The Idea of Self as the Source of Moral Action and the Problem of Geist in German Idealism
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2023
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Beytulhikme Felsefe Cevresi
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Özet
In German Idealism and in other philosophers of ethics of values who follow this school of thought, the interpretation of the mind according to the human is mainly established on the ethical views of Kant on the main characteristics describing the human namely mind, self-awareness, and freedom of choice. The subject in the moral philosophy of Kant is kept responsible for both the structure of the reality belonging to the essence and the moral code as the self-ruling rational decision-maker. From this perspective, the philosophical rationalism of the modern period which started with Kant bases the morality of the human upon his/her capacity of mind and subjectivity. In this period while the quest for finding a rational basis for morality was prioritized, the subject was taken as the source of values (values of morality) in the name of morality. But we should remark that while the moral conception based on the human mind in parallel with Kant's idealist thought indicates a novelty, it has been criticized by subsequent German idealists (Fichte, Hegel) and the founder philosophers of ethics of values (Scheler, N.Hartmann). This paper aims to discuss the interpretation of ethics according to the human by making a critical evaluation of how much the self can be acceptable in establishing the basis of morality from the perspectives of the ethics of values and German Idealism.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Ethics, Idealism, Geist, Freedom, Self-Awareness
Kaynak
Beytulhikme-An International Journal Of Philosophy
WoS Q Değeri
Scopus Q Değeri
Cilt
13
Sayı
1
