

**T.C.  
NECMETTİN ERBAKAN UNIVERSITY  
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND  
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

**IMPACT CAPACITY OF THINK TANKS IN TURKEY**

**NİYAZİ KARABULUT**

**MASTER'S THESIS**

**SUPERVISOR:  
PROF. DR. ÖNDER KUTLU**

**KONYA-2019**

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Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Müdürlüğü



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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this study.

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## ABSTRACT

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**This thesis analyzes impact capacities of think tanks in Turkey. It primarily seeks to find answer to the question of whether there is a think tank culture in Turkey or not. After defining the concept of think tank, historical development and typologies of think tanks are debated. The thesis looks at the development and expansion of think tanks in and outside Turkey in terms of their size and fields of work. It also tries to find out to whom the think tanks are serving and which financial resources and functions they have in Turkey. Finally, this thesis has the final aim of measuring impact capacities of think tanks operating in Turkey in order to find their effectiveness and efficiencies and also to develop ideas for enhancing their capacities. As a conclusion, impact capacity of think tanks operating in Turkey was found insufficient and some suggestions was made for enhancing their impact capacity.**

**Keywords: think tanks, think tank culture, impact capacity, policy making process, Turkey**

## ÖZ

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Tezin Adı	Türkiye’de Düşünce Kuruluşlarının Karar Alma Süreçlerine Etki Kapasitesi			

**Bu tez Türkiye’deki düşünce kuruluşlarının etki kapasitelerini analiz etmektedir. Öncelikle Türkiye’de bir düşünce kuruluşu kültürü olup olmadığı sorusuna cevap vererek düşünce kuruluşlarının Türkiye’deki konumlarını ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu kapsamda “think tank” yani düşünce kuruluşu kavramı tanımlanarak hem Türkiye’de hem de dünyada düşünce kuruluşlarının tarihsel gelişimleri hakkında bilgi verilmektedir. Ancak, temel olarak bu çalışma Türkiye’de faaliyet gösteren düşünce kuruluşlarının hem topluma yönelik olarak hem de siyasa süreçlerine yönelik olarak etkilerinin ölçülmesini amaçlamaktadır. Böylece düşünce kuruluşlarının etkinliği ve etkililiği açısından bir fikir edinilmeye ve etki kapasitelerinin artırılması için fikir yürütmeye çalışılmaktadır. Sonuç olarak ise Türkiye’de faaliyet gösteren düşünce kuruluşlarının etki kapasitelerinin düşük bir seviyede olduğu tespit edilmiş ve bu sorunun çözümü için önerilerde bulunulmuştur.**

**Anahtar Kelimeler: düşünce kuruluşları, düşünce kuruluşu kültürü, etki kapasitesi, siyasa yapım süreci, Türkiye**



To my family

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ALT</b>	Association for Liberal Thinking
<b>API</b>	Application Programming Interface
<b>APM</b>	Ankara Policy Center
<b>ASAM</b>	Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies
<b>AYBU</b>	Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University
<b>BAUSAM</b>	Bahçeşehir University Strategic Research Center
<b>CDI</b>	China Development Institute
<b>CIGI</b>	Centre for International Governance Innovation
<b>CRS</b>	Congressional Research Service
<b>CSJ</b>	The Center for Social Justice
<b>DIF</b>	Foreign Policy Forum
<b>DPA</b>	Foreign Policy Institute
<b>DPT</b>	State Planning Organization
<b>EAF</b>	Economic Research Forum
<b>Ed.</b>	Editor
<b>EDAM</b>	The Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies
<b>EEC</b>	European Economic Community
<b>ERI</b>	Education Reform Initiative
<b>ESAM</b>	Economic and Social Research Center
<b>ESI</b>	European Stability Initiative
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EuroMeSCo</b>	Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission
<b>FES</b>	Friedrich Ebert Foundation
<b>FETÖ</b>	Fetullahist Terrorist Organization
<b>FSB</b>	Fabian Society of Britain
<b>GDN</b>	Global Development Network

<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GGTTT</b>	Global Go To Think Tank
<b>GPoT</b>	Global Political Trends Center
<b>GRADE</b>	The Group for the Analysis of Development
<b>IAV</b>	Economic Research Foundation
<b>ICCG</b>	International Center for Climate Governance Page
<b>IIA</b>	Institute for International Problems
<b>IKV</b>	Economic Development Foundation
<b>IPC</b>	Istanbul Policy Center
<b>IPIS</b>	Iranian Institute for Political and International Studies
<b>ISS</b>	Institute for Security Studies
<b>İÜSAM</b>	İstanbul University Strategic Research Center
<b>KAS</b>	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
<b>MENA</b>	Middle East and North Africa
<b>METU</b>	Middle East Technical University
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>NIRA</b>	Nomura and Mitsubishi Research Institutes and National Institute for Research Advancement
<b>No.</b>	Number
<b>OECD</b>	The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>ORSAM</b>	Center for Middle Eastern Studies
<b>OTT</b>	On Think Tanks
<b>p.</b>	Page
<b>RSF</b>	Russell Sage Foundation
<b>RUSI</b>	Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies
<b>SAEMK</b>	National Committee for Strategic Research and Studies
<b>SAM</b>	Center for Strategic Studies
<b>SAREM</b>	Strategic Research and Study Center

<b>SDE</b>	Institute of Strategic Thinking
<b>SETA</b>	Political, Economic and Social Research Foundation
<b>SSN</b>	Strategic Studies Network
<b>TASAM</b>	Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies
<b>TEGV</b>	The Foundation of Turkish Education Volunteers
<b>TEPAV</b>	Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey Page
<b>TESAM</b>	Center for Economic, Political and Strategic Research
<b>TESEV</b>	Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
<b>TGNA</b>	Turkish Grand National Assembly
<b>TOBB</b>	The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
<b>TOBB ETU</b>	TOBB Economy and Technology University
<b>TOG</b>	The Foundation of Community Volunteers
<b>TTCSP</b>	Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program
<b>TUSAM</b>	National Security Strategies Research Center of Turkey
<b>TÜSİAD</b>	Turkish Industry and Business Association
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNFCCC</b>	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>USAK</b>	International Strategic Research Organization
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>USTAD</b>	International Strategic Analysis and Research
<b>YÖK</b>	The Higher Education Board of Turkey
<b>VGM</b>	The General Directorate of Foundations of Turkey
<b>YTB</b>	Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities

## INTRODUCTION

We are living in a world which is characterized as 'Information Age'. Within this conjuncture, there is need for the reliable and correct information for the process of public policy formulation and policy making process. In this contemporary time when information sources are diversified and complexified as time passes by, it is vitally important to get the information from the right source and at the right time. At this point, it is known that there are various sources of getting reliable and applicable information that decision makers from all over the world can use, think tank organizations also became widespread (Bağcı and Aydın, 2009:57). In the recent times, beside the decision makers, think tanks gained a rising value for public discourse by its means of reaching information. Nevertheless, attention has been attracted because there are not much studies in the area of think tanks despite they have gradually become widespread and they have started to play important roles in policy making processes of many countries. As Turkey is concerned, think tank organizations in Turkey are not so active as the parts of the world. Therefore, in comparison with the other countries, studies on think tanks remained at a low level. But in the same time, there is a gradual increase in the number of studies on think tanks because of the increasing trends in the number of think tank organizations in Turkey since the beginning of 2000s. Despite the increase of think tanks in number, there is a very limited literature on think tanks in Turkey (Aras et. al., 2010: 175). In this context, it is obvious to say that it is vital to improve think tank culture and in order to do this, there is a need for study to improve this culture in Turkey.

Think tanks are known as organizations that offer suggestions and produce reports on many issues concerned with countries such as politics, economy, security, social policy, foreign policy, culture, strategy and so through. It is also possible to categorize these organizations as research institutes that are involve in the development of countries, regions and the whole world. Generally, they have been established to carry out research activities, to introduce policy proposals, and to raise strategies which could be evaluated by politicians and governments in social and political life. They also aim to raise public awareness and take part in decision-making processes (McGann, 2014: 12). In this context, think tank organizations have

an important place in contemporary political and social life. Think tank organizations are important for the democratic systems to function well and for the enhancement of participation. Therefore, in this study, the effort has been made to examine the development of think tank culture in Turkey and to identify shortcomings of this development phase. Keeping all these views into account, this study focuses on the evolution of think tanks in Turkey by highlighting the problems they encountered. Outcome of this study is to make a contribution to the development of think tank culture in Turkey by discovering their impact capacities.

Think tank organizations are considered as permanent and essential elements of democracies of developed countries in recent years. In this sense, Turkey, as a developing country, is required to integrate think tanks in its political system by taking into account the practices of developed countries and introducing new strategies which are appropriate to its internal dynamics. In addition, it is regarded as a prerequisite for the establishment and continuity of think tanks in Turkey, it should be encouraged think tanks to be established, to be active, to be respected by decision-makers and society, and to be involved them in policy-making processes. Based upon the examples of developed countries, it is important for think tanks to play the necessary roles in the country in terms of ensuring democratic development. In Turkey, think tanks are still gradually evolving. In recent years, some positive developments have been noted increase in the number of think tanks in Turkey have been observed. However, when it is compared to the countries where think tanks are more active, it should be stated that the developments did not reach to the expected level. Economic, political, social, cultural and many other factors can be cited for the lack of growth of think tank culture. Therefore, it can be stated that, in Turkey, the importance of think tanks has not yet fully perceived. They did not receive sufficient support from the state, government, and private sector. Keeping all of these into account, it is obvious that it is necessary to be studied on the topic in order to find the ways to develop think tanks in the country.

In this study, a general framework about think tanks has been drawn for the purposes and targets mentioned above. First chapter deals primarily with the question of what does think tank mean. Second; historical development of think tanks,

different classification methods on typologies of think tanks, and their roles, significance and impacts have been revealed. In addition, a comprehensive literature review has also been given under all of these titles. A general idea about the questions of what a think tanks is, how they showed up and grew within the historical context, what their aims and objectives are, why they are needed in social and political fields of a country, and what their organizational features are. All of these issues are also discussed in the first chapter.

The second chapter deals with the question of what is the meaning of think tanks for Turkey. Then; historical development, significance, impacts, capacities, and roles of think tanks in Turkey is also discussed in detail. In this way, the development of think tank culture in Turkey has been analyzed. Historical development of think tanks in Turkey has been divided into two parts as the beginning of the history of think tanks in Turkey and their expansions in the country. After that, different typologies of think tanks operating in Turkey have been explained under seven different titles. Within this context, the roles and functions of think tanks in Turkey have been mentioned. Their significance and impacts on Turkey have been tried to be explained by considering all of previously explained features of them. Finally, in the second chapter, organizational structures and financial statues of think tanks in Turkey have been explained.

Lastly, in the third chapter, different ways of measuring impacts of think tanks have been discussed. For this reason, former studies have been analyzed in terms of how they processed think tanks' impacts or impact capacities. Then, the methodologies which were used within those studies have been evaluated in terms of their results and success. A methodological design has been formed in order to evaluate impact capacities of think tanks in Turkey. Within the design of this study, problems which have been faced while measuring the impact of think tanks and the solutions which are offered to those problems have been explained. By examining all of these issues, the aim is to provide an answer to the question of how they can have more impact on both public and policy processes. Therefore, a group of indicators of impact capacity of think tanks have been determined and deeply analyzed within the context of think tanks operating in Turkey. This study has been done by applying

both quantitative and qualitative approaches, impact capacities of think tanks have been measured under 10 different categories by using different research methods. Then, a measurement has been developed under a standardized score of 10 for each of indicators. Finally, impact capacity of think tanks in Turkey have been evaluated out of 100 points as quantitatively. Therefore, it can be argued that the final outcome of this study reflects the overall impact capacity of think tanks in Turkey.



## I

### GENERAL FRAMEWORK ON THINK TANKS

Think tanks are becoming more and more widespread all over the world and they became informal actors to play the roles in the policy making processes of many countries in the world. It is estimated that there are around 8000 think tanks in the world (McGann, 2018: 3). Think tanks have a potential to play important roles in the policy-making process. Emergence of think tanks began in 1960's, since they have been in a position to increase their influence in formulating government policies across the world, especially in the areas of foreign policy and international relations. However, there is no definite and generally accepted definition of the concept of think tank. For this reason, there are also some problems in the definition of the term in Turkish. There are many different translations of the "Think tank" concept in Turkish, therefore, there is no common definition of the phrase of the think tanks in Turkey (Bağcı and Aydın, 2009: 59). However, the most widely accepted translation is "thought organization (düşünce kuruluşu)". The existence of many different definitions of the "think tank" concept in the world literature lies at the basis of this problem. Definitions of the concept of think tank are getting changed frequently, therefore many different organizations are included or left out of the scope of think tanks. From this point of view, it is necessary to deal with different definitions of the concept and then by examining different definitions, we are required to identify the accepted definition of think tanks in this study.

#### 1.1. Defining the Concept of Think Tank

The idea of think tanks differs from each other in terms of their human resources, economic resources, working areas, types of dependency or independency, political culture of the country or region where they were established, their purposes, objectives, and many other characteristics. Therefore, definitions of think tanks shape within the context of how they manage their financial requirements, how they harmonize with the culture of the country where they are situated, how they decide their personnel policy, and how they carry other qualifications in particular. At the

same time, the referred qualifications have been designed to enhance functionality, performance, capacity of influence, and to improve working conditions of the think tank organizations. As a result of all of these, there is no single definition that completely portrays the concept of think tank; therefore, it can be argued that every definition of think tanks should be examined. In consequence of the differences and similarities between different definitions of think tanks. Think tanks vary from each other due to existence of several definitions, therefore their works and areas of interest also differs from each other. Likewise, some definitions include many think tank organizations but some of them do not include the same organizations.

When getting to the origin of the concept of the think tank, it is seen that the concept was used for the first time in the US for military purposes. That is, the main of establishing think tanks was to develop military strategies in era of World War II (Weaver and McGann, 2000: 2). Later, the meaning of the concept of think tank has enlarged. With passing time, they are not only active in military field but the concept also includes organizations which were established to develop strategies in many different fields. In other words, it can be argued that think tanks are the thought institutes and the fields of generating ideas that are developed to produce specific strategies. From this point of view, it can be said that similarities between all of the definitions of think tanks show that they are organizations of thought and strategy making. However, although they produce specific types of strategies, think tanks do not take part in the implementation processes of these strategies. As a result of this, the transmission of the produced strategies, information, or policy recommendations to the politicians and decision makers stands out as the main function of the think tanks. As far second main characteristic is concerned, the works of think tanks should be directed towards decision makers and those who are involved in implementation of these decisions. From these two basic features, it is known that the think tank institutions are primarily aimed to influence decision makers while they are framing their policies. After highlighting common points, many different definitions of think tanks can be generated in terms of the different missions, working areas, methods, and other features assigned with them. Because, it can be argued on their basic and invariant characteristics, think tanks are similar with many

other organizations in terms of definition, so expansion of the scope of definition is a necessity.

When its main characteristics have been examined, it seems that think tanks can be confused with strategic and policy-producing government agencies, consulting firms, university based strategy development units, interest groups, and many other similar organizations. Stone (1996: 14), by examining the distinctive features of think tanks that distinguish them from other institutions that study on policy making and strategy, discussed them under six different titles. For Stone, think tanks differ firstly because they are independent and persistent in their studies. Other organizations often function depending on a specific scheme or in a project-based manner. Secondly, think tanks can independently determine their own research areas. They are not obliged to comply with state directives, government programs, or the interests of specific groups. The third difference is that they are policy oriented. They shape their studies on building policy recommendations on specific issues and only focus on their profession; they do not take part in the implementation of these policies. As the fourth distinctive feature, Stone expresses that think tanks are public interest organizations. Because they do not work for the benefit of specific communities, interest groups, or social classes; they work for the general interest of the public. They do not work on any interests other than the public benefit because they are non-profit-making and self-employed organizations. As the fifth difference, stating that specializing in the field and having professionalism is a distinctive feature for think-tanks, Stone lastly stated that think tanks differed from other institutions with the outputs they set forth. By explaining all these distinctive features; he defines the think tanks as non-profit-oriented and specialized productive institutions for internal and external politics acting independent entity that has nothing to do with the state, political parties, governments, interest groups, and similar authorities.

There is no ambiguity in the definition of think tanks when it is described by its differentiations from the organizations working in the same fields or working in other fields but producing similar studies. However, the understanding of think tank varies depending on the region, geography, and political and institutional culture of

the country in which they emerged. Because these factors significantly affect the function, capacities, and activities of the think tanks in policy making processes (Zariç, 2012). For example, some American experts consider research institutions and strategy development units working within the state body as think tanks (Robinson, 1992: 182), and some experts consider research centers working in universities as think tanks (Polsby, 1983: 15). When examined from a different perspective, in some studies, think tanks are considered as non-governmental organizations, while in some studies it is argued that they cannot be considered as non-governmental organizations.

When several definitions related to think tanks are examined, similarities and differences can be analyzed better. The definitions of some academicians who are specialized in the field of think tanks are clarifying this issue. Weaver and McGann (2000:5) define think tanks as political research organizations that highly autonomous from social interests such as state, private companies, interest groups, and political parties. Also, in the first “Think Tank Index Report” published in 2009, McGann (2009: 7) defines think tanks as *“public policy research, analysis and engagement institutions that generate policy-oriented research, analysis and advice on domestic and international issues that enable policymakers and the public to make informed decisions about public policy issues”*. Hames and Feasy (1994:216) have given the general definition of think tanks as non-profit research institutes of public policy with significant organizational autonomy. James (1993: 492) stated that think tanks are independent organizations that conduct interdisciplinary studies in order to influence public policies. On the other hand, for Andrew Rich (2001: 11), they are independent, non-profit, and unsparing political organizations that produce ideas in areas where they are experts in order to influence the policy making processes and support or criticize the policies that are produced. Finally, considering Abelson's definition, he defines think tanks as research-based institutes whose main objectives are to influence public policies and public opinion that are non-profit and neutral but ideologically capable of influencing public policies (Abelson, 1996: 10).

There are many different definitions of think tanks in the social science literature. As mentioned earlier, these definitions may vary from each other due to

regional and cultural characteristics. A broad definition of think tank can be made by examining given definitions: Think tanks are independent, neutral but ideological centers of policy making, research, and strategy that are non-profit; non-partisan; established in order to do research and to make certain studies as a result of these researches; aiming to be effective in decision making processes via their studies; also aiming to inform the public and raising awareness of public about their studies. In this study, think tanks are discussed over this broad definition as possible in order to get more comprehensive results by including more organizations.

## **1.2. Historical Development of Think Tanks**

The concept of think tank that has been discussed above is a concept that showed up with the beginning of the 20th century and started to be used for organizations established in the time of the World War II (Smith, 1993: 15-17). However, the first think tanks in history had been established in the early 19th century (Ediger, 2009: 200). The concept of think tank was a term used to refer to organizations that produced military strategies in 1950s. Since 1950s onwards, it started to gain its current meaning. Since then, especially in the United States and European countries, many think tank establishments have begun to emerge.

Fundamentally, the history of think tanks can be traced back to the fact that the sharp lines between the legislative and the executive created a set of impediments for producing policy (McGann, 2007: 4). Yet, it should also be noted that the political, social, economic conditions, corporate culture and norms, and social and political culture of each country have created different results in terms of the emergence and development of think tanks. The functions of think tanks and their influence in the policy processes have been determined according to these variables. By considering from this point of view, each country has specified the missions and functions of think tanks in line with its own conditions and enabled them to be integrated within their political system. On the other hand, it is possible to say that think tanks are more developed and spread in countries where culture of civil society, freedom of thought, and democratic culture are settled. In addition, according to

Köseoğlu and Köktaş (2017: 539), democratic and liberal system must be established in order to build think tanks and to maintain their existence.

The expansion of the think tanks in the world, the increase in their numbers, and increase in their power of influence has been linked to some global developments. These global developments are examined through three different breakpoints (Altınbaş, 2009: 23). First of all, it is thought that the importance of security for the states in the post-World War II period is a springboard in the history of think tanks. In this period, the number and importance of the think tanks which were focused on foreign policy issues in the fields of security and international relations have increased significantly. Secondly, it is known that, with the end of the Cold War era, inter-state relations became more complex, and as a result, the need for think tanks increased. Because the end of the bipolar world order has profoundly influenced states' understanding of security and foreign policy strategies, and think tanks have played an important role in establishing and maintaining the new order. Lastly, the increase of the importance of international studies as a result of the loss of importance of the boundaries arising with the effect of globalization is shown as the last breaking point; because, the problems faced by states and governments have increased and diversified in the globalized world. Besides, globalization has increased the capacity of non-governmental elements to influence policies and the number of actors in the solution of the problems that go beyond national boundaries and become global. The diversification of the actors involved in the policy processes, the diversification of the problems, and the globalization of these problems have led to a complexity in the solutions to be developed for these problems. The need for think tanks has increased continuously due to these complexities, and it has become inevitable that think tanks become an important actor in policy processes (Altınbaş, 2009: 25).

For Ediger (2009: 200), the first think tanks in the world were founded in the United Kingdom of Great Britain in the 19th century. Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies (RUSI) founded in 1831 and Fabian Society of Britain (FSB) founded in 1884 are generally accepted as the first think tanks in the history. Ediger (2009: 201) stated that, however, the actual development began in the

early 20th century with the establishment of Russell Sage Foundation (RSF) in the United States in 1907. However, the idea that the first think tanks were established in the UK is not a widely accepted view. The number of scholars who accept the organizations that were established in the US in order to develop military strategies in 1900s as the first think tanks are in majority. With respect to Nakamura (2000), more comprehensively, Fabian Society founded in England in 1884, Russell Sage Foundation founded in 1907 in the USA, Hamburg Institute for Economic Research founded in Germany in 1908, and the Brookings Institution founded in 1916 in the USA are the oldest think tanks in history (Rich, 2004). However, as far as the discussion of where they arose, it cannot be denied that the fact that the most important think tank center in the world is the United States from the very beginnings. It is confirmed by many scholars that the US is one of the countries that preparing the most suitable ground for the development and effectiveness of think tanks in terms of its political structure and the party system which does not have a strict discipline. On the other hand, its huge economic power, the privileges that the tax system provides to the non-governmental organizations, developed culture of donation, and the existence of large entrepreneurs investing in the information have made the US a center for think tanks (Stone, 2004: 5-6).

Even there is not a common name which think tank has been established first in the world but there is a general acceptance about the extent to when think tank organizations became widespread worldwide. The emergence of the need for think tanks in the aftermath of the World War II and their spread in various regions are accepted as starting points (Yemen and Gül, 2013: 516-517), and the period when they had become widespread is accepted as the post-Cold War period. In addition, with the end of the Cold War, the perception and understanding towards think tanks began to change. In fact, the think tanks that first emerged as organizations producing military strategies have expanded their fields of work and have started to gain their current meaning after the World War II. By the way, after the Cold War, many new topics such as human rights, environmental problems, economic-political and social rights have been added to the working areas of think tanks and they have gained lots of new meanings (Karabulut, 2010: 94).

**Table 1. Number of Think Tanks Established by Period**

<b>Period</b>	1900-1910	1910-1920	1920-1930	1930-1940	1940-1950	1950-1960	1960-1970	1970-1980	1980-1990	1990-2000	TOTAL
<b>Think Tanks Established</b>	18	25	42	42	120	213	367	612	1001	1422	3862

(McGann, 2013: 17)

It can be observed from Table 1 that the number of think tanks established per year has shown a continuously increasing trend. While the average of think tanks established per year was 1.8 between the years 1900 and 1910, it has become 142.2 between the years 1990 and 2000. However, it can be seen from the table that there were some breaking points for the increase of think tank establishments. The number of think tanks established between 1900 and 1940 is almost the same with the numbers between the years 1940 and 1950. That is, 1940's can be interpreted as a breaking point. Also, as another breaking point, a great increase can be observed beginning with the 1970's. Then, it has continued to increase in number and has reached a total number of 3862 at the end of the 1990's.

It can be seen that think tanks are spreading all over the world since the 1970's. McGann says that 2/3 of all think tanks around the world have been established since 1970 and more than half of them have been established after the year 1980 (McGann, 2013: 14). Besides the US, the EU Commission's encouragement for the emergence of new think tanks in Europe had an impact on the increase in the number of think tanks in Europe. Moreover, according to Boucher et al. (2004: 9), the fall of totalitarian regimes in Spain, Portugal, and Greece in the 1970s and political changes in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 allowed the development of think tanks in Europe. In this context, Gdansk Institute and Adam Smith Institute in Poland, Market Institute in Lithuania, and Economic Institute in Hungary are think tanks came in existence after 1989 in Europe. At the same time, Nomura and Mitsubishi Research Institutes and National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) in Japan and Korean Development Institute in South Korea were established in the Northeast Asia (Aydın, 2006: 22; Bağcı and Aydın, 2009: 67).

The number of think tanks has increased considerably in the post-Cold War period as a result of the expansion of their study areas, the need to reorganize interstate political relations, the states' willingness to take part in the new order, and as well as the think tanks gaining well recognition in the field of politics. In addition, in response to the need, think tanks diversified their activities and began to gain more visibility. Abelson (2002: 10) has called the think tanks before this period as like “universities minus students” because after Cold War they have expanded their fields of activity, published journals and books, and gained an informative mission in order to appeal to a wider audience. In this context, Abelson (2004) explained the historical development of think tanks in different periods. He said firstly that at the beginning of the 20th century, only the US and several Western European countries had think tank organizations and these were organizations that were funded by strong foundations such as the Ford and the Rockefeller Foundation with a large number of staff and budgets. The aim of those first think tanks was to improve knowledge and professionalize management processes (Abelson, 2004: 218). Secondly, it is stated that during the period of the World War II and Cold War, think tanks emerged across Europe and in OECD countries (Aydın, 2006: 20). In this period, think tanks were generally focused on internal and external security issues. The most prominent organization which reflects the character of this period is the US-based Rand Corporation (1948) which mainly produced research for the US military (Weaver: 1989: 566). It is thirdly asserted that, after the 70's and especially after the end of Cold War era, the existence of think tanks has spread to South East Asia, to Latin America, to the developing countries in the Arabian Peninsula and Africa. In this period, the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the European Commission and various international private funds had supported the development of think tanks in the countries in above mentioned regions. These organizations have played an important role in exporting the Western liberal values and market economy logic in the countries where they are located (Stone, 2004: 4).

Think tanks that have developed in the post-Cold War period have experienced a big leap forward with the increasing impacts of globalization. Because

globalization has made the world more complex and incomprehensible. As mentioned before, in such a period when the problems and the solutions created a more complex situation, the importance of the think tanks has been boomed. As a matter of fact, in case of such a chaos, it became clear that the bureaucratic cadres and the outmoded problem solving methods of classical state institutions cannot be successful (Sönmez, 2009: 492). At this point, non-state actors and new methods had to come into play. The think tanks which have qualified human resources and sources of information to create new strategies were effective in those times in solving problems, producing new strategies, and policy making processes. During this period, many governments have encouraged building of think tanks in order to meet the needs of the processed information and policy proposals (Karabulut, 2010). Moreover, as the most important aspect of this period, think tanks began to gain a capacity to do transnational activities. Due to impact of globalization; political, economic, social, and other problems have started to show an international character, communication and transportation technologies have developed, and in parallel, think tanks have become more prone to transnational mobility, cooperation, and joint research. As a natural result of all these, there are thousands of think tanks around the world today. In the first times, due to influence of the World War II and the Cold War, think tanks, which focused more on issues such as security, foreign policy and international relations; have spread to a wide range of areas in recent years and have started to have a voice in decision-making mechanisms in many different areas.

As a result of the above mentioned factors and developments, the number of think tanks in the world has continued to increase after the year 2000. It is stated by McGann (2013: 17) that 486 think tanks had been established between the years 2000 and 2007. Then, beginning with the year 2008, as McGann began to publish *Global Go To Think Tank Reports* annually. Table 2 is prepared with the data taken from these reports. In the reports, the total number of think tanks in the world has shared annually. When the numbers analyzed, it has been observed that the increase number of think tanks around the world between 2008 and 2018 is 2697. That is, when compared with the data given in Table 1, it should be stated that the trend of increase has still continuing.

**Table 2: Number of Think Tanks Worldwide 2008-2018**

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Number of Think Tanks Worldwide<sup>1</sup></b>	5465	6305	6480	6545	6603	6826	6618	6846	6846	7815	8162

(McGann, 2019)

### 1.3. Typologies of Think Tanks

The problem of the lack of a generally accepted definition of think tank has led to different perceptions of think tanks shaped by different definitions. As a result of this, different opinions emerged also in the classification of think tanks. In Turkish literature, for Karabulut (2010), think tanks should be classified according to their structural and institutional characteristics. With respect to this classification, think tanks may be classified in terms of their scopes (global, regional, national, local, etc.), according to their functions (security, human rights, energy, etc.), and in accordance with their independence criteria (independent, relative, independent, dependent, etc.).

The two most prominent and used classifications in the social science literature were made by American experts Weaver and McGann (Bağcı and Aydın, 2009: 72). Abelson, Stone, and some European experts also have different classifications.

Weaver (1989: 563-564) argues that think tanks are US based organizations and that the think tank culture is spreading to the world from the US. Accordingly, his classification follows a path through think tanks in the United States while making an assessment. He claims that there are three basic think tank models in the USA. They are universities without students, contractual research centers, and advocacy organizations. The main characteristics of the model of universities without students are expressed by Weaver as: Researchers who they employ are generally consist of academicians or individuals with academic origins; the outputs they produce are shaped as academic articles, journals, or books; financial resources are generally provided by funds obtained from the private sector. The point that these

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<sup>1</sup> The numbers show the minimum number of think tanks worldwide observed

organizations differentiate from universities is that they aim to influence policy processes with their studies, it means that their research could carry some political impact or aims.

The second model, as the name suggests, includes the think tanks working with respect to a contractual procedure. Organizations involved in this model often try to produce outputs that are appropriate to the agreement by employing project based experts. As a result, the outputs they produce are generally not academic outputs such as books or articles, but those reports prepared directly for implementation. These institutions, which usually prepare reports for the use of institutions directly as a result of their contracts with government agencies, are dependent on the contract in the announcement of the reports to the public. In short, if government agencies, which are parts of the contract, do not want the reports to be publicly available or distributed, the reports are known only to the parties to the contract.

The third and final model in Weaver's classification is advocacy organizations. The main characteristics of advocacy organizations are expressed as: They are innovative, aim to influence policy processes by using marketing techniques, can be biased or ideological, and provide supportive reports on policies implemented rather than policy proposals. Weaver (1989: 565) claims that advocacy organizations are the newest, most active, and more in number think tanks.

McGann (2014: 14-16) also made a classification of six categories with the claim that it would include all types of think tanks in the world. Because, he argues that think tanks are structured in different ways due to different political cultures, civil society conceptions, and state structures. The models in McGann's classification are as follows:

*Political Party Affiliated Think Tanks:* It refers to think tanks established under the organization of a political party or established official ties with a political party. In the countries where think tank culture develops, almost every political party has its own or contracted think-tank (Kanbolat, 2009: 315). As prominent examples; Konrad

Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) in Germany, the Jaures Foundation in France and the Progressive Policy Institute in the United States are shown.

*Government Affiliated Think Tanks:* It refers to think tanks within the state organization which are like state institutions. It is a think tank model that has seen more examples in countries where the state tradition is strong but has become widespread throughout the world. As examples of prominent; China Development Institute (CDI) in China, the Iranian Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) in Iran, Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) in Turkey, and Congressional Research Service (CRS) located in the US are shown.

*Autonomous and Independent Think Tanks:* It refers to organizations which are independent or substantially autonomous from political parties, business circles, governments, and interest groups. In addition to the fact that they do not depend on any contract, they generally share their output with the public. The reports produced on the current developments in order to be effective in the policy processes, the studies published in order to inform the public, and the journals published in order to contribute to the literature are shaped as basic outputs of them. As examples of this model; The Center for Social Justice (CSJ) in the United Kingdom, the Institute for International Problems (IIA) in Pakistan, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in the Republic of South Africa, and the Institute of International Economics in the United States are shown.

*Quasi-Governmental Think Tanks:* It refers to organizations that are not parts of government structure, or not have official ties with government, but are almost entirely funded by the government. As output, they usually prepare reports for state institutions. The Korea Development Agency in South Korea and the Woodrow Wilson International Experts Center in the US are prominent examples of this model.

*Quasi-Independent Think Tanks:* Although they are independent or autonomous from the state and other institutions, they are thought to be organizations that are largely funded by business or interest groups. Since they are financed by certain groups, the impact of the institutions or organizations providing financial resources is felt in their works. They often try to influence policy making process in order to reach a specific

goal, and these specific goals are often shaped in the interests of their financial resources. The NLI Research Institute of Japan and the US Defense Information Center can be shown as significant examples of this model.

*University Affiliated Think Tanks:* It refers to research institutes established under the structure of a university and working in accordance with the studies of the university. They are designed as the institutes where reports, proposals, and academic studies are prepared for the country, region, and world policies at universities. Research centers founded in the legal entity of universities with the request of the Higher Education Board (YÖK) in Turkey are located in this category. Other examples are the Carter Center and the Hoover Institute in the US.

Although the classifications of Weaver and McGann have drawn a general framework, some other scholars working in the field have put forward different classifications. Apart from the classifications of Weaver and McGann have been accepted separately by almost all of the scholars, the classifications put forward are generally made by making small additions to their classifications or by making minor changes within the classifications. For example, Abelson (1998: 114) adds the model of “think tanks based on show and leadership” on the models of Weaver’s and McGann’s classifications. According to Abelson, think tanks in this model are established by people who want to make political propaganda or established by former presidents in order to maintain their effectiveness in politics. However, Abelson opposes a strict classification of think tanks by means of definite boundaries. He said that some organizations may have qualifications that can be included in more than one category and he also argues that functions should be prioritized instead of qualifications in the classification process (Abelson and Carberry, 1998: 532).

Stone’s (2005: 4) classification is a notable one among the classifications were made by other experts. Stone, like McGann, wanted to make a classification that would cover all of the think tanks around the world. According to his classification, there are five different models of think tanks. These models are shaped by using independent entities of the think tanks, the structure they are founded on,

and by whom they are established. These five models are as follows (Stone, 2005: 4-6):

*Independent Non-Governmental Think Tanks Established as Non-Profit Organizations:* It refers to independent and non-profit non-governmental organizations and organizations that show almost the same characteristics as their functions, objectives and objectives. They are seen as non-governmental organizations and try to be involved in decision-making processes by working in that way.

*Policy Research Institutes Located Within or Affiliated with A University:* It refers to the same model as McGann's classification of "university affiliated think tanks". However, Stone's model includes organizations which are dependent to universities but established outside of the universities and organizations not involved in the structuring of universities as units.

*State Sponsored and Government Think Tanks:* In this model, Stone unites the models of government affiliated think tanks and quasi-governmental think tanks from McGann's classification. He argues that these two models do not show a significant difference. The common point of them is state sponsorship.

*Corporate Created or Business Affiliated Think Tanks:* It refers to the organizations that the business community establishes for conducting researches and making recommendations in order to protect their interests. Also, it refers to the organizations which business community deals for corporation.

*Political Party Think Tanks:* It refers to think tanks established within or associated with to political parties and working for the sake of the political goals of that party. Stone, Like Abelson and McGann, states that such organizations are more common in Europe.

European scholars, on the other hand, can classify think tanks in different ways in accordance with European culture. Although the most prominent classifications are generally accepted in Europe, some academicians and think tank experts studying in the field have put forward new classifications. These

classifications generally appear as classifications arising from the distinctions that are determined on the think tanks of the local scale. Classifications which have been made for think tanks in Turkey also have been included in the later sections of this study.

Gellner's classification of think tanks in Germany is a good example of the classifications of Europe. Gellner (1995: 498) primarily divides think tanks as thought organizations and political think tanks. Then he divides the political think tanks into three different groups. The “universities without students” model, which refers to previously mentioned the traditional American system, is the first group. The second group includes think tanks which are interest-oriented and ideological, they are independent but have some ideological aims and act within these ideologies. Lastly, interest-based think tanks which have almost completely lost their independence to achieve certain goals are the third model of Gellner (Gellner, 1998: 84-85).

Bulgarian scholar Krastev's classification can be shown as the second example of European classifications. Krastev (2001: 23) argued that the think tanks in the Central and Eastern European countries after the communist period fail to be completely independent. According to Krastev (1999: 8), think tanks in the Central and Eastern European countries after communist period divided into three groups as; government-oriented think tanks studying within the framework of government policies, legislative-oriented think tanks working for affecting the legislation process, and media-oriented think tanks which work in integration with media and media-based organizations.

As the last example of classifications in Europe, Antonio Missiroli and Isabelle Ioannides' classification which makes an assessment over all of the think tanks in Europe could be handled. According to Missiroli and Ioannides (2012: 9), there are four different think tank models in Europe. These include academic think tanks, contractual research centers, think tanks working under political parties, and advocacy organizations. In this classification, there is no different model from the classifications of American scholars.

When looking at the classifications from Europe generally, it can be said that there is no new model outside the McGann and Weaver's classifications. That is, it can be said that although there are differences in cultural and social orders, think tank classifications do not vary greatly from region to region. Although there are many classification types on think tanks, they all have almost the same categories. Those classifications vary according to the institutional characteristics or their functional characteristics of the think tanks. However, as a result, think tanks are divided into specific classes according to their fields of study, according to their independence, according to the institutions and organizations they work with, and according to their aims. This study mainly focuses on the classifications of Weaver and McGann. Classifications of think tanks in Turkey are also mentioned in the following sections of this study.

#### **1.4. Roles and Functions of Think Tanks**

The roles and functions of think tanks are basically constructed on closing the gap between knowledge and authority in the political sphere (Köseoğlu and Köktaş, 2017: 544). Because decision makers have limited time and limited opportunities to make qualified analysis within the diversity of policy areas. It is not an easy process for politicians, administrators, and bureaucrats to decide in many areas from domestic and foreign policy, economic continuity, health and education services, culture and art, and many others. The basic roles and functions of think tanks are thus shaped in accordance with this situation. They fundamentally try to access policy making processes by transferring intellectual expertise rather than direct lobbying by giving advises for future policies and carrying out evaluation studies on implemented policies (Rich, 2004: 12; Peetz, 2017: 256). The relationship between knowledge and authority becomes important in this context, in terms of the roles and functions of think tanks (Weaver and McGann, 2000: 3). The most important problem here is the excessive amount of information and the inability to select the correct and necessary information by sifting them out. This is because an excessive number of information sources are presented to decision makers which are more highly than that they can use such as reports, researches, reviews, recommendations, advice documents, intelligence records, special files, and news. This information pollution creates a

serious confusion in decision making processes. In such a time that information pollution has rapidly been increasing, it is the most important role and function of think tanks to compile this information, make it functional, and bring it into the form that will be used by decision-makers.

The roles undertaken by think tanks are shaped according to whether they take part in decision making process or not. Their inclusion in decision-making processes is directly related to the political system and political culture in which they are located. However, apart from the political culture, the internal dynamics of think tanks are also effective in this regard. Two different views are encountered at this point, Stone (1996: 26-28) reports these two views as pluralistic approach and elitist approach. According to the pluralist approach, it is easier for think tanks to be accepted as actors in the system when they more in number and when there is a competition among them. Pluralists consider think tanks as organizations in a market where information and ideas are bought and sold. As a result of the increase in the number of think tanks and the competition among them, according to pluralists, policymakers and decision makers gain access to a wider range of information sources. Besides, according to the Elitist approach, the roles of think tanks are to maintain political stability, to reduce and eliminate the tension between politicians, and to protect the economic interests of countries which they are located. In order to fulfill these roles, they need to be active in political and bureaucratic life. In addition, being few in number will prevent information pollution and will be beneficial in maintaining stability according to elitists (Stone, 1996: 29).

Except for the two basic views on the roles and cause of existence of think tanks, it is necessary to mention the views of the Neo-Marxists. Neo-Marxists consider think tanks as organizations that prepare plans on the economic policies and as a result of these plans they try to affect public policies of countries they located (Desai, 1994: 30-31). According to them, think tanks serve to preserve the hegemony of capitalism by adapting countries' public policies to the world economic order.

When the theoretical approaches are taken into account, it can be stated that think tanks have many different roles and functions in practice. At first, think tanks,

by taking role as a bridge between the processes of production and processing of information, function as a road to decision makers. They play an important role in processing raw information that they received that decision makers can use them directly in practice. In this respect, it is one of the primary roles of think tanks to transform the information they obtained into a content and form that decision makers will understand (Stone and Garnett, 1998: 16).

As mentioned before, think tanks can reach the decision makers directly by presenting the studies they have prepared or they can expect to be involved in decision making processes by measuring the people's response via presenting their studies to public first. Policy makers often consult to think tanks in solving specific problems, in creating future oriented policies, and in case of need for alternative solutions in decision processes. Because the output produced by think tanks has to contain the information that has reached the level that the policy makers will directly use (Johnson, 1996: 21). When they find roles themselves in such processes and in other fields of practice, there are some roles assigned to them. Again, there are different approaches in literature on these roles. These approaches have many common features, as well as different definitions and classifications on think tanks.

For McGann (2005: 3), think tanks have nine critical roles that they can undertake. He lists these roles as follows:

- To play a mediating role between the government and the society,
- To create discussions about the current political issues, which have characteristics of expertise and independence,
- To conduct research on political dilemmas and problems and putting forth studies,
- To develop solutions for the political problems which are needed to be solved in the short term and to present these solutions to the decision makers,
- To evaluate and analyze government programs,
- To prepare reports and publications to the media to inform the public,
- To play mediating role between different political views in order to solve political problems,

- To create an environment in which different actors involved in decision-making processes can discuss their ideas and share information.
- To provide qualified human resources to governments.

With respect to Weaver (1989: 569-570), think tanks have five main roles. These roles are listed by Weaver as follows:

- To make studies which can be a source of political ideas and discussions,
- To make suggestions on political issues,
- To evaluate and analyze government programs,
- Providing qualified human resources to governments and senior bureaucracy,
- Provide information to the media to inform the public.

In addition to McGann and Weaver, Simon James made a different evaluation of the roles of think tanks. With respect to James (2000: 4), think tanks have four key roles. These roles arise from the fact that think tanks act as a bridge between academic community and the world of politics. These four roles are listed by James (2000: 4-6) as it follows:

- To improve policy proposals by contributing to government policies,
- To create an environment for the evaluation of the ideas thoughts of different people,
- To create an environment in which policies can be discussed in society by informing the public about the policies that are already implemented or which are under construction.
- To open policies that the government does not discuss for political reasons up for discussion.

Finally, Mendizabal and Sample (2009), who approaches the roles and functions of think tanks through think tanks in Latin America, argues that think tanks are shaped by the historical development of their roles and the relationships they have with decision makers. In this context, he defined five different roles to think tanks as follows:

- To establish political relations in order to implement policy proposals they produced,
- To assume the duties of publicizing and defending the policies of political authorities, parties or other actors involved in the policy processes,
- To create alternative solutions to the problems by creating discussion and brainstorming environments and to support the development of new policies,
- To produce financial resources by conducting contractual works with political parties or interest groups,
- To provide qualified human resources for governments and decision making mechanisms.

As can be seen above, the four approaches developed on the roles of think tanks have many common features because think tanks aim to be involved in policy making processes and to influence decisions taken. As a result, the roles they try to undertake are shaped to achieve these goals. In this context, conducting researches on policies, making recommendations on policies, preparing reports, and informing the public can be expressed as the core functions of think tank organizations. However, the roles and functions of think tanks are not limited to mentioned roles (Aydın, 2006: 33). Within the changing structures and with the time changes, think tanks undertake the roles of organizing trainings, seminars and conferences, functions such as marketing and networking, and supporting the participation of the society (Bağcı and Aydın, 2009: 78).

### **1.5. Goals and Targets of Think Tanks**

Think tanks undertake the roles and functions mentioned in the previous section in order to achieve some specific goals and objectives. Although the first goal of think tanks is involvement in decision making processes, their goals and objectives vary according to what is expected from them, the political and cultural conditions, the conditions of time, and some other variables. Especially, due to the change of political cultures, think tanks have different goals and targets according to the countries where they were founded.

Expectations of the people, governments, and organizations from think tanks in local, regional, and global scales before they are established are important variables in the determination of goals and objectives of them. Caliva and Scheier (Cited by Altınbaş, 2009: 26) list the expectations of think tanks as follows:

- To create a mental challenge,
- To raise awareness,
- To introduce new approaches,
- To try to make changes in general opinions,
- To develop creative ideas,
- To ask new questions,
- To exchange ideas and information with colleagues,
- To produce ideas that broke down the status quo,
- To develop ideas on possibilities,
- To encourage dreams and visions,
- To ask the question of “why not?”,
- To say something no one wants to hear,
- To analyze and re-examining existing beliefs, political and economic balances.

All of the expectations mentioned above cannot be actualized by every think tank. As a matter of fact, it is not easy to all of the listed expectation be realized by a think tank because of the environmental, political, cultural, and institutional external effects. Even though they sometimes contradict with these expectations, many think tanks work to meet the expectations. The reactions of think tanks to these expectations also vary according to the targets they want to reached and the goals they have previously determined.

For Okman (1987: 456), the main goal of a think tank is to deliver the results of the research that they have prepared for people, to ensure that they are read, in short, to disseminate them. Because think tanks have the opportunity to reach their targets as a result of the reactions they get to their reports and other works. Even though think tanks are supported by certain institutions or organizations, they cannot

achieve their goals if they do not have the capacity to be evaluated in policy processes. The studies and recommendations put forward by the think tanks should be realistic, actionable, and pragmatic within the framework of real policy in order to be taken into consideration by the decision makers (Altınbaş, 2009: 26).

Most fundamentally, as mentioned earlier, think tanks have set goals for themselves in order to be effective or directly involved in decision making processes. When the studies that list the goals and objectives of think tanks in the literature are examined, it is seen that all of the goals and objectives listed are aimed to achieve the objective of influencing decision-makers in the end. For example, Mütercimler (2006: 177) list the objectives that think tanks should have as:

- To make military, political, economic and social researches for the future and to prepare strategic plans as a result of these researches,
- To ensure that the works are aimed to protect national targets and interests,
- To provide consultancy services to official and civilian authorities when necessary,
- To obtain information,
- To inform the public by the means of media in order to guide and orientate them

As can be seen in Mütercimler's list, think tanks can have different goals and objectives, but they are eventually intended to be involved in policy making processes with these goals and objectives. In short, the most fundamental and ultimate goals of think tanks are to influence decision making processes and to find themselves as actors in policy making.

### **1.6. Significance and Impacts of Think Tanks**

Think tanks have a critical significance in modern societies. They have an important place in the relations between politics and the public with regard to their studies on public policy research, analysis, and suggestions. The primary function of think-tanks is to produce policy strategies for governments and to provide them with reports and analyzes that will inform them about the accuracy of their decisions at

local, national and international levels (James, 2000: 166). The primary functions of think tanks are to produce policy strategies for governments for future and to provide reports and analysis to inform them about the accuracy of their decisions at local, national, and international levels (Aydın, 2006: 36). Therefore, there is a need for think tanks both before and after decision making processes. In other words, think tanks are involved in decision making processes by making recommendations before the policy production, by trying to impact decisions during process, and by evaluating decisions taken after the process. In addition, they not only inform the government but also the people with the reports they have prepared after the decisions taken. In this respect, think tanks can play a mediating role between the public and the government. Thus, they also gain importance in terms of influencing the public's trust in politicians. Because, think tanks close an important gap by undertaking the mission of explaining, interpreting and evaluating current policies, strategies and political programs in a way that is accessible to the public (Abelson, 1998: 118-119).

It is a vital importance for all countries across the world to collect information on issues related to public policy and to produce effective policies in the light of this information. Nevertheless, decision makers cannot understand which information is needed, useful, or accurate from the various sources of information they have such as their intelligence reports, news sources, field studies, government resources, and pressure groups. Therefore, within this time of information pollution, think tanks carry out the duties of straining certain information and selecting the useful and correct information among them. In this respect, they gain a great importance in policy making processes.

Think tanks have many contributions to world politics. They bring the problems encountered in domestic politics to a discussion platform, analyze the problems, and produce solution suggestions; also in the area of foreign policy, they produce strategies in a way that respects the balances of world politics both regionally and globally and determine a quick road map through these strategies (Abelson, 2018: 91-93). In developed countries, all of the earlier mentioned missions of the think tanks are gained as much as possible, whereas in developing countries,

this approach tends to be stronger. In fact, think tanks reduce the burden of the state and the decision makers in domestic politics, foreign policy, education, health, security and many other areas by providing them direct information and analysis. However, in undeveloped countries and in countries where the concept of democracy is not fully established, think tanks are seen as places where dangerous ideas can develop (Bal, 2009: 127).

Developed countries mostly utilize the think tanks for the services which they provide, the effects of them are also felt in the policy process. However, in developing and underdeveloped countries, think tanks have been showing great efforts to be involved in decision making processes. Primarily, they need to gain the financial support and media support which are necessary to be effective in policy processes. For this reason, in order to legitimize their work and to share their analysis on current developments in the country and the studies they carry out on issues concerning the country with the decision makers and the public; they organize conferences and seminars, strive to be visible in written and electronic media, disseminate researches, and publish peer-reviewed journals. With all of these efforts, they contribute to the development of the country's policy and to inform the public, so that even if they are not included in the decision making processes, they can show their effects (Abelson, 1998: 120).

According to Stone (2005: 15), the effects of think tanks on policies can be demonstrated by some direct or indirect indicators, but these effects are extremely difficult to be measured. Stone argues that even if it is hard to state how the impact can be measured, how active a think tank is can be an indicator of how effective it is. In this respect, she lists indicators of the effects of think tanks as (Stone, 2005: 16):

- Contribution to the drafting processes of laws and proposals,
- Number of the appointed personnel to official commissions,
- Establishment of networks with politicians,
- Recognition and visibility in the media,
- Research projects for government and business groups,
- Network memberships,

- Number of publications,
- Qualifications of staff and their experience,
- External funding,
- The content and practicality of their website.

James (2000: 165), like Stone (2005: 16), supports that think tanks exist in order to influence public policy process directly or indirectly. He classified the effects of think tanks in policy process based on his observations in United Kingdom and surveys undertaken by the Global Development Network (GDN) in three groups as atmospheric influence, targeting the medium or short term agenda of government, and micro-policy research. In detail, according to James (2000: 166-167), atmospheric influence refers to the mode of influence of think tanks on the general climate of political environment which has the potential to change the framework of thought about political and social issues of policy makers. Targeting the medium or short-term agenda simply refers to the mode of influence of think tanks on the agenda of governments via their advocacy roles such as meetings with decision makers, participation in conferences, and most importantly the use of the media to reach policy makers and to promote research findings. Micro-policy research refers to the mean of influence of think tanks on a specific policy by engaging in working through the detail of the policy that need a narrow and more specialist focus on the particular area of policy.

Abelson (2018: 105-106), like Stone (2005: 17) and James (2000: 165), suggests that influence of think tanks can be evaluated by their direct and indirect indicators. He argued, by citing Kingdon and Thurber (1984), that there are three ways which think tanks have the potential to influence policy process as issue articulation, policy formulation, and policy implementation. According to him, some think tanks may be more interested in sharing their ideas with public than reaching to decision makers for formulating or implementing policies. That is, some think tanks aim to get issues into political agenda by articulating their thoughts and worries via various channels like media, however some others aim to enter into policy making processes with their efforts for formulating or implementing policies. Within these

three ways, Abelson (2018: 146-149) specified the indicators of the influence of think tanks again under three titles as indicators of resource, demand, and impact. According to this evaluation, the influence of think tanks can be evaluated with the quality of their financial and human resources as the indicator of resource, with their media exposure, website hits, and the number of conferences they organized and reports they written as the indicator of demand, and with the number of citations of publications in academic journals and recommendations adopted by decision makers as the indicator of impact. Finally, Abelson states (2018: 143) that measuring the influence of think tanks is not an easy challenge. Nevertheless, as a good indicator of influence together with the above mentioned indicators, how active or inactive think tanks are on a specific policy issue can be a way to measure the capacity to effect. In this regard, the most important indicators are seen as; how many media citations the organization has received, the number of visitors to their website, the volume of publications downloaded, and the number of followers they have on Facebook, Twitter, and other social media channels. In other words, Abelson asks the question of “Do think tanks matter?”.

McGann (2019: 33-34) also claims that assessing the impact of think tanks is not an easy endeavor to undertake. However, he forms a metric for using in the reports of “Global Go To Think Tank Index (GGTTT)” which is designed to serve as a catalyst for a discussion on how to effectively measure the impact of think tanks. In the last index he published via Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP), he defines four different indicators of influence of think tanks as resource, utilization, output, and impact indicators. Resource indicators refer to think tanks’ ability to recruit and retain leading scholars and analysts; the level, quality, and stability of their funding; their proximity and access to decision makers and other policy elites; their institutional currency; quality and reliability of their networks; and their key contacts in the politics, academic communities, and the media. Utilization indicators refer to the quantity and quality of their media appearances and citations, web hits, testimony before legislative and executive bodies, briefings, and official appointments by officials. Output indicators refer to the number and quality of their policy proposals and publications produced such as books, journal articles, policy

briefs; and briefings, conferences, and seminars organized. Finally, impact indicators refer to their recommendations considered or adopted by policymakers and civil society organizations; issue network centrality; advisory role to political parties and candidates; awards granted; publication in or citation of publications in academic journals and the media that influences the policy debate and decision-making; website dominance; and success in challenging the conventional wisdom and standard operating procedures of bureaucrats and elected officials in the country.

Weidenbaum (2010: 134-135) specified the indicators of impact of think tanks as measure of inputs and measures of outputs. Measures of inputs are the resources used by them and the measures of output are the accomplishments of them in terms of the changes which they created in public policy processes. However, he also asserts that even with these indicators it is difficult, often impossible, to measure the impact of think tanks. He claims that there are many obstacles in measuring the impact. The extended nature of the public policy processes, variety of individuals and organizations in the processes, and the elusive nature of the impact are most prominent obstacles. However, because of their unique institutional characteristics, each think tank made strategic decisions about how and where in the policy cycle to make their presence felt (Abelson, 2018: 106). Thus, in this study, instead of trying to measure the impact of think tanks, it is tried in the forthcoming parts to measure their capacity to impact by using the indicators mentioned in this part of the study.

### **1.7. Financial Structure of Think Tanks**

The biggest problem encountered by think tanks in the global sense is seen as the problem of financial resources (Aydın, 2006: 41). Think tanks finance their activities with the income they derive from foundations, business groups, real persons, the government, the projects they have contracted, and their activities for profit (McGann, 2007: 4). In both developed and developing countries, some think tanks do not maintain their activities or do not have the opportunity to be involved in policy processes due to insufficient budgetary problems. In addition, owing to insufficient sources, they have to choose their employees from people who already have a profession such as academicians, bureaucrats, independent researchers who

provide a significant portion of their income from other jobs. Though, a think tank that wants to develop and be effective has to have ongoing resources (Weaver and McGann, 2000: 16). Stone (1996: 53) asserts that a think tank cannot cover its costs with its own indigenous resources such as membership fees and sales of publications, so corporate support and government contracts are essential for their survival.

Apart from their own works and donations, another financial resource of think tanks is foreign funds. Foreign funds generally are not needed by think tanks in developed countries thanks to variety of domestic funds. As a matter of fact, in the information age, societies which are aware of the importance of knowledge have been placed in the tradition of making donations to studies conducted on information. However, foreign funds constitute an important financial resource for think tanks operating in developing countries and underdeveloped countries (Aydın, 2006: 42). However, Weaver and McGann (2000: 16) argue that foreign financial resources call into doubt the reliability of research and policy recommendations by think tanks. Because it is a free and independent movement that makes a think tank truly reliable and independent think tanks do not use government resources or foreign resources. This situation helps the think tanks to produce innovative, impartial, and distinctive policies by protecting them from the political pressures and directions of the authorities they provide financial resources (Ezer, 2010).

It becomes clear that the funding of think tanks is an important criterion for their reliability and independence. In order for preserving their reliability and independence, think tanks in all over the world want to have diversified financial resources. Mendizabal (2011), founder and director of the On Think Tanks (OTT), has produced a lot of content on domestic funding for think tanks. He asserts that funding from domestic sources is limited and difficult to secure for think tanks in developing countries, so avoiding foreign funding is a significant challenge (Mendizabal, 2014). In other words, what has been presented in the US as a scandal, is a common practice for developing country think tanks. He suggests alternative models of funding for think tanks in developing counties which are based on domestic public or private funds. He claims that approaching new domestic funders requires a long-term effort and mobilizing domestic funding requires a concerted and

collaborative effort. He listed five recommendations for mobilizing domestic funds. He respectively suggests that think tanks need to reduce the share of foreign funding that they receive, they should focus on regional or local projects which help them to attract funders, so they can be transparent in order to be observed objectively, to invest in developing their cases, and to ask for money (Mendizabal, 2017).



## II

### THINK TANKS IN TURKEY

Think tanks in Turkey mostly reflect the same characteristics of think tanks in developing countries. Turkey, being a country where think tank culture is developing, is still in the process of the integration of these institutions into its political system. In addition, think tanks in Turkey have their own different typological classifications, impact capacities, roles, and functions within the political system. When Turkey's cultural features emerge from the past are considered, the necessity to exert a certain effort for the acceptance of think tanks within the political system of the country becomes outstanding. Indeed, although given a great importance in world politics, the establishment of think tanks in Turkey or supporting the established ones there have never mentioned in the government programs in Turkey (Külebi, 2009: 420). Think tanks in Turkey generally organize seminars, panels, national and international conferences and publish online information and reports with the purpose of informing the political actors as well as the public. They also try to disseminate the information they produce in their own peer-reviewed journals in order to produce scientific knowledge. In addition to these, they are working to reach human resources through their internship programs and to specialize these human resources (Bulut and Güngör, 2009: 267). As a result of all these studies, it is a matter of fact that think tanks, which aim to be involved in decision-making processes, often do not have the opportunity to influence decision makers.

#### **2.1. History of Think Tanks in Turkey**

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the first think tanks in the world have been established in the 19th century. However, establishments of think tanks in Turkey started after almost 150 years later. The first think tank established in Turkey was established in 1960's. Yet, think tanks have truly been active in Turkey since the last 20 years. The late development of think tank culture in Turkey can be explained with economic, social, cultural, and political reasons. But most importantly, it can be explained with the political tradition and conjuncture of Turkey before 1980's which

did not allow think tanks to enter the country. After 1980, especially due to the impact of globalization, Turkey also came in contact with different social, political and, cultural actors which one of them was think tanks.

### **2.1.1. Historical Development of Think Tanks in Turkey**

Heritage inherited by Ottoman Empire occupies a very important place in the formation of the development of culture of research and strategy in Turkey. In addition to this heritage, Kemalism, the founding ideology of Republic of Turkey, which has also been very much influential in shaping this culture (Kışlalı, 2007; Karatepe, 2018: 298). Furthermore, the process of westernization, which started to show its effect during the last period of Ottoman Empire and continued with the Republican period, is one of the important elements in the formation of this culture (Karaosmanoğlu, 2001: 158). In other words, the process of westernization, which had shown its effects firstly during the last period of Ottoman Empire and had become widespread across the country with the establishment of the republic. It failed to create the necessary conditions for the establishment of think tanks in Turkey. With respect to Bilgin (2005: 177-178), because of the “philosophy of administration of Turkey that has bottom-up planned hierarchical system and based on the assumption that everything is best known to bureaucratic elites who govern the state”, the participation of non-state actors in decision making processes was approached with suspicion. In short, while there were founders and administrators of the state, it was not seen as legitimate that other authorities have a say in matters concerning the future of the country. However, as the Republic of Turkey has grown and evolved in terms of government structure and international relations, problems of the state need to be solved have varied more and more. The diversification of problems has also revealed the need for non-state actors in decision making processes. As the problems become more complex over time, think tanks began to emerge and gain importance as a result of the need in this area.

Aydın (2006: 45-46) asserted that it is possible to say that the emergence of think tanks in Turkey was nearly in the same period, that was in the 1960s and 1970s, with OECD countries like Denmark, Spain, Norway, Greece, South Korea,

Japan and so on. Also, when examined specifically over the Middle East, Turkey is one of the countries which have oldest think tanks established in the region (Stone and Garnett, 1998: 6). Although it is generally accepted that the think tanks started to be established in Turkey in the 1960s, they began to be called as think tanks in Turkey as in the world in the 1990s (Bağcı and Aydın, 2009: 87).

It is possible to mention a group of main factors that influenced the emergence of think tanks in Turkey. Bağcı and Aydın (2009: 86-88) classified these factors under five main titles. The first of these main factors is the 1961 Constitution of Turkey, which was adopted after the 1960 military coup, coincided with the period when the think tanks were first established in the country. The 1961 Constitution had a quality that broadens the area of freedoms, with this characteristic, it had paved the way for the establishment of non-governmental organizations, non-state foundations, associations, and foundations. In particular, the constitutional guarantee of freedom of organization and expression and political emancipation had been a step to encourage people and institutions who had the intention to establish think tanks.

The establishment of the State Planning Organization (DPT) and transition to planned economy are shown as the second factor that influence the establishment of think tanks in Turkey. As a result, the business groups in Turkey had the opportunity to share their views and ideas to governments and government agencies. Establishing associations, foundations, or non-governmental organizations firstly came into prominence due to interest groups who were keen to gain from this opportunity. Economic and Social Studies Conference Board, which was established by businessman Nejat Eczacıbaşı in İstanbul in 1961, is accepted as the first think tank established in Turkey. In 1994, it took its current name and structure as Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), and then described its structure as “an independent non-governmental think tank that analyzes pressing social, political, and economic issues in Turkey and develops policy solutions for overcoming long running problems”<sup>2</sup>. Aydın (2006: 46), also said that the

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<sup>2</sup> See more from <https://www.eczacibasi.com.tr/en/social-responsibility/economic-and-social-ngos> (25.02.2019)

Conference Board paved the way for a basis for the establishment of new think tanks in Turkey.

The Ankara Agreement signed by Turkey in order to become a full member of European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963 is regarded as the third factor (Bağcı and Aydın, 2009: 87). Turkey made a political decision for economic and social development by signing the Ankara Agreement and it had set out to complete the shortcomings required by European Charter. In this context, Turkey stepped out into a situation that it had to initiate many reforms and innovations in certain economic and social fields. Thus, a need for specialized organizations and staff in the field emerged for the state and the business world to establish and carry out relations with the EEC. In order to meet this need, especially the private entrepreneurs in the country have pioneered the establishment of associations and foundations and thus prepared a convenient environment for the establishment of think tanks.

Bağcı and Aydın (2009: 87) state that Turkey's foreign policy and security policy began to be questioned in the times of the political liberalization environment brought by the 1961 Constitution, hence they argue that it is the fourth factor influencing the emergence of think tanks in Turkey. The new characteristic of Turkish foreign policy which included a western oriented understanding and security policies which effected from them took negative reactions from society. In this environment, Turkey's first foreign policy journal "Foreign Policy" had started its publication life in the early 1970s and then Turkey's first foreign policy think tank, the Foreign Policy Institute (DPA), was founded by Seyfi Taşhan (Karaosmanoğlu and Onulduran, 2004: 2).

Finally, the changes made in the Turkish Civil Code in 1967, are shown as the fifth factor which triggered Turkey's meeting with think tanks. According to Bağcı and Aydın (2009: 88), in the first version of the law was enacted in 1926, there was no specific framework for the establishment of associations and foundations, so there had been shortcomings on this topic in Turkey for a long time. Then in 1967, with the amendments in the provisions of the law related to foundations, new associations and then foundations began to be opened. Thus, it was created an

opportunity for think tanks to be established in the status of foundation or association.

When an evaluation is made by keeping these five factors in view, it can be said that, in the 1960s and 1970s, some required conditions actualized for the establishment of think tanks in Turkey and a small number of think tanks have been established as a result of some attempts. However, although the Constitution of 1961 created a field of freedoms, the fact that this area could not be maintained for a long time, so growth of think tanks had not been continued in the same period. The think tank adventure in Turkey started again in the 1980s.

### **2.1.2. Expansion of Think Tanks in Turkey**

During the 1980s, as previously mentioned, the number of think tanks around the world increased rapidly. Due to the restrictions which were created by the 1980 military coup in the country, Turkey was not able to follow the rapid rise of think tanks worldwide. After the coup, with the implications of military rule, there were many restrictions on freedom, politics became like an empire of fear, political prohibitions were introduced, and eventually 1982 Constitution has been passed. Therefore, the development of think tanks in Turkey were hampered to a considerable extent for a long period of time.

The think tank culture began to spread throughout the world and took its place in the political arena in the 1980s with the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has undoubtedly influenced most Central and Eastern European countries. After the collapse of the USSR, the concept of democracy which was tried to be established in the region brought many reforms along with itself. This democratization process had also been the main reason for the think tanks to emerge and spread in these regions at a great pace (Stone and Garnett, 1998: 6). In the same period, with the end of the bipolar world order, its effects were felt in Turkey and then a need for efforts to adapt to the new world order showed up. To meet this need, many think tanks were also established in Turkey. However, according to McGann (2001: 2), Turkey was able to follow the developments after 2000 which were happened in the world in 1990s.

With the process of spread of think tanks in Turkey, the state also began to focus on this issue. Establishments of research centers within the body of universities with the direction of Higher Education Board (YÖK), setting up research units and strategic research units by the public institutions within their own bodies, and the initiatives of establishing think tank structures by the statesmen and academicians have become reflections that the think tanks culture began to spread in Turkey. During this period the Ministry of Interior, Turkish Armed Forces, and the Turkish Grand National Assembly had established think tanks within their own bodies (Bağcı and Aydın, 2009: 92). On the other hand, it is observed that interest groups and business groups in Turkey also began to establish think tanks in this period.

The development of think tanks at largest scale in Turkey has occurred in the 2000s. Especially after 2002, the number of think tanks has increased considerably. Many organizations which were specialized or aiming to be specialized in the fields of regional development, security, strategy, and so forth have been established over the last 17 years (Simavoryan, 2015). In the 2000s, as a result of the complexity and dynamism of the political agenda of Turkey, there was a great need for think tanks. Therefore, both governments and the public have become concerned with think tanks. As a result, think tanks have begun to receive a certain level of acceptance in the country. However, within the framework of the early mentioned political culture and state tradition, it was not so easy for think tanks to be included in decision making mechanisms. There have been many obstacles in front of the think tanks which need to make extra efforts to be involved in decision making processes. These are discussed later in the study.

In the “Global Go To Think Tank Reports”, which have been published by James McGann since the year 2008 within the context of Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP), think tanks in Turkey indexed under the category of the region of “Middle East and North Africa”. The number of think tanks operated in Turkey which has been mentioned in the reports between the years 2008 and 2018 is shown in Table 3. When compared to the number of think tanks worldwide, the total number of think tanks operated in Turkey has remained at a low level. Yet, the number has considerably shown an increasing trend by the years. When there totally

were 21 think tanks in Turkey in 2008, the increase observed in ten years has been 27. Therefore, it can be said that there has been a great increase in the number of think tanks operating in the country in the last ten years.

**Table 3: Number of Think Tanks in Turkey (2008-2018)**

Years	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Number of Think Tanks in Turkey</b>	21	21	27	27	27	29	31	32	32	46	48

(McGann, 2019)

## 2.2. Typologies of Think Tanks in Turkey

In studies on think tanks in Turkey, it has generally not disclosed a specific classification to Turkey. It does already not seem possible to make a full-fledged classification of think tanks in Turkey. Generally, Turkish think tanks have been tried to be classified by taking the classification of McGann. In the classification of Turkish think tanks, it is useful to benefit from McGann's classification because it has more models compared to other classifications. However, some problems arise in the adaptation of McGann's classification to Turkey because there are no examples of the models such as quasi-governmental and quasi-independent in Turkey. In this study, in order to avoid the above-mentioned problems and to include as much organizations operating in Turkey as possible Stone's classification are taken into consideration for Turkey, instead of McGann's classification. It is thought that Stone's classification which includes five different models is the most convenient classification for the pattern of Turkish think tanks. In addition to these five models, it is aimed to broaden the scope which specific to Turkey by adding a model that includes representative agencies of foreign organizations in Turkey. In short, in this study a classification that includes six models on think tanks in Turkey is deemed appropriate based on the method of Stone's classification. When a classification with six models is applied, there are also organizations that are outside of this classification and which have characteristics of think tank. These organizations are also covered under a different title because these organizations are outside the classification.

Before moving to classification, difficulties encountered in classifying of think tanks should be mentioned. Indeed, as Abelson and Carberry (1998: 532) state, think tanks in Turkey are able to show qualities that can be evaluated in multiple models at the same time. Moreover, criteria of independence and financial resources which are included in Stone's classification are difficult to be detected for think tanks in Turkey. Because think tanks in Turkey do not tend to share their financial resources with the public clearly. Hence, it is also difficult to characterize the independence of organizations that have non-transparent resources. As a result, it is possible think tanks which are accepted in a specific model to have unshared financial resources and specific dependencies. Therefore, instead of qualifying think tanks in Turkey as independent or semi-independent as in McGann's classification, it is considered more appropriate to qualify them under the model of think tanks within the scope of non-governmental organizations model that used by Stone.

When a classification based on Diane Stone's classification is made, there have been difficulties in classifying think tanks and structures of think tanks in Turkey, the following six models emerge:

- Think Tanks within the Scope of Non-Governmental Organizations
- Think Tanks Established Depending on Universities
- Think Tanks Established or Financed by the State
- Think Tanks Established by Business Organizations or Interest Groups
- Think Tanks with Political Party Affiliations
- Representative Agencies of Foreign Think Tanks

### **2.2.1. Think Tanks within the Scope of Non-Governmental Organizations**

Think tanks which are evaluated as non-governmental organizations in Turkey are independent, quasi-independent, non-profit or able to act neutrally and independently in their profit-oriented works. They demonstrate almost the same characteristics with non-governmental organizations apart from their functions and objectives. They are seen as non-governmental organizations and try to be involved in decision making processes by working in this way. Within this scope, think tanks

which are established as an association or foundation status, which are established in the form of institute, and which are generally formed as non-governmental organizations are included in this model. Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM), the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Political, Economic and Social Research Foundation (SETA), and Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) can be displayed as the examples of this model in Turkey.

### **2.2.2. Think Tanks Established Depending on Universities**

Although it is controversial that they can be considered as think tank or not, it is a model which is very common in Turkey. In 1997, many strategic research centers within the bodies of universities were established with the directions of the National Committee for Strategic Research and Studies (SAEMK) which was established by Higher Education Board (YÖK) under its own structure (Bağcı and Aydın, 2009: 98). These research centers were established with the directions of YÖK and have engaged in certain activities with similar directions. However, it is known that especially the research centers established with the directions of YÖK have not acted actively enough and even SAEMK has terminated their studies. In addition, some of the research centers established within the universities do not have the characteristic of being a think tank because they focus on specific researches and scientific studies. However, apart from all of these, there have been a considerable amount of research centers which have the nature of think tank. Therefore, it has provided great convenience to research centers in universities for their establishment and carrying on activities. Then, the importance of these research centers has showed up in terms of their contribution to the future and the culture of think tanks of Turkey. That is, they have played an important role in providing a promise for the future of think tank culture in Turkey. As a result of the studies of research centers established in universities as think tanks, the benefits of transforming academic knowledge produced in universities into ready-to-use knowledge and interaction between academicians and decision makers have been revealed. Although there are many examples of these organizations in Turkey, they have not been able to be institutionalized due to the fact that academicians within the universities stay away

from them for various reasons (Kanbolat, 2009). A few prominent examples can be listed as follows: Financial Research Center of Hacettepe University, METU Economic Research Center, Anadolu University Center for Strategic Studies.

### **2.2.3. Think Tanks Established or Financed by the State**

In this model, Stone unites the models of government oriented organizations and quasi-independent organizations which are under McGann's classification. She argues that they do not show a significant difference between the two. In the example of Turkey, there are think tanks within the state structure, financed by the state institutions, and have specific dependencies to the state; and as Stone has pointed out, no significant differences are observed between them. Think tanks established by the State are one of the most common think tank models in Turkey. Because, as mentioned before, as a result of the strong state tradition and political culture of the past, the participation of non-state actors to the decision making processes in Turkey is still not fully accepted. As a result of this situation, such think tanks have emerged for the purpose of producing information processed within the state itself. By the way, it should be made clear that the strategic research units established as units of public institutions should not be considered in this category. Because these units are only assigned to work on the internal functioning of the institutions they are affiliated with and they do not show an organizational characteristic. The first example of the think tanks established within the state structure in Turkey was the Strategic Research Center (SAM), which was established in 1995 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was followed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly Research Center and the Strategic Research and Study Center (SAREM) established under the Turkish Armed Forces. However, it cannot also be stated that these organizations have been active. Among these organizations, only SAM is still active, the Parliamentary Research Center has remained in a passive position and SAREM was closed in 2011.

#### **2.2.4. Think Tanks Established by Business Organizations or Interest Groups**

There have also been examples of this model in Turkey, which have set up by business world and interest groups in order to do research and make suggestions for protecting their interests. Conference Board, which is previously mentioned that was established by Nejat Eczacıbaşı in 1961, is known as the first example of this model in Turkey. From this point of view, it can be said that this model has older basis when compared the other think tank models in Turkey. However, it is seen from the example of Conference Board, they mostly can show the characteristics of other models. Similarly, when the Economic Development Foundation (IKV), which was founded in the late 1960s, has been evaluated in this context, it is concluded that the first sector that intends to influence decision making processes is the business sector. In addition, until today, it is known that major business groups such as Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) and The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) have established think tanks. Today, the prominent examples which are actively studying in the field are the Foreign Policy Forum (DIF) and the Economic Research Forum (EAF) which are founded and funded by TÜSİAD.

#### **2.2.5. Think Tanks with Political Party Affiliations**

They are established within the bodies of political parties or with the initiatives of political parties and they work for the sake of the party's political objectives. It is generally accepted that this model is generally more common in Europe. With respect to Kanbolat (2009), nearly all of the political parties have their own think tanks in the West and those think tanks have branch offices in the countries which are important for the party's bilateral relations. Then, it can be said that there is not a clear example of this model in Turkey. However, it is claimed that many think tanks in Turkey work with political parties and are supported by political parties. The basis of these claims lies in the fact that some think tanks have been working on the propaganda of political parties. However, it should still be noted that there is no such a model of think tanks affiliated with political parties in Turkey. The

reason for the inclusion of the model of think tanks with political party affiliation in the classification of think tank organizations in Turkey is to mention this deficiency. It is seen as a deficiency because the political party think tanks, which are frequently encountered in the European tradition, are both empowering for political parties and for policy processes. Thereby, political parties have the opportunity to access the information they have created within the body of themselves by employing specialized strategists to think organizations they have established within their own bodies. In addition, the need of processed information of the political parties involved in decision making processes is at a high level and this need is more apparent in the countries like Turkey where decision making processes show a non-transparent and in door nature.

#### **2.2.6. Offices of Foreign Think Tanks in Turkey**

These organizations which had begun to exist in Turkey during the 1990s and 2000s are intended to influence the Turkish politics in the interests of foreign countries and to provide information to their countries through their research and studies which they carry on in Turkey. As with the think tanks founded in Turkey, although their impact capacity is low, they serve as a good information gathering tool. Another feature of these types of organizations that they usually transfer their own financial resources to think tanks operated in Turkey for their studies and their work is carried out through human resources of those think tanks with a contract (Bağcı and Aydın, 2009: 102). As the main examples of this model Turkey office of the US based Open Society Institute, Ankara Office of German based in Germany Marshall Fund, Istanbul Office of the Germany based Orient Institute, Turkey Office of Europe based European Stability Initiative (ESI), and finally Turkey office of Germany based Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) can be shown.

#### **2.2.7. Think Tanks Out of Classification**

As a result of this classification which has made under six titles, most of the think tanks in Turkey have been included. However, there are institutions that do not comply with any model under this classification or there are also organizations that cannot fully adapt to a model when they are evaluated according to their

understanding of independence, the structure in which they are founded, and who they were founded by. These organizations which were mentioned by Arslan (2009: 32-33) in his classification that evaluated think tanks in Turkey under nine different titles can also be divided into three in itself.

The most prominent examples among these are the organizations established by the unions or the organizations operated within the body of unions. National Security Strategies Research Center of Turkey (TUSAM) which is managed and financed by Turkish Metal Workers' Union can be shown as the example of this type of organizations.

The second group which is not included in the classification can be stated as the foundations established by communities, sects, and other religious groups. In a country like Turkey which has a strong communitarian culture, the establishment of foundations linked to these communities is a common practice. The foundations established by communities should be considered as think tanks because they have the aim of disseminating the thoughts and understandings of the community in which they are connected, although they are generally established on cooperation and solidarity. The communities mentioned here may belong to Turks, or they may also belong to minorities living in the country. According to the statistics of the Directorate General of Foundations, there are 167 different foreign community foundations in Turkey, 77 of which are Greek and 54 of which are Armenians<sup>3</sup>. The number of communities which belong to Islamic culture is also too many to count.

The third group outside the classification of think tanks in Turkey in this study is the organizations which cannot be considered in legal status because of their engagement in harmful activities and hence these organizations show more the nature of terrorist organization more than the nature of think tanks. Think tanks can show harmful characteristic as well as they can be useful. However, in the context of their forms of organization, the organizations they are affiliated with, and the ideas they propagate; organizations that knowingly and directly engage in harmful activities are not legally accepted even if they exist in practice. Kurdistan Center for Strategic

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<sup>3</sup> See more from VGM: <https://www.vgm.gov.tr/Documents/webicerik241.pdf> (11.12.2018)

Research (Navenda Lekolinen Stratejik a Kurdistan) which has been organized in Turkey and have been studying in Turkish and International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) whose activities were discontinued and closed due to its organic connection with the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) may be shown as prominent examples.

### **2.3. Roles and Functions of Think Tanks in Turkey**

Think tanks in Turkey, as mentioned before, have been in a process of accommodation in the political arena of the country. Think tanks have become more active players in the fields domestic policy and foreign policy in the last two decades in Turkey. There are several factors which have driven the growth of think tanks in the country. These factors also have determined the roles and functions which think tanks need to play in different fields. Weaver and McGann (2000: 1) stated that governments, decision makers, and bureaucrats need more expertise in decision making processes in a world that information pollution, interdependence, and complexity have continuously increased. As a result of these mentioned developments, think tanks have appeared as a source of expertise that can explain the causes and possible remedies of problems in the world. It is possible to say that these inferences made by Weaver and McGann are valid for think tanks in Turkey. In this context, the roles and functions of think tanks in Turkey actually have not been reflected a big difference from the other examples from the world.

The basic roles and functions of think tanks do not vary across the countries in general. However, some social, political, economic, cultural, and similar factors affect the roles and functions of them in a specific country in terms of its idiosyncratic features. In this regard, think tanks in Turkey take both the basic roles and functions like in other countries and specific roles and functions which have developed in accordance with the conditions in the country. Aydın (2006: 133-137) specified the roles and functions of think tanks in Turkey under eight different categories based on the interviews he did with some think tank directors in Turkey. His arrangement is also utilized in this study as a comprehensively explanatory categorization. However, specific roles and function of think tanks in Turkey are

explained in this study in addition to their basic roles which they have with their nature of establishment. When think tanks in Turkey analyzed in the context of the roles and functions they have undertaken, their roles and functions can be listed by following McGann's categorization as (2005: 3):

Firstly, as a fundamental role, think tanks in Turkey conduct researches on several policy issues and provide reliable data to policy makers (Aydın, 2006: 133). It is one of the roles undertaken by almost all of the think tanks in the world. Think tanks, as the nature of their goals and objectives, are established to do research. Therefore, in Turkey, they have been interested in internal and external policy problems, and produced applicable solutions for these problems.

Secondly, as a result of the increasing need for the expertise and processed information in policy processes, think tanks in Turkey advise policy makers on policy issues which they are working on (Akdoğan et al., 2018). This advice can directly be provided to policy makers or it can be published as a study that public is also able to reach. In this context, many think tanks in Turkey have been publishing policy briefs via their own channels<sup>456</sup>. In these policy briefs, think tank experts generally provide advices on the topics of possible needs, deficiencies, applicable solutions about the related policy issue. Especially in the times of that there were discussions on a draft law, it is observed that think tanks rapidly produced policy briefs on the draft law.

Thirdly, as an important function, think tanks strengthen the democratic culture by functioning as a bridge between the public and policy makers (Ladi, 2005: 33-34). By trying to participating policy processes and sharing the information they processed with the public, they perform a democratic role. It's a function that positively affect public awareness and political participation in the country by offering policy notes, briefs, and policy advices (Güvenç, 2005). It is an important function because there are many factors which create gaps between the preferences of policy makers and the preferences of their voters such as globalization, migration

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<sup>4</sup> See Policy Briefs of IPC from: <http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/kind/1policy-briefs/> (01.03.2019)

<sup>5</sup> See Policy Briefs of TEPAV from: <https://www.tepav.org.tr/tr/yayin/tur/3> (01.03.2019)

<sup>6</sup> See Policy Briefs of ORSAM from: <https://orsam.org.tr/en/21/> (01.03.2019)

flows, and economic problems (Peetz, 2017: 256-257). This function has become more and more important in Turkey in recent years because there have been many internal and external intervening factors such as Syrian refugee crisis, July 15 coup attempt, change of the governmental system from parliamentary to presidency, and so on.

Fourthly, think tanks function as a booster for civil society in decision making processes. They publicize their studies in order to shape public opinion and thus by creating a public doubt, they undertake a role of boosting civil participation to the decision making. While trying to reach their ultimate goal, affecting policy processes or policy makers, they also mobilize other social actors. As Weaver and McGann states (2000: 3), they play a mediating role between the ideas and actions as a part of the civil society. In Turkey, since the number of organizations that make studies and give advices on the decision making process is limited, it is thought that this function of the think tanks is important for both informing the public correctly and mobilizing other social actors especially in terms of immediate policy actions.

Fifthly, one of the basic roles of think tanks in Turkey is to contribute to the exchange of ideas between decision makers, bureaucrats, academicians, and public through their events such as briefing meetings, seminars, and conferences; publications such as reports, policy briefs, analysis papers, academic articles, books, and vision papers<sup>7</sup>; and activities such as public courses, TV broadcasts, podcasts<sup>8</sup>, and social media shares. By undertaking this function, think tanks create an environment for public debate on the specific policy issues. When think tanks in Turkey are observed in terms of their contribution to the public debate, it can be seen that they have really tried to create an environment for the exchange of ideas by organizing mentioned events and activities<sup>9,10</sup>.

Sixthly, think tanks interpret the policies and current developments in the political life for the media. According to Weaver (1989: 569), journalists have also

<sup>7</sup> See Vision Papers of SAM from <http://sam.gov.tr/category/publications/vision-papers/> (03.03.2019)

<sup>8</sup> See Video & Podcast List of TESEV from <http://tesev.org.tr/tr/video-podcast-listesi/> (03.03.2019)

<sup>9</sup> See Events of SETA from <https://www.setav.org/en/activities/> (03.03.2019)

<sup>10</sup> See Events of TASAM from <http://www.tasam.org/en/Etkinlikler> (03.03.2019)

used think tank sources when gathering information for their news preparations<sup>11</sup>. Because the information which is processed by think tanks is seen as clarified and detailed. Also, think tanks provide alternative thoughts and views for the current issues which may be very helpful for the comments of media. In Turkey, the relationship between think tanks and the media shows a compact feature. TV and radio channels host think tank experts in their broadcasts for asking for their expertise in the discussions on current topics<sup>1213</sup>. Aydın (2006: 135) stated that radio and TV news channels in Turkey competed with each other to find experts from think tanks in order to benefit from their commentary and criticism in their news programs. As a result, think tanks in Turkey are seen by the media as a source of expertise and as an alternative voice for current developments in terms of political issues. In return, think tanks and their experts gain a visibility and prestige.

Seventhly, as a strengthening factor for the diversification of qualified publications in the country, think tanks publish many types of academic and popular sources. They publish books, academic journals, popular journals, booklets, and reports concentrated upon different policy fields. Think tanks in Turkey also undertake this mission very seriously; some organizations even established their own publishing houses<sup>1415</sup>. When analyzed one by one, it can be found so many examples of think tank publications. Firstly, think tanks have published many books in different fields such as domestic and foreign policy, national security, urbanization, globalization, and so through<sup>1617</sup>. Think tanks such as TASAM, SETA, and IPC has their own publishing houses and they have sold their books in their own websites, in other book sale websites, and in bookstores. Secondly, many of the think tanks in Turkey have their own academic and/or popular journals. Journal of Strategic

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<sup>11</sup> See Media Appearances of 21<sup>st</sup> Century Turkey Institute from <https://www.21yyte.org/tr/strateji-tv> (03.03.2019)

<sup>12</sup> See TV programs which ORSAM experts were participated from <https://orsam.org.tr/en/45/> (03.03.2019)

<sup>13</sup> See TV programs which IPC experts were appeared from [http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/media\\_type/ipc-on-tv/?lang=en](http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/media_type/ipc-on-tv/?lang=en) (03.03.2019)

<sup>14</sup> See website of the publishing house of TASAM from <https://tasamyayinlari.com/> (03.03.2019)

<sup>15</sup> See website of the publishing house of ALT, Liberte from <https://www.liberte.com.tr/> (03.03.2019)

<sup>16</sup> See books published by SETA from <https://www.setav.org/en/category/book/> (03.03.2019)

<sup>17</sup> See books and book chapters written by IPC experts from <http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/kind/2books/?lang=en> (03.03.2019)

Foresight<sup>18</sup> published by Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies (TASAM), Journal of Liberal Thought<sup>19</sup> and Journal of Market<sup>20</sup> published by Association for Liberal Thinking (ALT), “Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs”<sup>21</sup> published by Center for Strategic Research (SAM), Journal of SDE<sup>22</sup> published by Institute of Strategic Thinking (SDE), Insight Turkey<sup>23</sup>, Rouya Turkiyyah (In Arabic)<sup>24</sup>, and Kriter (In Turkish)<sup>25</sup> published by SETA, Journal of IKV<sup>26</sup> published by Economic Development Foundation (IKV), Turkish Journal of TESAM Academy<sup>27</sup> published by Center for Economic, Political and Strategic Research (TESAM), and Journal of Middle Eastern Studies<sup>28</sup> and Middle East Analysis Magazine<sup>29</sup> published by Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM) are the some of the prominent examples of the academic and popular journals published by Turkish think tanks. Finally, think tanks in Turkey have also different types of publications which can be found on sale in bookstores such as booklets, reports, analysis papers, commentaries, and so through. Moreover, many of the think tanks in Turkey share their publication in PDF format via their websites and social media accounts.

As eighth, think tanks provide job and internship opportunities to young people especially who graduated from faculties of economics, political, and administrative sciences. They firstly offer a good internship environment for senior students and new graduates. Many think tanks have internship programs in different times of the year for especially university students. For example, IKV opens

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<sup>18</sup> Journal of Strategic Foresight is available at:

[http://www.stratejikongoru.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=96&Itemid=64](http://www.stratejikongoru.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=96&Itemid=64) (03.03.2019)

<sup>19</sup> Journal of Liberal Thought is available at: <http://www.liberal.org.tr/page/kat.php?kat=2&akat=20> (06.03.2019)

<sup>20</sup> Journal of Market is available at: <http://www.liberal.org.tr/page/kat.php?kat=2&akat=21> (06.03.2019)

<sup>21</sup> Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs is available at: <http://dergipark.gov.tr/perception> (06.03.2019)

<sup>22</sup> Journal of SDE is available at: <https://www.sde.org.tr/e-dergiler> (06.03.2019)

<sup>23</sup> Insight Turkey is available at: <https://www.insightturkey.com/> (06.03.2019)

<sup>24</sup> Rouya Turkiyyah is available at: <https://rouyaturkiyyah.com/> (06.03.2019)

<sup>25</sup> Kriter is available at <https://kriterdergi.com/> (06.03.2019)

<sup>26</sup> Journal of IKV is available at: [https://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.asp?ust\\_id=7&id=69](https://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.asp?ust_id=7&id=69) (06.03.2019)

<sup>27</sup> Turkish Journal of TESAM Academy is available at: <http://tesamakademi.com/en/> (06.03.2019)

<sup>28</sup> Journal of Middle Eastern Studies is available at: <https://orsam.org.tr/tr/yayinlar/ortadogu-etutleri-dergisi/> (06.03.2019)

<sup>29</sup> Middle East Analysis Magazine is available at: <https://orsam.org.tr/tr/yayinlar/ortadogu-analiz-dergisi/> (06.03.2019)

internship applications for four terms in a year as spring, summer, fall, and winter<sup>30</sup>; SETA accepts internship applications separately for both its Ankara and Istanbul offices<sup>31</sup>; Turkey office of Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) opens three months of internship term in every summer<sup>32</sup>; and SAM organizes an internship program twice a year as summer and winter<sup>33</sup>. In these internship programs, think tanks give interns the opportunities of testifying working procedures directly, conducting researches in different fields of study, running projects on studying fields of the organization, and learning how to be a think tanker. Secondly, think tanks provide job opportunities for both young people and experienced researchers. Think tanks in Turkey employ a wide range of researchers and experts within their different study areas as full time experts or project based researchers. For example, TASAM has more than 500 researchers and experts within its body (TASAM, 2019: 2-14), IPC has four different research fields and it has more than ten researchers for each research field<sup>34</sup>, and finally SETA has more than ten different directorates and employs more than 90 people under those directorates<sup>35</sup>. As can be seen from the examples, think tanks provide a great number of job and internship opportunities for the qualified people of the country. Moreover, they offer jobs to experienced people of the country such as retired politicians, administrators, ambassadors, generals, and other high level bureaucrats in order to convey their experiences to the public and policy areas (Aydın, 2006: 137-138). For instance, former minister of Economic Affairs and the Treasury of Turkey Kemal Derviş is a member of executive board of IPC<sup>36</sup>, former chairman of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey Cemil Çiçek is a member of the

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<sup>30</sup> See Internship Application page of IKV from: [https://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.asp?ust\\_id=2060&id=15](https://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.asp?ust_id=2060&id=15) (06.03.2019)

<sup>31</sup> See Internship Announcements of SETA from: <https://www.setav.org/staj/> (06.03.2019)

<sup>32</sup> See FES Internships from: <http://fes-tuerkei.org/pages/english/internship.php> (06.03.2019)

<sup>33</sup> See Internship conditions of SAM from: <http://sam.gov.tr/tr/internships-at-sam/> (06.03.2019)

<sup>34</sup> See people of IPC from:

[http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/category/news\\_category\\_1/?post\\_type=objective&lang=en](http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/category/news_category_1/?post_type=objective&lang=en)

<sup>35</sup> See SETA staff from <https://www.setav.org/en/staff/> (06.03.2019)

<sup>36</sup> See Kemal Derviş as a member of executive board of IPC from: <http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/people/kemal-dervis/?lang=en> (06.03.2019)

board of directors in TEPAV<sup>37</sup>, and former ambassador Murat Bilhan and former brigadier general Fahri Erenel are vice chairmen of TASAM<sup>38</sup>.

As ninth, think tanks in Turkey provide qualified human resources to high level bureaucracy and government. Think tank experts, as experienced and qualified people in political life, are offered in state and government cadres. For example, former director of SETA İbrahim Kalın was appointed as Spokesperson of the Presidency and former SAM researcher Çağrı Erhan and director of SETA Burhanettin Duran were appointed as a member of Security and Foreign Policy Board of Presidency<sup>39</sup>.

As tenth, think tanks organizes academic conferences on special issues. They have organized conferences on various topics in order to create an environment for the exchange of information and thought between academicians, practitioners, and think tank researchers. Liberal Thought Congress organized annually by ALT<sup>40</sup>, Istanbul Security Conference organized annually by TASAM<sup>41</sup>, Eurasian Economic Summit organized annually since 1997 by Marmara Group Strategic And Social Research Foundation<sup>42</sup>, and International TESAM Social Sciences Congress organized annually by TESAM<sup>43</sup> are some prominent examples of these academic conferences.

As eleventh, think tanks organize courses on their study fields. They aim to educate and raise university students by preparing courses and seminars in their fields of study like a university. Think tanks in Turkey are so active in organizing courses, so there are many examples in this field. Firstly, ORSAM organizes courses for foreign student in Turkey in cooperation with Presidency for Turks Abroad and

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<sup>37</sup> See the board of directors of TEPAV from:

<https://www.tepav.org.tr/en/html/248/Board+of+Directors/c> (06.03.2019)

<sup>38</sup> See TASAM team page from: <http://www.tasam.org/en/Kurumsal/team> (06.03.2019)

<sup>39</sup> See policy board appointments from: <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/10/20181009-12.pdf> (06.03.2019)

<sup>40</sup> See Liberal Thought Congress from <http://www.liberal.org.tr/page/kat.php?kat=1&akat=2> (06.03.2019)

<sup>41</sup> See Istanbul Security Conference from: [http://www.tasam.org/tr-TR/Etkinlik/15109/istanbul\\_guvenlik\\_konferansi\\_2019](http://www.tasam.org/tr-TR/Etkinlik/15109/istanbul_guvenlik_konferansi_2019) (06.03.2019)

<sup>42</sup> See Eurasian Economic Summit from: <http://www.marmaragrubu.org/economic-summits> (06.03.2019)

<sup>43</sup> See TESAM Social Science Congress from: <http://tesam.org.tr/kongre-2018/> (06.03.2019)

Related Communities (YTB) on the topics of political science, international relations, and Middle Eastern affairs in the context of International Students Academy two times in a year, organizes Middle East Seminars in cooperation with Yıldırım Beyazıt University (YBU) on the topics of religion, politics, and international relations in the Middle East<sup>44</sup>, organizes summer and winter schools on Middle Eastern affairs<sup>45</sup>, and finally organizes courses on leadership and personal development<sup>46</sup>. Secondly, SETA organizes course and seminar programs on a variety of topics about Turkish politics in all its Istanbul, Ankara, and Washington D.C. offices<sup>47</sup>. Thirdly, SAM organizes two types of summer and winter schools in a year, besides its classical schools it organizes summer and winter schools specifically on international law<sup>48</sup>. Fourthly, TESAM established TESAM Academy School in its own body and it organizes course programs on specific topics such as economy and law<sup>49</sup>. Last but not least, ALT organizes weekly conferences, weekend schools, and seminars for graduate students in the context of its Liberty Academy<sup>50</sup>.

Lastly, think tanks join transnational networks in terms of their interests and fields of study and establish partnerships with other think tanks, universities, non-governmental organizations, public institutions, and private organizations. According to Struyk (2002: 83-84), transnational networks of think tanks are rapidly emerging and spreading worldwide in various types. These networks can have a global focus or a regional focus. Think tanks in Turkey also have memberships and establish partnerships with global and regional think tank networks. For example, there are 8 members in the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo)<sup>51</sup>, 4 members in Global development Network (GDN)<sup>52</sup>, and 2 members in Strategic Studies Network (SSN)<sup>53</sup> from Turkey. In addition, when observed one by one, think tanks in turkey have many partnerships with internal and external organizations. TASAM has

<sup>44</sup> See ORSAM seminars from: <https://orsam.org.tr/en/35/> (06.03.2019)

<sup>45</sup> See ORSAM Summer and Winter courses from: <https://orsam.org.tr/en/36/> (06.03.2019)

<sup>46</sup> See ORSAM Leadership and Development courses from: <https://orsam.org.tr/en/38/> (06.03.2019)

<sup>47</sup> See SETA course and seminar programs from: <https://www.setav.org/kurs/> (08.03.2019)

<sup>48</sup> See SAM summer and winter schools from: <http://sam.gov.tr/summer-winter-school/> (08.03.2019)

<sup>49</sup> See TESAM Academy School from: <http://tesam.org.tr/category/akademi-okulu/> (08.03.2019)

<sup>50</sup> See Liberty Academy from: <http://www.liberal.org.tr/page/kat.php?kat=1&akad=1> (08.03.2019)

<sup>51</sup> See EuroMeSCo members from: <https://www.euromesco.net/members/> (08.03.2019)

<sup>52</sup> See partners of GDN from: <http://www.gdn.int/partners-funders> (08.03.2019)

<sup>53</sup> See SSN partner from: <http://strategicstudiesnetwork.org/the-way-forward/> (08.03.2019)

more than 150 partners from more than 15 countries<sup>54</sup>; IPC has 15 international partners containing Stiftung Mercator, Brookings Institution, Chatham House, and Free University Berlin<sup>55</sup>; SAM has 15 partners from 15 different countries<sup>56</sup>; and Ankara Policy Center (APM) has more than 35 partnerships containing 12 think tanks, 17 universities, and 2 public institutions<sup>57</sup>.

#### 2.4. Organizational Structures of Think Tanks in Turkey

Think tanks need to have an appropriate organizational structure to enable them to play their roles and deliver their missions. Many different factors such as the legal, economic, political, and social context of a country can be effective the way a think tank organizes itself. Then, above all, the type of a think tank is the most important factor that determined the organizational structure of it because think tanks have been managed in regard to its fields of study, financial bases, relations, dependence criterion, and so through (Moncada and Mendizabal, 2013). That is, when the organizational structure of a think tank is evaluated, the important question arises as how it is located in practice. As mentioned before, think tanks can be located in the state structure, civil society, universities, political parties, and business organizations. In this respect, the organizational structure of think tanks can be shaped in accordance with its location in practice. However, even in the same location in practice some organizational features can differentiate among think tanks. For this reason, legal status and personnel structures of think tanks in Turkey should be examined for a clear understanding on their organizational structures.

As a matter of fact, think tanks are generally established in Turkey with statuses of companies, foundations, and associations in addition to being affiliated to universities or the state. This situation creates difficulties in separating them from other organizations which are established as companies, associations, or foundations. In order for separating them from other organizations, their organizational structure

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<sup>54</sup> See partners of TASAM from: <http://www.tasam.org/en/Kurumlar> (08.03.2019)

<sup>55</sup> See international partners of IPC from: <http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/about/support-ipc/?lang=en> (08.03.2019)

<sup>56</sup> See partners of SAM from: <http://sam.gov.tr/tr/international-partners/> (08.03.2019)

<sup>57</sup> See partners of APM from: <http://www.apm.org.tr/ortaklarimiz/> (08.03.2019)

should be examined in detail. But firstly, the legal status of think tanks is necessary to be explained.

University-affiliated think tanks are established and organized depending on the rules and regulations of each university and similarly government-affiliated think tanks are established depending on the rules and regulations of the body they affiliated. For example, Strategic Research Center (SAM) was established based on the Articles 9 and 10 of Law no. 4009 on the Establishment and Duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which was changed in 2010 with Law no. 6004 on the Establishment and Duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>58</sup>) and organized depending on the Regulation of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Research Center<sup>59</sup> that regulates its structure, operation, shape, and conditions. However, other think tanks can be established under various legal statuses because there is no such a law in Turkey specifically covering think tanks. As a result of this absence, think tanks in Turkey have been established depending on the provisions in various related laws such as Law of Foundations no. 5737<sup>60</sup>, Associations Law no. 5253<sup>61</sup>, Turkish Civil Code no. 4721<sup>62</sup>, and Law no. 5072 on Relations of Public Institutions with Associations and Foundations<sup>63</sup>. That is, although there is no legal regulation in Turkey specifically regulated on think tanks, it should be stated that there is also no obstacle for establishing think tanks both in legal and in bureaucratic senses. Within these circumstances, the majority of think tanks in Turkey were established as foundations such as TESEV, SETA, TEPAV, and IKV. Some of think tanks were established as associations such as ALT, TESAM, EDAM, ASAM, ESAM (Economic and Social Research Center), APM, and Turkey offices of foreign think

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<sup>58</sup> See “Law no. 6004 on the Establishment and Duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs” from: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/mevzuat-2013.pdf> (11.03.2019)

<sup>59</sup> See “Regulation of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Research Center” from: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/Mevzuat/11-strm.pdf> (15.03.2019)

<sup>60</sup> See “Law of Foundations” no. 5737 from: <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.5737.pdf> (15.03.2019)

<sup>61</sup> See “Associations Law” no 5253 from: [https://www.dernekler.gov.tr/en/Statute/Compiled-statute-Laws/5253\\_Associations-Law.aspx](https://www.dernekler.gov.tr/en/Statute/Compiled-statute-Laws/5253_Associations-Law.aspx) (15.03.2019)

<sup>62</sup> See “Turkish Civil Code” no 4721 from: [https://www.tusev.org.tr/usrfiles/files/Turkish\\_Civil\\_Code.pdf](https://www.tusev.org.tr/usrfiles/files/Turkish_Civil_Code.pdf) (15.03.2019)

<sup>63</sup> See “Relations of Public Institutions with Associations and Foundations” from: <https://www.dernekler.gov.tr/en/Statute/Compiled-statute-Laws/5072.aspx> (15.03.2019)

tanks FES and KAS. Moreover, some other think tanks were established as companies such as DPE and TASAM.

Together with their legal structure, personnel structure of think tanks are also an important factor for defining their organizational structure. Personnel regimes of think tanks also change according to types and legal structures of them. For example, government-affiliated think tanks do not have the same personnel regime with a political party affiliated or a university affiliated think tank. Similarly, personnel regime of a think tank which was established in company status may not be the same with a think tank established as an association or a foundation. However, when an observation is made through websites of think tanks in Turkey, it can be seen that many of them have similar personnel structures. There have generally a director or a board of directors, an advisory board, and a group of staff such as experts and researchers. At first, it is important for the organizational structure of think tanks that who the founders of them were and who the directors of them are. Then, their directory boards and advisory boards and their staff structures and policies may be examined as indicators.

Founders of think tanks in Turkey are generally academicians, politicians, former bureaucrats, and the members of the business community or directly business organizations (Aydın, 2006: 123). For example, founders of TESEV, IKV, and DPE are businessmen; founders of ALT, SETA, ASAM, and ORSAM are academicians; founders of ESAM and TESAV are politicians; and founder of EDAM is a former bureaucrat. Moreover, some think tanks were founded by business organizations such as TEPAV and IKV and some think tanks were founded by a cooperation between business organizations and universities such as Economic Research Forum (EAF)<sup>64</sup> and Foreign Policy Forum (DPF)<sup>65</sup>. It can be said that think tanks in Turkey were founded by a wide range of entrepreneurs. This situation shows that a great range of people and organizations have been interested in getting involved in policy processes when the roles and functions of think tanks in Turkey are taken into account.

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<sup>64</sup> See EAF from: [https://caf.ku.edu.tr/en/about\\_us](https://caf.ku.edu.tr/en/about_us) (15.03.2019)

<sup>65</sup> See DPF from: <http://en.dispolitikaforumu.com/mission/> (15.03.2019)

The top executive body of think tanks in Turkey is generally the board of directors. In addition to board of directors; they generally have advisory, supervisory, and high supervisory boards. Number of the members of board of directors is change from one organization to others. However, the role and functions of these boards almost the same among all think tanks. Yet, procedures and processes of elections to board of directors also vary depending on the legal structure of the organization. In detail, think tanks with association status have often a general assembly and think tanks with foundation status have often a board of trustees that elects the board of directors.

In think tanks with foundation status, upon to be arranged in the foundation voucher, board of trustees is the highest decision making body and elects the board of directors, then the board of directors becomes the executive and administrative body of the foundation. For example, the Board of Directors of TEPAV consists of 7 official and 7 associate members elected for three years by the Board of Trustees and the majority of the members of the Board must be selected from the Board of Trustees<sup>66</sup>; the Board of Directors of IKV consists of 17 members elected for two years by the General Assembly and members of the Board of Directors are elected from among the founders of the foundation and Board of the Trustees<sup>67</sup>, IKV has also an Audit Committee (supervisory board) that consists of two members<sup>68</sup>; and the Board of Directors of TESEV consists of 9 official and 3 associate members elected for two years by the Board of Trustees, TESEV has also a supervisory board consists of 3 official members and 2 associate members and a high advisory board<sup>69</sup>.

In think tanks with association status, upon to be arranged in association charter, general assembly is the highest decision making body and elects the board of directors, then the board of directors becomes the executive and administrative body of the association. For example, the Board of Directors of APM consists of 5 official

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<sup>66</sup> See Article 11 of the Foundation Voucher of TEPAV from: [https://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/mce/tepav\\_vakif\\_senedi.pdf](https://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/mce/tepav_vakif_senedi.pdf) (15.03.2019)

<sup>67</sup> See Article 11 of the Foundation Voucher of IKV from: [https://www.ikv.org.tr/images/files/%C4%B0KV%20Vak%C4%B1f%20Senedi\\_.pdf](https://www.ikv.org.tr/images/files/%C4%B0KV%20Vak%C4%B1f%20Senedi_.pdf) (15.03.2019)

<sup>68</sup> See Audit Committee of IKV from: [https://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.asp?ust\\_id=12&id=17](https://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.asp?ust_id=12&id=17) (15.03.2019)

<sup>69</sup> See Articles 10,11,17, and 18 of the Foundation Voucher of TESEV from: [http://tesev.org.tr/wp-content/themes/teseV/docs/Vakif\\_Senedi.pdf](http://tesev.org.tr/wp-content/themes/teseV/docs/Vakif_Senedi.pdf) (15.03.2019)

and 5 associate members including a chairman, an accountant, and a secretary general elected for three years by the General Assembly<sup>70</sup>; the Board of Directors of ESAM consists of 15 official and 15 associate members including a chairman, vice chairmen, and a secretary general elected for three years by the General Assembly, ESAM also has a Supervisory Board consists of 5 official and 5 associate members<sup>71</sup>; and the Executive and Supervisory Board of EDAM consists of 16 members including a chairman, and a CEO elected by the General Assembly<sup>72</sup>.

In think tanks which have affiliation to universities or state institutions may not have a similar structure with above mentioned think tanks. In Turkey, directors or board of directors of these bodies do not usually elected but appointed. For example, the director and the board of directors of SAM are appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs from among the civil servants having the title of Ambassador<sup>73</sup>, and the director and board of directors of İstanbul University Strategic Research Center (İÜSAM) are appointed by the Rector<sup>74</sup>.

In terms of staff policies, think tanks in Turkey have followed different ways to employ researchers, experts, and administrative personnel. The most important issue for think tanks when employing staff is whether or not to employ as permanent staff (Aydın, 2006: 124). With respect to Weaver and McGann (2000: 26-27), employing a permanent staff gives a great control to directors of think tanks over their studies, on the other hand, permanent staff becomes much expensive than employing contract basis short-term researchers for each specific projects and also project based researchers are not negatively influenced from a situation of organizational policy change. For these reasons, think tanks have usually chosen to employ contract basis staff in Turkey. When examined one by one, it can be said that

<sup>70</sup> See Article 14 of the Association Charter of APM from: [http://www.apm.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/APM\\_tuzuk\\_tr\\_250318.pdf](http://www.apm.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/APM_tuzuk_tr_250318.pdf) (15.03.2019)

<sup>71</sup> See Articles 25 and 30 of the Association Charter of ESAM from: [http://www.esam.org.tr/tuzuk\\_k34.html](http://www.esam.org.tr/tuzuk_k34.html) (15.03.2019)

<sup>72</sup> See EDAM Executive and Supervisory Board from: <http://edam.org.tr/en/executive-and-supervisory-board/> Brookings experts from: <https://www.brookings.edu/experts/> (17.03.2019)

<sup>73</sup> See Chatham House experts from: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/experts/our-experts?expertsnav=>

<sup>74</sup> See Article 3 of the “Regulation of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Research Center” from: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/Mevzuat/11-strm.pdf> (17.03.2019)

<sup>74</sup> See Article 8 and 10 of the “Regulation of İstanbul University Strategic Research Center” from: <http://sam.istanbul.edu.tr/?p=5850> (17.03.2019)

the number of employment opportunity provided by think tanks in Turkey is not in the satisfactory level. For instance, TESEV has 9 staff, 5 of which are permanent staff and 4 of them are project-based<sup>75</sup>; IKV has 18 permanent staff, 7 of which are administrative staff, 9 of which are researchers, and 2 of which are directors<sup>76</sup>; IPC has employed 45 staff since 2011<sup>77</sup>, currently 30 staff are working in IPC<sup>78</sup>, 10 of which are project-based staff within their “Mercator-IPC Initiative” program, 8 of which are administrative staff, and 12 of them are permanent researchers<sup>79</sup>; finally FES has 8<sup>80</sup>, EAF has 4<sup>81</sup> and DPF has 2<sup>82</sup> permanent staff. These numbers do not show the general staff policies of think tanks in Turkey but it can be seen from the statistics that there are not much permanent staff employed by think tanks in Turkey when compared with the outstanding think tanks in the world such as Brookings with more than 400 full-time researchers<sup>83</sup> and Chatham House with more than 300 full-time researchers<sup>84</sup>.

## 2.5. Financial Structures of Think Tanks in Turkey

One of the most important problems that think tanks has faced in Turkey is funding. They need to cover their costs in order to survive within policy environment but they have had many troubles in finding financial resources. As a matter of fact, think tanks do not have the capacity to cover their costs with their own financial gaining. They may apply membership fees, put on their publications on market, and carry on projects with contractual agreements for money; but these are not enough for ensuring their financial survival without some sponsorships, government

<sup>75</sup> See page 8 of annual report of TESEV from: [http://teseiv.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/TESEV\\_2018\\_FAAL%C4%B0YET\\_21-2.pdf](http://teseiv.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/TESEV_2018_FAAL%C4%B0YET_21-2.pdf) (17.03.2019)

<sup>76</sup> See IKV Team from: [https://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.asp?ust\\_id=12&id=21](https://www.ikv.org.tr/ikv.asp?ust_id=12&id=21) (17.03.2019)

<sup>77</sup> See page 8 of IPC Annual Report from: [http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/%C4%B0PMAktiviteRaporu\\_TR.pdf](http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/%C4%B0PMAktiviteRaporu_TR.pdf)

<sup>78</sup> See page 63 of IPC Annual Report from: [http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/%C4%B0PMAktiviteRaporu\\_TR.pdf](http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/%C4%B0PMAktiviteRaporu_TR.pdf) (19.03.2019)

<sup>79</sup> See IPC staff from: <http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/group/ipm-calisanlari/?lang=en> (19.03.2019)

<sup>80</sup> See FES staff from: <http://fes-tuerkei.org/pages/english/about-us/fes-team-turkey.php> (19.03.2019)

<sup>81</sup> See EAF staff from: <https://eaf.ku.edu.tr/en/whoswho> (19.03.2019)

<sup>82</sup> See DPF staff from: [http://en.dispolitikaforumu.com/administrative\\_staff/](http://en.dispolitikaforumu.com/administrative_staff/) (19.03.2019)

<sup>83</sup> See Brookings experts from: <https://www.brookings.edu/experts/> (19.03.2019)

<sup>84</sup> See Chatham House experts from: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/experts/our-experts?expertsnav=> (19.03.2019)

contracts, or partnerships (Aydın, 2006: 127). That is, philanthropy is an important need for think tanks like many NGOs in the country.

When the culture of philanthropy examined in Turkey, it is seen that think tanks do not receive a significant donation. According to the findings of the research done by Çarkoğlu and Aytaç (2016: 14-15), the total of all of the donations made in one year in Turkey is approximately 228 Turkish Liras per capita which equals 0.8% of GDP and in the case of giving through NGOs, the amount drops in approximately 16.7 Turkish Liras which equals to 0.06% of GDP. In addition, it is seen from the report that people make donations for fulfilling religious obligations with a rate of 32.5% among motivations for individual donation. Similarly, government and private companies choose to make donations to more tangible projects rather than projects based on thoughts or information. For example, it can be seen from their last annual reports that TESEV received approximately 1 million Turkish Liras donation in 2018<sup>85</sup> and TEPAV received approximately 7 million Turkish Liras donation in 2012<sup>86</sup>. However, most of the think tanks in Turkey do not share any information about their budget, income, and expenditures via their official websites or social media accounts, even almost all of them do not publish their activity reports.

Think tanks try to get funds from various resources. They may get direct financial support from state budget, private organizations, business communities and so through. However, it can be said that the amount of state grants cannot be sufficient to cover their expenses. Also, dependence on state or business resources negatively affects their financial independence. As a result of all of these, think tanks in Turkey do not have sufficient domestic funding resources, so they try to find foreign funds. Yet again, foreign funds also affect their reliability and independence as mentioned earlier in this study.

Apart from donations, think tanks try to develop their financial resources by establishing relationships and partnerships with state agencies, business groups, other

<sup>85</sup> See page 32 of 2018 TESEV Annual Report from: [http://tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/TESEV\\_2018\\_FAAL%C4%B0YET\\_21-2.pdf](http://tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/TESEV_2018_FAAL%C4%B0YET_21-2.pdf) (22.03.2019)

<sup>86</sup> See 2012 TEPAV statement of income from: [https://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/mce/genel/yillik\\_raporlar/01.01.2012\\_31.12.2012\\_tarihi\\_ayrintili\\_gelir\\_tablosu\\_.pdf](https://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/mce/genel/yillik_raporlar/01.01.2012_31.12.2012_tarihi_ayrintili_gelir_tablosu_.pdf) (23.03.2019)

non-governmental organization both inside Turkey and from abroad. They carry out projects in cooperation with or with sponsorship of their partners. In this context, think tanks in Turkey have carried out projects in cooperation with or with sponsorship of domestic supporters like Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) and Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD). When think tanks established or funded by the business communities and trade unions are examined, it is seen that there are many examples of this situation such as TEPAV which was established and funded by TOBB, TESEV which was established and funded by Eczacıbaşı Holding, EAF which was established by the cooperation between Koç University and TUSIAD, similarly DPF which was established by the cooperation between Boğaziçi University and TUSIAD, and IKV which was founded by Istanbul Chamber of Industry and Istanbul Chamber of Commerce. Moreover, they carry out projects for foreign partners or supporters like EU and UN. “Istanbul Policy Center, Sabancı University and Stiftung Mercator Initiative” carrying out by IPC<sup>87</sup> and “International Student Academy” organized by ORSAM in cooperation with Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB)<sup>88</sup> are obvious examples in this regard. It should be stated that these funds are not permanent but supportive for think tanks to develop their operational capacity.

Finally, it should be stated that there are no sufficient data shared by think tanks in Turkey which reflect the financial indicators about the budget, incomes, and expenses of them highly because of the lack of transparency in their financial accounts. However, it can be said that think tanks in Turkey operate with small budgets when compared with their counterparts in Europe and the US.

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<sup>87</sup> See IPC-Sabancı University-Stiftung Mercator Initiative from: <http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/about/ipm-sabanci-university-stifting-mercator-initiave/?lang=en> (01.04.2019)

<sup>88</sup> See International Student Academy from: <https://orsam.org.tr/en/international-student-academy-by-orsam-ytb-spring-2019/> (01.04.2019)

### III

#### THE CAPACITY TO IMPACT OF THINK TANKS IN TURKEY

Turkey, as a country that recently passed to presidential system from parliamentary government system, is in a process of change and regeneration. When considered that think tank culture in a country is influenced by many different factors including political culture and government system, it can be stated that the roles, importance and influence of think tanks in policy processes have also been in a period of change. With this development, it is thought that the capacity to influence of think tanks on decision making process may positively change. Until the change of the governmental system, think tanks had not been officially involved in decision making processes as a result of the strong party culture in the parliament and strong bureaucracy (Aydın, 2006: 139-140). It can easily be said that think tanks do not have a visible influence over the decision making process in Turkey. Whereupon, the questions of this study are what their capacity to influence is and how it can be measured.

##### 3.1. Problem of Measurement

As Pautz (2012: 20) stated, think tanks have the potential to influence the decisions taken and to have a role in reformative movements so they can have a significant impact on policy change and policy continuity. However, according to McGann (2018: 112), think tanks were firstly established and advanced within developed countries and they have still been in a process of progress in emerging powers like India, China, and Turkey. Therefore, think tanks in Turkey are inevitably underfunded and less equipped than their counterparts in developed countries. In parallel with these deficiencies, one of the most important problems think tanks in developing countries faced is lack of political recognition. As a result of these problems, the influence of think tanks in Turkey cannot be examined as same as the ones in developed countries. They face much more challenges in terms of all local, national, regional, and global recognition. As Sak and Koru explained (2018: 44-45), Turkey needs think tanks to play more a bottom-up or grassroots role. For all of these reasons, the capacity to influence of think tanks was chosen as the main target of this

study instead of trying to measure the influence. It is obvious that the influence of think tanks on policy process in Turkey, as a country that has a non-transparent and closed policy making process, is almost impossible. Yet, it is thought that the efforts, performance and studies of think tanks can be measured as indicators of their capacity to influence.

The influence of think tanks varies by many variables such as organization, issue, and time period. Yet, it is approved by almost all of the studies on think tanks that they set up in order for influencing policies somehow (James, 2000: 165; Stone, 2005: 17; Abelson, 2018: 105-106). According to many scholars (Weidenbaum, 2010: 134; Selee, 2013: 85;), the most fundamental and challenging question faces scholars studying on the think tank phenomenon is how their effectiveness in the public policy process can be measured. Measuring the influence is difficult because of the uncertain nature of relationship between the endeavors of think tanks and policy outcomes (Rich, 2004: 8; Selee, 2013:15; Abelson, 2018: 105; McGann, 2019: 33-34). There are many reasons why the link between them is uncertain. However, the most important reason is the extended nature of the policy process. Public policy process takes a long time to evolve and a great number of actors such as media, organizations, and interest groups are involved in the process (Weidenbaum, 2010: 135). Within this process, think tanks are able to find roles themselves as well as other actors but the influence of these roles becomes difficult to be measured because of the broadness of the time and multiplicity of actors.

As an inference which has made over the complicated and nontrivial nature of the policy process, some scholars claim that it is not possible to measure the influence (Weidenbaum, 2010: 134). However, most of the scholars studying on think tanks have not stopped to try to measure influence somehow. There are different ways developed by different scholars in measuring the influence of think tanks. Each has advantages and limitations because they used indirect measures when assessing think tank influence. For example, with respect to Clark and Roodman (2013), while policy impact is hard if not impossible to measure, the strength of a think tank's public profile becomes a good indicator for its impact and capacity to influence. Moreover, Abelson (2018) states that influence cannot be

measured directly over specific policy outcomes but it can be assessed through interactions and exchanges among participants who directly or indirectly have an influence on policy making process. Finally, Selee (2013: 15) argues that there is an uncertain link between think tank activities and policy outcomes, so evaluating the influence over outcomes, which is the actual accomplishments of impact on policy ideas or decisions, requires a clear qualitative analysis. However, he suggests that the difficulties in assessing outcomes should not be an obstacle on developing a way to measuring the influence, because it can be developed by using indirect indicators such as measures inputs – resources used- and outputs –reports, publications, events, and so on.

As Selee (2013: 86) states, the measures of input and output show the activities and usage statistics of think tanks. These are good indicators for the capacity and ability to influence of them but not measures of their influence at the end of the day (Clark and Roodman, 2013). They because do not show the contributions of think tanks to actual policy outcomes, only show the indirect contributions to the policy environment. It cannot be known that their contributions to the long and complex periods of policy making found their correspondence within the final policy outcomes. That is to say that to examine the inputs and outputs, namely the intermediate products of think tanks (Weidenbaum, 2010: 135; Koellner, 2013), is a good way to measure the capacity to influence. Firstly, a quantitative analysis about the inputs and outputs of the features and activities of think tanks gives an idea about their efforts of trying to influence decision making process. Then, secondly, a qualitative interpretation of these quantitative data gives a clearer idea about their capacity to influence. In this perspective, the measurement of inputs includes structures of finance, staffing, management, legal status, relations, and other elements of inputs, and the measurement of outputs includes publications, events, meetings, briefings for decision makers, media citations, congressional testimony, briefings, social media attractions, website hits, and so through. Selee (2013, 87-88) argues that the measures of inputs help us to have an idea about the structural features of the organizations and give us a snapshot of how they are evolving structurally in order to meet their key targets. Also, he claims that the measures of

output provide a good statistic of what they are doing, how they undertake their roles and functions, and how they reach to their key audiences. Yet, as mentioned before, these statistics need qualitative interpretations because quantifying inputs and outputs can be the first stage of the evaluation process which can give useful statistics for developers, managers, and funders. The significant second stage is qualitative interpretation of the quantitative data which can provide a way to understand the influence capacity of the organization when made in the light of the targeted outcomes. Hence, the following question becomes how the inputs and outputs can be measured.

### **3.2. Measuring the “Impact Capacity”**

As mentioned in the previous sections of this study, several scholars identified different groups of indicators of influence. The problem of measurement comes to front after examining these indicators. It should be stated that measuring the capacity to impact needs a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods. Thus, a systematic approach is necessary for the measurement. In this regard, trials of different scholars become important for developing a new way of measurement specific to the case of Turkey.

There is no consensus on a common methodology for evaluating the inputs and outputs, namely the capacity to impact, of think tanks among the scholars studying on this issue (Alloisio et al., 2013). Different exercises on evaluating the influence of think tanks have different measurements and methodologies. These exercises generally focused on measuring think tanks’ performance, level of activity, level of visibility, and operational capacity as indicators of their capacity to influence. For this reason, different types of evaluations used in different studies are examined within this section of this study.

Firstly, Allosio and four other scholars (2013) from “International Center for Climate Governance (ICCG)”<sup>89</sup> developed a systematic approach on the measurement of think tanks for their projects of “ICCG Climate Think Tank

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<sup>89</sup> See ICCG from: <http://www.iccgov.org/> (09.04.2019)

Ranking” and “Think Tank Map”<sup>90</sup>. They evaluated think tanks working in the field of climate change economics and policies for their projects. Their measurement criteria are based on the think tanks’ overall productivity, so that is to say that they use measures of output. Think tanks are quantitatively evaluated under two main titles of activities and publications. Events, involvement to international policy change meetings and involvement to from United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)<sup>91</sup> studies are chosen as the measures under the title of activities and articles in peer-reviewed journals and articles in other journals are chosen as measures under the titles of publications. Moreover, they also evaluated think tanks qualitatively through their official websites whether they are transparent, publicly available and verifiable or not.

Allosio et al. (2013) support that the number of events organized shows the ability of think tanks to present their ideas to the audience they are trying to influence. For this reason, they assessed the number of lectures, conferences, seminars, workshops, forums, and non-academic events organized by think tanks as the indicators of the productivity of them in terms of events. Then, they support that their involvement in international meetings on climate and UNFCCC studies shows the visibility of think tanks in decision making process. In this respect, they assessed the number of fellows of think tanks who are authors or editors in reports and the number of submissions and papers presented in UNFCCC treaty bodies as the indicators of the success of think tanks in terms of involvement. Finally, they support that publications of think tanks show their productivity and academic sufficiency. In this context, they evaluated the number of articles and other academic papers published in peer-reviewed journals and the number of articles published in non-peer-reviewed journals. All in all, they ranked 34 think tanks with using normalized weights of their scores through measures mentioned above.

Secondly, Alcázar and three other scholars (2012) developed a comprehensive way of measuring think tanks impact for their report published by The Group for the Analysis of Development (El Grupo de Análisis para el

<sup>90</sup> See Think Tank map of ICCG from: <http://www.iccgov.org/en/observatories/think-tank-map/> (09.04.2019)

<sup>91</sup> See UNFCCC from: <https://unfccc.int/> (11.04.2019)

Desarrollo- GRADE<sup>92</sup>). They identified variables and indicators of think tanks impact in order to analyze three specific organizations from Africa, Asia, and Latin America as case studies. They used both the measures of inputs and outputs in the model of measurement they formed. They listed endogenous variables and exogenous variables as the measures of inputs and output indicators and indicators of research use as the measures of output.

Endogenous variables are listed as mission statements, main functions performed, organizational characteristics and resources, research management, type of research produced, primary audiences of the research produced, communication and diffusion strategies, and networks. Exogenous variables are listed as political-institutional variables, media, and policy linkages. They supported that these measures of inputs show the organizational capacity of think tanks in terms of their influence. Output indicators are listed as publications, Internet activity in owned website, media appearances, advisory roles played by the organization's members to policy makers and other relevant institutions, networking participation, conference and seminar presentations, educational activities conducted within the organization (courses, workshops, lectures, etc.), and other roles played by the organizations' members including teaching in higher education institutions, positions in government institutions. Indicators of research use are listed as invitations to provide expertise to policy makers, media and others; invitations to participate in panels; number of citations of published works by the organization and its members; and number of visits to the organizations' website. They supported that these measures of outputs show the level visibility and activity of think tanks. Finally, they identified reputational and final impact measures as the direct indicators of think tanks impact as stakeholder engagement to assess their perception of the organization, awards granted to the organization and examples of research use and influence. All in all, they use these metrics to evaluate three specific think tanks one by one.

Thirdly, Kuntz (2013), a fellow of Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)<sup>93</sup>, identified impact metrics for think tanks in his study which he

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<sup>92</sup> See GRADE from: <http://www.grade.org.pe/> (11.04.2019)

<sup>93</sup> See CIGI from: <https://www.cigionline.org/> (11.04.2019)

presented at the conference “Think Tanks: Facing the Changing World” in China in 2013. He aims to create a framework on measuring the influence of think tanks. He supported that almost all of the think tanks in the world have been seeking more effective ways to increase their impact and exploring better ways to measure that impact. In order for creating a model to measure think tanks he specified 15 feasible metrics which categorized under four different titles. Firstly, based on the assumption that think tanks need to be more exposed to public view in order to have more influence, the first five metrics are characterized as measures of exposure. Measures of exposure are listed as media mentions (including social media), number and type of publications, scholarly citations, government citations, and rankings in annual think tank ratings of think tanks. Secondly, it is assumed that think tanks need to have more diverse resources in order to achieve more influence, so following three metrics are characterized as measures of resources. Measures of resources are listed as diversity and stability of funding; number, experience, skills, and reputation of experts and researchers; and quality and extent of networks and partnerships that think tanks have. Thirdly, it is claimed that think tanks need to be visible for enhancing their influence, the third group of metrics are identified as measures of demand. Measures of demand are listed as think tanks’ events, digital traffic and engagement, official access, and publications sold or downloaded from web. Finally, even if they are the most difficult to quantify the last three metrics are characterized as measures of direct policy impact and quality of work. These measures are listed as policy recommendations considered or adopted, testimonials, and quality of work. All in all, Kuntz propound that think tanks have to take some or all of these metrics in consideration for being influential in policy cycles.

Fourthly, McNutt and Marchildon (2009: 223-224) developed a measurement model for think tanks’ visibility and influence through their Web activities. They supported that the Internet and Web are key variables in determining the influence of think tanks. They asserted that trying to measure the influence of think tanks means actually evaluating that whether they are active or not as Abelson (2018) said while it is extremely difficult to identify the link between activities of think tanks and actual policy outcomes. Yet, they argued that their popularity on the Web is an important

evaluative criterion. While think tanks are using the Web in order to market their studies, share research products, and enhance their reputations as policy experts, their online activity should be examined.

McNutt and Marchildon (2009) asserted that measuring web-based impact of think tanks constitutes an important indicator for their capacities of contributing policy making process. They used Web-based impact as the visibility and relevance of websites and other web pages of think tanks from policy community (Björneborn and Ingwersen, 2004). When making an evaluation through web-based impact, they analyzed the hyperlink circulation between the web activity of think tanks and policy actors such as governments and international policy organizations instead of making a quantitative analysis over the numbers of page views or downloads. McNutt and Marchildon made hyperlink analysis through two ways as crawling and connectivity analysis. They, as consequence, supported that high levels of hyperlinks from the policy community show the success of dissemination of research and strong public engagement of think tanks. Because these hyperlinks (or in-links) actually show the credibility and reliability of the web activities of think tanks. All in all, they made their web-based evaluation over five different policy areas to measure popularity of think tanks and relevance of their studies to public policy concerns or debates.

Fifthly, CGD fellows Clark and Roodman (2013) designed a quantitative approach on measuring think tank performance. Their methodology constitutes a perfect example for this study because it was mainly based on measuring the capacity to influence of think tanks. It provides a quantifiable scale for measuring the impact capacity from different dimensions. They made their evaluation through six different measures as; social media fans, website traffic, incoming links, media citations, scholarly citations, and organization size. That is, they analyzed both outputs and inputs of think tanks as the indicators of capacity to influence. They used the metrics of Facebook likes and Twitter followers for measuring social media fans, global web traffic rank for measuring website traffic, number of sites which link to the website for measuring incoming links, number of mentions in global news sources for measuring news citations, google scholar citations in all languages for measuring scholarly citations, and annual budgets and operational continuity for measuring

organization size. They finally created an aggregate performance analysis for US think tanks over these indicators. From the six different indicators, they analyzed the profile and performance of think tanks by doing a comparison over the mean and median values of their scores. All in all, as an objective and applicable study, it constitutes a good example of measuring think tank capacity in terms of influence.

Finally, as the mostly accepted and reliable studies on think tanks “Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports (GGTTT)”<sup>94</sup>, which have been produced by the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP)<sup>95</sup> at the University of Pennsylvania and managed by James McGann, developed a ranking strategy for think tanks. These reports, which have been published since 2008, have been ranking the world's leading think tanks. A selected group of think tank experts including scholars, policymakers, journalists, and NGO representatives evaluate think tanks in terms of various thematic fields. The evaluation is derived from a nomination and review process involving academicians, journalists, and think tank staff. Moreover, it has both qualitative and quantitative assessments on nominee think tanks. As the most significant example, Think Tank Index Reports should be examined in detail. However, prior to examining the reports, McGann’s suggestions about the influence of think tanks need to be given.

McGann (2007: 40-42), like the other scholars, supports that measuring actual influence is a difficult task to do and accordingly he asserts that there are some ways to measure the policy relevance of think tank activities to the policy process. In this context, according to his inferences, think tanks’ and their staff’s relationships with decision makers, quality of their research products, citations of their products by policy makers, utilization of their publications by other elites such as media, references to their studies given by civil society actors and pressure groups, cumulative media references to their studies, and citations of their studies in scholarly works are the important indicators of policy relevance of them. Moreover, the indicators of influence capacity of think tanks are not limited to these, there are many other indirect measures such as providing staff to policy making bodies,

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<sup>94</sup> See Annual Reports from: <https://www.gotthinktank.com/global-goto-think-tank-index/> (13.04.2019)

<sup>95</sup> See TTCSP from: <https://www.gotthinktank.com/> (13.04.2019)

making policy analysis on implemented policies, and holding conferences on different policy issues. Over these evaluations, McGann (2019: 33-34), as mentioned before, defines four different indicators of influence of think tanks as resource, utilization, output, and impact indicators. In GGTTT, McGann have generally been benefited from these indicators.

GGTTT has been published since 2008 and has reached a great popularity among the scholars and think tank directors. Every year thousands of think tanks have nominated to different indexes in the reports. To rank all of these think tanks, McGann describes a wide range of selection and evaluation criteria. These criteria, which have been changed and reformed every year from 2008 to 2019, have actually designed to measure the actual capacities of think tanks. There are 18 important criteria under the title of “Nomination and Ranking Criteria” of the 2008 report, while there are 29 criteria under the same title in the 2018 report. When all of these criteria examined, it can be seen that both the measures of input and output have been comprehensively taken into consideration in the reports. Then, in the evaluation process of the reports, McGann’s conceptualization of four indicators of resource, utilization, output, and impact indicators, which mentioned before, have been used as assessment tools. As an important reference point for the methodology of this study, GGTTT will be examined in detail in following parts. At this point, the evaluation criteria of the latest report can be seen below (McGann, 2019: 31-34):

- The quality and commitment of the think tank’s leadership,
- The quality and reputation of the think tank’s staff,
- The quality and reputation of the research and analysis produced,
- Ability to recruit and retain elite scholars and analysts,
- Academic performance and reputation,
- The quality, number, and reach of its publications,
- The impact of a think-tank’s research and programs on policy makers and other policy actors,
- Reputation with policymakers,
- A demonstrated commitment to producing independent research and analysis,
- Access to key institutions,
- Ability to convene key policy actors and to develop effective networks and partnerships with other think tanks and policy actors,
- Overall output of the organization,

- Utilization of research, policy proposal and other products,
- Usefulness of organization's information in public engagement, advocacy work, preparing legislation or testimony, preparing academic papers or presentations, conducting research or teaching,
- Ability to use electronic, print and the new media to communicate research and reach key audiences,
- Media reputation (number of media appearances, interviews and citations),
- Ability to use the Internet including social media tools, to engage with policy makers, journalists and the public,
- Website and Digital presence,
- Level, diversity and stability of funding,
- Effective management and allocation of financial and human resources,
- Ability of the organization to effectively fulfill the terms of the gifts, grants and contracts from governments, individuals, corporations and foundations who have provided the financial support to the think tank,
- The organization's ability to produce new knowledge, innovative policy proposals or alternative ideas on policy,
- Ability to bridge the gap between the academic and policymaking communities,
- Ability to bridge the gap between policy makers and the public,
- Ability to include new voices in the policymaking process,
- Ability of organization to be inscribed within issue and policy networks,
- Success in challenging the traditional wisdom of policymakers and in generating innovative policy ideas and programs; and,
- The impact on society"

### **3.3. Methodology**

Think tanks are recognized as one of the essential actors in decision making processes, providing advices and ideas to decision makers (Manegazzi, 2018: 28). However, their actual impact on implemented policies have not been measured precisely because of the reasons mentioned before in the previous sections of this study. Yet, by all of the efforts to measure the effect of think tanks, many scholars have presented some ways to measure think tanks performance, activity, and capacity. In this study, the capacities of think tanks in Turkey is tried to be measured by using both existing methodological approaches and new dimensions. Therefore, while examining the capacity of think tanks in affecting policy making process, a mixed method of research is used in this study.

The methodology of this study is a mixed method owing to the fact that it is benefited from social network analysis (Wassermann and Faust, 1994; Dutta and Jackson, 2003; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2011), website content analysis (Bauer and Scharl, 2000; Dalgın and Karadağ, 2013), existing statistics research (Neuman, 2003: 37-38), and application of already designed methodological approaches. While it is known that it is extremely difficult to find a direct correspondence between think tank advices and government policies (Stone, 2004: 11), the endeavors of think tanks for being influential in policy making processes are analyzed in this study by using various methodological approaches in order to make a comprehensive examination.

### **3.3.1. Sample and Universe**

The aim of this study is to measure the impact capacities of think tanks in Turkey in order for seeing how they can be influential in policy processes and how they can touch the future of the country. For achieving this aim, an activity and performance centered research is done in the study. Therefore, accordingly, the scope of the study includes think tanks in Turkey which have been mentioned in GGGTT index reports between the years 2014 and 2018. This is because GGTTT have been evaluating more than 6.000 think tanks from all around the world in many different categories. While the GGTTT is accepted as the largest, more frequent, and best known think tank ranking system (Clark and Roodman, 2013: 3), think tanks operated in Turkey which have been ranked in the GGTTT can be accepted as the most prominent think tanks in Turkey. From this point of view, the universe of this study is determined as all think tanks operating in Turkey and the sample is determined as think tanks operating in Turkey which have been ranked in the GGTTT index reports.

The GGTTT index reports, as mentioned before, have been published since 2008. However, the last five years' reports are scanned for this study in order for catching up-to-date information. So, when those five reports are scanned, it is seen that 19 think tanks operated in Turkey have been ranked in the reports. When a small-scale frequency analysis is made on the reports, it can be seen from table 4 that how many think tanks from Turkey was mentioned how many times in the reports.

**Table 4: Think tanks operated in Turkey mentioned in GGTTT reports from 2014 to 2018**

Organization	NUMBER OF MENTIONS IN THE REPORT					TOTAL
	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	
TESEV	7	7	7	7	7	35
ALT	4	4	4	4	4	20
EDAM	5	8	8	8	8	37
USTAD	2	2	2	2	3	11
SETA	-	1	1	1	1	4
TEPAV	-	2	2	2	2	8
TESAM	-	3	3	3	3	12
IPC	1	2	2	2	2	9
ESI	1	1	1	1	1	5
USAK	1	3	3	3	3	13
ERI	1	1	1	1	1	5
SAM	-	1	1	1	2	5
FES	2	1	1	1	1	6
BAUSAM <sup>96</sup>	-	1	1	1	1	4
GPOT <sup>97</sup>	-	1	1	1	1	4
SO <sup>98</sup>	1	-	-	-	-	1
Al Sharq <sup>99</sup>	-	-	-	-	1	1
GRF <sup>100</sup>	-	-	-	-	1	1
CSI <sup>101</sup>	1	-	-	-	-	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>187</b>

In the GGTTT reports between 2014 and 2018, 19 think tanks operated in Turkey have been ranked totally 187 times according to table 4. However, the sample of this study do not include all of 19 think tanks because of specific reasons. Firstly, according to the results of frequency analysis shown in table 4, some think tanks were mentioned just one time within all of the reports in five years. For instance, Strategic Outlook (SO) and Caspian Strategy Institute were ranked only in 2014 report and did not have any ranks in other reports. Also, Al Sharq Forum and Global Relations Forum (GRF) were mentioned in the last report for the first time. Secondly, as mentioned before in this study, USAK were closed due to its unlawful activities and its coordinator was sentenced to imprisonment. Therefore, when these five were struck off from the list, it is seen that the sample of this study includes 14 think tanks as TESEV, ALT, EDAM, USTAD, SETA, SAM, TEPAV, TESAM, ESI, ERI, IPC, BAUSAM, GPOT, and FES. Thus, in the sample of this study, almost all of the

<sup>96</sup> See BAUSAM from: <https://bau.edu.tr/icerik/2797-stratejik-arastirmalar-ve-uygulama-merkezi> (18.04.2019)

<sup>97</sup> See Global Political Trends Center (GPOT) of Kultur University from: <http://www.gpotcenter.org/> (18.04.2019)

<sup>98</sup> See Strategic Outlook from: <http://www.strategicoutlook.org/>

<sup>99</sup> See Al Sharq Forum from: <https://www.sharqforum.org/> (18.04.2019)

<sup>100</sup> See GRF from: <http://www.gif.org.tr/homepage> (18.04.2019)

<sup>101</sup> See CSI from: <http://www.hazar.org/> (18.04.2019)

different typologies of think tanks in Turkey have been exemplified. As can be seen from table 5, sample of the study includes different types of think tanks which actively working in the field.

**Table 5: Sample of the study**

NO	NAME	TYPE	LOCATION (Main Center)	YEAR OF EST.	WEBSITE
1	TESEV	NGO/Buss. Aff.	İstanbul	1994	<a href="http://tese.org.tr">http://tese.org.tr</a>
2	EDAM	NGO	İstanbul	2005	<a href="http://edam.org.tr">http://edam.org.tr</a>
3	ALT	NGO	Ankara	1994	<a href="http://www.liberal.org.tr/">http://www.liberal.org.tr/</a>
4	USTAD	NGO	Mardin	2011	<a href="http://www.ustad.org.tr">http://www.ustad.org.tr</a>
5	TEPAV	Buss. Aff./ NGO	Ankara	2004	<a href="https://www.tepav.org.tr">https://www.tepav.org.tr</a>
6	TESAM	NGO	Bursa	2008	<a href="http://tesam.org.tr/">http://tesam.org.tr/</a>
7	SETA	NGO/Pol. Par. Aff. <sup>102</sup>	Ankara/İstanbul	2005	<a href="https://www.setav.org">https://www.setav.org</a>
8	IPC	Univ. Aff./NGO	İstanbul	2001	<a href="http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu">http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu</a>
9	SAM	Government Aff.	Ankara	1995	<a href="http://sam.gov.tr">http://sam.gov.tr</a>
10	ESI	Office of Foreign TT	Berlin	1999	<a href="https://www.esiweb.org">https://www.esiweb.org</a>
11	ERI	Univ. Aff./NGO	İstanbul	2003	<a href="http://en.egitimreformugiri.simi.org/">http://en.egitimreformugiri.simi.org/</a>
12	FES	Office of Foreign TT	İstanbul/Ankara	1991	<a href="https://www.festr.org">https://www.festr.org</a>
13	BAUSAM	University Aff.	İstanbul	2012	<a href="https://bau.edu.tr/">https://bau.edu.tr/</a>
14	GPOT	University Aff.	İstanbul	2009	<a href="http://www.gpotcenter.org">http://www.gpotcenter.org</a>

### 3.3.2. Design

In order to measure the performance and activities of think tanks in Turkey as the indicators of their impact capacity, firstly a new methodological approach is designed by benefiting from two already designed methodological approaches. Those approaches are analyzed and then reinterpreted by adapting them to the study in line with its aim and scope. Then, the methods of social network analysis, website content analysis, and existing statistics research are benefited within the newly-designed methodology.

The first study which is benefited when designing a new methodologic approach was designed by Clark and Roodman (2013: 5-8). As can be seen from Table 6, they chose the indicators of social media fans, website traffic, incoming links, media citations and scholarly citations as the indicators of influence, and organizations size as the indicator of efficiency. In measuring these indicators, they use particular metrics. Facebook likes and Twitter followers are chosen as the metrics of social media fans, relative global traffic rank which can be obtained from

<sup>102</sup> SETA has been ranked by GGTTT under the category of “best political party affiliated think tanks”

alexa<sup>103</sup> is chosen as the metrics for website traffic, number of sites that link to the website is chosen as the metrics of incoming links, mentions in global news sources are chosen as the metrics of media citations, Google Scholar citations are chosen as the metrics of scholarly citations, and annual operating expenses are chosen as the metrics of organizations size.

**Table 6: Indicators of think tank performance which Clark and Roodman selected**

	INDICATORS OF INFLUENCE					INDICATOR OF EFFICIENCY
Indicators	Social Media Fans	Website traffic	Incoming links	Media Citations	Scholarly Citations	Organization Size
Metrics	Facebook likes & Twitter followers	Relative global web traffic rank	Number of sites that link to the website	Mentions in global news sources	Google Scholar citations	Annual operating expenses
Timeline	Snapshot	3-month avg.	Weekly count	1 Year	Total	Most recent fiscal year

(Clark and Roodman, 2013: 5)

The second study which is benefited when designing a new methodologic approach was designed by McGann (2007: 40-44). He designed a model of “impact measurement of think tanks” by comparing two prominent American think tanks Heritage Foundation and Council on Foreign Relations. As can be seen from Table 7, he uses five different indicators when making a comparison between the impacts of two think tanks, these indicators are ranking, website, media outreach, books, and meeting and briefings. Rankings of the think tanks in different indexes are accepted as the metrics of rankings, numbers of visits and unique visits are accepted as the metrics of website, numbers of mentions in newspapers, TV, radio and web are accepted as the metrics of media outreach, numbers of meetings and briefings organized are accepted as the metrics of meetings and briefings, and number of books published by the organization is accepted as the metric of books.

<sup>103</sup> See alexa from: alexa.com (30.05.2019)

**Table 7: Impact measurement criteria which McGann applied**

IMPACT MEASUREMENT CRITERIA	Ranking	Website	Media Outreach	Meetings & Briefings	Books
METRICS	Rankings of the think tanks in different indexes in GGTTT	Numbers of visits and unique visits to website	Numbers of mentions in newspapers, TV, radio and web	Numbers of meetings and briefings organized	Number of books published
TIMELINE	1 Year	1 Year	1 Year	1 Year	1 Year

(McGann, 2007: 43)

Above mentioned methodological designs serve as a model for the methodological design of this study. Considering the unique features of the Turkish think tank culture and political, administrative, and social order; those designs need to be redesigned in line with the aim of this study by extending and reinterpreting them. While doing this, it is benefited from both qualitative and quantitative measurement tools. In particular, all of the measurable indicators of think tanks capacity, credibility, and influence are tried to be involved in this study. Then, the results of the indicators are transformed onto a standardized scale of 10 in order to see quantitative values for a better measurement and to compare think tanks with each other.

**Table 8: Selected Indicators and Methodological Design of the Study**

Indicators	Metrics	Tools	Sources	Timeline	Max. Scores
Social Media	Facebook likes and Twitter followers	Twitter API Netvizz Gephi	Facebook.com Twitter.com	Snapshot	10
	Social Network Analysis			Total	10
Website	Relative global web traffic ranks	Alexa	Alexa.com	3-month Avg.	10
	Website content analysis	Manual	Official Websites of Think Tanks	Snapshot	10
Incoming Links	Number of sites that link to the website	Alexa	Alexa.com	Weekly <sup>104</sup>	10
Media Outreach	Mentions in global news sources	Google News	Google.com	The last 1 Year	10
Activity	Numbers of conferences, meetings, seminars, courses etc. organized	Manual	Organizations' Website	The last 1 Year	10
Publications	Numbers of reports, papers, books published	Manual	Organizations' Website	The last 1 Year	10

<sup>104</sup> Alexa.com serves the data only for a weekly count

<b>Ranking</b>	Rankings in GGTTT Indexes	Manual	gotothinktank.com	Yearly from 2008 to 2018	10
<b>Organization Size</b>	Budget, Staff, Memberships & Partnerships	Manual	Organizations' Website & Annual Reports	The last 1 Year	10

### 3.3.3. Findings

Getting and processing the data specified in table 8, as the indicators of think tank performance, capacity and so through, are not an easy process. There are some specific ways to be followed in getting and processing them. Then, those data are able to tell what they have after they processed. Therefore, in this part of the study, it is firstly explained how the data specified in table 8 collected and then it is processed and interpreted.

#### 3.3.3.1. Social Media Analysis

Social media has made think tanks' activities available to everyone including policymakers, public, students, and researchers. Therefore, social media usage is a significant indicator of think tanks' accessibility, credibility, popularity, and so that impact capacity. In order to measure think tanks in terms of their success on social media, a social network analysis is done by using the tools of "Netviz" on Facebook (Rieder, 2013) and NodeXL on Twitter (Gruzd et al., 2016), and also numbers of likes on Facebook and followers on Twitter are evaluated as indicators of social media popularity. Mentioned social media statistics were collected simply from think tanks' official accounts in May 15, 2019. Thus, before mentioning the findings of social network analysis, social media statistics of think tanks are given in table 9.

##### 3.3.3.1.1. Social Media Interaction

Likes on Facebook and followers on Twitter are accepted as indicators of popularity in modern world (Clark and Roodman, 2013: 6). According to table 9, it can be stated that most of the organizations in the sample do not have sufficient numbers of social media followers. Moreover, one of them do not even have any social media accounts while two of them do not have Facebook accounts and one of

them do not have a Twitter account. Moreover, only one of them has verified accounts on social media from among 14 think tanks.

**Table 9: Social Media Popularity of Think Tanks**

ORGANIZATION	FACEBOOK LIKES	TWITTER FOLLOWERS
TESEV <sup>105</sup>	2470	3153
EDAM <sup>106</sup>	-	8660
ALT <sup>107</sup>	4186	4207
USTAD <sup>108</sup>	3101	494
TEPAV <sup>109,110</sup>	4382	23400
TESAM <sup>111</sup>	1712	629
SETA <sup>112</sup>	19300	76200
IPC <sup>113</sup>	2823	4755
SAM <sup>114</sup>	-	4912
ESI <sup>115</sup>	5565	4622
ERI <sup>116</sup>	11584	24640
FES <sup>117</sup>	1910	-
BAUSAM	-	-
GPOT <sup>118</sup>	1039	923
<b>Mean</b>	5729,3	13049,6
<b>Median</b>	3101	4688,5
<b>Minimum</b>	1039	494
<b>Maximum</b>	19300	76200

When social media popularity of Turkish think tanks evaluated with respect to table 9, it is necessary to be said that they are not active enough in social media. As the report “Digital in 2019”<sup>119</sup> prepared by the organizations “We are Social” and “Hootsuite” states, the number of active social media users in Turkey is approximately 52 million; and also 82% of them are Facebook users and 58% of them are Twitter users. Therefore, maximum numbers of 19300 page likes on Facebook and 76200 followers on Twitter from among approximately 43 million

<sup>105</sup> See TESEV from @tesev2015 on Facebook and @tesev2015 on Twitter

<sup>106</sup> See EDAM from @EdamOrg on Twitter

<sup>107</sup> See ALT from @liberal\_dusunce on Twitter and @liberaldusunce on Facebook

<sup>108</sup> See USTAD from @ustadstrateji on Twitter and @USTADstrateji on Facebook

<sup>109</sup> See TEPAV from @tepav both on Facebook and Twitter

<sup>110</sup> TEPAV has verified accounts both on Facebook and Twitter.

<sup>111</sup> See TESAM from @tesamtr both on Facebook and Twitter

<sup>112</sup> See SETA from @setavakfi on Twitter and @setav on Facebook

<sup>113</sup> See IPC from @IstanbulPolicyCenter on Facebook and @ipc\_ipm on Twitter

<sup>114</sup> See SAM from @SAM\_MFA on Twitter

<sup>115</sup> See ESI from @europeanstabilityinitiative on Facebook and @ESI\_eu on Twitter

<sup>116</sup> See ERI from @egitimreformu on Twitter and @egitimreformugirisimi on Facebook

<sup>117</sup> See FES Turkey from @festuerkei on Facebook

<sup>118</sup> See GpoT from @gpotcenter both on Twitter and Facebook

<sup>119</sup> See the report “Digital in 2019” from: <https://wearesocial.com/blog/2019/01/digital-2019-global-internet-use-accelerates> (06.05.2019)

Facebook users and 30 million Twitter users seem as extremely low values. It should be stated that think tanks in Turkey officially do not successful in using social media as a tool for enhancing their popularity and accessibility. As a result, it can easily be claimed that they are not able to reach their target audience via social media. In raising this claim, some supportive data should also be mentioned. Think tanks' post activity per hour on Facebook and total number of tweets on Twitter are selected as the indicators of activity in social media. These statistics are given in table 10 below.

**Table 10: Social Media Activity of Think Tanks**

ORGANIZATION	POSTS ON FACEBOOK (PER HOUR)	TOTAL NUMBER OF TWEETS ON TWITTER
TESEV	0.01	856
EDAM	-	838
ALT	0.02	2300
USTAD	0	2260
TEPAV	0.05	8296
TESAM	0.03	642
SETA	0.26	28488
IPC	0	2550
SAM	-	1826
ESI	0.1	1305
ERI	0.05	4470
FES	0	-
BAUSAM	-	-
GPOT	0	1250
<b>Mean</b>	0.047	4590
<b>Median</b>	0.02	2043
<b>Minimum</b>	0	642
<b>Maximum</b>	0.26	28488

Social media activity can be measured with many different methods. However, as table 10 shows, it can be said that the most visible examples of activeness are post activities on social media platforms. It is stated in the report "Digital in 2019"<sup>120</sup> that average number of posts of pages on Facebook per hour is 1.23 and average of 4.47 tweets are tweeted per account in a day in Turkey. When these statistical data are taken into consideration, data given in table 10 show that think tanks are not active enough in social media as stated before. It is seen that the average of think tanks' posts on Facebook per hour is 0.047 which is approximately 1/30 of the general average. Moreover, the average of total number of tweets tweeted by think tanks is 4590 which is really low in number when compared to tweets

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

tweeted in Turkey per account. Therefore, as a result of evaluation of social media statistics of think tanks in Turkey, it should be stated that they failed in using social media as a platform for enhancing their popularity and visibility.

### **3.3.3.1.2. Social Network Analysis**

Social network analysis is a research method for understanding a community by clarifying the relations which connect them as a network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The aim of social network analysis is drawing out key actors within the network and relations between the actors (Scott, 1988). A network is formed by a number of nodes (or points) which are connected by edges (or links). The nodes represent actors in the network and the edges represent any social connection between the actors within the network. Hence, a social network can be represented by a graph  $G = (V, E)$ , where  $V$  is the set of nodes, respectively, and  $E$  is the set of edges (Ruhnau, 2000: 358). Social network analysis focuses on the pattern of ties within a group of social actors. The methodology of social network analysis is based on quantitative measures. Within these measures, calculating centrality has been a major focus of social network analysis research (Freeman, 1979).

It is given in the literature that there are at least eight significant centrality measures which are degree, betweenness, closeness, eigenvector, power, information, flow, and reach centrality measures (Borgatti, et al., 2005). Centrality measures are important in social network analysis because they show which actors occupy important positions in a network. Measures of centrality describe positions of actors within a network compared to others and in relation to the whole network. These centrality measures have been created to measure which actors in a network possess influential roles (Freeman, 1979; Scott, 1988; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The description of actors within social networks is often done in terms of some structural features of an actor which have been used to create measures of centrality for single nodes in a graph (Ruhnau, 2000: 360).

Centrality measures make implicit assumptions about the manner in which traffic flows through a network (Borgatti, 2005). In this study, centrality measures of

degree, betweenness, eigenvector and closeness are used due to these measures indicate the significance and prestige of actors in a network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

Firstly, degree centrality is defined as the number of ties which an actor has within a network. It is based on the idea that the structural position of an actor in a network is characterized by the number of paths of length one that stem from a node. Degree centrality has two dimensions as in-degree and out-degree centrality measures. In-degree centrality measures the volume of ties directed to a node which calculated by summing the number of nominations received. It is known that in-degree centrality shows high correlations between the actual and the sampled network measures. Out-degree centrality, on the other hand, measures the volume of ties sent by a node which is calculated by summing the number of nominations sent (Costenbader and Valente, 2003: 290).

Secondly, closeness centrality measures how many steps on average it takes for an actor to reach everyone else in the network. It is based on the idea that actors who have low closeness centrality measures can most efficiently make contact with others in the network (Freeman, 1979). Thus, closeness centrality pays attention to how far away an actor is located from all other actors. In a graph, closeness centrality of a node shows a measure of centrality in a network, calculated with the sum of the length of the shortest pathways between the node and all other nodes in the graph. Thus, in a social network, an actor with lower mean distance to others might have better access to information than other nodes and more direct influence on other nodes.

Thirdly, betweenness centrality measures the extent to which an actor lies between other actors on their geodesics (Valente et al., 2008: 19). Friedkin (1991) explained betweenness centrality as an increase in the potential of influencing other actors near them in a network through both direct and indirect links is parallel with the highness of the actor on betweenness centrality. For instance, in a graph, a node that shows high betweenness centrality have the potential of influencing the spread of information through the network by facilitating the communication between others

(Freeman, 1979). That is, betweenness centrality is a way of measuring capacity of communication of an actor in a network. Therefore, betweenness shows how often a node lies along geodesic ways of other nodes in the network (Newman, 2003).

Finally, eigenvector centrality, which was proposed by Bonacich (1972a), is defined as the eigenvector of the adjacency matrix defining the network. Eigenvector centrality is called as “rank prestige” by Wasserman and Faust (1994) because it is generally used for the analysis of interlocking directorates between the actors in a network (Mizruchi and Bunting, 1981). Moreover, mathematically, it is claimed that eigenvector centrality is related to the measures of influence proposed by Katz (1953) and Friedkin (1991) due to its function to measure the influence of an actor over other actors in a network either directly or indirectly. Bonacich (1972b) introduced eigenvector centrality as the quantifier of the extent nodes through their connections with other central nodes. Nodes which are connected to highly central nodes have greater centrality than those which are connected to less central ones. Therefore, while an actor is more central when it is in relation with actors who are themselves central, it is clear that eigenvector centrality of a node does not only depend on the number of its adjacent nodes, but also on their value of centrality (Bonacich, 1972a). As a result, a node that has a high eigenvector centrality is one that is adjacent to nodes which have also high centrality scores. However, it should be stated that its stability actually increases at smaller sampling levels (Costenbader and Valente, 2003). This is because eigenvector can only be calculated on a symmetric network.

These four centrality measures emphasize different structural aspects and represent different points of view about the actors in a network. They all are based on the measuring the impact capacities of actors in a network. Thus, all of them are used in this study in order for measuring the impact capacities of think tanks through different points of view. In-degree and out-degree centrality measures are used for analyzing the number of relational ties which a think tank have in a network. Closeness and betweenness centrality measures are used in order for analyzing the

structural features of those relational ties. Then, finally, eigenvector centrality is used for analyzing the significance of a think tank in the sampling network.

### 3.3.3.1.2.1. Social Network Analysis through Facebook


In social network analysis, firstly, think tanks' networks on Facebook were evaluated based on the data collected from their official accounts in May 15, 2019. "Facebook page like" networks are collected directly from Facebook through the instrument of the application Netvizz. Netvizz is a Facebook API that shares page statistics with a network analysis opportunity which one can analyze networks of pages connected through the likes between them (Rieder, 2013). The data provided by Netvizz can also be transformed into graphs and visualized with the help of "Gephi" which is a visualization software for all kinds of graphs and networks. In this study, Facebook pages of all think tanks included in the sample of the study were analyzed one by one via Netvizz v1.6. The aim of applying this analysis is finding out whether think tanks establish networks on Facebook for enhancing their accessibility, credibility and impact capacity or not. As can be seen from Table 9 above, 11 think tanks from among 14 have official Facebook pages. Page like networks of those 11 think tanks were imported by using Netvizz v1.6 with a crawl depth of 1, and then these networks are visualized by using Gephi 0.9.2. In this context, social network analysis is done in two ways on think tanks through Facebook. Firstly, their positions in their own networks are analyzed one by one by measuring their eigenvector centrality and degree centrality measures. Then, secondly, an extensive analysis of impact capacity of think tanks are done through the social network of Facebook which all of think tanks in the sample are included. The standardized scores of think tanks are determined over the mean value of the second network as an important independent variable of the analysis.

**Table 11: Findings of Social Network Analysis of Think Tanks within their own network on Facebook**

ORGANIZATION	Nodes	Edges	Eigenvector Centrality	In-Degree Centrality	Out-Degree Centrality
TESEV	18	26	1	2	17
EDAM	-	-	-	-	-
ALT	1	0	0	1	0
USTAD	3	3	0.70709	1	2
TEPAV	8	36	1	5	7


<b>TESAM</b>	3	2	1	0	2
<b>SETA</b>	6	13	1	6	5
<b>IPC</b>	7	8	0.73448	5	6
<b>SAM</b>	-	-	-	-	-
<b>ESI</b>	84	349	0.20035	5	83
<b>ERI</b>	15	42	0.45938	2	14
<b>FES</b>	14	26	1	5	13
<b>BAUSAM</b>	-	-	-	-	-
<b>GPUT</b>	4	4	1	1	3
<b>Mean</b>	14,7	46,3	0.69288	2,5	14,7
<b>Median</b>	7	13	0.73448	2	6
<b>Minimum</b>	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Maximum</b>	84	349	1	5	83

In Table 11, findings about 11 think tanks' Facebook networks are shared as row statistical data. As seen in social media statistics too, a low degree of activity in establishing networks in Facebook can easily be observed from the findings. When the mean values of findings analyzed, it is seen that think tanks establish relationships averagely with 14.7 other actors in Facebook. When in-degree and out-degree values are analyzed, it is seen that out-degree values are generally more than in-degree values, it means that the most of these relationships established by think tanks are originated from themselves. The mean value of in-degree centrality measures of all 11 think tanks is 2.5, it means that only average of 2.5 actors in their own network in Facebook follow think tanks' pages in return. Finally, as a rare positive situation in these findings, 6 of think tanks are the most central and effective actors in their network according to the results of eigenvector centrality. Moreover, content and structure of networks and features of the actors in those networks are important variables which determine the positions of think tanks in their own networks. These variables can be examined from the graphs of networks of think tanks on Facebook. There are 10 graphs, which were visualized with the help of the application Gephi 0.9.2., examined that show social networks of think tanks on Facebook below since ALT does not have any relations in its own network.




**Graph 1: TESEV's Social Network on Facebook**

In Graph 1, TESEV's social network on Facebook is visualized. It can be seen from the graph that there are 18 nodes in the network and 26 edges which connect them with each other. As mentioned earlier, all nodes represent actors in the network. Among the 18 actors; there are 10 non-governmental organizations, 4 political parties, 2 government organizations, 1 education institution, and 1 media organization. It is good to find that TESEV established relations with four of the most important political parties of the country and some European Union bodies. Nevertheless, it should be stated that there is not enough diversity in its relational structure. According to the page like network analysis of TESEV on Facebook done in crawl depth of 1, TESEV has the highest eigenvector centrality in the network. However, when the analysis is done in crawl depth of 2, TESEV's eigenvector centrality score is 0.50255. When impact capacities of all actors analyzed, the most influential actor in the network in terms of eigenvector centrality is European Parliament and the most popular actor in term of fan count is AK Party. As a result, TESEV has a good centrality in its own social network on Facebook and establish remarkable relations with important actors but it does not have enough relational activities in terms of its impact capacity.




**Graph 2: USTAD's Social Network on Facebook**

In Graph 2, USTAD's social network on Facebook is visualized. There is not much thing to say about its graph because there are only three actors including itself. It has relations with one of its subordinate organizations and the fan page of Turkish President. Therefore, fan page of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has the highest eigenvector centrality in the network as the most influential actor but it has no out-degree value because it has no reciprocal relations with others. USTAD's eigenvector centrality is 0.70709 but it has almost no impact in its own network. As a result, it can be stated that USTAD nearly do not establish any relational ties on Facebook and it has almost no impact capacity.



**Graph 3: TEPAV's Social Network on Facebook**


TEPAV's social network is visualized in Graph 3. According to the graph there are 8 nodes in the network and 36 edges which connect them with each other. Thus, it is seen that 8 actors in the network have intensive relations with each other whereas there are 36 relational ties amongst them. Among 8 actors; 3 project teams, 2 NGOs, 1 union, 1 education institution, and 1 fan page of a public figure. It should also be stated that 3 of actors in the network are founding members of TEPAV. However, significantly, it establishes relationships with project groups that tried to take roles in constitutional change processes of Turkey. TEPAV has the highest eigenvector centrality score when analyzed in crawl depth of 1 but the most influential actor in the network is TOBB as an important union in Turkey. When the analysis is done in crawl depth of 2, TEPAV's eigenvector centrality score is 0.40325. That is, it is not one of the most influential actors in the network. When impact capacities of all actors analyzed, the most influential actor in the network in terms of eigenvector centrality is TOBB and the most popular actor in term of fan count is TOBB ETÜ. As a result, TEPAV has a good centrality in its own social network on Facebook but it does not establish remarkable relations with important actors outside of its affiliations.



**Graph 4: TESAM's Social Network on Facebook**


In Graph 4, TESAM's social network on Facebook is visualized. There is not much thing to say about its graph because there are only three actors including itself. However, TESAM has relationships with only its founder İlyas Bozkurt and his

foundation of Bozkurt Foundation. Therefore, it can be stated that TESAM nearly do not establish any relational ties on Facebook and it has almost no impact capacity.



**Graph 5: SETA's Social Network on Facebook**


SETA's social network on Facebook is visualized in Graph 5. According to Graph 5, there are 6 nodes in the network and 13 edges which connect them with each other. Among 6 actors; there are 3 media organizations and 3 NGOs. However, all of the five actors in the network which have relations with SETA are subordinate bodies of it. That is to say that SETA also establishes relationships with its own bodies in Facebook. Therefore, not surprisingly, the most effective and central actor in the network is SETA. However, it is necessary to say that SETA do not have any relations with important actors outside of its own affiliations, so it can be stated that it does not have a good impact capacity on Facebook.



**Graph 6: ESI's Social Network on Facebook**


As can be seen from Graph 6, ESI has an exhaustive social network in Facebook. There are 84 nodes in the network and 349 edges which connect them with each other. ESI has a very central position in this wide network and its connections with other actors are shown with a density of edges. The negative point in the graph is that there are just a few actors from Turkey in the network. ESI, as a European initiative, does not have a significant network with actors operated in Turkey. Yet, this situation does not change its success of being active in establishing relations in social media. Among those 84 actors; there are 49 NGOs, 12 government institutions, 12 media organizations, 4 business organizations, 4 political organizations, 2 education organizations, and 1 bank. Most of these actors are European bodies and there are so many influential actors in this network. For instance, the most central actors in the network are Open Society Foundation in terms of in-degree centrality, Human Rights Watch in terms of eigenvector centrality, The Guardian in terms of fan count, and ESI in terms of out-degree centrality due to its significance in the analysis. Eigenvector centrality score of ESI is 0.20035 in this network, it means that ESI does not have a big impact capacity in this whole network.

Its relations with the other actors in the network have a capacity to impact of approximately 20 per cent in spite of its very high out-degree score. As a result, ESI has a significant relational structure and network compared with other think tanks in the sample but its impact capacity can be much higher in abroad than in domestic politics.




**Graph 7: ERI's Social Network on Facebook**

ERI's social network on Facebook is visualized in graph 7. There are 15 nodes in the network and 42 edges which connect them with each other. Thus, it is seen that 14 actors in the network have intensive relations with each other whereas there are 28 relational ties amongst them except ERI's direct ties of 14 edges. All of these 15 actors are non-governmental organizations interestingly. That is to say that ERI do not have relations with a variety of actors in Facebook. Moreover, almost the half of these actors are working in the field of education just like ERI. From a different perspective, it can be said that ERI focuses its own field when establishing relations in social media. Eigenvector centrality score of ERI in the network is 0.45938 while TEGV's score is 1 and TOG's score is 0.99071. It means that TOG and TEGV has better relational structures with the central actors of the network than ERI. Therefore, ERI do not have an influential position in its own network.




**Graph 8: FES Turkey's Social Network on Facebook**

In Graph 8, social network of Turkish office of FES on Facebook is visualized. There are 14 nodes in the network and 26 edges which connect them with each other. Among 14 actors, there are 8 NGOs, 3 political organizations, 2 project teams, and 1 media organ. Firstly, it should be stated that the strongest relations of FES Turkey are with the organizations which it is affiliated with. Yet, it should be noted that as a foreign think tank FES have more relations within Turkey than in abroad. It shows that its Turkish office has focused more on establishing relations in Turkey. It should also be stated that FES has the highest scores in terms of both eigenvector centrality and degree centrality measures, it means that it is the most central actor in its own network on Facebook.



**Graph 9: GPoT's Social Network on Facebook**

In Graph 9, GPoT's social network on Facebook is visualized. There are 4 nodes in the network and 4 edges which connect them with each other. All of the 4 actors in the network are NGOs. Although it is a very narrow network, GPoT's foreign project partners can be seen in the network. Thus, it can be said that GPoT does not have a good network on Facebook but it has established relational ties with its project partners on social media. However, with respect to eigenvector and degree centrality measures, it is observed that GPoT has the less impact capacity among all 4 actors in the network.



**Graph 10: IPC's Social Network on Facebook**

In Graph 10, IPC's social network on Facebook is visualized. There are 7 nodes in the network and 8 edges which connect them with each other. among those 7 actors; there are 4 NGOs, 1 education institute, 1 media organization, and government organization. Eigenvector centrality score of IPC is 1.0 in this network but all other actors in the network have 0.70709 eigenvector centrality scores because of there are no links between them. Therefore, the only common point of all actors in the network is IPC. IPC has bilateral relations with only 2 of the actors, and has one-way relations with 5 others in the network. As a result, IPC has a good centrality within its own network on Facebook but its impact capacity is limited only with its own actions.

After analyzing think tanks one by one, an extended social network which all of think tanks in the sample are included need to be examined in terms of finding the impact capacities of think tanks in the same network. In order to design this network,

all of 11 pages of think tanks on Facebook were processed by Netvizz and visualized by Gephi in one graph. In table 12, centrality measures of 11 think tanks in the same network is given. As mentioned earlier, these centrality measures show impact capacities of think tanks in terms of their relationships with the other actors in the extended network on Facebook. Almost all of the actors are seen from the graphs given above.

**Table 12: Results of Social Network Analysis of Think Tanks within the same network on Facebook(total)**

ORGANIZATION	Eigenvector Centrality	In-Degree Centrality	Out-Degree Centrality	Closeness Centrality	Betweenness Centrality
TESEV	0.108825	2	17	0.278899	0.063640
EDAM	-	-	-	-	-
ALT	0.010473	1	0	1	0
USTAD	0.003757	1	1	1	0
TEPAV	0.190527	5	7	1	0.002167
TESAM	0	0	2	1	0
SETA	0.052173	6	5	1	0.016214
IPC	0.089605	5	6	0.156057	0.046032
SAM	-	-	-	-	-
ESI	0.159846	5	83	0.440580	0.096893
ERI	0.046114	2	14	0.310838	0.011071
FES	0.118895	6	13	0.265271	0.053792
BAUSAM	-	-	-	-	-
GPOT	0.018832	1	3	0.185366	0.006124
<b>Mean</b>	<b>0.072640</b>	3.09	13.72	0.603364	0.026903
<b>Median</b>	0.046114	2	6	0.440580	0.011071
<b>Minimum</b>	0	0	0	1	0
<b>Maximum</b>	0.190527	6	83	0.156057	0.096893

In table 12, findings about the combined network of 11 think tanks' Facebook networks are shared as row statistical data. There are totally 158 actors in the network and 594 edges which connect those actors with each other. Firstly, when in-degree and out-degree values are analyzed, it is seen that out-degree values are generally more than in-degree values, it means that the most of these relationships established by think tanks are originated from themselves (Marlow: 2004: 2). Moreover, when the mean values of in-degree and out-degree scores are analyzed, it can also be seen that think tanks establish relationships averagely with 13.72 other actors and 3.09 actors establish relationships with them on Facebook. Therefore, they established relationships with the 8.68% of all of the actors and 1.95% of the actors established relationships with them. As a result of all of these statistics, their degree

centralities show that they just can have an impact capacity over less than 10% of the actors.


Secondly, while closeness centrality score shows actors' capacity of reaching everyone else in the network, the lowest score means the best centrality. In this context, it is necessary to be stated that it is not good to see that 5 actors have closeness centrality scores of 1. In terms of closeness centrality, IPC has the best score due to the ratio and reciprocity between its in-degree and out-degree centrality scores. In general, the mean value of closeness centrality of all think tanks is 0.603364 and it means that they do not have direct ties with most of the actors in the whole network.

Thirdly, while betweenness centrality score shows actors' potential of influencing the spread of information through the network as mentioned earlier (Barthelemy, 2004: 124), it is necessary to state that think tanks fail to communicate with other actors in the network on Facebook. This is because even the maximum score of betweenness centrality within the sample is lower than 0.1 and the mean value of all think tanks is 0.026903. This means that think tanks in the sample have a capacity to communicate with only 2.69% of the actors in the network on Facebook. This is a really low ratio for enhancing their impact capacity via social media channels. Also, three of think tanks have zero betweenness centrality scores that shows do not have any reciprocal relations and communication with other actors from the network.

Finally, although the analysis is done by putting the 11 think tanks to the center of the research, anyone of them do not have the highest eigenvector centrality in the network. That is to say that there are many actors in the network which have better eigenvector centrality scores in the network. Therefore, when the mean value of eigenvector centrality of the 11 think tanks is analyzed, it can be seen that the average score of 0.072640 shows the low influence of them over other actors in the network either directly or indirectly. It can be deduced from this score that their connections with other central actors in the network is not in a good point. While actors which are connected to highly central nodes have greater centrality than those

which are connected to less central ones, it can be seen that just 4 of 11 think tanks have relatively good connections with other central actors in the network but they even have capacity to reach just approximately 15% of the other central actors. In the light of all of these findings, it can be finally said that think tanks do not successful enough in enhancing their impact capacities via Facebook.

As in the previous analysis, content and structure of networks and features of the actors in those networks are also important variables which determine the positions of think tanks in the combined network. These variables were generally mentioned in previous graphs and the combined network, which was visualized with the help of the application Gephi 0.9.2, is given in graph 11.



**Graph 11: Common social network of 11 think tanks on Facebook**

In Graph 11, some of important actors in the network can be observed with their positions and connections within the network. It is easily observed from the

graph that the most central actor in terms of out-degree centrality is ESI. Also, in terms of in-degree centrality, important actors like European Commission, European Parliament, and UNICEF come to the front. As mentioned earlier, there are totally 158 nodes and 594 edges in this graph. When the mean values of in-degree and out-degree centrality scores of all actors are analyzed, it is seen that 11 think tanks in the sample have relatively good out-degree scores because other actors are dependent variables. However, in-degree scores of 11 think tanks are relatively worse than the average of other actors in the network. This means that they mostly do not receive feedback to their likes. In his regard, the most indicative centrality measure among all of 5 seems eigenvector centrality in order to measure impact capacities of think tanks. The actor who has the maximum eigenvector centrality score was determined as the independent variable for grading standardized score of think tanks.

#### **3.3.3.1.2.2. Social Network Analysis through Twitter**

In social network analysis, secondly, think tanks' networks on Twitter were evaluated based on the data collected from their official accounts in May 25, 2019. The data about "Twitter search networks" of think tanks were collected directly from Twitter through the instrument of the application NodeXL. NodeXL is an application, which works within the application of Excel, that analyzes social media statistics with a network analysis opportunity which one can analyze networks of accounts connected through the relations with other accounts (Smith et al., 2009: 255). NodeXL has a design that enables people who know to use Excel to import, export, analyze, and visualize social network data<sup>121</sup>. In short, it adds features of social network analysis and visualization to the Excel spreadsheet. The data provided by NodeXL can also be transformed into graphs and visualized within the application. However, while NodeXL provides two types of social network analysis on Twitter as search network and users network, analyzing users network requires a paid version of the application. Therefore, in this study, only Twitter search network was used for analyzing think tanks through Twitter.

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<sup>121</sup> See source codes and executables of NodeXL from: <http://www.codeplex.com/NodeXL> (26.05.2019)


Twitter accounts of all think tanks included in the sample of the study were analyzed one by one in this study. The aim of applying this analysis is finding out whether think tanks establish networks on Twitter for enhancing their accessibility, credibility and impact capacity or not. As can be seen from table 9 above, 12 think tanks from among 14 have official Twitter accounts. These accounts were processed with the help of NodeXL and the statistics taken from NodeXL were analyzed in order to evaluate them. Twitter allows researchers to reach their data only for last 9 days. Thus, it can be seen from the analysis how many times think tanks were mentioned and replied and how many accounts mentioned or replied them from May 17, 2019 to May 25, 2019. NodeXL includes a number of opportunities of calculating centrality measures including in-degree, out-degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector centralities. In this study, in-degree, out-degree, and eigenvector centrality measures were used in order to evaluate think tanks social networks on Twitter. The numbers of actors, links between them, their scores of in-degree, out-degree and eigenvector centralities are given in table 13 below.

**Table 13: Findings of Social Network Analysis of Think Tanks within Their Own Network on Twitter**

ORGANIZATION	Nodes	Edges	Eigenvector Centrality	In-Degree Centrality	Out-Degree Centrality
TESEV	19	27	0,1161	19	3
EDAM	59	81	0,2334	19	2
ALT	3	6	0,1667	2	2
USTAD	1	0	0	0	0
TEPAV	308	645	0,2366	72	1
TESAM	4	5	0,1111	5	1
SETA	189	571	0,3955	161	27
IPC	28	52	0,3061	9	10
SAM	49	59	0,1302	8	1
ESI	163	185	0,0121	25	0
ERI	102	251	0,1720	64	16
FES	-	-	-	-	-
BAUSAM	-	-	-	-	-
GPOT	25	144	0,2170	18	9
<b>Mean</b>	79,16	168,41	<b>0,17473</b>	33,5	6
<b>Median</b>	38,5	70	0,14845	18,5	2
<b>Minimum</b>	1	0	0	0	0
<b>Maximum</b>	308	645	0,3955	161	27

In Table 13, findings about 12 think tanks' Twitter networks are shared both as row statistical data and as processed data. A relatively high degree of activity in establishing networks in Twitter can easily be observed from the findings when the


findings were compared with the data gathered from Facebook. When the mean values of findings analyzed, it is seen that think tanks establish relationships averagely with 79.16 other actors in Twitter. When in-degree and out-degree values are analyzed, it is seen that in-degree values are generally more than out-degree values, it means that the most of these relationships established by think tanks are originated from other actors. The mean value of in-degree centrality measures of all 12 think tanks is 33,5, it means that average of 33,5 actors in their own network in Twitter have mentioned or replied tweets of think tanks. When the average value of edges in the networks were analyzed, it was seen that one actor has links with more than two actors within the networks. Moreover, as in Facebook network analysis, in order to analyze contents and structures of networks and features of the actors in those networks which determine the positions of think tanks in their own networks. Therefore, these findings should be examined through the graphs of networks of think tanks on Twitter. There are 11 graphs, which were visualized with the help of the application NodeXL, examined that show social networks of think tanks on Twitter below since USTAD does not have any relations in its own network.



**Graph 12: TESEV's Social Network on Twitter**

In Graph 12, TESEV's social network on Twitter is visualized. It can be seen from the graph that there are 19 nodes in the network and 27 edges which connect


them with each other. As mentioned earlier, all nodes represent actors in the network, and edges represent the links between those actors. TESEV has been mentioned 22 times and replied 4 times on Twitter by these actors within the period of 9 days. While the most followed account in the network has approximately 540,000 followers on Twitter, it can be said that TESEV has the opportunity to reach many people via Twitter. However, its out-degree score, which equals 3, shows that it has not used this opportunity yet. As can be seen from the graph, TESEV is not a very central actors within its own network on Twitter. Its eigenvector centrality score was also found as 0,1161 out of 1. That is, its relative impact capacity on Twitter can be deduced as approximately 11%.



**Graph 13: EDAM's Social Network on Twitter**


In Graph 13, EDAM's social network on Twitter is visualized. Within the graph, there are 59 nodes in the network and 81 edges which connect them with each other. While it is known, with the help of the data taken from NodeXL, that EDAM has been mentioned 69 times by 40 different Twitter users and replied 9 times by 5 different Twitter users within the period of 9 days, its in-degree value was found as 69. However, its out-degree score, which is 2, shows that it has not tried to reach the actors within the network enough. Yet, it can be seen from the graph that EDAM is a relatively central actor within its own network on Twitter. In accordance with its

centrality, its eigenvector score was found as 0,2334 out 1. It should be stated that eigenvector centrality of EDAM has become lower just because of its low performance in establishing relations by itself.




**Graph 14: ALT's Social Network on Twitter**

In graph 14, ALT's social network on Twitter is visualized with 3 nodes and 6 edges. The graph looks simple like the network. Therefore, there are not much thing to say about ALT's network on Twitter. Its in-degree and out-degree scores are 2 and its eigenvector centrality score is 0, 1667. As the most central actor in a network which has only 3 actors, its eigenvector centrality may not reflect reality. For this reason, it should be stated that ALT's centrality within its network on Twitter shows only relative values.




**Graph 15: TEPAV's Social Network on Twitter**

TEPAV's social network on Twitter is visualized in Graph 15 above. Within the graph, there are 308 nodes in the network and 645 edges which connect them with each other. While it is known, with the help of the data taken from NodeXL, that TEPAV has been mentioned 497 times by 299 different Twitter users and replied 29 times by 21 different Twitter users within the period of 9 days, it should be stated that TEPAV has a good in-degree centrality within its network. However, its in-degree score was found as 72 because of the repetition of the same types of relations. Then, TEPAV's out-degree score was found as 1 that means TEPAV has not touched any actor within the network except only one actor. Finally, its eigenvector centrality was found as 0,236 out of 1 because of its low out-degree centrality. As a result, it should be stated that TEPAV needs to mention and reply to different accounts on Twitter in order for enhancing its impact capacity via Twitter.




**Graph 16: TESAM's Social Network on Twitter**

In graph 16, TESAM's social network on Twitter is visualized with 5 nodes and 5 edges which connect them each other. The graph looks simple like the network as in ALT's network. Therefore, there are also not much thing to say about TESAM's network on Twitter. Its in-degree score is 5, out-degree score is 1, and its eigenvector centrality score is 0, 1111 out of 1. As the most central actor in a network which has only 5 actors including itself, its eigenvector centrality may not reflect reality. For this reason, it should be stated that TESAM's centrality within its network on Twitter shows only relative values in terms of its centrality scores.




**Graph 17: SETA's Social Network on Twitter**

SETA's social network on Twitter is visualized in Graph 17 above. Within the graph, there are 189 nodes in the network and 571 edges which connect them with each other. While it is known, with the help of the data taken from NodeXL, that SETA has been mentioned 517 times by 171 different Twitter users and replied 27 times by 18 different Twitter users within the period of 9 days, it should be stated that SETA has really a good centrality within its own network on Twitter. Based on these relations, its in-degree score was found as 161 and its out-degree score was found as 27. These values show that SETA has actively using Twitter for establishing a network and for being reachable by other users. As a result of its activity on Twitter, its eigenvector centrality score was found as 0,345 out of 1. That is, SETA is the most central think tank on Twitter among all 12 think tanks in terms of eigenvector centrality. It has a relatively better impact capacity on Twitter when compared with others.




**Graph 18: IPC's Social Network on Twitter**

In Graph 18, IPC's social network on Twitter is visualized. It can be seen from the graph that there are 28 nodes in the network and 52 edges which connect them with each other. Moreover, it was found with the help of NodeXL that IPC has been mentioned 33 times on Twitter and it has mentioned 10 different accounts during the period of 9 days. Since its out-degree score, which is 10, is more than its in-degree score which is 9, it can be deduced that IPC has aimed to establish relations with different actors on Twitter. Therefore, its eigenvector centrality has become 0,306 out of 1 as a consequence of its endeavors. As can be seen from the graph, IPC is the most central actor in its network on Twitter. Thus, it has the best impact capacity within its network on Twitter. It can be observed from the results that it should increase its followers and number of tweets on Twitter in order to enhance its impact capacity.




**Graph 19: SAM's Social Network on Twitter**

In Graph 19, SAM's social network on Twitter is visualized. Within the graph, there are 49 nodes in the network and 59 edges which connect them with each other. While it is known, with the help of the data taken from NodeXL, that SAM has been mentioned 49 times by 21 different Twitter users and replied 4 times by 4 different Twitter users within the period of 9 days, it can be defined as a relatively central actors in the network. However, its out-degree score, which is 1, shows that it has not tried to reach the actors within the network enough. Yet, it can be seen from the graph that the network does not has an absolutely central actor. It is a scattared graph beacuse there are more than one relatively central actor in the network and there are some actors who did not mentioned or replied anyone only tweet about them. Therefore, SAM has a popularity in Twitter in a sense but it has not been the main actor in the network. Therefore, its eigenvector cenrality is 0,1302 out of 1 because there are many actors in its own network that it does not have any relatios with them.




**Graph 20: ESI's Social Network on Twitter**

ESI's social network on Twitter is visualized in Graph 20 above. Within the graph, there are 163 nodes in the network and 185 edges which connect them with each other. It is known, with the help of the data taken from NodeXL, that ESI has been mentioned 25 times by 24 different Twitter users but has not been replied during 9 days. Moreover, ESI has not tweeted any tweets so does not have any out-degree centrality score. While its in-degree centrality score is also low depending on mentions on it as 8, it is necessary to state that ESI does not have significant impact capacity in Twitter. As can be seen from the graph, there are so many central actors in its network but ESI is not one of them. Therefore, it is not a central actor in its network on Twitter and its eigenvector centrality score also represent this non-centrality as being 0,0121 out of 1.



**Graph 21: ERI's Social Network on Twitter**

ERI's social network on Twitter is visualized in Graph 21 above. Within the graph, there are 102 nodes in the network and 251 edges which connect them with each other. While it is known, with the help of the data taken from NodeXL, that ERI has been mentioned 187 times by 81 different Twitter users and replied 14 times by 10 different Twitter users within the period of 9 days, it should be stated that ERI has a good centrality within its own network on Twitter. Accordingly, its in-degree score was found as 64 and its out-degree score was found as 16. These values show that ERI has actively using Twitter for establishing networks and for being reachable by other users. As a result of its activity on Twitter, its eigenvector centrality score was also found as 0,172 out of 1. Its eigenvector centrality seems low because of the number of actors and compact relations among other actors in the network. As a result, ERI is not the most central actor in the network but it has a relatively good centrality. It can be observed from the findings that it should increase its followers in order to enhance its impact capacity via Twitter.



**Graph 22: GPoT's Social Network on Twitter**

In Graph 22, GPoT's social network on Twitter is visualized. It can be seen from the graph that there are 25 nodes in the network and 144 edges which connect them with each other. Moreover, it was found with the help of NodeXL that IPC has been mentioned 135 times by 25 different users, replied 5 times by 3 different users and it has mentioned 9 different accounts on Twitter during the period of 9 days. It can be seen from these statistics that ERI has actively using Twitter and accordingly its in-degree centrality score is 18 and out-degree centrality score is 9. Therefore, it is one of the central actors of its network on Twitter. Since there are only 25 actors who has totally 144 links with each other, GpoT's network is a compact network and there are more than one central actors. Because of this compact network, eigenvector centrality score of GpoT was found as 0, 217 out of 1. However, it should be stated that if the links between the actors except it were lower, its eigenvector centrality and impact capacity will be a lot more.

All in all, when social networks of 12 think tanks on Twitter were analyzed one by one, it is seen that their networks are generally small. They need to increase the numbers of their followers, tweets, and popularity on Twitter in order to enhance their impact capacities. In addition, applying social network analysis on through

Twitter has some limitations. Firstly, almost all of social network analysis tools for Twitter are expensive products. Secondly, Twitter share its inner data with some concrete limitations. For instance, within the research of this study, Twitter API enabled collecting “Twitter search network” data only from inputs provided within the last 9 days. However, by overcoming these limitations, a social network analysis was done on 12 think tanks through their Twitter accounts. The result of this social network analysis was accepted as the mean value of all of think tanks’ eigenvector centralities since it shows the influence of an actor over other actors in a network either directly or indirectly. As seen in table 13, the average eigenvector centrality of all 12 think tanks is 0,17473 out of 1. It means that the impact capacity of think tanks in Turkey through Twitter was found in this study as approximately 17,47%.

### 3.3.3.1.3. Results of Social Media Statistics

Think tanks’ social media activities were measured in two ways in this study. Firstly, they were evaluated in terms of their popularity and capacity to reach their target group. Since Facebook like network and Twitter followers are accepted as indicators of popularity in modern world (Clark and Roodman, 2013: 6), the first evaluation on think tanks was made through these indicators. Standardized scores of think tanks in the sample were determined by analyzing the central actors in the Facebook page like network and Twitter followers network. Standardized scores were graded over the maximum value of 10. The actor who is closest the median number of likes on Facebook within the network and the mean number of followers of all networks analyzed through Twitter were determined as independent variables in the analysis. The actor has the median value of likes on Facebook was found as “Amnesty International” which has 37310 likes on Facebook and the mean value of followers on Twitter has 30900 followers on Twitter. Standardized scores were evaluated over these variables.

**Table 14: Aggregate Scores of Think Tanks in terms of Social Media Statistics**

ORGANIZATION	AGGREGATE SCORE	
	FACEBOOK	TWITTER
TESEV	0,66	1,020
EDAM	-	2,802
ALT	1,12	1,361
USTAD	0,83	0,159

<b>TEPAV</b>	1,17	7,572
<b>TESAM</b>	0,45	0,203
<b>SETA</b>	5,17	10
<b>IPC</b>	0,75	1,538
<b>SAM</b>	-	1,589
<b>ESI</b>	1,49	1,495
<b>ERI</b>	3,10	7,974
<b>FES</b>	0,51	-
<b>BAUSAM</b>	-	-
<b>GPOT</b>	0,29	0,298
<b>Mean</b>	<b>1,41</b>	<b>4,223</b>
<b>Median</b>	0,83	1,516
<b>Minimum</b>	0,29	0,159
<b>Maximum</b>	5,17	10

Aggregate scores of think tanks in terms of their social media popularity are shown in Table 14 above. It can be easily seen that think tanks have more impact capacities on Twitter than Facebook. Their average score on Facebook was found as 1,41 out of 10 and average score on Twitter was found as 4,223 out of 10. It means that, think tanks has a total score of 5,633 out of 20 in terms of social media popularity. This score can be evaluated as think tanks have the capacity to impact  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the actors which they are in relation on social media somehow.

Secondly, think tanks were evaluated in this study through their networks on Facebook and Twitter. For this reason, social network analysis tools were benefited in accordance with the characteristics of the social media channel. Therefore, in the process of evaluation through Facebook, the application of Netvizz was used for doing social network analysis on think tanks' Facebook page like networks and Gephi was used for visualizing these networks into graphs. In order for evaluating the relationships and networks between the Facebook accounts of think tanks and other Facebook accounts which they have established relationships, some significant centrality measures were calculated such as in-degree, out-degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector centralities. Then, in the process of evaluation through Twitter, the application of NodeXL was used for doing social network analysis on think tanks' Twitter search networks and also for visualizing those networks. In order to measure the relationships and networks of think tanks on Twitter, some centrality measures were again calculated. In Twitter search analysis, measures of in-degree, out-degree, and eigenvector centralities were benefited. Insights of relationships of

think tanks on Facebook and Twitter were analyzed by these mentioned centrality measures. Finally, the average value of eigenvector centrality was chosen as the indicator of impact capacity of think tanks through Facebook and Twitter network analysis.

All of the centrality measures were calculated because eigenvector centrality cannot be understood without to know their values. Eigenvector centrality score gains its meaning with the values of other centrality scores. Without calculating in-degree and out-degree centralities, it cannot be known whether eigenvector centrality score reflects reality or not. In addition, as closeness and betweenness centrality scores approach to 0, eigenvector centrality score begins to become meaningless. Therefore, eigenvector centrality was chosen as the indicator of impact capacity by considering all of these information. All in all, their aggregate scores which were obtained as a result of social network analysis are shown in table 15 below.

**Table 15: Aggregate Scores of Think Tanks in terms of Social Network Analysis**

ORGANIZATION	AGGREGATE SCORE	
	FACEBOOK	TWITTER
TESEV	0.108825	0,1161
EDAM	-	0,2334
ALT	0.010473	0,1667
USTAD	0.003757	0
TEPAV	0.190527	0,2366
TESAM	0	0,1111
SETA	0.052173	0,3955
IPC	0.089605	0.3061
SAM	-	0,1302
ESI	0.159846	0.0121
ERI	0.046114	0.1720
FES	0.118895	-
BAUSAM	-	-
GPOT	0.018832	0,2170
<b>Mean</b>	<b>0.072640</b>	<b>0,17473</b>
<b>Median</b>	0.046114	0,14845
<b>Minimum</b>	0	0
<b>Maximum</b>	0.190527	0,3955

As can be seen from Table 15, while 11 out of 14 think tanks have Facebook accounts, 12 of them have Twitter accounts. In this study, their aggregate scores were calculated due to they represent their impact capacities within their networks on social media channels. Think tanks' average score on Facebook was found as 0,07264 out of 10 and their average score on Twitter was found as 0,17473 out of 10.

It can be seen from these results that think tanks are more active in Twitter than Facebook as in previous analysis. However, it was also seen that their scores of social network analysis are lower than their scores of social media popularity. However, as a limitation, social network analysis includes more actors within its context who do not have direct relations with think tanks. Thus, it is not surprising that results of social network analysis have lower values. All in all, results of social network analysis can be concluded as the sum of 0,07264 and 0,17473 which equals 0,24737 out of 2. It means think tanks have the capacity to impact approximately 1/8 of the actors which they are in the same network on social media.

### **3.3.3.2. Website Analysis**

Website is another significant indicator of think tanks' accessibility, credibility, popularity, and so that impact capacity. In today's world, popularity in online platforms is one of the most important determinants in determining an organizations' overall popularity. Therefore, in this study, websites of 14 think tanks were analyzed in two ways. Firstly, their relative web traffic rankings were collected from Alexa and analyzed as the indicator of their accessibility and popularity among all of websites in the world. Secondly, a website content analysis was done through official websites of 14 think tanks as the indicator of website practicality and user-friendliness. These analyses show both think tanks' efforts to enhance their impact capacity and their websites' rankings among all of the websites active in the world.

#### **3.3.3.2.1. Relative Web Traffic Rankings**

Alexa ranked all of websites actively working throughout the world according to statistics of global Internet traffic and engagement which have been recorded for 90 days by themselves. Thus, rankings of websites of 14 think tanks were collected from Alexa for measuring their popularity comparatively. The findings collected are shown in table 14 below. Data on web traffic rank are captured from think tanks' principal domain (for instance, tesev.org.tr) on May 19, 2019. Alexa's web traffic ranks are based on 90 days averages of website's percent of Internet users who visits

the website and the number of pages visited by visitors<sup>122</sup>. The numbers in table 14 show the ranks of websites' of think tanks amongst all of websites in the world and in Turkey. As the numbers show ranking information, it should be stated that lower is better. The negative point of this analysis is the lack of information about scores, just ranks and page views are provided in the index.

**Table 16: Relative Web Traffic Rankings of Think Tanks**

ORGANIZATION	ALEXA RELATIVE WEB TRAFFIC RANKINGS	
	WORLD	TURKEY
TESEV	1,999,542	45,269
EDAM	1,724,529	73,519
ALT	1,948,375	37,030
USTAD	11,592,193	321,129
TEPAV	572,922	10,454
TESAM	4,653,371	109,711
SETA	238,948	4,408
IPC	-	-
SAM	757,370	35,365
ESI	1,396,715	193,847
ERI	1,166,206	24,907
FES	4,247,766	107,984
BAUSAM	-	-
GPOT	6,941,971	289,189
Mean	3,103,325	104,401
Median	1,836,452	59,394
Minimum	11,592,193	321,129
Maximum	238,948	4,408

As Table 16 shows, websites of think tanks in Turkey do not have enough popularity not only throughout the world but also in Turkey. Their rankings show that they do not attract visitors to their websites. Specifically, it should be stated, when the mean values of rankings analyzed, that none of them are not have a popularity that enhance its impact capacity. Alexa lists top sites by country from 1 to 1000. Based on this situation, it can be said that none of 14 think tanks cannot be defined as a top site in Turkey. As a result, it should be stated that think tanks in Turkey do not have a significant impact capacity via their websites. Thus, these findings show that think tanks' website activities may not be measured only through their rankings. For this reason, another way of measuring website activity is also decided to be applied in this study which is website content analysis.

<sup>122</sup> See alexa.com web traffic calculations from: <https://support.alexa.com/hc/en-us/sections/200077030> (02.05.2019)

### 3.3.3.2.2. Website Content Analysis

Content analysis is a frequently used method by researchers in the field of social sciences. According to Krippendorff (2018), content analysis is a systematic quantitative method for evaluating messages and the relationship between the messages and channels. Pavlik (1999) also argues that the development of Internet and online channels have radically been allowing more people and organizations to interact with each other. The most important result of this development is that websites can supply more idiosyncratic data than traditional forms of media (Potter, 1999). Website content analysis showed up in an environment like this. While there are various methods in evaluating websites, website content analysis has been used for evaluating efficiency, practicality, and user-centrality of a website (Herring, 2009). According to Weare and Lin (2000), as an important mean of communication, websites and web pages lend themselves *prima facie* to content analysis. Within website content analysis, the methods used by researchers in their evaluations have some similarities and differences in terms of their evaluation criteria. Considering the relevant literature, websites can be evaluated within the framework of different criteria (Weare and Lin, 2000).

In order to designate the criteria for evaluating websites of think tanks, relevant world literature and previous studies should be examined. In evaluating websites, scholars have applied different criteria in accordance with their objectives. Hamill and Gregory (1997) used features of information diversity, regular updating, orientation, interaction, and feedback as essential features which a successful website need to have. Bell and Tang (1998), in their study on website features from the perspective of visitors, determined that the most important criteria are accessibility of the site, diversity of the content, and structure of site map in evaluating a website. Jeong and Lambert (2001) also applied six criteria in their study which are necessary for website quality measurement. Those are accuracy of information, integrity, interest, clarity, ease of use, and quality of orientation.

Cox and Dale (2002) assumed that eight factors could be used in order to evaluate a website which are accessibility, communication capacity, reliability,

credibility, usability, functionality, and integrity. Li, Tan and Xie (2002) stated in their study that they measure the quality of web-based services, the criteria which can be measure a website's success are reliability, responsiveness, security, information quality, and communication. Loiacono et al. (2002) evaluated the quality of the website with eight factors in their study as ease of understandability, quality of information, interaction, reliability, feedback time, visual attraction, innovation, and fluency. Madu and Madu (2002) used performance, structure, aesthetics, reliability, storage capacity, usability, security and system integrity, responsiveness, service differentiation, reliability, visitor policy, popularity, and assurance as the criteria for evaluating a website's success.

Tan, Xie and Li (2003) used the reliability, responsiveness, accessibility, flexibility, ease of orientation, efficiency, trust, security, site aesthetics, personalization, and information quality as the criteria in their study in which they evaluated service quality of web-based information systems. Jeong, Oh and Gregoire (2003) identified eight main criteria in the evaluation of website quality in their study. Those are information accuracy, information clarity, information integrity, ease of use, orientation quality, color combination, information satisfaction, and behavioral purposes. Moenaert et al. (2004) used four criteria in their study as appearance, information, communication, and multi-language option. Finally, Abdullah et al. (2009) used the criteria of homepage speed, homepage attractiveness, use of navigation links, use of multimedia, browser compatibility, content presentation, information currency, and availability of further information for evaluating a group of NGOs' website designs.

In Turkey, website content analysis has been mostly done for evaluating websites of tourism agencies, hotels, and service supplier firms and also there are not much examples of website content analysis in Turkish literature. Among the limited examples, Kurulgan and Bayram (2006: 144) applied five criteria in evaluating websites in their study in which they evaluated websites of university libraries in Turkey which are accuracy, authority, objectivity, content, and currency. Also Marangoz et al. (2012: 63) used eight criteria for applying website content analysis in their study in which they analyzed e-commerce enterprises. Those are accuracy,



11	Subscribe	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	8	57.1	
12	Partners	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	7	50	
13	Staff	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	11	78.6	
14	Executive Board	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	12	85.7	
15	Human resources	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	11	78.6	
16	Map (Address)	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	7	50	
17	Social media links	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	14	100	
18	Site map	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	14.3	
19	Site search engine	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	9	52.9	
20	E-mail addresses	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	14	100	
21	Phone numbers	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	12	85.7	
22	Contact Form	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	4	28.6
23	Date and time	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	14.3	
24	Last Update	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	10	71.4	
25	Last update date	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
26	Visitor reviews	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
27	Number of visitors	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
28	News from the press	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	8	57.1
29	Annual Report	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	3	21.4	
30	Budget & Expenses	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7.1	
31	Financial Resources	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	14.3	
32	Donation	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	14.3	
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>232</b>	<b>51.5</b>
	<b>%</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>51.5</b>	

Table 17 shows row statistical data about the findings of website content analysis of 14 think tanks in Turkey which were collected manually from official websites of them. As can be seen from the table that 32 sub-criteria were used to evaluate the websites. Each of them has a special significance.

Logo is an icon that makes it easy to recognize and reinforce the brand image of an organization. When the web addresses of the think tanks were examined, it was observed that 92.8% of the web pages had a logo symbolizing the name of the organization. Based on this statistics, it can be stated that think tanks aim to keep their brands in mind. However, it can be said that many of them have difficulties in creating a creative logo. A brief information about the organization is a necessary

part of a website which increase recognition of the organization. It is given in the table that all of the web addresses contain brief information about the organization. It shows that all of them took the first step for presenting themselves.

78.6% of scanned web pages have multiple language options. The language options in most of these web addresses are English and Turkish. In addition, some web pages have options of Arabic, German and French. It can be concluded that many organizations give importance to their activities to provide access to foreign visitors. Another factor that contributed to increase of the recognition of an organization is the process since its establishment, that is history. At this point, sharing a history and corporate information that summarizes the organization's history could increase the recognition of the organization. It is seen that organizations generally do not give enough information about their histories (57.1%). Moreover, it was observed that many think tanks have not created a separate page for the history within their websites.

The most important outputs of think tanks to reach their target audience are their publications and activities. Therefore, they must share their publications and they must give information about their activities in their websites. Think tanks have a wide range of publications and activities. When they give information about their publications such as reports, books, policy notes, articles and their activities such as seminars, panels, conferences, congresses on their websites; the interest of target audience on their output could be increased. It is obviously seen from table 17 that think tanks in Turkey give a special importance to this point. All of 14 think tanks share their publications and give information about their activities within their websites. Therefore, it should be said that think tanks in Turkey pay attention their outputs to be reached. In addition, it is important for think tanks to announce the news, developments, changes, reforms about their organizations and events they organized in order to use their websites as an effective tool to reach their target audiences. In this regard, 71.4% of think tanks give some space to announcements and events within their websites.

Visuality is another important requirement for increasing the attractiveness of a website. Although all of the websites presented have visual elements in different parts of them, only one (7.1%) of them have a photo gallery. On the other hand, half of them give a special space for videos and podcasts within their websites. In terms of visual attractiveness, they cannot be described as unsuccessful in using visual elements due to their use of photos and videos within various parts of their websites. However, it should be stated that they do not give enough spaces apart to photo galleries and video galleries.

Think tanks can create follow-up audiences by establishing a membership system on their websites. Applying this method through defining some content that only members can access creates an organic tie between the think tank and its followers. As can be seen from table 17, think tanks in Turkey do not put importance on creating membership systems on their websites due to only one (7.1%) of them has a membership system. To create an e-mail subscription opportunity that allows their target audiences to follow announcements about their activities and studies in order to be able to communicate directly with them is also a feature that the think tanks should have on their websites for enhancing their capacity to communicate. It can be seen from the statistics that 57.1% of think tanks have subscription forms on their websites. Thus, more than half of the organizations provide their visitors the opportunity to follow them up to date.

Organizational structure is another significant feature of think tanks which is necessary to be shared on their websites. Think tanks should provide information about their staff, executive and advisory boards, and partners in order for informing their visitors about their operation. When findings analyzed, it is seen that 78.6% of them provide information about who are their staff, 85.7% of them show who take charge in their executive and/or advisory boards, and 50% of them share who are their partners and associates. Think tanks can also benefit from their websites to meet personnel needs. It is very important for them to reach human resources that are suitable for their purposes. The method of sharing human resource information via web page, which is an effective way to reach these human resources, has been applied at the web sites of think tanks by 78.6%. That is, 11 of 14 think tanks have a

page that contains announcements and policies about their human resources such as announcements and conditions about internship and job opportunities. As a result, it can be asserted that they generally tell who they are, what their relations are, and what their organizational policies are via their websites.

The significance of using social networking sites on the Internet environment has been increasing each passing day. Many organizations and businesses use these social networking sites to reach their target audience and communicate more effectively with their current visitors. For social organizations, social media usage creates important opportunities for strengthening their interactions with their target groups. Therefore, it was checked in this study whether think tanks give links of their social media accounts in their websites or not. Then, it was seen that all of 14 think tanks share their social media accounts within their websites. In addition, secondly about their media relations, it is seen that 57.1% of think tanks give spaces to news from the press about themselves and videos of TV news which their staff participated in on their websites.

Providing information about the website on the home page, that is, having a sitemap and in-site search facilities within the page are the factors that directly affect the usability of the website. Only two (14.3%) of websites contains a site map that summarizes the content of the web page, while 52.9% of them have an in-site search engine. In the light of this data, it can be concluded that the think tanks examined in this research did not give enough importance to the features that increase the usefulness of the websites. Another reason of this situation can be the lack of complexity due to the low number of content of the pages and the need for such technical support.

Giving information about the date and local time is a factor that enhances the usefulness of the site. Local time information is important for the visitors to see how much time spend on the site, and date information is important for checking the dates of events shared on the site. 14.3% of the web pages within the scope of the research share the date and time information on their website. Thus, it is observed that there is a deficiency at this point in the websites of think tanks. Moreover, in terms of time,

the last time the website was updated, ie when the latest information was added to the website, is an important factor showing how active the website is and how up-to-date it is. The frequency of updating the web page is an indication of the importance given to the web page. In this context, think tanks that added a new entry in the website within the last month were given a positive grade in this study, while those who did not have any activity in the last month were given a negative grade. It was observed that 71.4% of their websites have been updated in the last month. Ratio of updating websites is sufficient but Internet users need to know the date when the web page was last updated to ensure that the information published on the web page is valid. It has been determined that the reviewed websites do not share any information about their last update date.

In order to provide two-sided communication opportunities to potential visitors, contact information must be shared on the website. 100% of the reviewed websites shared e-mail addresses and 85.7% of them shared telephone numbers. It is clear that these web pages are successful in inviting potential visitors to communicate with themselves. However, it was seen that only 4 (28.6%) of them provide a contact form within their websites for visitors. Moreover, information on how to get to the center of the organization is another important information to be found on the website. Although it is very important, only half of the think tanks have included a transport map on their websites. In other websites, only open address information is given, no detailed description has been made.

The number of visitors of the website allows the organization to know how much the Internet and the website are useful and allows the visitors to know how popular the website is. Nonetheless, it can be seen from the statistics that none of the examined websites have any information about the number of people who clicked the web address. It is very important for think tanks to consider their suggestions and complaints in order to ensure long-term visitor satisfaction and to ensure the continuity of visitors. Continuous communication with the target audience provides great convenience in terms of improving the quality of the outputs. Internet is one of the most effective tools for establishing and maintaining communication with the target audience. It is tried to communicate with the customers through sections such

as visitor comments and membership system. It was observed that visitors' comments were not included in any of the websites reviewed. In the light of these data, it can be concluded that think tanks do not give enough attention to the visitors' suggestions and feedback or do not prefer to use the Internet in communication with their followers.

Finally, financial structure is accepted as another significant feature which think tanks should explain in their websites for ensuring their accountability and transparency. In this context, websites of think tanks were examined whether they publish annual reports, give information about their budget, expenses, financial resources, supporters or not. Also, websites were checked for the presence of a bank account number or a call for donations. As a result, it was found that 21.4% of think tanks has published annual reports, only one (7.1%) of them give information about their budget and expenses, 14.3% of them shares who support them and/or what their financial resources are, and finally 14.3% of them share bank accounts for potential financial donations. Therefore, it is necessary to state that think tanks are not successful in terms of informing their followers about their financial structures.

All in all, in the context of the provision of 32 criteria, the general grade of think tanks has emerged as 51.5%. That is, the ratio of think tanks to meet the determined criteria is 51.5%. That is to say that they may not be described as successful or unsuccessful in using their websites to enhance their impact capacity. It can be stated that while they averagely meet half of the criteria then their impact capacity can be described as half of which is possible.

### **3.3.3.2.3. Results of Website Analysis**

Firstly, for evaluating think tanks' rankings out of a standardized scale of 10, the independent variable was selected from the list of top websites in Turkey. Alexa's "Top Sites in Turkey"<sup>123</sup> list is accepted as the indicator of a website's popularity and accessibility in Turkey. Therefore, in order to be accepted as effective actors in terms of their website activity, it is thought that think tanks need to be

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<sup>123</sup> See the list "Top Sites in Turkey" from: <https://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/TR> (12.05.2019)

mentioned in the list of top sites in Turkey. With respect to this claim, website address which is ranked at the 500<sup>th</sup> rank in the list of top sites in Turkey was selected as independent variable in the determination of the standardized scale of 10. Alexa is required a pro account in order to view the name of the website which is in the 500<sup>th</sup> rank but its ranks in Turkey and in the world can be viewed freely although there is no information about the name. Therefore, rank of 500 in Turkey and rank of 39,682 in the world were determined as the independent values in order for calculating standardized scale of 10. Then, the average of their scores which were calculated from both their rankings in lists of the top websites in the world and top websites in Turkey were accepted as the final scores of them in terms of their websites' rankings. While evaluation was made through rankings, it was known that lower is better. Thus, standard scores of think tanks in terms of the ranks of their websites were calculated in the reversed way.

**Table 18: Aggregate Scores of Think Tanks in terms of Their Relative Web Traffic Rankings**

ORGANIZATION	AGGREAGATE SCORES		
	WORLD	TURKEY	AGGREGATE SCORE (Out of 10)
TESEV	0,99	1,10	1,045
EDAM	1,15	0,68	0,915
ALT	1,01	1,35	1,180
USTAD	0,17	0,15	0,160
TEPAV	3,46	4,78	4,120
TESAM	0,42	0,45	0,435
SETA	8,30	10	9,150
IPC	-	-	-
SAM	2,61	1,41	2,01
ESI	1,42	0,25	0,885
ERI	1,70	2,01	1,885
FES	0,47	0,46	0,465
BAUSAM	-	-	-
GPOT	0,28	0,17	0,225
<b>Mean</b>	1,83	1,90	<b>1,87</b>
<b>Median</b>	1,08	0,89	0,98
<b>Minimum</b>	0,17	0,15	0,16
<b>Maximum</b>	8,30	10	9,15

In table 18, aggregate scores of think tanks with regard to their websites' ranks within the all of websites around the world. These results show how much their websites accessible and popular are. When their scores are analyzed, it can be seen that the mean value of 12 think tanks' scores is 1,87 out of 10. This result, in a sense,

means that they are able to reach %18.7 of their target group via their websites. Alexa also provide information about number of unique visitors to the site, number of daily pageviews per visitor and daily time that a visitor spends on the site each day in addition to the rankings of the domains of websites. When all of these statistics are taken into consideration, it should be stated that think tanks need to create more opportunities for increasing engagements and interaction to their websites. Because statistics about their websites show that they do not reach enough people via their websites.

Secondly, in order for evaluating think tanks out of a standard score of 10 with regard to their website contents, their ratio to meet the criteria which were determined for website content analysis is accepted as the independent variable. That is, their standardized scores out of 10 are calculated easily by dividing the ratio which shows how much their websites meet the criteria of the analysis into 10. The results of these operations are shown in table 19 below.

**Table 19: Aggregate Scores of Think Tanks in terms of Website Content Analysis**

ORGANIZATION	RATIO OF MEETING THE CRITERIA	AGGREGATE SCORE (Out of 10)
TESEV	%56,25	5,62
EDAM	%50	5,0
ALT	%53,125	5,31
USTAD	%25	2,5
TEPAV	%56,25	5,62
TESAM	%43,75	4,37
SETA	%56,25	5,62
IPC	%59,375	5,94
SAM	%59,375	5,94
ESI	%71,875	7,19
ERI	%65,625	6,56
FES	%50	5,0
BAUSAM	%21,875	2,19
GPOT	%53,125	5,31
<b>Mean</b>	<b>%51.5</b>	<b>5,15</b>
<b>Median</b>	<b>%54.45</b>	<b>5,45</b>
<b>Minimum</b>	<b>%21,875</b>	<b>2,19</b>
<b>Maximum</b>	<b>%71.875</b>	<b>7,19</b>

As can be seen from table 19, think tanks have a score that represented by the mean value as 5,15 out of 10. It is not a good score although it is more than half because it also means that websites are unsuccessful with a score of 4,85 out of 10. Yet, it was observed that many of think tanks give importance to their websites and

they have tried to catch any development. Therefore, results of the website content analysis show that think tanks have a promising future in terms of their website usage but their current scores do not seem as sufficient yet.

### 3.3.3.3. Incoming Links Analysis

The number of incoming links gives an opinion about the relative popularity, replicability, and meaningfulness of the websites of think tanks. Thus, counting the number of incoming links is a way of measuring relative online capacity of an organization. Data on incoming links were captured from Alexa.com on May 20, 2019. Alexa indicates the number of websites in Alexa's crawl of the web which link to the website searched and Alexa's counts of incoming links are updated weekly<sup>124</sup>. Therefore, in table 20, row statistical data about the number of incoming links are shown.

**Table 20: The Number of Websites Which Link to the Websites of Think Tanks**

ORGANIZATION	NUMBER OF INCOMING LINKS
TESEV	233
EDAM	100
ALT	59
USTAD	9
TEPAV	413
TESAM	11
SETA	283
IPC	-
SAM	182
ESI	414
ERI	69
FES	40
BAUSAM	-
GPOT	31
<b>Mean</b>	153.67
<b>Median</b>	84.50
<b>Minimum</b>	9
<b>Maximum</b>	414

While Alexa counts only one link from a given site when counting the number of sites linking in, and not the number of pages; it can be said depending on the statistics on table 20 that averagely 153 websites give links to websites of think tanks. It can be deduced that think tanks have been mentioned in other websites and shown as reference. When the statistics given in the table deeply analyzed, it is seen

<sup>124</sup> See how Alexa.com counted the number of incoming links from: <https://support.alexa.com/hc/en-us/articles/200444340> (08.05.2019)

that ESI's website has the most number of incoming links and USTAD's website has the least number of incoming links. However, it should be stated that ESI is an international organization that focuses on 15 different countries and does not have an independent website on their studies on Turkey. That is, the number of incoming links of ESI do not represent the real impact capacity of it within Turkey. On the other hand, as having similar organization type with ESI, FES has a separate website for its Turkish office and that website has 40 incoming links. Moreover, data about incoming links of IPC and BAUSAM cannot be reached because of their websites were constructed as sub-domains of the main domains of the universities which they are affiliated with. Therefore, totally 12 think tanks' data were evaluated for grading think tanks with a standardized score. Standard scores of think tanks are given in table 21 below.

**Table 21: Aggregate Scores of Think Tanks in terms of Incoming Links Which Their Websites Have**

<b>ORGANIZATION</b>	<b>AGGREGATE SCORE (Out of 10)</b>
TESEV	4,771
EDAM	2,047
ALT	1,208
USTAD	0,184
TEPAV	8,457
TESAM	0,225
SETA	5,795
IPC	-
SAM	3,726
ESI	8,477
ERI	1,412
FES	0,819
BAUSAM	-
GPOT	0,634
<b>Mean</b>	<b>3,146</b>
<b>Median</b>	1,729
<b>Minimum</b>	0,184
<b>Maximum</b>	8,477

Turkey has been listed in GGTTT indexes as a country from "Middle East and North Africa (MENA)" with other 20 countries. There are totally 507 think tanks which were evaluated as think tanks from MENA countries and 103 of them indexed in the list "Top Think Tanks in the MENA". For that reason, the standard scores of 12 think tanks, which are given in table 21, are calculated through an independent variable which was selected as the mean value of incoming links that think tanks listed in GGTTT's "Top Think Tanks in the MENA" list as the index which most

think tanks from Turkey were ranked in. Therefore, the mean value of incoming links of 92 of 103 think tanks in the list were manually calculated through Alexa.com. As a result, the mean value was calculated as 488.33. Then the aggregate scores of 12 think tanks were calculated by taking the independent value of 488,33 as 10. Therefore, when their scores are analyzed, it can be seen that the mean value of 12 think tanks scores is 3,146 out of 10 in terms of incoming links. This means that think tanks in Turkey have a popularity among other websites in the ratio of 31.46% when they compared with all think tanks in the MENA countries. As a result of incoming link analysis, relative impact capacity of think tanks in Turkey is inferred as 3.146/10.

#### **3.3.3.4. Media Outreach Analysis**

Media citations have long been used as an indicator of effectiveness. In fact, media citations have been used as an important criterion to measure the impact of think tanks (Posen, 2002; Trimpath, 2005; Clark and Roodman, 2013: 7). Scholars have tried to measure media citations from different resources. For example, Posen (2002) scanned important newspapers in the US for measuring media citation of think tanks. Moreover, some scholars scanned media various channels like radio and TV broadcasts, online newspapers, magazines, and so through. Clark and Roodman (2013) scanned two search engines for counting media citations of think tanks which are Nexis and Google News. In this study, by referencing Clark and Roodman (2013), media mentions were tried to be measured by using Google News. They also used Nexis as a search engine for counting media mentions but it is not a convenient tool for Turkish websites. On the other hand, Google News is free and provides a wide range of languages.

Using Google News, think tanks searched and scanned in two languages of Turkish and English for a period of 1 year (from May 20, 2018 to May 20, 2019). All possible common variations of names of think tanks in both English and Turkish languages were searched on Google News in order to find all news about them. Then, all of found news were manually checked whether they are related with the related the think tank or not. However, the results still cannot be handled as

absolutely accurate, they need to be handled as approximate results. Thus, the results of media outreach analysis of think tanks will show their relative impact capacity in terms of their media citations. The numbers of media citations, which were found from Google News between May 20, 2018 and May 20, 2019, are shown in table 22 below as row statistical data.

**Table 22: Numbers of Media Citations of Think Tanks**

<b>ORGANIZATION</b>	<b>NUMBER OF NEWS THAT MENTION</b>
TESEV	109
EDAM	59
ALT	19
USTAD	9
TEPAV	84
TESAM	13
SETA	121
IPC	80
SAM	19
ESI	69
ERI	101
FES	41
BAUSAM	1
GPOT	4
<b>Mean</b>	52.07
<b>Median</b>	50
<b>Minimum</b>	1
<b>Maximum</b>	121

As can be seen from table 22, all of 14 think tanks have been mentioned in the news within the last 1 year. Some of them were mentioned only a few times while some of them mentioned more than 100 times. However, it should be stated that the mean value media citations of all think tanks, which is 52.07, is not a sufficient value for them in enhancing their impact capacity via media channels. When these statistics were compared with the statistics of media citations of think tanks in the list of top think tanks in the MENA of GGTTT which are Turkish think tanks included, it is seen that these number are not in a satisfying level. Therefore, standardized scores of think tanks in Turkey in terms of their media citations were calculated through an independent variable which was fixed to 10. This independent value was selected as the media citations of “Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Middle East Center”<sup>125</sup> which was ranked at 13<sup>th</sup> place as the first think tank

<sup>125</sup> See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Middle East Center (Lebanon) from: <https://carnegie-mec.org/?lang=en> (10.05.2019)

from MENA countries in the GGTTT's list of "Best in Media". Standard scores of 14 think tanks which were calculated through the value of independent variable of 236 are shown in table 23 below.

**Table 23: Aggregate Scores of Think Tanks in terms of Media Citations**

ORGANIZATION	AGGREGATE SCORE (Out of 10)
TESEV	4,618
EDAM	2,5
ALT	0,805
USTAD	0,351
TEPAV	3,559
TESAM	0,55
SETA	5,127
IPC	3,389
SAM	0,805
ESI	2,923
ERI	4,279
FES	1,737
BAUSAM	0,042
GPoT	0,169
<b>Mean</b>	<b>2,206</b>
<b>Median</b>	<b>2,118</b>
<b>Minimum</b>	<b>0,042</b>
<b>Maximum</b>	<b>5,127</b>

Aggregate scores of 14 think tanks in terms of their media outreach are shown in table 23. It can be observed from the table that average score of all 14 think tanks is 2,206 out of 10. While 6 of the 14 think tanks have scores which are lower than 1, only 1 of them has a score that is more than 5. It should be stated that the mean value of 2,206 is not a sufficient score for think tanks in order for enhancing their impact capacity via media citations. They need to establish more interactions with media channels both in online and in traditional means. For instance, they should invite media organizations to all of their activities.

### 3.3.3.5. Activity Analysis

Think tanks need to be active in order to be effective within their study field. Think tanks are especially expected to be effective in decision making processes. As mentioned before in this study, think tanks can reach the decision makers directly by presenting the studies they have prepared or they can expect to be involved in decision making processes by measuring the people's response via presenting their studies to public first. In addition to presenting their studies, they can organize

activities like seminars, panels, symposiums, and other meetings in order to create a platform in which public issues are discussed. Their main aim in organizing these events is discussing the current applications, possible future applications, problems, and possible solutions for policy issues. Therefore, organizing events is an important function for think tanks in order for reaching their goals. Moreover, they can also organize courses, summer schools, and similar educational activities. By providing these types of activities especially to youth, they aim to reach more people and enhance their popularity and recognition among public. Finally, they can conduct projects, organize academic events, and design workshops to create an environment to develop more applicable solutions.

Activities are the ways that think tanks publicize, commercialize and introduce themselves, their studies, and their ideas to both decision makers and public. As mentioned before, Allosio et al. (2013) support that the number of events organized shows the ability of think tanks to present their ideas to the audience they are trying to reach and Alcazar et al. (2012) support that number of events organized show the level visibility and activity of think tanks. For this reason, the variety of activities and events which a think tank organizes show its endeavors to be included in the policy processes. Therefore, activities of 14 think tanks in the sample of this study were analyzed as a significant indicator of relative impact capacity of them. The number and content of their activities were scanned from different resources such as their official websites, social media accounts, and annual reports for a period of 1 year from May 20, 2018 until May 20, 2019. As a result of the research carried out 14 think tanks, statistical data given in table 24 were obtained.

**Table 24: Number of Activities of Think Tanks**

<b>ORGANIZATION</b>	<b>ACTIVITIES ORGANIZED</b>
TESEV	27
EDAM	2
ALT	49
USTAD	1
TEPAV	39
TESAM	24
SETA	106
IPC	58
SAM	32
ESI	1
ERI	26
FES	2

<b>BAUSAM</b>	0
<b>GPOT</b>	0
<b>Mean</b>	26,14
<b>Median</b>	25
<b>Minimum</b>	0
<b>Maximum</b>	106

Numbers of activities organized by think tanks which are given in table 24 were limited to data collected manually from Internet sources only. That is, if think tanks carried out activities without sharing on their websites and other online accounts, those activities were not taken into consideration in this study as a limitation of the study. However, it is thought that almost all activities organized in today's world have been shared on the Internet. Therefore, as can be seen from the table, 12 of 14 think tanks were found active in a sense. When they were analyzed one by one, it should be stated that many of them actually found inactive in Turkey. While GPoT and BAUSAM do not have any events in the last one year, also EDAM and USTAD are seen as almost inactive. In addition, it is seen from the table that ESI and FES have not carried out activities in Turkey like as in other countries where they have offices, they can also be described as almost inactive in terms of organizing events. Therefore, depending on the mean value, number of activities of these mentioned 6 think tanks are far below from the average.

Other think tanks in the sample organized sufficient numbers of activities within the last one year. TESAM, ERI and TESEV organized almost the same number of activities with each other and with the average number of activities. However, most of the activities of TESAM are academic courses on law and economy, and apart from these courses, they organized 1 academic congress, 1 symposium, and 1 international meeting. Moreover, TESEV generally organized its activities within some projects. They have conducted EU projects and development agency projects. Then, when ERI's activities and events were analyzed, it was seen that they have focused their field of study in their activities. They have followed important developments in educational policies issued in the country and organized events on those policies. Also, ERI has conducted projects and organized courses and conferences on education policies. The number of activities of ERI can be increased in following year due to new educational reforms in the country but it should also be

stated that its endeavors in participating area of education in Turkey are comparably sufficient.

As a government affiliated organization, SAM has organized many formal events especially with foreign government representatives and organizations. They also have organized four different course programs as summer and winter schools and international law summer and winter schools. Their most outstanding activities are their special events of “SAM Talks” which they host important people in the country such as politicians, academicians, and so through for discussing important policy issues mostly on international relations. TEPAV’s activities have generally been organized within projects. However, they also organized 2 course programs and 27 meetings such as panels, seminars, symposiums, and so through. It can be said that they also focused on their field of study because most of their activities were based on economics.

It is observed from official accounts and website of the ALT that it has organized 46 events in the last one year. Their activities were generally operated within the context of their programs of “Liberty Academy”. They have also organized “Liberal Thought Congress” every year. Therefore, they focused on their political movement when organizing activities. When activities of IPC were analyzed in terms of their characteristics, it can be said that IPC has three types of activities which are conferences, workshops, and round table meetings. They have organized all of these activities for discussing policy issues both in domestic and foreign affairs. They have also conducted multidimensional projects in cooperation with foreign think tanks. Finally, as the most active think tank within the sample, SETA has really organized many events and activities which were mainly based on recent political issues. While they have 6 offices in Ankara, İstanbul, Cairo, Washington DC, Brussels, and Berlin; their capacity to operate is also better than other think tanks. They organized course programs on policy issues of Turkey in both their Ankara and İstanbul offices, and a one-month educational study visit program in their Washington DC office. Apart from their course programs, they have also organized panels, seminars, and conferences almost two times a week on policy issues related nearly all areas of politics, economics, security, and so through.

For evaluating think tanks in terms of their activities, after collecting the data about the number of activities they organized in the last one year, an independent variable tried to be selected from successful think tanks from all over the world. However, it was observed that the average number of activities organized by think tanks indexed in GGTTT's list of "top think tanks in MENA" in a year was found around 100 and the average number of activities of think tanks indexed in the list of "top think tanks worldwide" in a year was found around 100, too<sup>126</sup>. Therefore, it was determined that the number of activities of SETA can be selected as the independent value which was fixed to 10 for standardizing scores of think tanks shown in table 25 below.

**Table 25: Aggregate Scores of Think Tanks in terms of the Number of Activities They Organized**

<b>ORGANIZATION</b>	<b>AGGREGATE SCORE (Out of 10)</b>
TESEV	2,547
EDAM	0,188
ALT	4,622
USTAD	0,094
TEPAV	3,679
TESAM	2,264
SETA	10
IPC	5,471
SAM	3,018
ESI	0,094
ERI	2,452
FES	0,188
BAUSAM	0
GPOT	0
<b>Mean</b>	<u>2,472</u>
<b>Median</b>	2,363
<b>Minimum</b>	0
<b>Maximum</b>	10

Aggregate scores given in table 25 were calculated by dividing their number of activities organized in the last one year into the fixed independent variable of 106. As a result of this calculation, not surprisingly, the aggregate score of SETA was found as 10. Then, the mean value of all 14 think tanks' activities was found as 2,472 out of 10. It means that their impact capacity which they gain via their activities is approximately 2,5/10 in quantitative metrics. The negative point in this analysis is that there are 2 think tanks which do not have any activities and 4 others which have

<sup>126</sup> Official websites and social media accounts of all of the mentioned think tanks were scanned manually for counting the number of activities they organized.

scores which are lower than 1/10. In conclusion, although SETA has a full capacity of impacting in terms of its activities according to the results of this study with its almost 1 activity per 3 days, the average score of all 14 think tanks is not in a sufficient point. Think tanks in Turkey should increase the number of activities and events in order to enhance their impact capacity by popularizing, commercializing and publicizing their ideas, advices and solutions via their activities.

### 3.3.3.6. Publication Analysis

Publications are one of the most important outputs of think tanks according to many scholars mentioned before (Stone, 2005; McGann, 2007; Alcazar et al., 2012; Allosio et al., 2013). Allosio et al. (2013) support that publications of think tanks show their productivity and academic sufficiency. Therefore, publications of 14 think tanks were analyzed in this study in order to measure their productivity, activity, and capacity. Think tanks need to publish studies in order for publicizing their ideas and advices to both public and policy makers. Number and content of their publications show their endeavors for impacting policy process. Thus, number of publications are accepted as a significant indicator of their relative impact capacity. Moreover, as mentioned before, publications were used as one of the measures of influence in many previously done studies on think tanks. Row statistical data about think tanks in terms of the number of publications they published in the last one year are given in table 26 below.

**Table 26: Number of Publications of Think Tanks**

<b>ORGANIZATION</b>	<b>PUBLICATIONS</b>
TESEV	16
EDAM	39
ALT	5
USTAD	0
TEPAV	65
TESAM	9
SETA	121
IPC	15
SAM	4
ESI	4
ERI	21
FES	4
BAUSAM	0
GPoT	14
<b>Mean</b>	<b>22,64</b>

<b>Median</b>	11,5
<b>Minimum</b>	0
<b>Maximum</b>	121

The numbers given in table 26 are limited to data collected manually from Internet sources only. However, it should be stated that a great majority of the publications mentioned in the table are online publications. Some of these online publications have printed versions but many of them do not have printed versions. There are some originally printed publications among them but almost all of them are books. The content and context of these publications are also necessary to be analyzed for observing whether they related with think tanks' study fields or not. But it should firstly be stated that 2 of 14 think tanks, USTAD and BAUSAM, do not have any publication in the last one year. It means that they have not been actively working for a year.

It can be seen from the table 26 that five think tanks in the sample do not have enough publications within the period of the last one year. SAM, ESI and FES have only 4 publications, while ALT has 5 and TESAM has 9. These number are exactly not sufficient for a think tank to publicize its ideas and advices. It should also be stated about the publications of these 5 think tanks that they are mostly academic journals which their content was prepared by other academicians. When analyzed one by one apart from academic journals; it was observed that SAM published 2 policy notes, TESAM published 4 analysis papers, ESI published 3 reports on Turkey, FES just published 1 report on Turkey, and ALT has not published any reports, policy notes or similar publications. However, ALT cannot be labeled as unsuccessful in terms of publication like other four. Since it has a publishing house<sup>127</sup> and an affiliated website that has established for non-academic blog (op-ed) articles<sup>128</sup> which have been written mostly by ALT researchers; ALT can be labeled as a productive think tank. ALT researchers have taken roles both in books published by the organization and blog articles published in the website but blog articles and edited books were not figured in when number of publications were counted. As a

<sup>127</sup> See publishing house from: <https://www.liberte.com.tr/> (05.05.2019)

<sup>128</sup> See mentioned website from: <http://www.hurfikirler.com/category/english/> (05.05.2019)

result, since ALT researchers have written more than 50 blog articles, ALT cannot be labeled as inactive in terms of productivity.

TESEV, IPC, ERI, and GPoT have comparatively more publications than mentioned 7 think tanks and numbers of publications which they published within the last one year are close to average number of publications. TESEV has only published reports within the context of its fields of study. IPC has published 8 reports, 3 policy notes, and 2 articles. ERI has published 3 reports, 13 policy notes, and 1 book apart from its op-ed articles. Finally, GPoT has only published 14 policy notes. All of them have different types of publications as parts of their websites, but they published only one or two types of publications within the last one year. As a result, they need to increase the number of publication they published. It can consequently be stated that they also cannot be labeled as successful in terms of productivity.

Think tanks which can be described as successful in terms of their publications are determined as EDAM, TEPAV, and SETA in this study. As a result of the research done through their websites and social media accounts, it was found that the number of publication they have published within the period of the last one year are far more than the average number of publications of all think tanks in the sample of the study. However, when their publications were analyzed deeply, it was seen that EDAM has only published 13 reports and 13 articles within its field of study. That is, EDAM do not seem as successful as other two. On the other hand, TEPAV has published 26 reports, 39 economic analysis reports in the last year apart from its 190 op-ed articles and SETA has published 20 reports, 46 analysis papers, 44 perspective analysis papers, 10 books, and 4 academic journals apart from its op-ed articles. Therefore, TEPAV and SETA have published a great number of publications within the last one year.

In order for evaluating think tanks in terms of their capacities of productivity and activity through the number of publication which they have published within one year, an independent variable was determined after a long process of research and analysis through think tanks from all around the world. As in the previous evaluation

on activities of think tanks, websites and social media accounts of think tanks in the list of “top think tanks in MENA” and the list of “top think tanks worldwide” were scanned manually. Yet, the average number of publications were found again around 100, that is to say that the average number is close to the number of publications of SETA. Therefore, the value of independent variable which was fixed to standardized value of 10 was determined as 100 and the standard score of SETA was fixed to 10. Depending on this calculation, row statistical data about the standard scores of think tanks are given in table 27 below.

**Table 27: Aggregate Scores of Think Tanks in terms of the Number of Publications They Published**

<b>ORGANIZATION</b>	<b>AGGREGATE SCORE (Out of 10)</b>
TESEV	1,6
EDAM	3,9
ALT	0,5
USTAD	0
TEPAV	6,5
TESAM	0,9
SETA	10
IPC	1,5
SAM	0,4
ESI	0,4
ERI	2,1
FES	0,4
BAUSAM	0
GPoT	1,4
<b>Mean</b>	<b>2,114</b>
<b>Median</b>	1,15
<b>Minimum</b>	0
<b>Maximum</b>	10

Table 27 shows the aggregate scores of 14 think tanks in terms of their productivity through the number of their publications. As evaluated above, their overall productivity is not at the desired level. The number of publications of most of 14 think tanks (11/14) are under the average number of publication of all of them. This result shows that think tanks need to produce more publication especially on current policy issues. Moreover, it is seen from the results that many of think tanks have not published a sufficient number of publication in a year, even some of them have not published any publications. The mean value of the scores of all think tanks was found as 2,114 out of 10. While it represents the level of productivity of think tanks in Turkey, it can be stated that they meet the expectation with the ratio of approximately 2,1%.

### 3.3.3.7. Ranking Analysis

Think tanks in Turkey were analyzed in terms of their rankings in GGTTT indexes. As mentioned before, the sample of this study was selected from think tanks which indexed in different lists of GGTTT from 2014 to 2018. The data on how many times think tanks are listed in the indexes were given in Table 4. It was seen in table 4 that they were totally mentioned 187 times in the indexes within 5 years. Nevertheless, total number of mentions do not give an opinion about the impact capacities of think tanks, so it was determined that a deep analysis should be done in terms of the ranks of think tanks in the indexes. As the most globally accepted study on think tank rankings, GGTTT indexes were analyzed deeply for doing this analysis. In order to evaluate think tanks through their rankings in the GGTTT, the last report of “2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report”<sup>129</sup> was selected as the evaluation criterion. According to table 4, within the last report which was published in 2019; EDAM was listed 8 times, TESEV was listed 7 times, ALT was listed 4 times, USTAD and TESAM were listed 3 times, TEPAV, IPC and SAM were listed 2 times, and SETA, FES, ERI, ESI, BAUSAM, and GPoT were listed 1 time.

In the “2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report”, totally 8248 think tanks from all around the world were analyzed under 50 different categories. These think tanks were categorized under 10 different regional categories. Among these 10 regions, Turkey was included in the region of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) with 20 other countries. Totally 507 think tanks including 48 think tanks from Turkey within MENA were evaluated in the report. Based on these statistics about the report, think tanks in Turkey were evaluated in this study in terms of their rankings in the report. Their overall scores in terms of ranking were calculated through equal distribution of how many categories they are listed in the report and in which place they were ranked in those categories. That is, when they were evaluated out of 10 points, these points equally distributed as 5 for how many times they are listed and 5 for in which place they were ranked.

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<sup>129</sup> See 2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report from: [https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=think\\_tanks](https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=think_tanks) (01.05.2019)

Since think tanks from Turkey were able to be listed only one of the 10 regional categories, the maximum number of categories was taken as 41. Then, the maximum value for the score of second evaluation was calculated through the total number of think tanks which were listed in the categories. For example, if a think tank was listed 2 times in the report, first part of its score will be calculated by multiplying  $2/41$  with 5 and it will have the score of 0,243 out of 5. At second, if supposed that its ranks in the lists were 20 out of 50 and 25 out of 100, the second part of its score will be calculated by summing  $50-20/50$  and  $100-25/100$  and multiplying the result with  $2/5$  and it will have the score of 3,375 out of 5. Finally, it will have the overall score of  $0,243 + 3.385 = 3,628$  out of 10.

As shown in Table 4 before, mostly listed think tank from Turkey within the report is EDAM. It was ranked under 8 different categories in the report. When checked deeply, it was seen that it was ranked as 17<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Think Tanks in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)” out of 507, as 20<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Defense and National Security Think Tanks” out of 111, as 42<sup>nd</sup> in the list “Top International Economic Policy Think Tanks” out of 87, as 110<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Foreign Policy and International Affairs Think Tanks” out of 155, as 99<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top International Development Policy Think Tanks” out of 132, as 61<sup>st</sup> in the list “Best Managed Think Tanks” out of 75, as 22<sup>nd</sup> in the list “Best Think Tank Conference” out of 65, and as 21<sup>st</sup> in the list of “Top Think Tanks with Annual Operating Budgets of Less Than \$5 Million USD” out of 48 think tanks. It is necessary to state that EDAM should be labeled as successful in terms of ranking analysis because it was listed under a comparatively sufficient number of categories and it was ranked under significant categories in terms of its area of research and special achievements. EDAM’s overall score on ranking analysis is shown in table 28 below.

**Table 28: EDAM's Evaluation Through Its Rankings in the GGTTT Indexes**

EDAM	How many categories it was ranked	In which rank it was listed								Aggregate Score
		Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	
Rank	8/41	17/507	20/111	42/87	110/155	99/132	61/75	22/65	21/48	-
Score	0,975	0,605	0,456	0,323	0,181	0,156	0,116	0,413	0,351	<b>3,576</b>

As the second mostly listed think tank from Turkey within the report, TESEV was ranked under 7 different categories in the report. When checked deeply, it was seen that it was ranked as 40<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Think Tanks Worldwide (Non-U.S.)” out of 145, as 79<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Think Tanks Worldwide (U.S. and non-U.S.)” out of 177, as 11<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Think Tanks in Middle East and North Africa (MENA)” out of 507, as 44<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Science and Technology Policy Think Tanks” out of 72, as 36<sup>th</sup> in the list “Think Tanks with the Best External Relations/Public Engagement Program” out of 78, as 41<sup>st</sup> in the list “Best Use of Media (Print or Electronic)” out of 64, and as 29<sup>th</sup> in the list “Think Tanks with the Most Significant Impact on Public Policy” out of 70 think tanks. Therefore, it should be stated that TESEV was listed in the report in a comparatively sufficient number of times. Also, it was seen that TESEV was ranked in the most important lists of the report which are the lists of “Top Think Tanks Worldwide”. TESEV’s overall score on ranking analysis is shown in table 29 below.

**Table 29: TESEV's Evaluation Through Its Rankings in the GGTTT Indexes**

TESEV	How many categories it was ranked	In which rank it was listed								Aggregate Score
		Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	
Rank	7/41	40/145	79/177	11/507	44/72	36/78	41/64	29/70	-	
Score	0,853	0,418	0,395	0,698	0,278	0,384	0,256	0,520	<b>3,820</b>	

ALT, as the third mostly listed think tank from Turkey, was ranked under 4 different categories in the report. When checked deeply, it was seen that it was ranked as 74<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Think Tanks Worldwide (Non-Us)” out of 145, as 90<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Think Tanks Worldwide (U.S. and non-U.S.)” out of 177, as 15<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Think Tanks in Middle East and North Africa (MENA)” out of 507, and as 27<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Domestic Economic Policy Think Tanks” out of 146 think tanks. It can be stated that ALT was ranked in the top lists like TESEV but it was not ranked under any special achievement rankings. It can be labeled as relatively successful in terms of ranking analysis. ALT’s overall score on ranking analysis is shown in table 30 below.

**Table 30: ALT’s Evaluation Through Its Rankings in the GGTTT Indexes**

ALT	How many categories it was ranked	In which rank it was listed				Aggregate Score
Rank	4/41	74/145	90/177	15/507	27/146	-
Score	0,487	0,612	0,614	1,113	1,008	<b>3,834</b>

USTAD was ranked under 3 different categories in the report. When checked deeply, it was seen that it was ranked as 79<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Defense and National Security Think Tanks” out of 111, as 36<sup>th</sup> in the list “Think Tank to Watch in 2019” out of 113, and as 136<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Foreign Policy and International Affairs Think Tanks” out of 155 think tanks. Therefore, as asserted in the report, it can be stated that USTAD seems like a promising think tank for future. However, based on the previous analysis, it can be stated that USTAD is not active enough for being a promising think tank. In addition, while it was not ranked under sufficient number of categories, it cannot be labeled neither successful nor unsuccessful in terms of ranking analysis. USTAD’s overall score on ranking analysis is shown in table 31 below.

**Table 31: USTAD's Evaluation Through Its Rankings in the GGTTT Indexes**

USTAD	How many categories it was ranked	In which rank it was listed			Aggregate Score
		Rank			
Rank	3/41	79/111	36/113	136/155	-
Score	0,365	0,480	1,035	0,204	<b>2,084</b>

TESAM was also ranked under 3 different categories in the report. When checked deeply, it was seen that it was ranked as 71<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Think Tanks in Middle East and North Africa (MENA)” out of 507, as 92<sup>nd</sup> in the list “Top Defense and National Security Think Tanks” out of 111, and as 113<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Foreign Policy and International Affairs Think Tanks” out of 155 think tanks. It can be seen that its results are not many different from USTAD’s results. It cannot also be labeled neither successful nor unsuccessful in terms of ranking analysis while it was not ranked under sufficient number of categories. However, it can easily be observed that its rankings are also not very high when compared other think tanks in the sample of this study. TESAM’s overall score on ranking analysis is shown in table 32 below.

**Table 32: TESAM's Evaluation Through Its Rankings in the GGTTT Indexes**

TESAM	How many categories it was ranked	In which rank it was listed			Aggregate Score
		Rank			
Rank	3/41	71/507	92/111	113/155	-
Score	0,365	1,433	0,285	0,451	<b>2,534</b>

TEPAV, IPC, and SAM were ranked under 2 different categories as stated before. When checked deeply, it was seen that TEPAV was ranked as 79<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Think Tanks in Middle East and North Africa (MENA)” out of 507 and as 50<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Foreign Policy and International Affairs Think Tanks” out of 155 think tanks; IPC was ranked as 90<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Think Tanks in Middle East and North Africa (MENA)” out of 507 and as 30<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Education Policy

Think Tanks” out of 65 think tanks; and SAM was ranked as 92<sup>nd</sup> in the list “Top Think Tanks in Middle East and North Africa (MENA)” out of 507 and as 53<sup>rd</sup> in the list “Best Government Affiliated Think Tanks” out of 74 think tanks. It can be seen that they all listed under the regional category of the MENA and under one more categories depending on their fields of studies. While they were not ranked under sufficient numbers of categories and ranked under categories which are related with their main field of study, they cannot also be labeled neither successful nor unsuccessful in terms of ranking analysis. Their overall scores in terms of ranking analysis are shown in table 33 below.

**Table 33: TEPAV, IPC and SAM’s Evaluations Through Their Rankings in the GGTTT Indexes**

	ALL	TEPAV		IPC		SAM	
	How many categories they were ranked	In which rank it was listed					
Rank	2/41	79/507	50/155	90/507	30/65	92/507	53/74
Score	0,243	1.910	1.383	1,856	1.326	1,804	0,709
Aggregate Score	-	<b>3,536</b>		<b>3,425</b>		<b>2,756</b>	

Finally, SETA, FES, ERI, ESI, BAUSAM, and GPoT were ranked only once in the report. SETA was ranked as 34<sup>th</sup> in the list “Best Think Tanks with a Political Party Affiliation” out of 39 think tanks, FES was ranked as 62<sup>nd</sup> in the list “Best Think Tank Conference” out of 65 think tanks, ERI was ranked as 47<sup>th</sup> in the list “Top Education Policy Think Tanks” out of 65 think tanks, ESI was ranked as 22<sup>nd</sup> in the list “Top Think Tanks in Middle East and North Africa (MENA)” out of 95, BAUSAM and GPoT were ranked consecutively as 62<sup>nd</sup> and 71<sup>st</sup> in the list “Best University Affiliated Think Tanks” out of 94 think tanks. According to these results, as a limitation of this study, their overall scores may be misleading because they were ranked only once in the report. They need to be raise their endeavors for being more active and effective in their fields of study. Therefore, they can be labeled as

relatively unsuccessful in terms of ranking analysis when compared with others. However, they may not have labeled as totally unsuccessful because they were listed for at least once, though. Their overall scores are shown in table 34 below.

**Table 34: SETA, FES, ERI, ESI, BAUSAM, and GpoT's Evaluations Through Their Rankings in the GGTTT Indexes**

	ALL	SETA	FES	ERI	ESI	BAUSAM	GPoT
	How many categories they were ranked	In which rank it was listed					
Rank	1/41	34/39	62/65	47/65	22/95	62/94	71/94
Score	0,121	0,641	0,230	1,384	3,542	1,702	1,223
Aggregate Score	-	<b>0,762</b>	<b>0,351</b>	<b>1,405</b>	<b>3,663</b>	<b>1,823</b>	<b>1,344</b>

As a result of the ranking analysis, when rankings were evaluated in general, it was seen that think tanks in Turkey ranked totally 42 times in 21 different lists in the report. In the lists “Top Think Tanks Worldwide (Non-Us)” and “Top Think Tanks Worldwide (U.S. and non-U.S.)”, there were 2 think tanks from Turkey as TESEV and ALT. In terms of regional rankings, total number of 7 think tanks from Turkey were ranked in the list “Top Think Tanks in Middle East and North Africa (MENA)”. Then, in terms of their areas of research, think tanks from Turkey were ranked under 7 different categories. Specifically, 5 think tanks from Turkey were ranked in the list “Top Foreign Policy and International Affairs Think Tanks”, 4 think tanks were ranked in the list “Top Defense and National Security Think Tanks”, 2 think tanks were listed in the list “Top Education Policy Think Tanks”, and 1 think tank was ranked in each of 3 lists “Top Domestic Economic Policy Think Tanks”, “Top International Economic Policy Think Tanks”, and “Top Science and Technology Policy Think Tanks”. Finally, in terms of special achievements, 8 think tanks from Turkey were listed under 9 different categories. In detail, in the lists of “Best Think Tank Conference” and “Best University Affiliated Think Tanks”, there

were 2 think tanks from Turkey; and in the lists of “Best Think Tanks with a Political Party Affiliation”, “Best Government Affiliated Think Tanks”, “Best Managed Think Tanks”, “Think Tank to Watch in 2019”, “Think Tanks with the Best External Relations/Public Engagement Program”, “Best Use of Media (Print or Electronic)”, “Think Tanks with the Most Significant Impact on Public Policy”, there was 1 think tank from Turkey.

To conclude the ranking analysis, aggregate scores of think tanks in terms of their ranks should be gathered within a body in order to see their average scores. The average score of all 14 think tanks represents their impact capacities within all of the categories of ranking. Hence, aggregate scores of 14 think tanks are shown in table 35 below.

**Table 35: Aggregate Scores of Think Tanks in terms of Ranking Analysis**

<b>ORGANIZATION</b>	<b>AGGREGATE SCORE (Out of 10)</b>
TESEV	3,820
EDAM	3,576
ALT	3,834
USTAD	2,084
TEPAV	3,536
TESAM	2,534
SETA	0,762
IPC	3,425
SAM	2,756
ESI	3,663
ERI	1,405
FES	0,351
BAUSAM	1,823
GPoT	1,344
<b>Mean</b>	<b>2,493</b>
<b>Median</b>	2,645
<b>Minimum</b>	0,351
<b>Maximum</b>	3,834

The mean value of aggregate scores 14 think tanks through ranking analysis was found as 2,493 out of 10 as shown in table 35. This value represents the impact capacity of think tanks in Turkey in terms of their ranks among think tanks all around the world. That is, impact capacity of think tanks in Turkey when compared to think tanks from all over the world is approximately 25%. As a consequence, think tanks in Turkey needs to be more active, exertive, and ambitious in order to be more

effective in their fields of study and to be ranked under more categories in the future ranking reports.

#### **3.3.3.8. Organizational Analysis**

As the last analysis of this study for evaluating impact capacities of think tanks, their organizational size and structure were analyzed. Data on their organizational structure, staff, budget, and expenses were tried to find from their websites, social media accounts, institutions which they are affiliated with, and annual reports, if any. Organization size has also been used as an indicator of think tanks' capacity, performance, and efficiency in various studies before (McGann, 2007; Clark and Roodman, 2013; Abelson, 2018). Since organizational size is an important indicator for organizational capacity and autonomy of think tanks (Fraussen and Halpin, 2017: 115), it has been a significant indicator for measuring the relative impacts of them on both public and policy process. Thus, organizational size was also used as an indicator of impact capacity of think tanks through both financial resources and human resources of them.

It is really difficult to reach financial information about think tanks in Turkey. Thus, this analysis became also an indicative study that measures transparency of think tanks. A great majority of think tanks operated in Turkey do not publish annual reports and do not share information about their budget and expenses. Only a few think tanks publish annual reports but they also do not share information about financial structures within their annual reports. On the other hand, most of think tanks list their staff on their websites. However, staff size is also difficult to be defined because many think tanks employ part-time researchers and interns. Yet, organizational size of think tanks in Turkey was handled through their financial capacity and staff size. When they do not share any information about their budgets and expenses within their official sources, their score in terms of organization size analysis was determined as 0 while this analysis has also the aim of measuring their transparency and accountability.

Think tanks in Turkey have been established mostly as foundations or associations as mentioned before. Since they have the status of associations or

foundations, they are mostly dependent on related laws. Therefore, they are obliged to share their financial information to the institutions they are affiliated with. However, Directorate of Association of Turkey and General Directorate of Foundations do not publicly share financial information of organizations one by one. Therefore, the data were tried to be collected from official online sources of think tanks. When there is no information found about a selected indicator, its score was given as zero because of the lack of transparency and accountability. In this context, organizational size analysis was also used as a measurement opportunity of transparency and accountability of think tanks. In table 36 below, row statistical data about the selected indicators of organization size of think tanks were given.

**Table 36: Findings about Organizational Sizes of Think Tanks**

ORGANIZATION	Budget (TL)	Expenses (TL)	Number of Directors	Number of Staff	Number of Partners
TESEV <sup>130</sup>	1,2 M	1,3 M	12	10	36
EDAM <sup>131</sup>	2,4 M	2,2 M	16	7	-
ALT	-	-	10	-	-
USTAD	-	-	-	-	-
TEPAV <sup>132</sup>	2,5 M	3,8 M	7	53	4
TESAM	-	-	5	6	1
SETA	-	-	7	78	-
IPC	-	-	5	27	16
SAM	-	-	2	14	16
ESI	-	-	2	14	26
ERI <sup>133</sup>	1,6 M	1,4 M	5	23	29
FES	-	-	2	8	32
BAUSAM	-	-	-	-	-
GPOT	-	-	10	11	19
<b>Mean</b>	1,9 M	2,2 M	5,92	22,81	19,89
<b>Median</b>	2 M	1,8 M	6	14	19
<b>Minimum</b>	1,2 M	1,3 M	2	6	1
<b>Maximum</b>	2,5 M	3,8 M	16	78	32

<sup>130</sup> All the data about the budget and expenses of TESEV belongs to the year 2018 and they were collected directly from its lastly published annual report from: [http://tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/TESEV\\_2018\\_FAAL%C4%B0YET\\_21-2.pdf](http://tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/TESEV_2018_FAAL%C4%B0YET_21-2.pdf) (09.05.2019)

<sup>131</sup> The data about the budget and expenses of EDAM have not publicly shared since 2014. Presented values belong to its budget of 2014 which were gathered from [http://edam.org.tr/document/EDAM\\_PPT\\_Final.pdf](http://edam.org.tr/document/EDAM_PPT_Final.pdf) (01.05.2019).

<sup>132</sup> The data about the budget and expenses of TEPAV have not publicly shared since 2012. Presented values belong to its budget of 2012 which were gathered from [https://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/mce/genel/yillik\\_raporlar/31.12.2012\\_tarihli\\_karsilastirmali\\_bilancio.pdf](https://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/mce/genel/yillik_raporlar/31.12.2012_tarihli_karsilastirmali_bilancio.pdf) (09.05.2019).

<sup>133</sup> The data about the budget and expenses of ERI have publicly shared in 2018 for the last time. Presented values belong to its budget of 2017 which were gathered directly from its lastly published annual report from: <https://indd.adobe.com/view/9eb9c600-6a30-452e-8428-b1da425d412d> (11.05.2019)

The data presented in table 36 represents the sizes of think tanks in terms of their organizational features. Their operational budgets and expenses show their financial capacity, the numbers of their staff and directors show their human resources capacity, and the number of their partners show their relational capacity. The column of number of directors represents the number of people which think tanks have in their board of directors, number of staff represents the number of researchers, experts, and administrative personnel which think tanks employed, and number of partners represents the number of organizations that think tanks have established partnerships. In this context, all of online sources of 14 think tanks, which were reachable, were scanned for listing these indicators. While a lack of care on requirements of transparency and accountability was detected on the basis of the lack of information about budgets and expenses of think tanks, all of their online sources were scanned in a ten-year period. That is, while the data about the numbers of directors, staff and partners of think tanks belong to the up-to-date information which were shared within their official websites, up-to-date information about their budgets and expenses were not found except one of them. Therefore, in order to make a relatively comprehensive analysis and finding approximate average values, data about budgets and expenses of EDAM, TESEV, and ERI were collected from their sources which are not up-to date.

When table 36 was analyzed by taking the mentioned limitations into consideration, it can easily be seen that think tanks in Turkey generally do not have big operational capacities. In GGTTT index reports, think tanks which were operated under 5 million \$ budget were accepted as low-budget think tanks. Therefore, we can easily label think tanks in the sample of this study as low-budget think tanks. By considering this situation, the value of 5 million Turkish Liras was selected as the standardized scale for evaluating think tanks in terms of their budgets and expenses. On the other hand, the data about human resources and relational resources of think tanks were easy to reach. Except only a few of them, almost all of numbers were found throughout the research. Then, for evaluating the numbers of think tanks' directors, staff, and partners; standardized values were determined with a research done on think tanks which were ranked under the GGTTT's list of "Best Managed

Think Tanks” in 2018. As a result of the research done through websites of 50 different think tanks ranked in the list their average values in terms of numbers of directors, staff, and partners were found. Finally, number of directors of think tanks was scored out of 10 through the standardized scale of 14,11 which was the average number of people which have best managed think tanks have their boards of directors. Number of staff was scored out of 10 through the standardized scale of 61,23 which was the average value of staff best managed think tanks have. Then, number of partners was scored out of 10 through the standardized scale of 47,14 which was the average value of partners which best managed think tanks have. Depending on these evaluations, aggregate scores of 14 think tanks are presented in table 37 below.

**Table 37. Aggregate Scores of Think Tanks in terms of Organizational Size**

ORGANIZATION	AGGREGATE SCORE					
	Budget	Expenses	Number of Directors	Number of Staff	Number of Partners	TOTAL (out of 10)
TESEV	2,4	2,6	8,504	1,633	7,636	4,555
EDAM	4,8	4,4	10	1,143	0	4,068
ALT	0	0	7,087	0	0	1,418
USTAD	0	0	0	0	0	0
TEPAV	5	7,6	4,961	8,655	0,848	5,412
TESAM	0	0	3,543	0,979	0,212	0,947
SETA	0	0	4,961	10	0	2,992
IPC	0	0	3,543	4,409	3,392	2,269
SAM	0	0	1,417	2,286	3,392	1,419
ESI	0	0	1,417	2,286	5,515	1,843
ERI	3,2	2,8	3,543	3,756	6,151	3,890
FES	0	0	1,417	1,306	6,788	1,902
BAUSAM	0	0	0	0	0	0
GPOT	0	0	7,087	1,796	4,031	2,582
<b>Mean</b>	1,1	1,242	4,295	3,825	4,319	<b>2,956</b>
<b>Median</b>	0	0	3,543	1,714	2,120	2,085
<b>Minimum</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Maximum</b>	5	7,6	10	10	7,636	5,412

Aggregate scores of 14 think tanks given in Table 37 show that their organizational size has a capacity of approximately %29,56. It means that think tanks in Turkey have the potential to impact 3 out 10 of their target group. While organizations which have not publicly shared the investigated data were scored with the value of zero, it can be seen from the table that think tanks in Turkey do not have sufficient capacities in terms of their budgets and expenses. Moreover, as a required

body, almost all of think tanks have board of directors. Number of people which think tanks have within their boards of directors seems as sufficient in general. However, since two of them have not presented their boards of directors and a few of them have only one or two directors, aggregate score of them in terms of the number of people which they have in their boards was found as 4,295 out of 10. Then, it can be seen from the table that almost all of think tanks presented how many staff they hire on their official sources. Again, it was observed that most of them have sufficient number of staff but the aggregate score of them was found as 3,825 out of 10 since three of them have not presented their staffs within their websites of other official sources and some of them just hire a few people. Finally, number of partners which think tanks have is another important indicator of organizational capacity since they need to have partners in order to operate in an expanded field. It can be seen from the table that think tanks in Turkey have established partnerships in general. It was observed that only two of them do not have partners or they have not shared the data about their partnerships on their online sources. Aggregate score of think tanks in terms of their relational capacity calculated through the number of partners they have was found as 4,319 out of 10. It should be said that think tanks in Turkey have a good capacity in terms of getting into partnerships.

## Conclusion and Suggestions

Think tanks were tried to be measured in this thesis till this part of the study in terms of their different characteristics, activities, and endeavors. Now, under this title, results of all of the evaluations are united. Impact capacity of think tanks was tried to be measured by evaluating their popularities on social media, their networks on social media, their relative web traffic ranks, contents of their websites, number of other websites which link to them, number of mentions of them in global news sources, number of activities they organized, number of publications they published, their ranks in GGTTT index reports, and their organizational size. These ten different indicators were determined after a long-term research on previously done studies about the topic. Moreover, think tank culture of the country was considered as a selection criterion for the indicators. As a result, all of the indicators were evaluated through different types of sources, different means of research, and different standardized scales which were fixed to maximum score of 10. Finally, in this part of the study, an aggregate score of all think tanks in terms of their impact capacity was achieved by summing all of previously obtained scores. By this way, the final score of think tanks can be seen out of the value of 100 and the ratio of their capacity to impact can easily be seen, too. In this context, aggregate scores of think tanks in terms of all of the handled indicators of impact capacity were gathered into one simple table in order to present them together. Therefore, as the final point of this research, aggregate scores of think tanks in terms of their impact capacity are given in table 38 below.

**Table 38: Aggregate Scores of Think Tanks in terms of Their “Impact Capacity”**

Indicators	METRICS	OUT OF	AGGREGATE SCORE
Social Media	Facebook likes and Twitter followers	10	2,8165
	Social Network Analysis	10	1,2369
Website	Relative global web traffic ranks	10	1,8700
	Website content analysis	10	5,1500
Incoming Links	Number of sites that link to the website	10	3,1460
Media Outreach	Mentions in global news sources	10	2,2060
Activity	Numbers of conferences, meetings, seminars, courses etc. organized	10	2,4720

<b>Publications</b>	Numbers of reports, papers, books published	10	2,1140
<b>Ranking</b>	Rankings in GGTTT Indexes	10	2,4930
<b>Organization Size</b>	Budget, Staff, Memberships & Partnerships	10	2,9560
<b>TOTAL</b>	Sum of All Scores	100	<b>26,4604</b>

Results presented in table 38 are accepted as the harvest of this thesis. As can be seen from the table, think tanks in Turkey were evaluated through 10 different indicators in terms of their impact capacities. Firstly, they were evaluated through their attractiveness on significant social media channels of Facebook and Twitter. In terms of their social media popularity, their total score was found as 2,8165 out of 10. That is to say that they have the capacity to attract approximately 3 out 10 people or organization from their target group via their social media accounts on Facebook and Twitter. Secondly, they were evaluated through their networks on social media. Their total score was found as 1,2369 out 10 in terms of social networks which they have taken part. It means they have the capacity to contact approximately 1 out of 10 actors within their social networks. Thirdly, they were evaluated through their website traffic. In terms of their relative global web traffic ranks, their score was found as 1,87 out of 10. That is, they have the capacity to attract approximately 2 out of 10 people via their websites. Fourthly, the method of website content analysis was specifically designed to evaluate websites of think tanks in terms of their attractiveness, efficiency, practicality, and quality. Their total score was found as 5,15 out of 10 as a result of website content analysis. This score was interpreted that think tanks have the capacity to attract approximately 5 out of 10 people who have entered their websites.

As the fifth evaluation, an incoming link analysis was applied through the number of sites that link to websites of think tanks. By this evaluation, it was tried to find to what extent think tanks are popular on the web. The total score of them in terms of their popularity on the web was found as 3,146 out of 10. It means that think tanks have been mentioned by approximately 3 out of 10 people who have visited their websites. Sixthly, think tanks operated in Turkey were evaluated through the number news which they were mentioned in a year. Their total score in terms of their

popularity in media sources was found as 2,206 out of 10 which shows their capacity to be mentioned in media. That is, approximately 2 out of 10 outputs of think tanks have been mentioned in news sources in a year. Seventhly, they were evaluated through the number of activities and events they have organized in a year. The total score of them in terms of their activity level was found as 2,472 out of 10. It means that they have the capacity to reach approximately  $\frac{1}{4}$  of their target groups via activities and events.

As the eighth evaluation, think tanks in Turkey were through the number of publications they have published in a year. The score of them in terms of their productivity was found as 2,114 out of 10. It means that think tanks have the capacity to reach approximately  $\frac{1}{5}$  of their target groups via their publications. Ninthly, they were evaluated through their ranks in the globally accepted think tanks ranking of GGTTT indexes. Their total score in terms of their success and global recognition was found as 2,493 out of 10. That is, approximately  $\frac{1}{4}$  of think tanks operated in Turkey have the capacity to be recognized by global assessment bodies. Finally, think tanks in Turkey were evaluated through the size of their organizations. The total score of them in terms of their operational capacities was found as 2,956 out of 10. It means that they have operated with a capacity of approximately 3 out of 10 of what it should be.

Consequently, the final score of think tanks in Turkey in terms of their impact capacity was found as 26,46 out of 100 by summing all of the scores of 10 evaluations. This score was found for representing the ratio of the impact capacity of think tanks in Turkey. Finding this final score was the gradual aim of this thesis. It should be stated that this final score is believed to reflect the reality. Then, it is thought that it means that think tanks operated in Turkey have the capacity to impact approximately  $\frac{1}{4}$  of their target groups.

Turkey, as a country in which the think tanks culture still is in the process of development, needs the impact of think tanks in both public and politics for enhancing its democratic capacity. In recent times, much more think tanks operate in Turkey when compared to the past. Moreover, the number of think tanks operated in

Turkey has been increasing day by day. However, unfortunately, it is not possible to say the same thing for their impact capacities. When they compared with their counterparts in developed countries, even with their counterparts operated in MENA countries, it should be stated that the impact areas of think tanks in Turkey do not reach the desired level. Today, it should also be noted that in Turkey, the appropriate conditions for establishments and operations of think tanks are met at a much better level than in the past. Whether they are organized under the status of non-governmental organization or as an affiliated body, there is an environment in Turkey that they can easily carry out their activities. However, think tanks operated in Turkey also face several problems.

The problem of financial resource seems as the most important problem faced by think tanks in Turkey. Financial problems have a negative effect on both their operational capacities and organizational autonomies. Moreover, depending mostly on financial problems, think tanks in Turkey have problems in terms of finding sufficient human resources and meeting the human resources required. In this context, it can be noted that the most important problem of think tanks in Turkey faced can be generally defined as the problem of resource. Secondly, think tanks have problems in drawing an independent and neutral image in front of the public. Most of think tanks operating in Turkey are identified by the public as being close to some political views. This situation shows that think tanks are not successful in drawing a neutral image in the eyes of the public. In addition to these problems, even if think tanks do everything to achieve their goals in the context of their power, political culture in Turkey is not flexible enough for these organizations to be involved in policy making processes. That is, they need to establish direct relations with policy makers in order to have a little opportunity for being included in policy processes.

Think tanks have the aim to impact society and politics due to their inner nature as mentioned before in this study. Thus, being effective is one of the most important aims of think tanks. In return, democratic countries need think tanks within their social and political systems since they play a mediating role between the society and politics. In this study, impact capacity of think tanks in Turkey was tried to be

measured for revealing to what extent think tanks in Turkey played their primarily defined roles. It is known that the higher the capacity of the think tanks to impact the social and political spheres, the higher the democratic nature of the country. Because think tanks provide advices to governments as in the forms of information, ideas, or researches and they facilitate the decision making by acting as an equilibrium mechanism in the context of the evaluation of government practices. In this sense, impacts of think tanks play an important role in making the social and political orders more democratic and in building a bridge between society and the government.

In this study, by considering the recent conditions, the impact capacity of think tanks was measured in the light of the data mostly obtained through online researches. By believing that the results of this measurement reflects the facts, an evaluation has been made through these results. As can be seen from the quantitatively obtained data, which is 26,46 out of 100, the impact capacity of think tanks operating in Turkey is not in a sufficient level. In order to increase this capacity, some solution suggestions were prepared based on the conditions which have been observed throughout the research.

Firstly, think tanks in Turkey have to be much more active in social media. Their levels of activity and number of inputs are much more below the required value on both Twitter and Facebook and also on other social media platforms which were not included in this study. First of all, they should include themselves in this field. They should increase the number and frequency of sharing and interactions in order to be more visible. Then, they must share information about their studies, activities, events, and organizations on social media in order to increase their attractiveness. While doing this, they also need to establish relations and interactions with outstanding people such experts of a field that they have studying. Therefore, it is claimed in this study that they can improve their impact capacities by being a more active user on social media.

Secondly, since websites are the faces of organizations in the web environment, think tanks have to keep their websites up-to-date for impacting the

visitors. Moreover, they need to develop the designs of their websites that anyone who visits the website should be able to easily find what they are looking for. As an official source of them, their websites should have visual quality, attractiveness, practicality, and efficiency.

Thirdly, the organizations that have frequently been mentioned in the media and in the news have a more respectable position in the eyes of the public and the policy makers. For this reason, think tanks should invite the members of the media and the people who are known to the public to the activities they organize in order to be named in media more.

Fourthly, think tanks should organize activities and events to exchange ideas in the fields where they are studying and to ensure that society and policy makers are aware of their studies. They should also announce their activities in their websites and social media accounts for increasing the interest on their events. They should also share the photos taken during the event and the topics mentioned in the event after the events they organize.

Fifthly, as the most important outputs of think tanks, publications should be delivered to the target groups. Think tanks should publicly share their publications on their websites and they should make announcements on social media when they publish a new work.

Sixthly, they must offer internships, part-time jobs or course programs such as summer schools or certificate programs to undergraduate and graduate students studying in related fields. By doing this, they can attract young researchers and raise the human resources they are in need by themselves.

Seventhly, since they have faced with problems of financial resources, they should conduct project based studies. In project based studies, they will have the opportunities to employ project-based researchers, to take grants of financial supports from both private entrepreneurships and the state, to establish continuing partnerships with the other partners of the project, and to develop its staff's project

skills. Thus, they should follow the project calls related with their fields of study from both domestic and foreign institutions.

Eighthly, think tanks should send representatives to the law commissions in the parliament. Whether or not they have a record in reports, it is important to think tanks have a representation in policy making commissions in terms of their visibility. While conducting lobby activities is one of the easiest ways of getting involved in the political field, think tanks should at least be spectators in the commissions of TGNA.

Finally, think tanks in Turkey have been observed as not transparent and accountable bodies throughout the research of this study. One must directly communicate with them in order to learn many of information about them. However, think tanks, as organizations who seek the ways to develop their impacts, should be more transparent and accountable than other non-governmental organizations. Therefore, they should enhance their accountability and transparency in order for having more impact capacities.

All in all, it is found in the study that think tanks operating in Turkey have still in a process of development and expansion. It is not a surprising result due to Turkey is a country that its think tank culture has still been in the process of evolution. However, it is also revealed that strengthening the think tank culture in the country and increasing the impact capacity of think tanks in the societal and political areas of the country is possible within the environment of the country. If the indicators of impact capacity of think tanks used in this thesis taken into account, there is no significant obstacle for the realization of the achievement.

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