDO successfully test-fires Surface to Air Missile jointly developed with Israel, March 28, 2022,

<https://newsonair.com/2022/03/28/drdo-successfully-test-fires-surface-to-air-missile-jointly-developed-with-israel/>

³⁷⁷ Ely Karmon, India's Counterterrorism Cooperation with Israel, Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 16, Issue 2, p.3

the three leading partners of Delhi in the field of military-technical cooperation. India has become one of the biggest importers of Israeli weapons.

4.1.Pakistani Threat as an Influence on Anti-Muslim Sentiment

Mutual suspicions, claims and enmity have haunted Pakistan and India since the birth of the twin dominions on August 14-15, 1947. The Indo-Pakistani rivalry has been going on for eight decades and has the character of a military confrontation. Its direct result is four major military confrontations: the Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1947, 1965, 1987, 1999, as well as cross-border terrorism on the LoC in Kashmir. Both nuclear powers pose a great danger to both the region and the world³⁷⁸.

The fighting was suspended, but the confrontation between the countries continues. Even at present, the threat of terrorist activity in the Kashmir region remains, caused by tension between the countries due to religious and economic contradictions, mainly related to the construction of the CPEC along the disputed territory, as well as fears of a military confrontation³⁷⁹.

Subsequently, Pakistan and India continued to increase military power by purchasing large quantities of weapons from abroad. Pakistan made the most of the situation in neighboring Afghanistan after the revolutionary events of 1978. Its territory became a springboard for hostilities against the Afghan authorities and the Soviet troops supporting them. This provided Islamabad with multi-billion-dollar aid from the United States, Saudi Arabia and their allies³⁸⁰.

The focus of the Kashmir independence movement shifted from nationalist to Islamist. The tone in this direction was set by extremists from the Joint Jihad Council (JJC), who worked closely with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence. The OSD included such pro-Pakistani groups as Hizb ul-Mujahiddin (Party of the Mujahideen), Jamaat ul-Mujahiddin (Community of the Mujahideen), Harakat ul-Ansar

³⁷⁸Mohammad Z. I. and Shabir H., Indo-Pak wars (1948, 1965, 1971, 1999): Projecting the Nationalistic Narrative, *Journal of Political Studies*, Vol. 25, Issue - 1, 2018, p.142

³⁷⁹Ivliev I. I., *Global'nye i regional'nye aspekty Indo-Pakistanskogo konflikta* [Global and Regional Aspects Indo-Pakistan Conflict], p.96

³⁸⁰V.P.Kashin, *Pakistan, Indiya i transgranichnyi terrorizm* [Pakistan, India And Cross-Border Terrorism], 2018, p.235

(Movement of the Prophet), Al-Jihad (Holy War) and others. They were joined by Lash Kar-i-Toiba (Army of the Faithful) and later Jaish-i-Mo Hammed (Army of Muhammad). But the first to call for armed resistance was the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, which advocated a united independent Kashmir. It was and is a great honor to die for jihad in Kashmir³⁸¹.

In fact, from the very beginning of his post, Modi has named “neighbors first”, building stable relations with neighbors and above all Pakistan, as one of his priorities. Modi tried to develop and strengthen Indian-Pakistani ties through measures of mutual trust and personal contacts. However, this attempt did not justify itself. New Delhi's desire to initiate a dialogue with Islamabad invariably ran into terrorist attacks on the LoC and the Indian-Pakistani border. Such a situation fully meets the interests of a part of the military circles of Pakistan, for whom the threat from India remains a decisive factor in the leading role in the political life of the country.

New Delhi called Pakistan an “exporter of terrorism” and refused to attend the SAARC summit in Islamabad. India condemns Pakistan's interference in its internal affairs and accuses its leadership of fomenting jihad in Kashmir, supporting terrorists and supplying them with weapons. In argument, the Indian government reports that many Kashmiri militant groups still have their headquarters in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. Although these US-recognized terrorist organizations are banned by the UN, despite this they continue to maneuver under a different name³⁸². Pakistan denies this and demands that India stop its punitive operations in the Kashmir Valley, respect human rights there and hold a referendum on self-determination³⁸³.

Among the reasons for such a decisive step, one can single out the growing radicalization of Hinduism, both within the BJP itself and in Indian society, as well

³⁸¹Varnavin A.O., Vliyanie vnutripoliticheskikh izmenenii v Indii i Pakistane na Kashmirskii konflikt [The impact of internal political changes in India and Pakistan on the Kashmir conflict], St. Petersburg, 2020, pp.51-52

³⁸² Pakistan Sponsored Terrorism : Security Threat to India Pradeep Kumar 212

³⁸³ Kashin V.P., India - Pakistan: Vos'moy desyatok let voennogo protivostoyaniya // Aziya i Africa Segodnya [India - Pakistan: The Eighth Ten Years of Military Oppositions // Asia And Africa Today], - 2018. - Issue No. 6 C. 18-25

[URL: https://asaf-today.ru/s0321-50750000495-0-1-ru-8/](https://asaf-today.ru/s0321-50750000495-0-1-ru-8/)

as warning and anticipating enemies, minimizing their possible influence on the territory. The authorities are said to be in dialogue on a ceasefire with many terrorist groups.

Not surprisingly, these decisions caused sharp discontent in Pakistan, which in response accused India of violating the UN Security Council resolutions, according to which no unilateral actions of governments can change this controversial status. New Delhi claims that these measures are a purely internal affair of India. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan compared the actions of New Delhi with the actions of Nazi Germany, that India is trying by fascist methods to suppress the struggle for the freedom of the inhabitants of Kashmir and arrange "ethnic cleansing" in the state with a predominantly Muslim population. Also, Pakistan has reduced the level of diplomatic ties and stopped trade, as well as bus and rail transport between the two countries³⁸⁴.

The specificity of the unity of the peoples' inhabiting Pakistan was ensured by only one factor - Islam, which for this country is not just a religion, but the basis on which Pakistani statehood stands. And therefore, annexation of Kashmir, populated predominantly by Muslims, is practically a sacred goal for Pakistan, just like accession to Pakistan is for many Kashmiris. Pakistan's main fears are that the subsequent policy of the Indian authorities will be aimed at changing this situation, for example, by resettling representatives of other religions in the union territory, which will sharply proportionally reduce the number of people who want to join Pakistan. This, in turn, deprives Pakistan of the hope that the principle of the right of nations to self-determination can one day be applied in Kashmir, for example, in the form of voting under the auspices of the UN³⁸⁵.

³⁸⁴ Andrey Chistov, "Eta Voina stanet poslednei": krizis vokrug Dzhammu i Kashmira ["This war will be the last": the Jammu and Kashmir crisis], August 12, 2019, https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2019/08/12_a_12574525.shtml?updated

³⁸⁵ Martynova Daria, *Indiya - Pakistan - Kitay: Uzel Protivorechiy* [India - Pakistan - China: The Interweaving Of Discords], 2021, Pp. 104-106

On the one hand, it is understandable why Pakistan reacts so negatively, since Islamabad will no longer have cards left to play in Kashmir³⁸⁶. The Pakistani state must be confronted with the fact that the policy of using proxy terrorists to further its interests is now a completely self-defeating policy³⁸⁷. If the Kashmir conflict is resolved according to India's plan, then, as Angela Stanzel says, the government of Pakistan, especially the military, are afraid of being insignificant, ignored, of not playing any role. And conflict is a way to get more benefits like attention, support, influence and etc³⁸⁸. Prior to that, terrorists roam freely around Pakistan and preach hate speech and incite terrorist attacks. In this hopeless situation, Pakistan counted on the support of Muslims around the world, but these calculations did not materialize: the UAE, the Maldives and Bangladesh sided with India, and Saudi Arabia, Iran, Malaysia and Turkey made formal statements avoiding direct criticism. Unlike Muslim countries, Pakistan supported China, stating that it is unacceptable to unilaterally change the status of disputed territories in view of the UN resolution.

The interaction between political parties and terrorist groups in India is characterized by several unique features, namely the interaction of one of the main political parties (such as BJP) with organizations indirectly associated with terrorist activities, a wide range of actors involved in this process, a significant influence of the factor of broad public support to the interaction process. Where, with the connection of the RCC with various "saffron" terrorist groups and the participation of its representatives in terrorist acts, they are not particularly hidden and have been repeatedly banned. They are accused of numerous Muslim pogroms, explosions and other acts of violence.

³⁸⁶ Kunwar Khuldune Shahid, The End of Article 370: How Pakistan Surrendered Kashmir, The Diplomat, August 06, 2019 <https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/the-end-of-article-370-how-pakistan-surrendered-kashmir/>

³⁸⁷ Nandan Unnikrishnan, Indiya vs Pakistan: kak rozdaetsa istoriya pobeda [India vs Pakistan: how victory history is made], 2019, <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/indiya-vs-pakistan/>

³⁸⁸ Elena Kurenkova, Luda Kornievich, The end of independent Kashmir. How India cancels the autonomy of a troubled state on the border with Pakistan, hromadske, August 8, 2019 <https://hromadske.ua/ru/posts/konec-samostoyatel'nogo-kashmira-kak-indiya-otmenyaet-avtonomiyu-problemnogo-shtata-na-granice-s-pakistanom>

But with the coming to power of the BJP, the influence of the RSS only increased and continues to grow for quite a long time in India.³⁸⁹



³⁸⁹ Leonid A. Chernyshev, *Osobennosti vzaimodeistviya politicheskikh partii i terroristicheskikh organizatsiy v Indii na sovremennom etape* [Features of political parties and terrorist organizations interaction in India at the present stage], *Society: politics, economics, law*, № 8., 2021, pp. 28–29

CONCLUSION

Religion can be and is used by politics as a means of maintaining power. It is the religious factor that becomes one of the most convenient when used for political purposes to justify violence and aggression. Physical coercion, violence or the threat of violence and the manipulation of people's minds are becoming increasingly important role in India.

The rise of Hindu nationalism also provides strong support for Samuel Huntington's famous "clash of civilizations" theory: after all, Modi and Hindu nationalists insist precisely that Hindu India, not only religiously and culturally, but also politically, is a separate civilization that is in clear or potential conflict with other civilizations.

For a long time, Hindu nationalists remained in the shadows. This is due to the fact that most of the 75 years that have passed since India gained independence, power in the country was concentrated in the hands of the INC, which largely inherited the ideas of Mahatma Gandhi. The INC has always been aimed at maintaining national and religious balance, advocating a secular and pluralistic India. At the same time, the descendants of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of independent India, continued (and continue to be) in the leadership of the INC.

Of course, today in the political course there are significant deviations of the Bharatiya Janata Party from the traditional foreign policy course in comparison with the usual policy pursued by the INC. Modi's administration priority goal is to restore the Hindu Rashtra, the Hindu nation, the revival of Hindu culture. The idea of creating a state of the Hindu Rashtra fully met the interests of the Hindu majority, and the lack of political experience led to the fact that since the 1980s, the ideology of Hindutva ("Hinduness") has become a key one in the activities of Hindu politicians, the ideological core of propaganda, the legal cover for any discriminatory actions, directed against national minorities. The RSS undoubtedly still plays a decisive role in countering the secular constitutional foundations of India. Secularism and tolerance under the rule of Hindu nationalists in modern India present a complex and largely contradictory picture.

Islamophobia and continued discrimination against India's Muslims are characteristics of contemporary Indian politics. Anti-Muslim sentiment is politically motivated and is part of the electoral strategy of major nationalist political parties, including the BJP. As we can see, the course of Narendra Modi's government is carried out with the participation of his associates in the BJP and like-minded Sangh Parivar. Muslim discrimination has intensified under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the ruling BJP, which has been pursuing a Hindu nationalist agenda since its election to power in 2014. The current sectarian policy pursued by Modi is characterized by the use of Islamophobic rhetoric and attempts to change historical facts, discriminatory migration policies, condemnation of interfaith marriages.

Muslims and Christians fear for their future as a result of the activities of nationalist organizations, primarily the RSS. While Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists are not attacked as they are considered part of India because their faith originated in the country. The pursuing goal of the Sangh Parivar is to completely cleanse India of Muslims and of all centuries-old traces of the presence of Islamic civilization in it. Their big dream is homogeneous Hindu society. Since they follow the Sarvarkar ideology of the Hindutva, according to him Hindustan is exclusively a civilization of Hinduism and not Islam.

Muslims may consider India as their homeland, but Hindu Indians can never consider them children of India. Despite the fact that, most of the Muslims of India are the descendants of Hindus who, for one reason or another, converted to another faith. As the Indian historian S. Kaviraja correctly stated, in fact, today's formed national state of India is rather the successor not of modern European states, but of the empires that existed on the territory of India in the pre-colonial era.

The RSS are also inspired by the fascist views of Golwalkar, where he offered two ways out of the situation: either the lowering of the status of non-Hindus, or their destruction. The history of mankind knows many such alternatives, when the idea of renunciation of their own cultural identity, of their "foreign mentality" is imposed on minorities, and instead a variant of a common national life is offered in favor of the

majority according to the principle “who is not with us is against us”. The re-election of the BJP in the parliamentary elections of 2019 gave a huge opportunity to fulfill the unfinished mission and unfulfilled dream of the Hindu Rashtra. This is evidenced by a number of absurd and unfounded anti-Muslim laws and Islamophobic measures adopted in 2019: CoronoJihad, repeal of the Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir, Supreme Court decision to transfer disputed lands of Ayodhya to Lord Ram Hindu Temple public trust, protests against the National Population Register, National Citizens Register and transition to Citizenship Act Amendment. The marginalization of Muslims continues in all spheres: in social, political, legal, educational, even in the medical field.

With the advent of BJP, the position of India is fundamentally transformed, from secular to populist, from tolerant to intolerant, from internationalism to nationalist, a crisis in democracy, anti-constitutional actions, militarization, a fascist direction.

Modi as a religious player is using religion to manipulate the masses for his own interest. He and his party intend to win the upcoming elections in 2024, for this they are doing everything possible. For example, the current government of India is actively seeking to change the demographic situation in the region in order to reduce the Islamic population. Having abolished the special status of J&K, where Muslims predominate, the new regime is designed to change the demographic structure of the region through the active resettlement of Hindus into it. The Modi government, on the one hand, under the CAA law, opens the country for the resettlement of representatives of conditional Hindu cults from neighboring countries, and on the other hand, passes NRC laws that deprive millions of Muslims who have been living in India for decades of Indian citizenship. In the project Gar Wapasi encourages the conversion of Muslims and Christians from the lower castes by luring or forcibly back to Hinduism. By restoring the temple of Rama in Ayodhya, banning the purchase and eating of cows and bulls, they are trying to win the trust of the Hindu population. With such bills, today's elite intend to reduce the number of minorities and maintain the superiority of the Hindu majority. Thus, the BJP, together with the RSS, is gradually expanding its influence in all states. The political goal here is that thanks to the multiplication of its supporters, win the upcoming elections of 2024.

Moreover, the year 2025 will mark a major milestone in Indian history as it marks the centenary of the birth of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (1925), the Hindu supremacist organization to which the Modi and most of his senior leaders belong. These people would very much like to mark their centenary with other milestones. And the work to achieve it has already begun in earnest. This may explain the sudden acceleration of violent activity.

The current Modi administration is very much focused on the Muslim minority, even though India has important serious problems in domestic and foreign policy. Summing up, we note that, based on the history of the Jewish-Muslim confrontation, it is obvious: it is unlikely that it can stop as long as there are representatives of the opposing side, whether it will be about extermination or voluntary acceptance of the faith.

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