Materyalizm, Fenomenal Özne ve Ontolojik Statüsü
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Tarih
2014
Yazarlar
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Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Özet
Pek çok açıdan felsefi bir muamma olan fenomenal bilinç, çağdaş zihin felsefesinin en merkezi sorunlarından birisidir. Analitik felsefe geleneğinde fenomenal bilincin doğasını kavrama çabasına, daha çok materyalist/fizikalist yaklaşım egemen olagelmiştir. Bu makalenin birincil iddiası, niteliksellik karakterinin yanında fenomenal bilinci fenomenal bilinç yapan diğer asli unsurun fenomenal özne olduğu savıdır. Makale buradan yola çıkarak fenomenal öznenin metafizik kökeni ve buna karşı materyalizmin alabileceği olası pozisyonlarla ilgili şu iki savı ortaya koyma ve gerekçelendirme amacını taşımaktadır: (1) Fenomenal özne içi boş olmayan tözel bir ontolojik statüye saliptir ve (2) bu tözel ontolojik yapı materyalizmi kaçınılmaz bir açmazla yüz yüze bırakmaktadır. Fenomenal öznenin tözel yapısı, ya zihnin diğer ögelerinde teşebbüs edildiği gibi materyalist/fizikalist bir dille açıklanmalı, ya da söz konusu içi boş olmayan tözel ontolojik yapı inkâr edilmelidir. Her iki durumda da materyalist görüş başarısız olmaya daha yakındır.
Phenomenal consciousness, which is philosophical mystery in a lot of ways, is one of the most central problems of contemporary philosophy of mind. In the analytic tradition, the materialist/physicalist approach has been the dominant approach to understanding the nature of phenomenal consciousness. The first thesis of this paper is that phenomenal subject, along with the qualitative character, is the other essential element of phenomenal consciousness. Based on this thesis, the paper aims to put forward and justify the following two claims about the ontological status of phenomenal subjects and the possible reactions of the materialist/physicalist thesis to this status: (1) Phenomenal subjects are not ontologically vacant; rather they substantially exist, and (2)this ontological substantiality causes materialism to face an inevitable dilemma: The substantial existence of phenomenal subjects either must be explained away in materialist/physicalist terms as it is attempted to in the case of other mental items, or the substantial existence in question must be denied. On both options, materialist view is closer to fail than to succeed.
Phenomenal consciousness, which is philosophical mystery in a lot of ways, is one of the most central problems of contemporary philosophy of mind. In the analytic tradition, the materialist/physicalist approach has been the dominant approach to understanding the nature of phenomenal consciousness. The first thesis of this paper is that phenomenal subject, along with the qualitative character, is the other essential element of phenomenal consciousness. Based on this thesis, the paper aims to put forward and justify the following two claims about the ontological status of phenomenal subjects and the possible reactions of the materialist/physicalist thesis to this status: (1) Phenomenal subjects are not ontologically vacant; rather they substantially exist, and (2)this ontological substantiality causes materialism to face an inevitable dilemma: The substantial existence of phenomenal subjects either must be explained away in materialist/physicalist terms as it is attempted to in the case of other mental items, or the substantial existence in question must be denied. On both options, materialist view is closer to fail than to succeed.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Fenomenal özne, Kendilik bilinci, Fenomenal bilinç, Materyalizm, Fizikalizm, Phenomenal subject, Self-consciousness, Phenomenal consciousness, Materialism, Physicalism
Kaynak
Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy
WoS Q Değeri
Scopus Q Değeri
Cilt
4
Sayı
2
Künye
Arıcı, M. (2014). Materyalizm, fenomenal özne ve ontolojik statüsü. Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy, 4, 2, 1-13.
